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Abstract:
Even long before the recent financial and economic crisis  of 2007/2008 economists
were more than aware of the insufficiencies and a lack of realism in macroeconomic
modelling and model calibration methods, including those with DSGE methods and
models, and spelled the need for further enhancements. The issues this research started
addressing even before the 2008 crisis imposed demand for improvements, was use of
single, fully informed rational agents in those modes. Consequently, the first part of this
research project was aiming to improve the DSGE econometric methods by introducing
novel solution for DSGE models with imperfect, partial information about the current
values of deep variables and shocks, and apply this solution to imperfectly informed
multiple  agents with their  different,  inner-rationality models.  Along these lines,  this
research also shows that DSGE models can be extended and suited to both, fitting and
estimation of long-term yield curve, and to estimating with rich data sets by extending
further its inner-mechanism. 
In the aftermath of  the  2008 crises,  which struck at  the  beginning of  this  research
project, and the subsequent, extensive criticism of DSGE models, this research analyses
the alternative causes of the crisis. It then focuses on identifying its possible causes,
such as yet unknown debt accelerator mechanism and the related, probable model miss-
specifications, rational inattention, and as well, a role of institutional policies in both
the development of the crisis and its resolution. 
And finally,  in a response to many of the critiques of the,  usually monetary policy
oriented DSGE models, this research project provides another set of novel extensions to
such models, aiming to bring more of Keynesian characteristics suited to a more active,
endogenous fiscal policy deemed needed in the aftermath of the crisis. This project,
henceforth,  extends the NK-Neo-Classical synthesis  monetary DSGE models with a
novel,  endogenous,  counter-cyclical  fiscal  policy  rule  driven  by  news  and
unemployment changes. It then also shows overall benefits of the resulting, mutually
active, monetary-fiscal policy for both capital utilisation and overall economic stability.
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Part 1: Introduction and Background Literature
1. Introduction 
1.1 A Summary and Motivation
This research is a bit a-typical as it evolved over relatively long time, spanning different
periods  spent  in  different  European  countries  while  I  was  working  on  different
professional projects, most of which turned to be related or relevant to this research.
However, probably most importantly, it also spanned the world's biggest financial and
economic crisis since the 1929 crash and the Great Depression. On the other hand, due
to its relatively longer running, some of the results were published in earlier or mid-
stages of its full development, whilst some of the work was paralleled by others and
published by them before the whole dissertation completed, making thus, some of the
work nearly  or completely obsolete.
The  recent  financial  and  economic  crisis  of  2007  spelled  the  need  for  a  different
approach than the policies usually implemented in times of recession, and. contrary to
expected policy recommendations by IMF for a tightening approach, the fiscal stimulus
oriented New-Keynesian (NK) policies of government intervention have prevailed in
the most of the countries that have been substantially affected by the crisis, notably the
US and the Euro-zone.
Also, as the first part of this research project was conducted within a joint EU FP7
funded MonFisPol project5, aiming to show the benefits of new econometric methods
for optimising monetary and fiscal policies and models, so the rest of this research was
also motivated by similar aims to address improvements of tools and methods for both
policies and their possible combined work.
5 Seventh Framework Programme for Research (FP7) of the European Commission's Socio-economic
Sciences and Humanities (SSH) Program from October 2008 to September 2011 under grant agreement
SSH-CT-2009-225149.
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This research will therefore analyse the role of governments in both the development of
the crisis and its resolution, and provides some justification for such NK approach. In
chapter 6, I will also analyse in more detail the development of the 2008 crisis and how
much that crisis resulted from the bursting of the housing debt bubble, itself inspired by
the  low inflation  and  interest  rates  that  the  governments  were  expecting  and  their
central banks maintained as their targets.
1.1.1 Methodological focus: DSGE Models and Dynare Software 
The main focus at the very start has been on issues of imperfect (partial) information in
Dynamic  Stochastic  General  Equilibrium (DSGE)  models  used  by  macroeconomic
policy-making and planning bodies  such as  central  banks and on their  relation and
dependence on various aspects and the role of information and decision-making. 
Note:  However, in some instances this project will be using different methodologies
such as VAR or Granger cause analysis when appropriate, as additional tool, or as an
alternative  tool  when  DSGE could  not  be  used  such  as  the  analysis  of  the  Great
Recession and the crises of 2007/2008.
1.1.1.1 Dynare Software for Estimation of DSGE models
The main computational and methodological toolkit used for this research will be the
Dynare  software  package6,  a  widely  used  application  for  solving,  estimating  and
simulating DSGE models, developed initially in Matlab language by Prof. M Juillard
and maintained by a team of developers at CEPREMAP (Adjemian et al. (2011)).
Dynare solves  and provides IRF simulation of the models up to  third order  Taylor
approximation  around  the  steady  state  using  perturbation  mechanism  (Collard  and
6 Dynare is free to use but it requires either Matlab, which is not free software kit, or the free Octave 
package which emulates Matlab environment and programming language syntax but which is rather 
slower than Matlab (http://www.gnu.org/software/octave/download.html).
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Juillard (2001b), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002/2004)). It however estimates only
first  order  Taylor  approximation  (i.e.  linearised)  model’s  parameters’  posterior
distributions using Bayesian inference methods by applying observable data on Kalman
Filters.
Dynare also provides for Bayesian VAR estimation along the lines of Sims and Zha
(1996) and the DSGE-VAR combination for model miss-specification assessment and
comparison based on del Negro Scharfheide (2004) and del Negro Scharfheide Smets
Wouters  (2007).  After  its  enhancements  for  Pearlman  solver  and  PCL86  partial
information, it was used in this research reports as well as in Levine, Pearlman Perendia
and Yang (2009-2012).
However,  most  of  the  classic  DSGE  models  make  a  computationally  simpler
assumptions of asymmetric full information about shocks is available to the economic
agents but not to the institutional (e.g. central bank's) econometricians. According to the
critics, such models henceforth fail to take into account that only partial information is
available to all the economic agents.
In  line  with  the  main  aims  of  this  research  to  address  the  most  frequently  voiced
criticisms of both classical and NK DSGE models and tools (see Chapter 3) aiming for
more  realistic  assumption  of  absence  of  full  information  and  that  of  individual
economic agent's limited ability to process it in fully rational manner in time-restricted
decision  making  process,  one  of  the  sections  (Chapter  5),  provides  and  test
improvements to DSGE modelling based on in making corrections to the two critical
assumptions: 
1. that all agents have full information available at their disposal (and, though less
explicitly mentioned, are also assumed to be able to process it also correctly and
on time), and,
2. that  one  single  representative  aggregate  agent  may  then  form fully  rational
expectations and be sufficient to represent aggregate economic behaviour.
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As a part of this research, an extension was built into Dynare package to deal with
partial information assumption based solution, this extension itself being based on the
solution to the partial information model developed by Pearlman, Currie and Levine
(1986),
Some of the results of this part of research were published over successive years and
finally in Levine, Pearlman, Perendia and Yang (2012) and the research had a few other
dimensions brought in.   
1.1.2 Rationality and Information
Firstly,  aiming, to address issues of rational agent,  it  was deemed important first to
address in depth nature of rationality and rational thinking with limited information
(Ch. 4), either by its in-availability (bounded rationality), or by rational optimisation of
its  use  (rational  inattention),  dwell  into  the  realms  of  animal  spirits  and
neuropsychology driving our decisions through developments of neuroeconomics. One
of additional aims and results of this apparent diversion was to identify if there are
reasons for the duality of two models of rationality in economics, that of the so-called
rational choice theory and the other, the rational expectations (RE) decision. 
Broadly  speaking,  one  can  argue  that  most  but  the  simplest  information  based
“rational”  decisions  are  boundedly  rational,  performed  within  limitations  of  the
bandwidth  of  information  medium  and  system  at  disposal  and  based  on  rational
inattention aiming to abstract from excessive information deemed to be unimportant or
less important and make assumptions deemed acceptable aiming to reduce size and
complexity of the problem and focus on the problem in an isolation, a methodological
approach comparable to “bracketing-out” in phenomenological epistemology.  
Some of the work developed on the subject of rationalisation over the period of this
research (and earlier) has been in meantime superseded by the publication of Daniel
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Kahneman's  comprehensive  volume of  work,  Kahneman (2011)7,  that  is  integrating
much of his and late Amos Tversky's work with the many other earlier works, some of
which this research was also drawing upon. However, this research then follows-up to
complement  and  fill  gaps  in  other  theoretical  literature  and  to  point-out  the  likely
reasons for which our own empirical analysis results (i.e. Levine et al. 2008-2012) can
be correct  when showing  that  only a  minority  of  economic  agents  act  on  basis  of
rational expectations using full available information at the time. 
Similar  limitations,  however,  in  turn  then  apply to  most  if  not  all  of  the  scientific
research and academic projects (including this one) as well as various mathematical or
other  conceptual  models,  thus,  economic  models  too.  So  we  have  an  inherent
methodological limitations in that scientists and policy makers can only make rational
inattention simplified models of the reality or the other agents' behavioural decisions
based on rational  inattentions  simplified  reality and,  in  turn,  that  of  policy makers'
decisions anticipations.  
1.1.3 Great crises as tests for economic models
Following  the  2007-08  crisis,  however,  an  additional  aim  became  to  identify  any
important issues or omissions with macroeconomic modelling that either lead to the
crisis or prevented its early diagnosis and to draw a path towards improving economic
(and mainly the DSGE) models and policy decision making so that such omissions, if
made, can be avoided in future. 
By  analysing  the  complexity  of  preceding  events  that  led  to  both  of  the  two  big
economic  crises,  the  1930s  Great  Depression  and the  recent  2007 crisis  (so  called
“Great Recession”), one may conclude that the causes and errors leading to them may
have been far more complex than mainstream publications are indicating. This may
have been in part due to the individual academic researchers affinity to simplify and
abstract the related complexity (i.e. perform bracketing mentioned earlier) and focus
7 “Thinking Fast and Slow”
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attention on just a single, or a limited, related group of factors, such as, e.g. roles of the
financial intermediaries. 
The focus however still remained the role of information, its completeness based and
economic agents' ability to fully comprehend and rationally process the information and
form rational expectations, the limitations imposed by bounded rationality and rational
inattention and their role in the evolution of the crisis.
Though apparently departing from the main theme of DSGE modelling, this research
then shows a bigger picture of more systemic and complex issues that were contributing
to  the  overall  process  leading  to  the  2007/8  crisis  rather  than  just  limitations  of
insufficiencies  of  DSGE  tools  (that  many  authors  tend  to  blame)  or  any  other
econometric  tools  or  methods.  It,  instead shows likely importance of  the effects  of
liquidity shortage shock and its causes, but also, the effects of an under analysed debt-
accelerator  and  of  the  possibly  inadequate  information  (or  omitted  data)  for  the
evolution of the crisis. Any miss-specification or rational inattention and the resulting
data  omission,  if  occurred,  would,  however  not  be  specific  to  any  one  particular
methodological approach such as DSGE.
1.1.4 Information and unemployment fiscal rule
The  research  completes  with  additional  extension  to  DSGE  models  which  show
importance of effects of expectation changing information shocks (news) and of the
active,  endogenised role  of  government  fiscal  spending,  e.g.  in  pursuing post-crisis
recovery, and in particular, when reacting to  deviations in employment and to those
shocks to the expectations. 
The  innovations  tested  there  and  the  results  are  in  line  with  the  recent  return  to
Keynesian theory of fiscal spending as important contributor in the post-crisis recovery
after years of its theoretical neglect. 
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 We there show that government has a role in protecting viability of its economy and
the welfare of its citizens and that its actions and intention to play such protective,
countercyclical role need also to be publicly visible so to achieve even greater effect
even if not fulfilled to its full planned or publicised financial commitment level. 
This may appear to be in contrast with the more traditional monetarist approach which
is at least neglecting if not side-lining the role of public spending in recovery, whilst
favouring the role monetary policy lead by an independent central  bank as the sole
mechanism of macro-economic control. 
Whilst the fiscal and the monetary policies can be decided and effected independently
by the government and the independent central bank, it is still left to be affirmed if it is
more optimal to pursue a closer cooperation between the two bodies and coordination
of  their  policies  in  general,  and  especially  when  monetary  policies  are  almost
ineffective in a near-zero interest rate regimes like the one following the 2007-08 crisis.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
Part1, Introduction, Chapter 1:  
Dissertation  begins  with  an  Introduction  and  overview  of  contemporary  dynamic
macroeconomic analysis and forecasting models used by macro-economic research and
policy institutions8.
Chapter 2:  
A discussion of some perceived insufficiencies in modern economic modelling theory
and practice that may have contributed to the development of the later crisis, namely,
assumptions  of  fully  rational  and  fully  informed  agents,  bounded  rationality  and
rational inattention . 
 
8 Competitive market micro-economic games of asymmetric information are not in the focus or scope of 
this research. 
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Part 2, Chapter 4: 
Introduction and an overview of literature on rationality and rationalisation 
Chapter  5:   Economic  model  based on alternatives  such as Partial  Information (PI)
DSGE methodology but  using  heterogeneous  and adaptive-rational  agents  acting  in
models of imperfect information conditions are considered as important improvements
over those insufficiencies.
It  also includes  further  experimental  analysis  into PI DSGE and simulations  of  the
effects  of  partial  imperfect  information  and  reactions  of  agents  according  to  what
information they have at their disposal.
Part 3, Chapter 6: 
An in-depth analysis is then made to some of the perceived main causes of both the
1930s  Great  Depression  and,  more  so,  the  recent  2007  crisis  (so  called  “Great
Recession”).  Along the lines of this research, an additional factor contributing to the
crisis is analysed and identified to potentially be a form of informational insufficiency,
i.e., a potential form of a rational inattention. As it appears, important information on
private debt, both the household and the SME business one, may have been omitted or
under-estimated on the part of major institutions such as central banks. 
Part 4, Chapter 7:
Effects of news and the resulting change in economic agent's expectations based on
such information are analysed in context of advanced DSGE models together and in
conjunction  with a  role  government  countercyclical  spending,  the  actual  or  at  least
publicised intention for spending, in maintaining strength of its economy midst pending
unemployment.
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1.3. A Short Summary of Main Contributions to the Literature:
1. Estimating  effects  of  Partial  Information:  The  first  innovation  is  the
implementation  of  a  solution  to  the  RE  DSGE  partial  information  model
developed  by  Pearlman,  Currie  and  Levine  (1986).  It  provided  background
work for further research and publications with Professors J. Pearlman and P.
Levine on correcting DSGE estimations and shock simulation effects since the
more traditional DSGE models and methods make inappropriate information
assumptions and assume that economic agents have full access to all relevant,
needed measurements of economic shocks. Within this research: 
a) a reduced Smets and Wouters (2003) PCL86 extended DSGE models was
also  extended  with  an  alternative  Kalman  Filter  solution  for  a  Bernanke  &
Boivin (2003) and Boivin and Giannoni (2005) M-FAVAR like extension for
augmenting the estimation using a much larger number of additional data series
(factors). 
b) This solution was then extended with multiple Taylor rule type equations for
fitting the US treasuries based yield curve spanning several decades (Perendia
2008). 
c)  After  extending  Dynare  DSGE  package  with  a  PCL partial  information
solution  making  it  available  for  its  broad  use,  we  showed  that  a  partial
information heterogeneous DSGE model indicates a balanced presence of both
adaptive  and  rational  expectations  among  the  broad  spectrum  of  economic
agents  (see  Levine  et  al.  2008-2012),  with  some  causes  and  implications
extensively elaborated within this research (Ch. 4).
d)  In  addition,  simulations  were  run  to  show how different  assumptions  of
partial information series observations affect the IRF responses of a standard
DSGE model. 
2. Recessionary debt accelerator:  Another, more theoretical contribution of this
research is to show that one, so-far less known and researched, but potentially
crucial factors may have led to both, the recent 2007-08 financial and economic
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crisis known as the Great Recession and potentially the Great Depression. This
research   introduces  a  new  type  of  a  recessionary  accelerator,  namely  the
recessionary debt accelerator, a down-spiral recessionary trend resulting from
a  consumption  restriction  midst  liquidity  shortage  among  the  small  private
borrowers, this shortage, in turn, resulting from an contractionary interest rate
shock, as the major factor in development of both, 1930s and 2007 economic
crises (see more below in chapter (6) and Perendia 2015)
3. Unemployment  driven fiscal  rule  and effect  of  news:  The third  group of
innovations of this research are the extension of the standard DSGE model (e.g.
Smets  and  Wouters  (2007)  in  our  case)  that  include  two  factors  affecting
consumption  and growth.  It  introduces  firstly news shock with  the resulting
change in consumers'  expectations,  and, secondly,  a simple,  J.B. Taylor like,
novel endogenised fiscal policy rule based on both unemployment and the news
related rational expectation changes.  We then also find that such rule driven
fiscal intervention can act as countercyclical accelerator on consumption. The
research results assert importance of counter-cyclical fiscal intervention strategy
for facilitating an economy out of a recession or a crisis  (see chapter 7 and
Perendia and Tsoukis (2012)). It then discusses and argues for balanced, active
fiscal and monetary policies in times of recessions.
The work concludes that extending classic DSGE models estimations and simulations
with partial information, heterogeneous agents and, even more so, the news, the fiscal
and yield curve rules provide much better parameter estimates and data fit  than the
classical,  full  information  and  reduced  data  models.  It  then  provides  some
recommendations for future enhancements.
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2 Review of Literature on Macroeconomic Modelling
2.1 An Overview of Macroeconomic modelling and Forecasting 
Modelling and forecasting dynamic phenomena goes hand in hand. Forecasting usually
refers to predicting an out-of-sample behaviour of phenomena in some future time. This
is, at least, in relation to the data sample one has at hand, though, this may be done for
past periods to perform model calibration within a sample (e.g. performing forecasts in
2011 for 2008 using data 1980-2007). 
One cannot forecast and get good results without decent models. Models'  quality is
usually also tested for their ability to explain a posteriori or predict a priori behaviour of
some multi-dimensional spatio-temporal dynamic phenomena. 
 
The older static IS-LM models of macroeconomic equilibrium are usually evaluated
from a system of equations of exogenous and endogenous variables. Such models were
suitable for analysis of factor-change dynamics and their effects on the stability of long-
run equilibria. However, the older models were not taking an explicit consideration of
the (time) length of the impacts and the related time dimension dynamics.
Many authors have emphasised insufficiencies of the old “static” IS-LM models  of
macroeconomic  equilibrium.  The  very  nature  of  the  free  market  as  a  competitive
economic  process  is  to  be  time-dynamic  and  static  equilibrium is  never  observed.
Virtually  all  of  economic  measurements  are  performed  in  a  state  of  dis-equilibria
(Ferguson and Lim (1998), pp 1).
Diebold  (1998)  explains  why  large-scale  Keynesian  structural  macro-models  and
forecasting based on them faded away for various reasons. These included their lack of
suitability for conditional forecasting and the Lucas critique that showed that the rules
of decisions they are based on would change with policy change. Such models were
replaced by Lucas-Sargent like models, which incorporate rational expectations into the
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structural model, and they are still in use. 
This  development  was  complemented  by the  rise  of  discrete  time-series,  VAR and
unstructured models. However, policy change analysis requires that structural models,
dynamics and dis-equilibria can be modelled as either continuous processes using a set
of structural differential equations (Ferguson and Lim 1998), or, more frequently, as
discrete-time series using difference equations or other techniques outlined below. 
2.1.1 The Main Categories of Macro-economic Models
The literature (e.g. Diebold 1998, Dieppe and Henry 2004 and Issing 2004) outlines
five main categories of dynamic macroeconomic modelling strategies, most of which
are used at central banks (such as ECB, or BoE) which may employ a suite of different
models to improve reliability of their forecasts.
.1 Non-structural  statistical  time-series  without  theoretical  underpinning.  The
demise of Keynesian models was followed by re-development of non-structural
and  unconditional  forecasting  models  based  on  auto-regression,  difference
equations and stochastic behaviour and used for impulse propagation analysis.
Those models include Cointegration-ECM models. 
.2 Vector  Auto-Regressive (VAR) -  all-endogenous variable models suitable  for
empirical  analysis  of  time-series  characteristics  of  economic  factors,  their
statistical interactions and their shock-impact responses without the restrictions
and constraining assumptions imposed by a domineering theoretical framework.
They however, are not without their limitations, such as sensitivity to structural
change, unsuitability to account for Rational Expectations and hence the Lucas
Critique. 
a.  The  Structural  VARs  overcome  some  of  the  limitations  (and  reduce  the
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flexibility of VARs) by allowing some structural model rules or pre-calibrated
parameters to be imposed. This then allows for a better economic interpretation
of  disturbances.  However,  aiming  to  overcome  some  of  the  remaining
limitations of VAR and Structural VAR (SVAR) models, such as the relatively
small number of variables and time-series they can handle9 and suffering from
the so-called “price puzzle” forecast anomaly10, Bernanke et al. (2004/2005) are
building upon their earlier work (Bernanke and Boivin 2003) and that of Stock
and  Watson  (1999)11 and  suggest  a  new,  Factor-Augmented  VAR  (FAVAR)
method. This method combines the SVAR analysis with recent developments in
non-parametric,  principal component analysis  based dimension reduction and
Bayesian likelihood factor estimation for large data sets by nesting “smaller”
VAR estimates. 
b.  Bayesian  VAR  estimation  overcomes  many  hurdles  of  the  model  size
restrictions on both the recursive (standard) and the restricted (structural) VAR
models  (see  Waggoner and Zha (2000), Waggoner and Zha (2003)) and for
regime switching models with Rational Expectations (Sims, Waggoner and Zha.
(2008)).
.3 Small size, several reduced-form equations used for analysis of specific changes
in monetary policy and expectations (e.g. Phillips Curve and optimising models
used at BoE).
.4 Medium sized,  complete  structural,  “inter-temporal”  macro-models  based  on
systems of simultaneous equations derived from a comprehensive theoretical
framework and used for policy change simulation and forecasting. They tie the
9 inclusion of additional variables in standard VARs is severely limited by degrees-of-freedom problems.
10 the  conventional  finding  in  the  VAR literature  is  that  a  contractionary monetary policy shock  is
followed by an  increase in the price level, rather than a decrease as standard economic theory would
predict.
11 For example, Bernanke & Boivin (2003) build upon the work of Stock&Watson (1999) who conclude
that “the best-performing forecast for inflation is an augmented Phillips curve forecast that uses a new
composite index of aggregate activity comprised of the 168 individual activity measures”. 
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theoretical  framework  with  a  close  fit  to  data  and  may contain  lagged  and
forward-looking data and expectations to reflect the dynamics of the system. 
.5 Dynamic  Computational  General  Equilibrium  (CGE)  models:  Initially
developed in 1970s,  the early,  calibrated and static  CGE models were often
micro-founded,  structured,  budget  constraints,  real  economy  and  long  run
equilibrium oriented  models  calculated  around steady state  though  there  are
extensions for non-steady state calculations. Dixon and Rimmer (1998) develop
a  widely  used  MONASH dynamic  CGE model.  Burniaux  and  Truong  (2002)
extend the  global trade analysis project (GTAP)12, with energy sector extended
(GTAP-E) CGE model and Beckman, Hertel and Tyner (2011) delivers a GTAP-
E  CGE  models  with  improved  validation  techniques  applied  to  petroleum
energy sector. For more recent examples and developments in use of forward
looking  dynamic  CGE  (DCGE)  models  for  optimising  corporate  income
taxation in US, see Bhattarai, Haughton, Head and Tuerck (2017).
.6 Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE or SDGE) models developed
initially in 1980s are similarly based on comprehensive theoretical foundations
and are used to associate shocks and the economic system’s responses based on
forward-looking expectations.  Initially used for analysis of RBCs they are now
used  for  short  to  mid-term  forecasting  and  optimisation  of  the  economic
responses.  Many of the recent  DSGE studies  show significant superiority of
DSGE  over  unrestricted  VAR,  Structural  S-VAR  and  the  Bayesian  B-VAR
forecasts, especially for longer term forecasts (e.g. Smets and Wouters (2002)
and (2003), (denoted SW02 and SW03 henceforth), and Boivin and Giannoni
(2005)).13 
.7 Heterogeneous agents simulation models such as EURACE (der Hoog, et al.,
2009) use Monte-Carlo simulation of economic agents segmented by various
12 See https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/models/current.asp
13 This work concentrates on such models and explains them in more detail.
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criteria such as geographic position and economic role whilst integrating a large
variety  of  traditional  micro  and  macro-  economic  models.  It  is  however
important  to  note that  the recent  developments  in  areas  of both,  DSGE and
DCGE  models  makes  those  models  suitable  for  large  a  very  scale
disaggregation and simulation of a large number of heterogeneous agents: firms
and households, in both, closed and multi-country open economy models (see
for  example  a  15,000  variable  DCGE  model  of  Fair  Taxation  in  a  highly
disaggregated model of US economy in Bhattarai, Haughton and Tuerck 2016).
2.1.2 Combined method and Large Models: 
Choosing the “right” model  for an economic institution or a  central  bank has been
proven to be a futile task. Contrary to the opinion of Diebold (1998) of the “death” of
large macro models and suggestion that the recent tendency is to keep those models
relatively small, the recent practice at the central banks is to maintain complex models
(e.g. ECB's Area-wide model - AWM and BoE's Macro-economic Model), or, as US
Fed,  a  rather  large,  data-rich  models.  To  reduce  the  effect  of  errors  and  improve
estimation precision, the major national and international institutions (e.g. US Fed14)
maintain thousands of time-series15 and use a combination of aggregate indices, several
macro-models and VAR techniques. They then create their estimates usually on a basis
of informal or a formal heuristics and the weighted average of the results obtained from
different models16. 
2.1.3 Forecasting of the rational agents’ behaviour 
14 US Federal Reserve Board model
15 Observers  of  Alan  Greenspan’s  chairmanship,  for  example,  have  emphasized  his  own meticulous
attention to a wide variety of data series (Bernanke & Boivin 2003).
16 “Small models have many advantages, including most obviously simplicity and tractability. However,
we believe that this divide between central bank practice and most formal models of the Fed reflects at
least in part researchers’ difficulties in capturing the central banker’s approach to data analysis, which
typically mixes the use of large macro-econometric models, smaller statistical models (such as VARs),
heuristic  and  judgemental  analyses,  and  informal  weighting  of  information  from  diverse  sources .”
(Bernanke & Boivin 2003)
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As mentioned  earlier,  the  forecasting  of  rational  agents’ behaviour  has  become  an
integral part of forecasts of economic dynamics as a step in resolving the Lucas critique
issues of dynamic changes in the market agents’ forward-looking rational expectations.
To address this issue, in addition to large models, the some institution or a modeller,
(e.g.  Bank of England,  BoE,  suite  of models) uses also special,  small  “optimising”
models  to  estimate  the  optimal  behaviour  of  microstructure  agents  (see  below).
Optimising  models  are  used  to  estimate  and  project  the  rational,  dynamic,  inter-
temporal optimal behaviour of microeconomic actors such as individuals and private
organisations. They estimate the agents’ optimal reactions to macro-economic shocks.
They assume that  the  actors  are  identical  and that  they rationally and dynamically
optimise  their  behaviour.  The  starting  point  is  the  standard  inter-temporal  budget
constrained  agent  behaviour  optimisation  equations  (the  equations  below  and  their
explanations in the Notes are reproduced from BoE documentation):
                             (2.1.3.1 - Note17)
These assumptions imply the inter-temporal Euler equation:
                                                                              (2.1.3.2) 
For example, when applied to an agent’s investment behaviour using the Consumption
CAPM (C-CAPM) it yields an equation characterising the agents’ optimal decision to
invest:
                          (2.1.3.3 - Note18)
Taking into account estimates of the time-series properties of consumption using the
Auto-regressive moving averages (ARMA) technique, the real yield on an n-maturity
17 where U is utility, ß is the pure subjective rate of time preference, r is the real interest rate,
and  A,  YL  and  C  denote the real  level  of  financial  wealth,  labour income and consumption
respectively. Et (.) denotes the expectation formed at time t.
18 where Pit is the real price of the asset at time t, and Dt+1 is the dividend payment on the asset
between t and t + 1.
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bond is then given by19:
               (2.1.3.4 Notes 20 and21)
The  FRB/US  (US  Fed)  uses  two  alternative  representations  of  the  economy:  an
auxiliary VAR and the main model.  They utilise weighted levels of past  and future
fundamentals to derive the value of decision variable. The FRB also uses “Polynomial
adjustment costs” (PAC) to model the high order of auto-regression22 within the Euler
error correction model (ECM) of agents’ decision-making (Muehlen 2001). 
2.1.4. Trap of the self-confirming equilibria
Sargent (1999) and, Sargent,  Williams and Zhao (2006) point to occurrences of so-
called  trap  of  self-confirming  equilibria.  These  equilibria  are  imperfect  rational
expectation  equilibria  that  are  usually  sub-optimal  and  highly  inflationary-biased.
Sargent and his co-authors claim that they result from partial irrationality on the side of
governments (or monetary policy authorities) that create incorrect beliefs of the Phillips
curve. These self-confirming equilibria are based on inferior, least square regression
methods that tend to predict incorrectly high inflation and employment policies based
upon the incorrect estimations of the PC direction. They then argue for the importance
and future use of (expectation augmented) Phillips curves in macro-economic models
based on RE.
19 Although this by-proxy estimate of real interest rates is useful for analysis of an agent’s behaviour, the
long-term  real  interest  rates,  both  in  the  MM  and  internationally,  are  assumed  to  be  set  on  the
international financial markets independently of domestic developments. However, this assumption is not
reflected in the empirical findings which show that the UK’s real interest rate has for several years been
lower than expected by the international financial markets.
20 where Et and Vart denote the conditional expectation and variance respectively, and is the
coefficient of relative risk-aversion.
21 In another example, the models were used to estimate the behaviour of a firm and assess the impact of
the Working Time Directive. It derived that the WTD would reduce labour demand through an increase
of effective wage for an increased relative level of training and recruitment costs.
22 This  high order  of  autoregression in  behaviour of  consumers  may be due to  spending habits,  i.e.
“lifestyle rigidity”
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2.2. Introduction to modern monetary policy and inflation targeting23
Following  the  oil  crisis  and  the  resulting  economic  recession  of  1970s  that  was
accompanied  with  the  high  inflation,  interest  rates  and  market  volatility,  monetary
policy changes were introduced in the early 1980s. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000)
(CGG 2000) show that, since the early 1980s, the new Volcker-Greenspan interest rate
rules have had a stabilising effect on the US economy. They show that pre-1979 and
pre-Volcker policies were often rather “accommodating” of inflation and, for example,
let short-term real interest rates drop in times of high inflation or left space for bursts of
both output and inflation due to self-fulfilling expectations. Those “sunspot” market
volatilities were based on the agents’ correct expectations that the Fed will maintain
low short-term interest rates which will drive demand, prices, and, thus, inflation to rise
even further24. 
This  perception  led  to  the  seminal  Lucas  critique  ((Lucas  (1972),  (1973),  (1975),
(1976)), and work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) which identified an inflationary bias
when  the  monetary  policy  authority  follows  a  time-consistent  policy  and  does  not
commit to a rule. The consistent (optimal) policy was defined by Kydland and Prescott
(1977) as the choice of policy  at each point in time, the current and the future, that
maximises  the  previously agreed-upon objective  function  S (x,)  and based on the
previous actions of agents x. Without getting involved into how the objective function
is  agreed  upon25,  such  backward-only  looking  policy  is  made  without  taking  into
account  forward  looking  agents  who  take  into  consideration  their  own,  and,  when
23 Inflation  targeting  tools  at  the  disposal  of  the  central  banks  are  mainly two-fold:  either  directly
expansionary (contractionary) monetary actions in case of inflation falls (increases) or the adjustment of
the  policy interest rate at which it lends to financial institutions: rate increase to reduce inflation through
the sale, or its decrease in expectation of inflation lowering below its target, mainly through purchases of
short term securities (inc. gov. bonds).
24 CGG note that there are research papers that try to explain this by over-optimistic under-estimates of
the production gap and related under-estimates of NAIRU, or, according to Orphanides (1997), that their
preliminary over-estimates of potential output. 
25 However, though most authors assume the government is benevolent and takes action that satisfies
households, it is not realistic to assume all households will be satisfied with it or consider it optimal.
Even  Pareto  optimal  policy  may  not  be  perceived  as  satisfactory  by  the  majority  of  the  average
representative households from all sides of political spectrum because it is not unique. Governments tend
to be benevolent predominantly to their own voter base and the target representative agent may be chosen
from there or as a weighted average of their voters and another target base.
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known, the others’ expectations of the future policies26.
Their  argument  started  a  long-term,  still  ongoing,  discussion  in  economics  on
differences between consistent and discretionary policies27. Time consistent policies can
be predicted and accounted for in the agent’s plans and the policy effects can then be
diminished. Discretionary policies are however shown to be suboptimal in the long run.
During  the  resulting  discussion  in  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s,  the  roles  and
advantages of  policy credibility and the related state-contingent  rules in  controlling
inflation  over  the  time-consistent  or  discretion  based  re-optimisation  policies,  have
been considered as being proven and accepted
A new style of monetary policies are based on Rogoff’s (1985) recommendations and
the definition of an independent, “conservative” central banker who adjusts monetary
policy according to the pre-defined rules. These are usually contractually agreed with
the government, widely published and known to other economic agents. Such policies
are in line with what is frequently called the “conservative bias” that tailors policy in
line with the needs of the business community and market stability. Such an approach is
perceived to have greatly contributed to policy credibility and reduced pure forward-
looking time-inconsistent discretionary behaviour described by Kydland and Prescott
(1977). 
Consequently, an increasing number of independent central banks have, since the early
1980s,  pursued inflation  targeting  and interest  rates  instrument  based  control  rules.
These have mostly been on the lines of those pioneered by J B Taylor (Taylor (1993)),
initially on basis of only lagged data on output and inflation. Such inflation targeting
rules have found, with few variations, their way in a large number of macro-economic
26 Note: The example they give, building on flood plain and forcing the government to build protection,
is not appropriate. It is simply an example of a policy that has not been implemented consistently – the
mentioned absence of a law prohibiting building on a flood plain that was not put in place and hence
discouragement was just nominal. It is more an example of a government policy that was not given full
support, power and mechanism of execution due to insufficient funds or deliberate manipulation. 
27 This issue is not new, however. For example, the 18C French Revolution (as many similar ones) was
fought mainly for the establishment of consistent business and market rules and the fairness of the market
game against the absolutist discretionary rights of the royals and the aristocracy ruling at the time. 
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models, in particular, ones aimed at that problem and used in central banks.
In addition to the lagged data on output and inflation, the most of the modern rules
extend the original Taylor (1993) model by incorporating forward-looking rules. These
are  usually  based  on Rational  Expectations  of  future  economic  values  such  as  the
expectations of inflation and output. Examples are the inflation forecast-based (IFB)
rules in Batini et al. (2005b) or the inflation forecast targeting (IFT) rules in Svensson
and  Woodford  (2003).  Those  combined  backward  -  and  forward-looking  inflation
forecast targeting rules collapse to a simple, original backward looking Taylor type rule
as a special case in steady state of economy. 
Since its introduction in New Zealand and Canada, and subsequently in most of the
industrialised countries, this approach is widely believed to have greatly contributed to
the reduction in inflation.  This was the case particularly where there was a lack of
credibility of older, central government lead discretionary, temporary optimal and time-
inconsistent  inflation  policies  that  were  often  perceived  as  short-term opportunistic
optimisation, thus, resulting in consistent inflation bias.
2.2.1 Introduction to Taylor rule and its origins
A major  development  point  in  interest  rate  targeting  occurred  when  John  Taylor
estimated and provided as a future “ideal” (long-term optimal) normative rule as its
interest  rate  equation  (Taylor  (1993)).  The  original  “Taylor  rule”  equation  for
optimisation of the interest  rate it as a function of the past interest  rates, either the
current  (j=0)  or  of  the  currently  expected  future  inflation  rate  t,  t+j,  (j>0)28,  the
production gap29 (yt – ynat,t) and the monetary policy shock mp t, has had few variations
28 Note: Following Batini et al. (2005b) it and t in this equation are neither real nor nominal, observed
but deviations from the mean, difference between the observed data (when available, e.g.obs,t  in our
case) and unobserved means, r* and t* respectively. In addition, we estimate the mean, real inflation t*
and unobserved real interest rates r*, and use the later in the calculation of the (quarterly) future discount
coefficient  as =1/(1+r*/100)1/4. 
29 Many DSGE models  identify the production gap as the difference between production at time t and
the “natural production”: either production in steady state or production in the model economy without
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and modifications and can be expressed as:
it = it-1 + (1-)[Et,t+j + y (yt – ynat,t)] + mpt                                     (2.2.1.1)
where ,  and  y are inflation forecasting based (IFB) monetary policy reaction (i.e.
feedback control) rules’ parameters that will be estimated and mpt is a simplified IID30
monetary policy shock given by mpt.. 
 
The policy maker balances between a quick return and a smooth inflation path to the
target after the shock, and sets nominal interest rate accordingly. Parameter  defines
the degree of interest rate smoothing – the higher it  is,  the lower are the effects of
inflation or production gaps on the resulting interest rate. The feedback parameters y
and  define the speed of the correction. The higher they are, the higher the effects of
the inflation and the output gap on the interest rate will be. In addition, the higher the
effect is, quicker the economy will react to eliminate either or both of the gaps: between
the expected (forecasted) and the target inflation rate, or the output gap.  Index j is the
policy horizon - this is the number of periods ahead during which the policymaker is
looking for the feedback31.  In some forms of the equation, the employment gap is used
instead of the output gap, but rarely so. Adherence to the rule became subject to much
discussion just prior and after the 2008/8 crisis and this research is covering later on in
the  section  on  the  causes  of  the  crisis.  (Appendix  8  contains  some more  technical
details on the original rule and, as one of the side result of this research, it there shows
how the  rule  form can  actually  be  derived  directly  from the  pre-existing  financial
market economics (bond) interest rate determination methods. Similarly, Appendix 7
shows how Taylor  rule  can be extended with additional yield curve terms for their
estimation and possible forecasting.) 
frictions and rigidities (e.g. price and wage stickiness). This similarly applies to consumption too. In the
estimated model, equations 10 and 11 define natural rates of consumption and output respectively and
define natural equilibrium as a reference for estimating consumption and output gaps respectively.
30  Independent and identically distributed random variable.
31 In our model j=0 and Et,t+j = ,t
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2.2.2 Inflation Forecast Based (IFB) Rules
As  mentioned  above,  Dynamic  stochastic  general  equilibrium  (DSGE)  methods,
initially developed to simulate and predict real business cycles (RBC) have been found
to be valuable tool in forecasting effects, and development of remedying strategies for
implementing Taylor  rules for  successful targeting of  inflation Batini  and Pearlman
(2002) state that there are two main types of forward looking, forecast based inflation
targeting: 
1. The  so  called  Inflation  Forecast  Targeting  (IFT)  rules  (e.g.  Svensson  and
Woodford 2003) that aim to optimise the economy and usually minimise the
central  policy  (usually  welfare)  loss  function  whilst  penalising  expected
deviation of inflation from its given target,
2. The so-called “simple” Inflation Forecast Based (IFB) rules originate from the
seminal  Taylor  (1993)  work,  but,  like  IFT  rules,  they  also  respond  to  the
inflation forecast rather than focus on current inflation as Taylor’s (1993) rules
do. In addition, the mere simplicity of those rules makes them more acceptable
and credible within the business community.
Batini and Pearlman (2002) also state for IFB rules that 
 “…they are usually good approximations of optimal feedback rules. However, as these
rules are not fully optimal, they can lead to dynamic instability or indeterminacy. A
standard result in the literature is that to avoid indeterminacy, the monetary authority
must respond aggressively (i.e. with a coefficient above unity) to expected inflation”32
(See also Levin, Wieland and Williams (2001)).
In another report Batini, Levine and Pearlman (2004) apply IFB rules on a small open
economy. They indicate that the problem of indeterminacy is even more serious in an
open  economy whilst  most  of  the  literature  tends  to  avoid  the  treatment  of  these
32 As we will see later, application of the IFB rules based aggressive response policy may have had a
crucial role in bursting the bubble and the 2007/08 crisis (the so called “Great Recession” crisis).
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problems  in  the  more  realistic  open  economy  situation33.  They  also  find  that  the
problem of indeterminacy is even higher if Central Banks, such as the US FED and
ECB do, use consumer price indices (CPI) as their target rather than producer price
indices (PPI).
2.2.3 Additional issues with central bank inflation targeting rules
Many authors (e.g. Worell 2000 and Wray 2014a) have raised the issue of the extent to
which central bankers can be making decisions beyond and independently of the usual
democratic process and that of related central bank accountability to the democratic
institutions. Even Lucas was aware of that issue when he closed his famous critique of
backward-looking  econometric  estimation  strategies  (Lucas  (1976))  with  a  less
discussed and publicised call for the policymakers to forecast their citizens’ (i.e. market
agents’) future responses. This was advocated so that the policymakers could be more
in “...accord … with preference for democratic decision making” (Lucas (1976)). 
One way this call could be met is by using rather more advanced methods of economic
agents’  decisions  modelling  and  forecasting  technology.  However,  a  commonly
accepted approach is, instead, to assume a position of delegated responsibility for social
welfare maximisation (or, more often, welfare loss minimisation) within independent
central  banks'  models.   Stokey (1991)  outlines  the  difference  between  the  Ramsey
outcome and no-commitment outcomes. As most of the authors, she assumes in both
cases that the agents will choose option x that maximises overall welfare. 
2.2.4 Inflation Targeting in Emerging Economies
Some of the emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe, namely the Czech
Republic  National  Bank  (CNB)  in  the  late  1990s  adopted  so  called  “Net  “  price
targeting (Mishkin (2007)). The ‘Net’ price targeting involves targeting only a portion
33 As we will see later, even the US economy in the more recent years with high inflows and outflows of
capital can not be considered as closed.
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of the overall (headline) CPI, for example, only those prices which are not subject to
government  control  and  regulated  (e.g.  milk,  rents,  etc.…)  and  are  not  exogenous
supply prices (such as oil).
However, by reducing the target price bundle, inflation targeting policy may be both
ineffective and create unwanted effects (Mishkin (2007)). If a bundle is relatively small
compared with the overall CPI and overall inflation is decreasing (increasing) but the
bundle  index  is  moving  in  opposite  direction,  a  country  may  impose  a  tightening
(loosening) inflation targeting (interest rate) policy when, instead, the opposite should
be applied. 
Mishkin  (2007)  finds  that  there  is  however  the  danger  of  an  additional  effect  of
inadequate  (e.g.  net)  targeting,  that  is,  self-fulfilling  inflation  (deflation).  Higher
(lower) t than necessary interest rates may fuel rather than correct the high inflation
(deflation).  This  occurs  as  economic  agents  seeing  a  higher  (lower)  than  necessary
interest rate may read it as a signal of a high (low) forecast of inflation and adjust their
inflation expectations and prices accordingly but incorrectly.  This then instead fuels
destabilising market price volatility, especially when the credibility in the central bank
and its ability to control inflation has not been established yet.
The above effects may thus have severe consequences on the overall economy. They
may increase a destabilising volatility of overall growth instead of providing a counter-
cyclical, stabilising effect.
Similarly,  Mishkin  (2007,  pp  376)  states  that  CNB’s  net  inflation  construct  indeed
turned to be more volatile and it led to targets being missed more than would have been
case with the headline inflation. Mishkin also stated that a narrow net inflation target
might be difficult for the public to understand and to adjust-to in their plans. This in
turn  may  damage  central  banks'  credibility,  which  may  have  especially  bad
consequences when such credibility is still being established. 
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Due to those problems, in 2001 the Czech Republic abandoned Net inflation targeting
for  headline  (overall)  measured  by  CPI  because,  as  CNB  explanation  goes,  the
“headline inflation covers more comprehensively price development in the economy
and that it is more relevant for decision of economic agents… [and] monetary policy
should also be better able to affect inflation expectations” (Jonas and Mishkin 2005, pp
362).  
Also, following an introduction providing a comprehensive overview of discussion on
Taylor  rule  for  inflation  targeting,  Caporale  et  al.  (2016)  engage  in  analysis  of
evidences of use of non-linear Taylor rule as opposed to the classic linear ones based on
Taylor(1993) estimated and discussed usually.  They are both,  quoting other  authors
who find it  in UK and other  developed and developing countries that  use different
thresholds to trigger parts of the rule, namely the output gap. They then estimate both,
linear and threshold versions of the augmented rule with three forward-looking values
and, as well, exchange rate as potentially more suitable and significant for smaller and
open economies. Applying GMM estimation method they find that the threshold non-
linear Taylor rule fits better the historical data from the most of the smaller countries
they analysed. 
2.2.4.1 Comment
Despite Czech’s bad experience with the net targeting, both the US and Serbia entered
into their own versions of net (i.e. “base”) price index targeting seven years later with
possibly  even  a  smaller  proportion  of  targeted  price  bundle  (i.e.  excluding  energy
prices). Thus   potentially distorting the real measure of inflation even more and thus
running even a higher risk of applying inadequate interest rate policy and the higher
risk  of  a  destabilising  volatility.  The  distortionary  effect  of  a  relatively  small  net
inflation target domain (compared with the headline) may also work in the opposite
direction and lead to a low base inflation forecast (compared with headline) which then
may lead to an inadequate decrease in the interest rate and depreciation of the domestic
currency.
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2.2.5 Discretionary and Commitment Based policies
Another issue of volatility relates to discretionary versus commitment based monetary
policies adopted by independent or less so independent central banks and government-
led fiscal policies. In-depth analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this research
and it is mentioned here only for a reference.
Many authors  (e.g.  Levine,  McAdam and Pearlman (2006))  show the  advantage of
commitment-based policies over discretionary ones. One may argue that the difference
is analogous to the known advantage of rule by law based economic systems over the
(hopefully  benevolent)  dictatorship  rule  based  ones.  The  policy  by  rule  or  by
commitment  take-out  a  substantial  level  of  uncertainty  in  forming  Rational
Expectations in comparison to the discretionary (or dictatorship) based system for its
agents who then can reduce uncertainty driven price volatility. 
Both myopic, and those not so governments and central banks may find commitment
based strategies sub-optimal over time and try to renegade their policies in short term.
This possibility however introduces uncertainty and increases the volatility of both real
and financial markets. 
This is not to say that, according to the authors, a benevolent dictatorship may not be
advantageous for  faster  development  and growth in  the  underdeveloped and export
based economies,  e.g.,  those that  seek foreign investment  and provide high returns
based  on  low  wages  over  the  relatively  shorter  periods  of  fast  growth.  However,
systems  governed  by  publicly  known  laws  (rules),  provide  additional  public
information and constraints, which, in general, should further reduce uncertainty and
hence price volatility. 
It is however needed to say that, complicated or constrained rules and laws should not
become overly complicated to be modelled by its agents, or overly constraining so to
lead economies to constrained standstills. (e.g. Levine, McAdam and Pearlman 2006). 
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However, in-depth discussions on Central Banks' optimal policy and the uniqueness of
the  equilibria,  though referred  to  through the  review,  are  beyond the  scope of  this
research.
2.3 Credit markets frictions and credit rationing
2.3.1 Financial accelerator and credit markets frictions
The  seminal  ideas  on  agency  costs,  net  worth  and  financial  accelerator  effects
expressed by (Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG later on))
revives  the  importance  of  Fisher’s  1933  notion  of  on  "debt-deflation"  and  his  and
Keynes’ analysis of Great Depression34. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) introduce a notion
of a financial accelerator as a non-linear, pro-cyclical, market fluctuation in response to
fluctuations in the corporate borrowers’ net-worth and the reciprocal (counter-cyclical)
lender’s agency costs due to asymmetric information. They take up the NK approach
and restate the importance of the financial sector for the real economy. They assume
that previous work based on Modigliani, which states that financial markets have little
or no effect on the real economy, is a pragmatic approximation rather than an incorrect
approach.   They  believe  it  is  an  approximation  that  does  not  represent  the  more
extenuating situations of recessions or depressions, when cash starved banks cannot
provide sufficient credit to companies, leading to corporate bankruptcies. The financial
accelerator is a feature that amplifies the shocks in the credit markets and generates a
systemic effect - so called “positive-feedback” to the cyclical behaviour of the markets:
either further slowing an already declining economy, or in up-turns, accelerating further
an already growing economy.
They  analyse  the  effects  of  what  they  think  is  the  main  mechanism  of  financial
34 Fisher claimed the Great Depression was triggered by a spiralling effect of pessimism, debt liquidation
and resulting asset deflation leading to credit deflation and liquidity constraints It was also prolonged by
the high debt in the financial sector and general deflation at the time.  
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accelerator – asymmetric information induced agency costs35. They show that banking
loans  carry  a  risk  premium,  which  is  counter-cyclical  due  to  the  higher  (lower)
expected risks of agency costs in down-turns (up-turns) and is inversely related to the
net-worth36 of the their borrowers.
Based on earlier work by Townsend, their model adopts the costly state verification
(CSV) approach, which assumes that the auditing (monitoring) costs are imposed on the
loan lender if the lender wants to inspect the financial development of the borrower. 
Analysing Impulse-response functions (IRFs) of interest rate shocks applied on models
of a variety of industrialised countries Goodhart and Hoffman (2004) show that interest
rate  shocks  had  a  significant  negative  effect  on  asset  prices  whilst,  contrary  to
expectations, bank lending was less affected by those shocks. The authors argue that the
agents' sentiments had a stronger non-linear effect on business cycles than the monetary
policy appears  to  have,  the  highest  effect  being  at  the  times  of  sentiment  changes,
possibly even accelerating such cycles. Using graph analysis they also show that credit
growth is highly correlated with asset prices, and, though less so, also correlated with
inflation for most of the countries (leading the CPI by several quarters). Their analysis
shows that in recent years in the UK, correlation between credit and house prices has
increased whilst credit’s correlation to equity prices has decreased. They also refer to a
number of other studies that show a causality relationship from housing prices to levels
of credit. Those authors’ VAR based IRF simulation studies show that property prices
have significant effect on lending while effect of credit shocks on equity prices show
less significant effects. 
The authors emphasise that the two most famous economic disasters and the resulting
deflations - the 1929 Great Depression in US and 1990 crisis in Japan - have both been
caused by their respective central banks trying to prick market bubbles. In the US it was
the assets bubble and the real-estate one in Japan. These are just the most prominent
35 the costs associated with the lenders assessing and monitoring performance of their borrowers
36 They defined net-worth as difference between the sum of liquid and the collateral value of illiquid
assets, less outstanding obligations.
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examples of non-linear effects that interest rate shocks can have on asset prices.
2.3.2 Credit and Imperfect Information
According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Stiglitz and Blinder (1983), due to imperfect
information, banks ration credit by nearly-randomly rejecting loans to potentially good
borrowers even in (or near) the economy’s equilibrium. This is because the optimum
return interest rate for banks may be too low to clear demand for loans but lending at a
higher rate is likely to increase rate of default among otherwise good borrowers and
decrease  the  banks’ returns.  In  addition,  in  a  credit-rationing situation,  the  reduced
amount of loanable funds results in reduced economic activity, away from its optimal
level. 
Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) then take further the ideas on the financial accelerator
expressed by Bernanke et al. (1999) and in their opinion “… general equilibrium credit
linkages may be every bit as important in determining the behaviour of the economy as
the linkage in goods and factor markets emphasised in traditional general equilibrium
models. However the general equilibrium credit linkages are only partially mediated
through the price system (i.e. adjustments in interest rates).” (Ditto pp 140)
“  … if  there  is  a  common belief  that  that  the  economy may well  go into  trouble,
interest rates will be high, many firms will go bankrupt and the expectation may be
self-fulfilling. “ (Ditto pp 143).
 
They then assert that corrective actions by central banks, such as changing interest rates
and  targeting  inflation,  may not  be  as  effective  as  it  is  widely  believed  (and  that
sometimes they are  only efficient  due  to  the  central  banks’ undue credibility,  thus,
leading the economy by the means of “placebo pills” and self-fulfilling prophecies). 
In times of economic changes (e.g. a recession) risk averse retail and business banks
may not drop their high-street interest rates in line with the central banks reductions.
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They mainly fear adverse selection and moral hazard due to incomplete information.
This thus causes a gap (a spread) to occur and dampens down the corrective effect of
reduced base rates intended by government institutions and central banks.
A recession may be then deepened despite a reduction in the central bank’s short-term
rates. This is because the optimal, loan portfolio driven, interest rate that many risk-
averse retail banks charge, may not change, at least, not proportionally. This occurs to
reduce any probability of adverse selection of taking up bankruptcy prone borrowers.
They claim that complex networks of companies, both, borrowing and lending from
each other, may absorb (i.e. “hedge”) a small shock to the profits but not substantial
(systemic) ones. Their position may be seen as rather prophetic in the view of the recent
2007 credit crunch crisis.
2.3.3 Money and Credit
According to Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003, pp295), although money and credit  are
closely related and created, for most of the time simultaneously, by banks, there are
differences.  Credit however can be created by non-bank channels too, and therefore,
the interest rate monetary policy does not affect the credit supply at the same level as it
does bank loans and money supply. 
The level  of  credit  offered  to  a  potential  borrower  is  a  combined quantitative  and
qualitative assessment of the level of credit-worthiness37 of that potential borrower. In
fact, this is true, to an extent, of any economic agent who may even simultaneously act
as a borrower, an investor and a lender. The resulting credit worthiness is usually a
private, proprietary information set, based on a combination of standard and proprietary
assessment methods and judgement of asymmetric and partial information As such it is
often  specific  to  the  assessment  agency (usually  the  lending  bank  or  a  specialised
37 Credit worthiness is related to the borrower’s credit value and in turn related to, but different from, the
financial Net-Worth as defined by Bernanke et al. 1999.
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organisation), and may vary from agency to agency and itself tradable on the credit
assessment markets. 
For example, using a heterogeneous agent model, Beaudry and Lahiri (2009) argue that
small  variations  in  information  across  heterogeneous  agents  and,  thus,  a  resulting
(small) amount of asymmetric information, can create a high volatility in expectations
of the investors and in the aggregate supply of risk capital  available on the market
influenced  by investor  sentiment  and  the  pro-cyclical  behaviour  of  the  risk  averse
investors.
.
For  the  above  reasons,  S&G03  claim  credit-worthiness  is  heterogeneous  (and
asymmetric) and an aggregate assessment can be misleading since the surplus of funds
in one bank is not a substitute for the lack of funds in another, the client’s usual lender.
This is in part  because a bank that has sufficient funds may not be accessible to a
borrower for various reasons such as logistic access. Another reason is such a bank may
not have sufficient credit information on the client and may either refuse the loan all
together or charge too high interest rate. The higher interest rate resulting from both the
increased risk premium and the increased agency costs.38
Due  to  information  and  the  resulting  credit  asymmetry,  S&G03  claim  that  credit
allocation is not Pareto efficient and its effects are highly non-linear - a bankruptcy
resulting from increased interest rates cannot be undone by decreasing interest rates
after the bankruptcy.
Whilst Stiglitz and Blinder (1983) argue that the credit (e.g. loan) rationing prevents
demand clearing at the equilibrium interest rate, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) abandon
both  the  perfect  substitutability  of  money  loans  and  bonds,  and,  also,  the  credit
rationing, and focus on a simplified (idealised) model with the clearing of loan demand
and supply at a certain (equilibrium) interest rate i: 
38 The agency cost is what Bernanke et al. (1999) perceive as one of the main mechanisms behind the
financing positive feedback mechanism exacerbating business cycles they termed “financial accelerator”
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Ld  = L(,i,y) = (,i)D(1-) = Ls                                                                                       (2.3.3.1)
where ,i and y are loan and bond interest rates and output respectively, and(,i) the
return on deposits D. 
Kiyotaki  and  Moore  (1997)  build  their  model  of  the  collateral  asset  value  credit
constrained agent  based upon the earlier  work of Bernanke and Gertler  (1989) and
Greenwald  and  Stiglitz.  After  applying  a  variant  model  of  game-of-life  where  the
predator (the credit-unconstrained) in an analogy plays versus the prey (i.e., the credit-
constrained firm), they found that credit constraints in down-turns spirals down credit
worth  of  firms and their  collateral  asset  prices  which,  in  turn further  reduces  their
creditworthiness. They also found that the marginal productivity of a constrained firm
is higher than that of unconstrained ones. This, on other hand, has an accelerating effect
on output in business cycles when output of (and employment by) a constrained firm is
more affected by asset value fluctuations in business cycles.
2.4 Asset market targeting
2.4.1 Background
Asset targeting has been raised as a potential  alternative or as an additional control
mechanism  to  inflation  and  growth  targeting  used  since  1980s.  The  positions  of
Bernanke and Gertler (1999/2000) and Bernanke and Gertler (2001) (and, similarly also
Lansing (2008) and Gwilym (2009)), is that asset targeting is not an optimal tool in
stabilising an economy and favour of using asset price movements just as indicators of
future inflation changes. This is however taken by the authors with one exception of
bubble build-up when price fluctuations  are  driven by non-fundamental  movements
which  can  then  have  wider  implications  on  economy (e.g.  due  to  mere  regulatory
changes liberalising access to asset markets, or the so called “rational bubbles” due to
imperfect rationality and herd behaviour of investors). Otherwise, as the main argument
against asset targeting, they note that there is not much empirical support in spending
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being directly affected by asset price fluctuations affecting the wealth of consumer. 
In opposition are few: Cecchetti et al. (2000), Cecchetti (2006), DeGrauwe (2007) and
Farmer (2009b), all claim that, in addition to inflation targeting, central banks should
adhere to asset market targeting too. In particular, the Central Banks should target and
control  the  rise  of  rational  bubbles  and  misalignment  between  the  market  and  the
econometric,  fundamental  prices and aim to prevent the market crashes too.  As the
Great  Depression  of  1929,  the  recent  1997,  2002  and  the  most  recent,  2007-2009
financial crises show, the asset market crashes can have very significant repercussions
on the banking sector  and on the overall  economy by creating a recessionary push
through the channels and the mechanisms discussed later in this text.
A similar stance was taken by Batini and Nelson (2000) in relation to foreign exchange
rates and related assets. It appears that targeting exchange rates and related currency
asset prices is of similar importance as those of bonds and interest rate assets for their
wider importance and implications on the economy as whole. This is however not the
case with individual equity related assets or even equity related indices.
Farmer (2009b) argues that wealth rather than the wage level is the determining factor
for level of aggregate demand39. He then develops further his argument that demand is
the  main  determining factor  in  the  levels  of  employment  and so  the  central  banks
should target inflation through interest  rates and target the (un-) employment levels
through asset price index targeting. 
As  a  follow-up  to  Keynes’  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  psychology  in  the
functioning of asset markets, Farmer insists that asset values depend on, and are highly
correlated to the levels of confidence. To target asset prices but avoid political issues of
public ownership in private companies and the direct purchase of shares in companies,
Farmer  (2009b)  suggests  the  creation  of  an  asset  index  managed  by  private  fund
39 This may be the case more and more as a large community of (mainly US) households are increasingly
also market asset holders whilst the wage share of income is in decline.
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managers.   Central  banks  would  purchase  units  from these  managers  as  the  bank
committee agreed and publicly announced its price - the purchase would be then funded
by short-term debt issue (e.g. treasury bonds).40
2.4.2. Discussion
Farmer's  (2009b)  above-discussed  method  of  both,  setting  and  then  targeting  asset
market index is rather complicated and potentially costly to implement and maintain,
requiring central banks to invest in the market.  In addition, it is still to be determined if
the increasing numbers of households are mainly shareholders or bondholders and how
effective share asset-targeting may be in controlling unemployment,  separately from
controlling  the  interest  rates.  On  another  hand,  it  is  also  likely  to  be  a  form  of
“helicoptering  the  money”  that  will  help  mainly those  who already hold  the  crisis
depleted shares, to offload them at higher than current market prices to the index-fund
managers in the first instance but, indirectly, to the central banks at the current or the
future tax-payers’ expense.  If however it may be profitable, e.g. buying at low and
selling at high price as is the case with many of central banks current open market
money operations  aimed at  controlling currency rates,  than large commercial  banks
would probably do that themselves.  
In addition, there is nothing to prevent the market reversing the prices (and the market
confidence in the companies and banks) below the targets once the term of the offer
expires,  that  is,  unless  central  banks  (CBs)  keep  and  maintain  their  price  promise
continuously.  On  the  other  hand,  if  central  banks  control  the  index  price  level,  it
remains a question: what happens if the market price exceeds the bank’s target. That
may create an arbitrage opportunity to buy from the CBs at their target rate and sell on
the market at the higher rate. An alternative is for the CBs to sell at the higher market
rate at a profit but cause a reduction of the market prices.
40 There maybe no need to form a separate, new index fund but just to use one of the existing market
indices such as Dow Jones or S&P500, and for the central banks to offer to buy that index at a set rate.
However,  the  private  index  managers  will  gain  extra  powers  and  will  require  additional  regulatory
control imposed on them to minimise potential abuse of such increased power.
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This will however not financially help the companies (and banks) directly other than by
increasing their credibility. The traded shares are from the secondary market and do not
bring value to the companies but only to the previous shareholders. It may also lead to
the creation of a new asset market bubble that may burst once the CBs cannot maintain
their offer at the over-the-market price if public borrowing costs (e.g. yields on treasury
bonds) exceed the expected return on the fund index. In that case, maintaining the index
at higher than market value could be rather costly and may come at a taxpayer expense.
Instead,  this  research will  argue that asset prices are to be considered a part  of the
package of an extended price index and that  they constitute  an additional  factor  in
overall  inflation  targeting.  Thus,  the  Taylor  rule  may need to  be extended with  an
additional factor,  am,  or a single, aggregated price inflation index should include the
asset prices index too. In either case, it  could be accounted for through a weighted
combination of either the standard or a newly created asset price index mechanisms.
Moreover, although asset prices do not directly reflect the cost of current living, they
affect the real cost of saving and, thus, the future time living in their retirement. Any
forward-looking agents seeking balanced spending in the future then must increase their
current saving/spending ratio and so reduce their current purchasing power. In turn, it
would be wrong to account for asset prices without a relation to changes in the cost of
living components. This creates new dynamics for price index calculation.
In addition, asset prices are counter-cyclically affected by interest rate fluctuations – the
rate rise will have a triple effect on the asset prices reduction:
1. the growth rate will be reduced and, with it, the average share price rise will
have to be adjusted downwards too
2. the resulting increased discount rate will reduce the value of future dividends
3. the rate increase reduces cash borrowing as well  as the amount of free cash
liquidity, and, consequently, reduces demand for shares and so the price of those
assets too.
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Accounting for house prices in the weighted target inflation index will also prevent
over-heated housing booms to occur  on the margins  of (incorrectly accounted)  low
inflation  and  the  resulting  low  interest  rates.   On  the  other  hand,  the  weighting
proportion of different assets in the extended inflation index may vary selectively so
that variances and values of some assets may be allowed to rise or, oppositely, their rise
may be suppressed more than that of the other assets. This, in turn will create a very
price flexible and variable component to of the standard CPI. 
A moral  and wider  economic  issue  however  rises  from the  RE hypothesis  and the
central bank’s need and capability to forecast moves of the asset markets that may, in
turn, affect the markets. Bernanke and Gertler (2001) argue that such interference may
have dangerous effects on the market psychology. A similar argument applies however
to any centralised control including the standard (CPI) inflation targeting. On the other
hand, Bernanke and Gertler state there are some underlying benefits of bubbles being
contained,  in  their  role  in  increasing  consumer’s  wealth  and  as  a  result  increasing
aggregate demand resulting from the increased value of the assets and the related levels
of  financial  credit.  An  additional  mechanism  for  central  banks’  control  of  the
commercial  banking sector  and its  overall  exposure  to  risk  in  particular,  as  argued
before, could be to impose pro-cyclically varied levels of economic capital of those
banks.
Also there may be a few explanations for the inelasticity of consumption raised by
Bernanke and Gertler (1999/2000):  lifestyle rigidity41 (or habit0 may not be affected
and changed by the relatively insecure income from assets, and so consumption does
not increases in response to rise in asset prices as the rise itself may be resulting from
higher demand, this resulting from an increased saving through asset investment. The
income  wage/investment  share  has  shifted  in  recent  years  towards  the  investment
41 This research identifies difference between habit and what is this research introduces and refers to as
lifestyle  rigidity.  Though  they  sometimes  may  be  used  interchangeably,  the  latter  is  wider  in  its
connotation  and  fits  the  economic  theory  better.  Whilst  habit  implies  an  in-reflexive  automatism
(autopilot)  in  consumption  behaviour,  lifestyle  rigidity assumes an  active  intentionality to  utilise  all
means  of  maintaining lifestyle when it  is  threatened,  such as seeking loan or other  means of  extra
income if the primary become insufficient.
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income  but  that  presupposes  higher  savings  and  it  is  unlikely  to  maintain  current
lifestyle and lead to the same or similar levels of consumption as before.
2.5 Sovereign Debt Crisis and Default Risk Today
2.5.1 Solvency Criteria and Debt Targeting Rules
In  the  wake  of  the  Great  Depression,  few European  countries  such as  Britain  and
France  defaulted  on their  debt,  mainly to  protect  their  domestic  markets.  In  recent
years, Argentina and Russia defaulted on their debt and a few other countries such as
Mexico and Greece escaped such a measure with a combination of IMF intervention,
external pressure and EU countries’ solidarity support in the case of the latter. Manasse
and Roubini (2005) define some basic criteria for sovereign solvency42.
In a (large) closed economy, government debt rise followed by small fiscal adjustments
and tax smoothing, may be a suitable solution to tax revenue affecting shocks as found
by several authors (e.g., Hawkesby and Wright (1997)). However, Bi (2010) finds a
different situation in a RBC model of (small) open economies where governments are
facing debt-to-GDP ratio rated interest risk premia on their debt and where a more rapid
consumption tax adjustment is found to be optimal. On the other hand, Mitchel et al.
(2006) argue that there is a point in level of debt when sovereign debt targeting fiscal
rules  -  triggered  corrective  measures  along  three  main  fiscal  instruments  (Gov.
spending, taxes and transfers) - cannot provide for the sustainability of the debt any
more whilst  Ferrero (2008) explores and finds advantages of flexible debt targeting
rules.
42  “A sovereign is solvent, if the discounted value of future primary balances is greater or equal to the
current net  public  debt stock.  Likewise,  a country is  solvent,  if  the discounted value of  future trade
balances exceeds the current stock of net external debt... Willingness to pay depends on the relative costs
of  defaulting  or  continuing  to  service  the  debt.The  main  costs  of  defaulting  are  loss  of  access  to
international capital markets and the potential output and trade costs of default. Low output growth does
not only affect the ability to pay but also the willingness to pay. When growth is low, being cut off from
capital markets is less costly.A debt crisis can also occur if a country is illiquid rather than insolvent.
Hence, liquidity measures, such as short-term debt over reserves or M2 over reserves, are included in
many recent models of currency and financial crisis that stress the risk of a liquidity run .”( Manasse and
Roubinil 2005)
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Also, Bi (2010) and, Bi and Leeper (2010) analysed the Swedish model of consistent
counter-cyclical fiscal activity and find that in estimating effects of sovereign debt it
matters very much whether an economic model takes in fiscal policy exogenously, as
most models do, or endogenously. Likewise, a credible government’s commitment to it
is a necessary precondition for a sustainable economy. 
2.5.2 Discussion
All those authors concentrate on fiscal rules as methods for controlling sovereign debt.
This work however believes that the sovereign debt control problem in RBC smoothing
models is just one part of a larger picture of public debt and that it may be targeted by
means of a Taylor type interest rate rule (or its extension) that will take into account the
public  debt/GDP term factor.  Simply,  increased combined public  debt  -  a  weighted
household, corporate and government debt, each having a separate coefficient driven
factor  –  over  GDP  will,  in  different  proportions  affect  rate  increases  and  drive
borrowing down.  
In addition to reducing household and corporate borrowing, higher interest rates are
also likely to lead to a reduction in sovereign borrowing due to the higher costs of
borrowing and reduced demand for bonds. Alternatively, the sovereign debt linked rate
rise may be triggered by rules similar or same as those described by Bi (2010). Bi and
Leeper (2010) also find that the endogeneity of debt-target driven taxation is a pre-
requisite for equilibrium to exist. 
NOTE: In relation to this is an endogenous government spending and unemployment
targeting rule introduced later in this text, where this research work will explain and
provide both an empirical analysis and model comparison for a different, novel, Taylor-
like, endogenised, counter-cyclical fiscal spending policy rule within a DSGE model
using  unemployment  as  its  control  and  target  variable  as  in  Perendia  and  Tsoukis
(2012). 
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2.6 Elections and politico-economic cycles 
2.6.1 Background
Alesina et al. (1992) find substantial evidence across developing and OECD countries
that  governments  regularly pursue  both  monetary  and  fiscal  expansions  in  election
years  whilst  inflation  jumps  in  post-electoral  years  as  a  result  of  those  policies.
Frenzese  (1999  and  2001)  goes  further  and,  on  similar  lines  rejects  the  classic,
benevolent, welfare-loss minimisation rational expectation monetary policy in favour of
a more realistic and empirically observed rational-strategic one, a monetary policy  that
will take into account partisan manipulation of the budget both in the pre- and post-
election periods as well as possible other political distortions. 
Santiso (2013) analysed Latin American countries and states that the Investment Banks’
recommendations  changes  around  elections.  This  occurs  mainly  in  the  pre-election
periods and they tend to downgrade markets even more if the new candidates are strong
and  not  committed  to  preserving  financial  sustainability  and  the  stability  of  the
government budget, thus seeking a higher “democratic premium” on investments.  The
author then argues two fold, that emerging democratic countries that have governments
separated from financial markets and without direct influence on the banking sector
have more chance to reduce electoral volatility and maintain a stable financial market in
times around and immediately post elections, whilst, at the same time, he concludes
that the governments and their agencies such as central banks need to monitor financial
market  recommendations  and  pro-actively  adjust  their  policies  to  avoid  financial
market turmoil in the pre and post-election periods.
On those lines, Breuss (2008) states that there are two schools of thought. One, where
governments generate an “opportunistic” politico-economic cycle to facilitate their re-
election, and the other, where so-called, “partisan” cycles are created with the aim to
follow the party’s own ideology. The two may, however, coincide but Breuss concludes
that asynchronous elections in the Eurozone, which is economically lagging the more
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synchronously elected US indicate that an asynchronous approach is not optimal. Only
in such a synchronised model can common monetary policy be optimal and facilitate
faster GDP growth and unemployment reduction. 
2.6.2 Discussion
Whilst in countries such as the US, where elections take place on regular, four year
periods and the policy manipulation may take place in regular periods too, in some
other countries such as UK, the election time may be flexibly chosen (within limits), by
the government so to match any more advantageous state of business cycle and the
popularity swings. Consequently, whilst such beneficial situation may reduce need for
altering the policies just ahead of election, any governments’ pro-cyclical actions on
behalf of the pre-election distortions is therefore in those countries likely to create an
additional acceleration effects triggering a substantial volatility in their business cycles
but more detailed analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this research. It appears
that it may also be expected that a synchronisation of European elections would result
in higher swings of the joint, synchronised business cycles despite that the elections
may  bring  disparate  political  outcomes  in  different  states.  There  may  be  other,
additional  reasons  why the  European economy lags  the  US such as  lack  of  labour
mobility (e.g. due to language differences) or any common fiscal policy.
One could argue that, to achieve economic stability and avoid use of political cycles, in
larger countries or markets, they should not run their regional elections at the same as
those run for the central control (authority), and also, that the regional elections should
not be run for all regions at the same time but spread across the cycle life-span and
regional space. 
However,  a  conclusion  from  the  above  discussion  would  be  that  macro-economic
models  assessing business  cycles  would need to  have  a  model-mechanism that  can
accommodate and measure effect of the election cycles, e.g. as a form of long-term
(regular or not) seasonality so that:
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1. pure real business cycles can be filtered out and measured free of distortionary
effects of  the political ones,
2. better overall  forecast can be made by modulating pure RBCs with political
ones, and,
3. political distortions can be measured and possible socio-political or institutional
controls and checks put in place to prevent them if so deemed prudential.
However,  to  achieve this  statistical  identification,  substantially longer,  probably 4-7
times longer time-series data-sets would need to be measured to be able to identify,
measure  and  filter-out  effect  of  usually  4-7  years  long  election  cycles  in  modern
democracies, especially in smaller and more isolated economies or where international
or confederation-like market unions run their elections in an synchronised unison like
what EU is considering putting in place as discussed above. In addition, usually applied
detrending techniques such as HP filters, can be filtering out those effects, by them, as
too slow to be included in the data set used for estimations. See also Farmer (2012) who
is also raising the issue of detrending using Hodrick-Preston (HP), or any similar filters
because  they  take  long-term  movements  out  of  the  resulting  data  and  out  of  the
economist's  picture.  One  of  these  that  he  points  out  to  the  long-term  correlation
between wealth and unemployment he is focusing on in his paper, and refers to several
other authors (e.g. Ludvigson) who raised similar concerns.  
An outstanding question for research is, are political cycles very different from RBC or
they constitute their integral part and was one of the success of independent central
bank inflation targeting in controlling inflation and RBCs rooted in them taking control
of monetary policy from the government and reducing its ability to impose them as well
as RBCs.  
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3. Overview of Literature: Issues with DSGE Economic 
Modelling and their Computational Methodology 
This  section  is  a  short  survey  of  the  background  literature  on  DSGE  modelling
methodology  and  forecasting  methods  for  macro-economic  models  used  by  many
central banks and monetary policy research institutions. It also contains many of the
recent critiques of (mainly DSGE) and the follow-up discussions on dynamic macro-
economic modelling and estimation methods. 
3.1 A Brief Introduction to DSGE Models Used in this Research
3.1.1. Introduction to the Methodology Used in Research
Dynamic Stochastic General  Equilibrium (DSGE or SDGE) models were developed
initially in 1980s and have been used ever since to associate shocks and the economic
system’s responses to these shocks. Initially used for analysis of the real business cycles
(RBCs), they now combine RBC with several Keynesian elements, notably inflation
and the essentials of price and wage stickiness. 
The forecasting of rational agents’ behaviour has become an integral part of forecasts of
economic dynamics as a step in resolving the Lucas critique issues of dynamic changes
in   agents’ forward  looking  rational  expectations  and  in  situations  of  incomplete
information  caused  by either  spatial  or  vertical  segmentation  and  isolation  (“island
story”). This was paralleled buy Lucas’ “research programme” (Lucas 1975) aimed at
the endogenisation of the agent’s (rational) expectations and their pre-emptive reactions
to  monetary  and  policy  shocks43.  The  turning  point  in  the  history  of  the  DSGE
modelling was when Blanchard and Kahn (1980) provided the first general solution for
a linear model under the rational expectations (RE) in the state space form during the
1980s to open path in addressing Lucas's critique using DSGE models. These models
43 It is now questionable whether their expectations are truly rational in the sense of REH or they are 
actually adaptive rational expectations in sense of integration of AEH and REH -> AREH.
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were  augmented  by  introduction  of  Kalman  filtering  state  space  systems'  methods
within economics (Aoki 1987, Harvey 1989).
DSGE research  has  later  shifted  its  focus  towards  issues  of  inflation  targeting  and
measuring  the  effects  of  the  potential  disturbances  (including  those  caused  by  the
Governments’  fiscal  and  Central  Banks’  monetary  policies)  and  improving  the
economic  system’s  resilience  to  such  disturbances  (see  in  Levine  et  al.  (2006),
Woodford  2003,  and,  Batini,  Justiniano,  Levine  and  Pearlman  2006).  This  work
concentrates on such models and explains them in more detail.
The main computational and methodological toolkit, both used and particularly adapted
for  this  research,  has  been  Dynare  software  package44 for  solving,  estimating  and
simulating DSGE models, developed initially in Matlab by M. Juillard and maintained
by a team of developers at CEPREMAP (Adjemian et al. 2011). Dynare software also
provided a starting model for the design and development of the new BoE's core DSGE
modelling and estimation toolkit and the related COMPASS suite of models (Burgess et
al.  2013).  This  new DSGE model,  in  the  recent  BoE  move  amid  post-2007  crisis
criticism,  is  planned  to  replace  their  Monetary  Policy  Committee’s  earlier,  BoE’s
quarterly structural macroeconomic model (BEQM, Harrison et al. 2005) as an even
better mid-term forecasting toolkit45.
DSGE models used in this research implements a set of Taylor type inflation targeting
rules  in  the  monetary policy reaction  equation  and is  closely based on the  models
developed and described in the work of Batini et al. (2005a and 2005b) but similar to
those used in Smets and Wouters (2002), (2003) and (2007) (SW02, SW03 and SW07
henceforth).
44 Dynare is free to use but it requires either Matlab, which is not free software kit, or the free Octave
package which emulates  Matlab environment and programming language syntax but which is rather
slower than Matlab (http://www.gnu.org/software/octave/download.html).
45 The BoE Quarterly Model (BEQM) replaced (or complemented) their earlier Medium Term Macro
Model (MTMM) in 2005 whilst providing stronger theoretical grounds based on forward looking and
limited, rather than infinite, lifetime agents.
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3.1.2 Bayesian Estimation in DSGE Tools
For parameters  estimation,  modern DSGE methods enhance Kalman filtering  based
Bayesian VAR state space model with optimising, stochastic simulations and posterior
density sampling algorithms to provide the optimised estimates of the values of  the
model parameters' posterior density distributions.
There are various methods that can be used for estimating DSGE models’ posterior
likelihoods such as General method of moments (GMM) (e.g. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
1998),  Method of  Simulated  Moments  (MSM) or  Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MLE) together with Kalman filter (Sargent, T. 1989). However, the most frequently
used  is  the  so-called  strong  interpretation  (see  Smets  and  Wouters  2002)  -  a
combination of Bayesian inference,  Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) stochastic
simulation  and  MLE  methods  with  Kalman  filter  (For  further  information  see
Appendices  1  and  3  or  Geweke  1998).  Most  MCMC  algorithms  used  for  DSGE
estimation,  use  either  the  Gibbs or  Metropolis-Hastings  algorithm for  sampling  the
posterior distribution and evaluation of marginal likelihood of the estimation (Batini et
al. (2005 a and b), Boivin and Giannoni 2005 and Levine et al. (2006). 
It has been shown that DSGE estimates are generally superior to the VAR or BVAR
methods’ estimates (Smets and Wouters (2002) and (2003)). This is especially true for
longer-term predictive estimation, and in data-rich conditions such as facto augmented
VAR (FAVAR)  and  MCMCML conceptualised,  defined  and  used  in  Bernanke  and
Boivin46 (2003),  Jacquier  et  al.  (2004)  and,  Boivin  and  Giannoni  (2005)  (BG05)
respetively.
Note:  This  research continues  the previous work (Pearlman and Perendia 2006 and
Perendia 2006) and, in its early stages, in Levine, Pearlman and Perendia (2007) and
Perendia (2008)), it also enhanced the PCL86 DSGE methods by using the data rich
46 For example, Bernanke & Boivin 2003 build upon the work of Stock & Watson (1999) who conclude
that “the best-performing forecast for inflation is an augmented Phillips curve forecast that uses a new
composite index of aggregate activity comprised of the 168 individual activity measures”. 
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FAVAR-alike DSGE model implemented through another enhancement of the solution
for the partial  information rational expectation model for estimating and forecasting
optimising micro-structure agents developed in PCL86.
3.2 Recent Developments in DSGE Modelling and Contributions
Since writing the most of the thesis, popularity and then following critiques of DSGE
models produced a substantial number of works providing comprehensive introduction
and overview of such models in detail so that a part of work initially provided here is
now surpassed by those and hence replaced by a brief guide through those references. 
Christiano, Lawrence, R. Motto, M. Rostagno (2014) provide an in-depth methodology
of DSGE Bayesian econometrics whilst Caporale et al. (2016) provide a comprehensive
overview of central banks macro modelling and policies.
Taylor (2016) provides a brief history of macroeconomic modelling while Wieland et
al. (2016) provide both another view of the history of mainly DSGE models as well as
of the methods for their comparison. Taylor (2016) elaborated that the early, historical,
backward  looking  “path-space”  analysis  based  models  were  paradigmatically
superseded by “rule-space” models in mid-1970s after Lucas critique providing more
stable monetary policies since 1980s to the more recent departures from those models
from early 2000s bringing more instability, e.g. by Alan Greenspan -led low US Federal
reserve policy rate held far below what (Taylor) rule would otherwise prescribe. 
On the other hand, Kocherlakota (2016) criticizes strict adherence to Taylor type rules
and argues that, alike in the 1930s when the US Federal Reserve prudishly followed the
pre-crisis  rules and frameworks and henceforth slowing down the Great Depression
recovery, so was the case with the US Fed policy following too closely rules (e.g. such
as Taylor type rules) based policy and slowing down recovery after the 2007/08 crisis.
He therefore argues that a more discretionary policy of a central bank rather than one
based on the laws of the rules would be more efficient and beneficial in times of crisis.
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The author's argument is not new however and it just adds to a long standing discussion
between discretion and transparent rule based policies for central banks (e.g. see Taylor
2016) but adds another argument that in time of crisis and policy rate already near zero,
the FED should have pursued policy based on publicising forward guidance for its
future plans but rather more aggressive ones than ones driven just by following the
(close to-) normal state framework or one based on asset purchase pursued by the US
FED.
Wieland  et  al.  (2016)  are  providing  a  comprehensive  presentation  of  the  semi-
automated model comparison method developed for the Macroeconomic Models Data
Base (MMB) maintained by the team around Volker Wieland and also, a large set of
comparative results obtained by application of its methodology based toolset on a large
sample of the models in the database. For this research, it is important to highlight some
of their findings. Comparing the impulse response functions (IRFs) to the monetary
policy tightening shock on the NK models with financial accelerators (e.g. BGG99 and
DG08 (De Graeve (2008))) and those without (e.g. SW07),  Wieland et a. (2016) show
that the responses are much more affected in the models with the accelerators which is
what  would  be  expected.  They also  find  that  the  financial  accelerator  models  with
investment adjustment costs (e.g. DG08) responses of GDP decline are more hump-
shaped and persistent, and thus closer to the real observations,  than in models with
capital adjustment costs (e.g. BGG99) indicating that entrepreneurs are more likely to
adjust their mid -term future investments to the new conditions rather than the already
installed, productive and past investments.
In addition, Lindé, Smets and Wouters (2016) provide a partial survey of macro-models
focusing  on central  bank  models  and  thus  complement  the  work  of  Wieland et  al.
(2016).    
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3.3 Modelling Issues and Failures
“The 2008 economic crash led to remarkable shifts  of opinion among world
leaders.  Does  this  crisis  create  favourable  conditions for  the  reform  and
revitalisation of economics itself—from a subject dominated by mathematical
techniques  to  a  discipline more  oriented  to  understanding  real-world
institutions and actors?”,  Geoffrey M. Hodgson (2009)
In this section this work assesses the main issues with the variety of economic models
midst questions such as: Could economists have modelled the butterfly effect of the
sub-prime crisis triggering the much larger, but closely related burst of the CDO market
bubble,  not  envisaged by the FED models before they started increasing the policy
rates47? Will extending the Taylor rule with the private and Government public debt
terms, or a separate bank-leverage targeting/control help?
Though this chapter focuses on bringing-up the DSGE specific issues, it as well brings
those more general issues related to various types of economic models as long as they
are also applicable to DSGE models.
3.3.1 Insufficiency of pure R.E. theory: Animal Spirits and Herd Behaviour
It was even in the aftermath of the Great Depression that a few authors (e.g. Keynes
1936),  pointed  out  that  one  of  the  main  causes  for  the  crash  was  irrational  panic,
herding, and “Animal Spirit” instincts that greatly contributed to the market crush and
its spread throughout the economy.  Some other authors also pointed out the similar
herding behaviour being observed in the wake of the 2007 crisis and blamed it for the
acceleration of the crisis (Akerlof and. Shiller 2009).  It is difficult to assess to which
47 In a recent speech at the Thirteenth Annual International Banking Conference, on 23 rd September 2010,
P. Volcker said “he found it inconceivable that complex financial products were developed over the last
few years  without  any updated oversight.  He mentioned a  subprime mortgage  market  exceeding $1
trillion and $60 trillion in credit default swaps.” Thus, the CDSs market exceeded 60 times the value of
value of the sub-prime mortgages and contributed consequently more to the crisis than the sub-primes..
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extent and whether the Animal (herd) spirit was a cause or just an accelerator for those
crises. It is also likely that the crises may not have become crises and could have stayed
minor recessions if there was no such herd behaviour widespread among the agents that
was accelerating the downturn. I therefore dedicate a separate chapter to Analysis of
Rationality and the Critiques of the Pure Rational Expectations theory, Animal spirits
and herd behaviour (see further below).
3.3.2 Beyond the Single Representative Agent: Heterogeneous Agents 
Models
One of the main issues with the classic macro-economic models is that they assume that
a single representative agent may be used to model macro-economic behaviour at the
aggregate level. 
3.3.2.1 A Brief Introduction to Heterogeneous Agents Models (HAMs): 
Heterogeneous agents simulation models such as EURACE (der Hoog, et  al.  2009)
integrate and combine a variety of traditional micro and macro models and use Monte-
Carlo simulation of economic agents segmented by various criteria such as geographic
position and economic role whilst integrating a large variety of traditional micro and
macro-economic  models.  The  HAMs are  departing  from the  representative  rational
agent models into an area of modelling and the behavioural aspects of a range of non-
rational and rational expectations of aggregate groups (segments) of agents.
First  examples  of  modern  heterogeneous  agent  models  date  from  the  mid-1990s:
Krusell and Smith (1998) analyse an equilibrium with boundedly rational agents whose
forecasting  converges  with  learning  over  time  to  a  near-rational  one.  Whilst  early
algorithms relied mainly on pure simulation procedures, a variety of new algorithms
based on perturbation around fixed point (e.g. static or dynamic steady state), or, global
solution  based  on  projection  combined  with  simulation  and  either  polynomials  or
splines of moments point are better suited to solving larger models (Algan et al. 2010).
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For example, more recently, Lansing (2011) includes asset prices in a macro-economic
model  to  addresses  the  equity-risk  premium  puzzle.  He  examines  the  effect  of  a
concentration of assets in a small Ricardian–type subset of heterogeneous household
agents on an increasing of the equity-risk premium that he finds to be related to the
higher volatility of their  consumption, itself dependant on asset returns significantly
more than is the case with generalised representative agent’s consumption. 
The HA models'  accuracy is  usually measured  through the  R2 or  standard  error  of
regression but more potent measures are suggested (Den Haan, Judd, Juillard 2010,
Algan et al.  2010). Authors focus their models on different behavioural aspects and
types of heterogeneous agents e.g.:
 The  more  and  less  (bounded)  rational  entrepreneur  macro  agents  (e.g.  see
Levine, Pearlman Perendia and Yang 2009-2012). (An overview of the literature
and an  exploration  of  issues  of  rationality,  rational  inattention  and bounded
rationality will be given in more detail later in the text).
 Parallel "Ricardian" saving and "Keynesian" cash-strapped households (Batini
et al. 2008 and Iacoviello 2005).
 Weighted averages of the expectations of the fundamentalists and the chartists’
investment predictions (Westerhoff 2009 and Gwilym2009).
3.3.2.2. Estimating Heterogeneous Agent Models
On the other hand, the main problems with the pure traditional HA simulation models
(HAMs)  is  the  estimation  of  the  initial  parameters  from  the  historical  data  series
(Hommes, 2005). However, as few recent papers prove (e.g. Haan  and Ocaktan 2009,
Batini et al. (2008), Curdia and Woodford (2009), De Negri et al. (2009), Furceri and
Mourougane (2009) and Levine, Pearlman Perendia and Yang 2009-2012)  DSGE and
Kalman filters may be used for estimating and simulation of simpler HA models too.
Aiming to test and overcome the potential shortcomings of the single representative
agent models and the issues with estimation of the HAM, Hommes (2009) applies a
59
Sorger-Hommes model of consistent expectation equilibrium for asset price market. He
concludes  that  the models with two-type heterogeneous investor  agents,  one with a
variety of sophisticated forecasting on one end, and a naïve expectation,  p t  = pt-1 on the
other, generate negative autocorrelation on prices. Though they will converge to RE
models  of  asset  market  prices  in  stable  conditions,  they will  diverge into unstable,
highly volatile systems in less stable conditions. The author also suggests that simple,
naïve expectation agents may need to be replaced or complemented by a third type of
adaptive expectation ones, which seems a direction worth pursuing in future research.
Few others (e.g. Kirman 2009 and Gabaix 2016) conclude that,  due to the inherent
complexity of markets, a model that includes the interactive dynamics of heterogeneous
agents provides a better basis for the modelling of market aggregate behaviour than a
model of single representative agent.
On similar lines, Gwilym (2009) and Westerhoff (2009) also points to the importance of
the interaction of heterogeneous agents in forming of the asset market dynamic. The
author analyses the volatility of exchange rate markets and its agents’ heterogeneity. He
identifies  two  types  of  traders:  the  fundamentalists  as  those  who  are  bringing  the
stabilising, negative (the long-run converging) feedback effect that is opposed to the
actions  of  the  other  group  consisting  of  technical,  chartist,  traders  who  follow
(whatever) the current trend is and bring the destabilising, positive feedback effect to
the asset markets dynamics.
Note: A more detailed discussion of the heterogeneous agent models is provided
later in the text. 
60
3.3.3 Complexity in Economic Systems
A few other authors, such as Chen (2010), go a step further and argue for the use of
heterogeneous agents models based on the evolutionary and stochastic, physical chaos-
type models in economics.
Chen (2010) identifies two main strands of Real Business Cycle (RBC) theories; the
exogenous shock driven cycles based on Frisch’s work and endogenous ones based on
Samuelson.  He  also  sees  two  main  versions  of  optimisation-equilibrium  business
cycles.  Whilst  the  New  Classical  school  lead  by  Lucas  focuses  on  the  effects  of
monetary shocks, he claims that the RBC mainly studies the effects of technological
shocks  as  the  main  source  of  external  shocks.  Whilst  Lucas  uses  many agents  on
isolated  islands  and  models  estimated  using  Log-Likelihood  (LL),  RBC  uses
representative agent on HP filtered data. 
Chen claims  that  both models  however  omit  to  take  into  account  the  law of  large
numbers and central limit theorem states that a system with N independent uncorrelated
elements has standard deviation in the order of N-1/2 (pp 252). He then takes the stance
of Classic economists and concludes that micro-fluctuations in large economies with a
large number of agents N cannot result in macroeconomic fluctuations of such a large
order as business cycles and micro-foundation models cannot explain the persistency of
macroeconomic business cycles. (However, Chen is admitting that relative deviation of
perfectly co-ordinated N events will be of same order as of its elements .
Chen then observes that a relative small deviation in the US real economy, compared to
the financial  economy,  implies that  the real  economy is  driven by monopolistically
behaved large corporations48. He states the fluctuations in the financial markets may be
influencing the business cycles more than it would be possible for the real producer and
labour market to influence the cycles together.
48 I.e. driving the price fluctuations followed by the majority of smaller companies, the price-takers
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Chen states that the representative agent-based RBC model has N=1 and behaves as a
perfectly co-ordinated set of N agents. On the other hand, Lucas’ many-agent model of
overlapping  generations  behaves  in  similar  fashion  because  it  is  solved  as  a
representative  agent  model.  He  identifies  three  main  potential  sources  of  business
cycles:
1. non-linear macro-economic dynamics,
2. structure and the interaction dynamics of financial and real economies
3. macro foundations of the micro-economy 
In Chen’s view, Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972) had opposing views of rationality, the
former saw it as way to overcome price fluctuations through arbitrage, the latter as a
way to amplify price fluctuation through enforcing common, simultaneous beliefs and
their resulting behaviour (self-fulfilling prophecies).
It  appears  from  Chen’s  discussion  that  the  more  agents  believe  in  natural  rate
equilibrium, the more they can take an arbitrage opportunity over the minority of those
driven  by  fluctuations  and  the  more  they  then  can  take  advantage  of  driving  the
economy towards the rationally expected “natural” equilibrium through self-fulfilling
prophecy. However, the opposite is true too: the more agents believe in an incoming
disequilibrium (or a new equilibrium target) the more it is likely to materialise and then
arbitraging around the old equilibrium may show to be disadvantageous.  Chen thus
refers to rational expectation as a self-defeating prophecy.
Aoki  and  his  colleagues  argue  on  similar  lines  (Aoki  2005,  Aoki  2006,  Aoki  and
Yoshikawa 2008 and Aoki and Yoshikawa 2011) and claim that the representative agent
based micro-foundational macro models such as the NK DSGE must be superseded by
the  stochastic  physics  based  models  of  behaviour  of  random clusters  of  numerous
heterogeneous agents, each following its own Markov-Chain distribution. Consequently
the  new  stochastic  models,  with  two-parameter  Poisson-Dirichlet  distribution  of
innovations  are non-self-averaging and hence are not automatically converging to the
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single steady state equilibrium but diverging to at least two and potentially to an infinite
continuum of sunspot equilibria. He explains the ongoing problem with stagnation in
the  Japanese  economy  by  the  occurrence  of  uncertainty  trap,  a  phenomenon  that
parallels liquidity trap and questions the matching model of the labour market derived
by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). 
More precisely, whilst the most of the current macroeconomics theorists assume that
processes are IID (independently and identically distributed), and hence result in self-
averaging outcomes, the multiplicative variables and the likelihood of correlated shocks
may  result  in  exponential  probability  distributions  leading  to  non-self-averaging
systems.  The  earlier  mentioned  uncertainty  trap  pertains  to  the  agent’s  uncertainty
about the future benefits of some decision and it is measured by entropy, the Shannon
(1948)’s relative information level measure of making the decision midst uncertainty.
Therefore, Aoki and Yoshikawa claim that it is not realistic to have a micro-foundation
where all  agents,  regardless of their  size and position face the same micro-founded
shock, a position which could then be more aligned to Chen’s earlier mentioned critique
that shocks mainly have macro, not micro foundations.
3.3.3.1 Comments on Aoki and Chen
One may argue that such stochastic modelling of agent behaviour, based on stochastic
physics, however omits to account for the endogeneity and mass (herd) behaviour of
heterogeneous agents. In addition, they are trying to impose a model more akin to those
that govern a more normative, the so-called efficient market based costing models used
in the finance area.
On the other hand, the notion and the model of the uncertainty trap may be rewritten in
a different, more economically inherent manner.  The classical economist’s view that
the representative agent is a plausible base for modelling macroeconomic dynamics
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because actions of one set of agents that is shifting economy off-its equilibrium in one
direction is fully offset and neutralised by another, equally weighted and important set
of agents acting on the opposite end of equilibrium, seems invalid and ungrounded. In
the state of higher uncertainty and large number of agents, as raised by Aoki, economic
systems will have a larger number of agents making decisions that are sub-optimal at an
absolute level that is not offset by other agents acting sub-optimally but their common
actions are additive, leading the whole economy to act further away from the optimal
equilibrium, thus, acting in a higher order (level) disequilibria.  In other words, the
potential  uncertainty  trap  Nash  (the  “2nd best”)  equilibrium that  the  economy will
operate-in during the times of high uncertainty will therefore be further away from the
welfare  maximising  or  the  Pareto  optimal  one  and  it  may  not  be  self-averaging
(converging) either.
To illustrate this, let us assume a multi-dimensional bell-shaped, concave hill-surface,
which defines the possible limiting outcomes for the economy’s portfolio’s efficient
frontier  and the  optimal  equilibrium representing  by its  maximum point.  However,
instead of the economy’s states/movements being limited to the surface, let us assume
that the surface only limits the efficient frontier and that its position can be anywhere
within  the  volume  that  that  surface  delimits.  If  all  agents  are  acting  close  to  the
maximising equilibrium the economy as a whole will be there (“close to the green hill-
top”) too. If however many of them, in time of uncertainty act away from it, in their
own sub-optimal positions with the high standard deviation from the optimal one, the
economy as a whole will be in a state of lingering somewhere in the inner space below
the efficient frontier boundary and below the best of the welfare maximising optimum
Nash equilibria (“meandering buried within the caves and the mines below the green
hill-top”).
3.3.3.2 Spatial and Hierarchical DSGE
Despite  EU  unification,  its  countries  retain  substantial  economic  and  geographic
differences. Such heterogeneous, complex organisation is suitable for the application of
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geographic and spatial economic analysis methods such as those suggested by Krugman
(1997/2002), and Krugman et al. (2001) and for their integration into DSGE the macro-
modelling suite. 
An adoption and integration of the hierarchical state-space models (Aoki 1996, pp 29-
40) or its derivative seems also suitable for the above data-rich models and spatially
oriented  estimation.  Its  application  is  well  suited  to  projects  aimed  at  modelling
economic space  or  markets  segmentations  such as  models  in  deWalque,  Smets  and
Wouters (2005).
3.3.4 Dynamic Economic Pricing
One of the most common product pricing approaches in NK DSGE modelling is to use
Cournot’s equilibrium pricing based price convergence towards the marginal cost due
to diminishing margins with the number of participating competitive firms within a
monopolistic competition framework. This equilibrium is, however, dependent on the
economy operating within a non-increasing (e.g. constant or even diminishing) return to
scale  technology environment  and within  an increasingly competitive,  large  market
with many participants (see e.g. Vives (2001), pp110). However, this equilibrium fails
if the economy is either monopolistic, oligarchic and either small or operating within
increasing returns to scale technology, all of what is nowadays widely accepted within
the new international trade economics paradigm. 
In uncertain demand conditions, the pricing of any durable but even more so, of those
non-durable, perishable, non-renewable, non-transportable or time limited goods (e.g.
food produce and services including transport or event tickets) has been made dynamic
to  follow  so  called  “economic”  dynamic  pricing  approaches  such  as  revenue
management or yield management. These are based on computational automation and
electronic points of sale such as internet (Bitran and Caldentey 2003 and Courty 2003).
The new technologies such as internet allow for more dynamic price changes. It is,
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however  also  worth  investigating  further  and  possibly  confirming  whether  if
technological  developments  and  related  practices  in  recent  years,  such  as  internet
shopping, market monitoring and electronic pricing, has led to substantially lower price
rigidities  and consequently the lower Calvo type probability of  keeping prices  in  a
(quarter) period fixed, i.e. a measure of price rigidity, p, identified in this research.
The introduction of electronic sales mechanisms such as internet sales means that prices
may be adjusted not only once within a year quarter but automatically, possibly even as
frequently as several times within each trading day (which may also last 24 hours). This
means that the Calvo index of price rigidity has gone through a substantial structural
change in the last ten years since online and dynamic pricing started to be introduced.
However, whilst reducing price stickiness, those technological advances and dynamic
pricing methods are likely to introduce an increased level of volatility and complexity
in price levels as well as in the market values of companies’ shares.
3.3.5 Modelling Methodology Issues: Determinacy and Sunspots
3.3.5.1 Demand Constrained Equilibria 
In a series of preceding articles and in his latest book, Roger A. E Farmer claims that
Keynesian animal spirits and self-fulfilling prophecies can lead to numerous inefficient
equilibria  with  different,  market  confidence  dependent,  (“natural”)  levels  of
employment (Benhabib and Farmer 1999, Bennett and Farmer 2000 and, Farmer 2009a
and 2010). He is criticising the would-be-saviour attitude among the world politicians
rushing  to  implement  Keynesian  strategies  in  the  2007  Great  Recession  affected
countries.  However,  politicians  can  only use what  is  available,  and,  in  independent
central bank regimes, they are restricted to the fiscal intervention tools only.
Farmer (2009a) distinguishes between rational classic economy investors who value
shares  on  basis  of  fundamentals  and  dividend  returns  and  the  Keynesian  economy
investors who trade on asymmetric information and hope that in future shares will be
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valued by other investors higher or lower than their current price are:
“When  households  remain  pessimistic  for  a  long  period  of  time,  they
undervalue  the  stock  market.  If  this  pessimism persists,  it  will  cause  some
households to reduce their purchases of consumption goods. … Firms will be
unable  to  sell  all  of  the  goods  they  produce  and  will  lay  off  workers.  ….
Dividends, profits and investment will all fall and the initial pessimistic view of
the future will become self-fulfilling.”(ibid.)
Farmer (2009a)  then introduces Demand Constrained Equilibria as an alternative to
RBC theory and claims that there is one such equilibrium for each state of long-term
expectations,  each  related  to  the  self-fulfilling  prophecies  of  different  relevant
confidence levels (“Animal Spirits”). Following upon their earlier work in Benhabib
and Farmer (1999),  Farmer, Khramov and Giovanni (2015) provide a different solution
to a standard DSGE model which also points to existence of multiple, so called to sun-
spot  equilibria  in  a  NK  model  but  without  significantly  large  modifications  to  a
standard  (Dynare)  DSGE  package  and  without  use  of  asymmetric  imperfect
information as used in  Lubik,  Matthes and Mertens (2016, see par.  5.8) and shows
equivalence of his solution with one of their earlier works on the same subject.
3.3.5.2 Financial Equilibrium
Farmer and  Geanakoplos (2008) develop  a  model  of  an  alternative,  financial
equilibrium as opposed to general one. They state that only economic models in which
at least some agents act in rational manner are the equilibrium model  candidates. In
Arrow  and  Debreu’s  general  equilibrium,  the  allocation  is  Pareto  efficient.  The
financial market equilibrium is also Pareto efficient if the market is complete and has
payable  securities  for  all  of  its  possible  states.  However,  “When  markets  are
incomplete, a benevolent and wise dictator can almost always make everyone better off
simply by taxing and subsidizing the existing security trades “ (ibid, pp14). Because
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allocation efficiency in modern financial economies cannot be shown to be sustainable,
economists  adopted  informational  efficiency as  a  measure  of  an  efficient  financial
market where prices are expected to be martingales leaving no player with a sustained
informational advantage. Because it does not rely on agent’s utility function, which is
difficult to estimate, the authors claim that such an arbitrage (free) efficient state of
economy is a better-fixed point for financial economy than a (general) equilibrium.
In an early analysis of the incoming recession of 2007 (in the first version of the article)
the  authors  pointed  that  rational  expectations  based  on  fear  of  future  defaults  and
foreclosures was likely to drive the banks to seek larger deposits and so to drive the
existing sub-prime borrowers out of the re-mortgage market for new loans. In turn, this
was,  causing  further  defaults  and  further  drop  in  the  housing  prices  and  thus
foreclosures, concluding that equilibrium models do not stand the scrutiny of historical
and psychological facts and recommend alternative, dis-equilibrium based models of
the economy based on natural models such as gas-physics, biological or genetic ones.
The authors however, do not seem to take into account that those natural models do not
suffer  from (and hence  do not  model  adequately)  the  non-linear  effects  of  rational
expectations  which may be providing positive feedback towards  extreme non-linear
fluctuations  rather  than  driving  the  economy  by  means  of  a  stabilising,  negative
feedback.  Nevertheless,  their  observation  is  still  valid  considering  that  a  non-linear
dynamic of agent’s psychology based in rational expectations may create much larger
fluctuations  than  that  assumed  by  any  of  the  commonly  used  economic  models
including the recent DSGE ones.
3.4 Credit Issues and 2007-08 Crisis
In this section, we revisit and discuss credit-modelling issues from perspective of recent
developments and 2007/8 crisis. 
As pointed earlier, in his well-known PhD thesis and the related publications, Bernanke
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(1983) and (1995), the author explains causes of the Great depression as the loss of
confidence in the banking system and debtor insolvency (in part caused by the doubling
of debt service cost/GDP ratio from 1929 to 1933). Bernanke sees roots of the Great
Depression's prolonged effect in increased (agency) costs of financial intermediation in
the post-crash economy, in contractionary policy that triggered it, and in negative credit
supply shock effected through increased interest rates.  This is, he claims, in line with
the  monetarist  views of  Freedman and Schwartz  that  banking difficulties  created  a
money shortage  leading  to  an  aggregate  output  downturn  and caused  the  financial
crash.
In  addition,  the  milestone  joint  paper,  Bernanke  and Gertler  (1989) introduced  the
notion  of  a  financial  accelerator  as  a  non-linear,  pro-cyclical  market  fluctuation  in
response to, and accelerating the effects of the fluctuations in corporate borrowers’ net-
worth and the lender’s agency cost channel due to asymmetric information.  However,
their financial accelerator model is not sufficient to explain and capture the non-linear
dynamics in highly indebted markets affected by credit rationing and the recessionary
debt accelerators,  a novel  type of accelerator  introduced and explained later  in  this
research work49. 
BGG (1999) however pay little attention to models of households' debt and the effects
of  the  financial  accelerator  on  consumption  of  any  long-term  loan  or  mortgage
constrained households  or  businesses  midst  increased  interest  rate  conditions.  Their
model  of  consumption  therefore  may  not  fully  reflect  the  effect  of  the  financial
accelerator since in their model the accelerator affect was applied only to entrepreneurs
and not households. 
In  addition,  most  macroeconomic  models  consider  only  the  borrowings  of
entrepreneurs and exclude households (e.g. financial accelerator of BGG (1996)) and,
for simplicity, assume one-period loans only. They assume that a high interest rate only
49 As also mentioned earlier, it may be however that the effect of B&G financial accelerator is over-
estimated as the other accelerators are not being modelled and their effects estimated.
69
deters  from further  borrowing.  They do not  consider  the  effect  of  the  interest  rate
increase  in  conjunction  with  longer  term  loans,  taken  by  either  entrepreneurs  or
households locked in illiquid assets (e.g. real estate) that cannot be easily liquidated and
how  this  will  become  an  additional  burden  on  operational  or  house-expenditure
cashflow (as similarly raised by e.g. Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Cecchetti (2006)). This
is an additional loan rate rise triggered financial accelerator (decelerator) which this
research work introduces and refers to as the recessionary debt accelerator (see later
explanation and relation to Fisher’s debt deflator).
This effect on firms holding longer-term loans has been reflected upon in the earlier
version  of  their  paper  BGG(1996) Also,  most  of  household  models  assume  bond
holdings but not loan holdings, assuming possibly that loan holdings can be modelled
by negative bond holding but interest rates on loans tend to be higher and differ even
more from the deposit or bond rates in recessions accelerating interest rate effect on the
household consumption even more.  
The BGG’s financial accelerator functional model is based on increased agency costs in
recessions, despite author’s attempt to give it power to explain many of the non-linear
cyclical fluctuations50. Its functional explanation is also a restricted simplification in
comparison to the wider notion of credit rationing models by Greenfield and Stiglitz:
Hence, the model simplifications made by BGG are that employment is fixed and that
the  household  is  infinitely  living  and  it  uses  only  one-term  loans.  The  model  is,
therefore,  unaffected by the effect  of long term,  (overhung) loans that trigger debt-
accelerator and recessionary trend in conditions of interest rate increase. They hence
wrongly assume that the inflation targeting driven increase of interest rates exceeding
inflation will  simply reduce the demand for (new) loans but they omit  to take into
account effect of the existing, long-term loans on consumption. 
50As noted earlier, effect and importance of BGG's financial accelerator may be overestimated and overly
generalised because it may aggregate effects of other acclerators, such as debt-accelerator, not being 
modelled or their effects estimated separately.
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3.4.1 Housing Prices and Borrowing Constraints
Whilst Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) explore in detail effects of credit rationing on
businesses,  Jilek and Matousek (2010),  pp 204-207,  complement  their  work with a
comprehensive overview of the effects of interest rate increases on the monetary policy
credit  channel, modern credit  and money creation channel within the banks and the
budget constraints  of mortgage indebted households (for effects  of banks as money
creators, see also Jakab and Kumhof 2015).
De la  Dehesa  (2010) points  to  twelve  main  systems’ failures  leading to  the  recent
financial  crisis  and  the  regulatory  failures  among  them.  The  author  also  criticises
central banks for using DSGE models that do not consider housing and financial asset
price  bubbles,  or  unemployment,  whilst  wrongly  assuming  market  efficiency  and
agents’ full rationality.  That observation however applies equally to a range of older,
structural models used by central bank. For example, although the Bank of England’s
MPC structural  Quarterly  model  (Harrison et  al.  (2005))  considers  the  inflation of
mortgage interest payments  (eq. B.47) as a proxy and as a weighted component of
RPI index and housing rent  as  a  weighted component  of  CPI,  the  mortgage  levels
versus  total  GDP are not  considered.  Whilst  the model  with mortgage and housing
rental  prices included in inflation indices handles well  the influence of inflation on
future housing moves and decisions, the problem is that it does not handle well, if at all,
the rigidity fixed spending for the already existing mortgages and long-term rentals, the
credit  card and other  bank loans.  Those will  persist  at  least  for  a  while  after  falls,
affecting the indebted household’s other consumption disproportionally.  Even worse,
households with negative mortgage equity may not be able to part with their increased
obligations  for  much  longer,  facing,  and  sometimes  even  entertaining,  bankruptcy
option as the only ones remaining.  
The roots of the problem are: 
1. there is no model for financial intermediaries such as banks in the model,
2. the model  uses a  single representative agent’s  household which has various,
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including government  and corporate  debt  assets  but,  consequently to  (a),  no
household bank  loans  or  mortgage  debts  figure  in  the  model.  Only  the
government and corporate debt explicitly figure in the model: 
“Financial intermediaries are not modelled explicitly in BEQM, so households 
are assumed to hold financial assets directly, including those which in practice 
are held on their behalf by pension funds and other financial companies. We 
also use a narrow definition of money, so households’ holdings of deposits with 
monetary financial institutions and household sector debt are not separately 
identified.” (ibid, pg. 95)
However,  the illiquid pension fund savings, consisting of government and corporate
bonds in reality could not be disposed of in exchange for liquid funds by households
when needed. Consequently,  the effect  of changes in  the bank interest  rate  (e.g.  its
increase) on indebted household’s consumption and its consequent effect on aggregate
consumption could not have been forecasted by the model properly. 
Iacoviello  (2005) is  one of  the  first  authors  to  extend the  complete  BGG financial
friction  macro-economic  DSGE models  with  a  model  of  the  pro-cyclical  effects  of
housing prices and overhung loans on households’ credit and resulting consumption. He
is using three heterogeneous categories of consumers, two of which are two types of
households: the savings (i.e. patient) ones and the non-savings, impatient ones whose
future discounting factor “ is much larger than that of the patient ones ‘ and who tend
to  borrow  money  to  conduct  spending  (“>  r>  ‘).  The  latter  face  a  borrowing
constraint, which is a function of the collateralizable fraction of the expected value of
their housing investment. However, the impatient group generally includes the cash-
constrained households that are not in a position to save and tend to spend their income.
Housing boom and rising price periods then allow liquidity constrained households to
increase their consumption beyond their usual income constraints using their house as
collateral  for  consumption  loans.   The  simulated  model  shows  that  there  is  a
consumption  increase  following  a  housing  price  shock  but  likewise  a  substantial
reduction in consumption as a result of an interest rate rise.  
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Iacoviello  (2005)  also  introduces  and  augments  his  model  with  another  type  of
accelerator – a demand shock driven effect of asset and interest rate rises allowing for
higher  collateralised loans  and even more  demand (and the  opposite,  supply shock
“decelerator”).  This  demand  shock  accelerator  is  however  different  from  and  is
eventually dampened by the recessionary “debt accelerator” (decelerator)  introduced
and explained in this research. This shock results from a rise in loan interest rates in an
already highly indebted economy (see earlier explanation).
Similar to Levine et al. (2008-2012), only one, the former group, is the only group that
follows the rational consumption model (in log-linearised form): 
 logC1,t = log C1,t+1 – rt                                                                          (3.4.1.1)
However, similar to the findings of Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Iacoviello also shows
that there is no significant benefit in adding housing asset prices to the monetary policy
Taylor type rule for the stabilisation of output. 
Note: Later in the text this research work will return to Iacoviello’s model to reproduce
some of original IRF simulations and analyse his work in more detail.
The importance of targeting, or at least considering, housing assets in macroeconomic
models has been emphasised by Cecchetti (2006). He points out that policymakers must
distinguish between equity and housing assets for several reasons; the efficient markets
hypothesis  may not  be  as  applicable  to  housing as  to  equity markets;  that  housing
represents  assets  in  the  hands  of  a  wider  population  than  equity  assets,  which  are
restricted to high income recipients only and finally housing has much more leveraged
so  its value fluctuations may be potentially affecting economy as whole.
Philipon and Midrigan (2011) use  a  cash  in  advance  (CIA)  model  to  show how a
decline  in  house  equity  borrowing  contributed  to  the  acceleration  of  the  recent
recession and explain regional correlation between the housing debt leverage and the
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unemployment.
Figure 3.4.1.1 Reproduced from Philipon and Midrigan (2011) showing regional (i.e.
individual US states) correlation between the housing debt leverage and the
unemployment increase in those regions (US states).
Cobham (2012) provides an overview of the literature on the relation of central banks
and house prices in the run-up to the crisis. He argues, in conclusion, they neglected the
issue of house asset prices and that they should have used an additional mechanism to
target those assets. He, however, does not provide an analytical model or any proof of
the beneficial effect of such policy.
3.5 Responses to the recent criticisms of DSGE
“A modern economy is not globally stable. Theories that assume that the economy is a
stable general equilibrium system, albeit beset with some frictions and imperfections,
do not hold true in general. The instabilities that such theories ignore are precisely
those problems that should be the particular responsibility of macroeconomists.”, from
Leijonhufvud (2009)
On the other side of  the camp, Hendry and Mizon (2014),  and Hendry, (2016) strongly
criticize DSGE models and outline fundamental econometric arguments to explain why
they inevitably fail in time of crises such as 2007/8. The main cause they find is that the
models fail when distribution shifts in context of regime change (also in  Muellbauer
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(2016)).  However,  Dynare  DSGE  package  already  has  Markov  regime  switching
mechanisms incorporated and the recent work by Maih (2015) even further improves
efficiency of the perturbation methods for solving regime-switching (and distribution
changing) DSGE models and their ability to fit the major structural changes.
Muellbauer (2016) (and  Duca and Muellbauer (2013))  parallels some of the already
discussed criticisms of DSGE models,  particularly that of its  inability to  cope with
regime switching or their use of single, rational representative agent. Another aspect the
author is focusing the criticisms is the REPIH (or Rational Expected Permanent Income
hypothesis) assumed by very frequently used Euler equation of consumption and that it,
or  its  augmented  versions,  do  not  reflect  the  real  life  empirical  findings.  This  is
specially the case with the cash-constrained or heavily indebted households that may
face liquidity and bank-credit shortage problems once their main collateral asset, their
real  estate,  depletes in value.  His additional comments  that  NK-DSGE do not  have
debt, credit, money or liquidity constraints are also along the lines of  this and other
related and referred research that has already shown great importance of those issues in
analysis of the 2007/8 crises and has been partially addressed by other authors (e.g.
Iacoviello and Neri (2010)).  The author then suggests an extension of the usual Euler
based consumption equation in DSSGE by adding missing values: “an indicator of
income uncertainty,  ...  liquid  assets  minus  debt,  ….illiquid  financial  assets  and ….
gross housing wealth.” as well as four time-varying parameters derived as functions of
credit conditions: the secured housing liquidity index (HLI) and the unsecured credit
condition  index  (CCI).  This  extension  represents  a  remarkable  improvement  in
modelling of unsecured credit and housing collateral driven consumption rise between
1990s and 2005.
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3.5.1 Responses to Romer Critique
Another, more recent critique in Paul Romer (2016) lecture and the follow-up article
which are sharply criticising economic models,  particularly DSGE and those which
ignore simple facts that a monetary tightening can cause recession and shows that on
example of two recessions triggered in early 1980s and I shall refer to this henceforth as
“Romer  critique”.  Whilst  this  research  agrees  and  also  argues  that  such  monetary
tightening can cause crisis and shows that for the case of 2007-8, I also agree that he
quite rightly states that too many observations have been left out of the DSGE models,
(which is what this research also argues in case of household debt and its effect on
liquidity of the households midst the US Fed rate rise leading to 2007 crisis), or that the
effect  of  the  real  policy rate  rise  has  been  side-lined  even by the  New Keynesian
authors such as Smets and Wouters (e.g. in their 2007 paper,). Whilst that sidelining of
effects  of  monetary tightening  is  also  something  this  research  already points  to,  it
however appears that Romer misses some of the points, namely the point of the Smets
and Wouters (2007) model. For example, he states that there are only 7 variable and
equations. - there are in fact 14 endogenous variables and equations but only seven are
observed  whilst  the  other  seven  are  unobserved  (and,  in  addition,  there  are  seven
shocks).
Nevertheless, Romer raises other important questions in relation to DSGE models such
as role of (un-observed) technology shocks as well as other shocks, which have been
brought-in in numerical identification role rather than being realistic and measurable
shocks.51
Another recent article,  that of Olivier Blanchard (2016) on DSGE modelling is less
confrontational and more compromising, and so, more similar to the approach of this
research. E.g. whilst criticising some aspects of DSGE, he is also stating that they have
future  after  a  number  of  adjustments  and  a  better  integration  into  the  rest  of  the
economic theory and modelling. His argument that the models should be based more on
51Romer mentions reading Dynare user guide but does not quote it as a literature reference.
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realistic consumer behaviour has partially been already addressed by the extensions to
DSGE  modelling  pursued  throughout  this  research,  e.g.  as  part  of  heterogeneous
adaptive  and  rational  agents  in  Levine,  Pearlman,  Perendia  and  Yang (2009-2012),
saving (patient) and borrowing (in-patient) agents in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello &
Neri  (2010),  borrowing  and  saving  in  Curdia  and  Woodford  (2009),  Furceri  and
Mourougane (2009),  De Negri  et  al.  (2009), multi-country-agent  -  Hann,  Judd and
Juillard (2010) and others.  His final conclusion does not seem to be new either:  his
suggestion that DSGE models should be used in conjunction, as complements rather
than as substitute to their models, as already stated and identified in this research work,
has been already a practice commonly used in  larger  central  bank institutions (e.g.
BoE). 
Taylor (2016) claims that there was probably a new form of accelerator acting during
2007-2007 crisis and refers to Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014) (CMR14) work
on “Risk Shocks where authors introduce risk shock accelerator akin to the agency cost
accelerator defined in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999, BGG) where idiosyncratic
capital investment uncertainties are referred to as risks  whose fluctuations coincide
with  real  business  cycles  and  rising  shocks  coincide  with  recessions.   They  keep
referring  to  that  measure  as  uncertainty  though  the  theory  of  risk  and  uncertainty
strictly  distinguishes  risk  as  measurable  and  estimable  whilst  uncertainty  as
unmeasurable  one,  and,  to  be  consistent,  this  capital  investment  risk  referred  to  as
uncertainty remains unobservable in their model. I would agree that this effect can be
an additional bi-directional financial accelerator, either into, or out of, a recession. 
Whilst  it  would  primarily  influence  economy  through  its  effects  on  investment
decisions, and consequently but secondarily, through increased (reduced) required risk
premium and agent monitoring costs, and, reduced (increased) value of base collateral
assets (along the lines of BGG financial accelerator), the risk shocks do not come on
their own right but as symptoms or results of observations of news of major exogenous
or  endogenous  movements.  Also,  risk  shock  is  not  so  mechanically  binding  and
restricting  as  e.g.  a  liquidity  constraint  imposed  by  a  shock  of  an  increased  (or
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decreased) cost of both, existing and new borrowings and the resulting consumption
liquidity constraints. However, once an uncertainty is increased by, e.g. increased cost
of the borrowings and liquidity shortage, this uncertainty/risk accelerator brought in by
CMR14 can act as an additional accelerator working through the investment side of the
economy. 
Though  the  authors  claim  that  the  risk  shocks  are  a  major  driving  factor  for  real
business cycles, they admit that risk shock model cannot explain initial phase of the
2007 recession but only its later development after the crash news: 
“ The initial phase of that [2007} recession seems to have been driven by factors other
than the  risk  shock.  However,  according  to  the  results  the  accelerated  collapse  in
economic activity that occurred in late 2008 was largely due to an increase in risk at
that time “  (ibid)
Their comment is very much in line with the outcome of analysis of the causes of the
2007 crisis  developed and outlined as part  of this  research that the crisis started as
endogenous liquidity shortage and recessionary trend that triggered the financial crash
and the world market contagion.
One explanation and a possible factor in the failure of the economic models to predict
the 2007 crisis are likely to be the relatively slow growths of both, household debt and
house prices. The most of central bank economic models, here including DSGE, utilise
de-trended data and focus on relatively short to mid-term, one to four quarter deviations
from equilibrium whilst the relatively stable and slow growth trends of both, household
debt  did  not  contribute  significant  information  to  those  models  due  to  their  low
frequency of changes and variations and their relatively long trend. Such trends may
have been ignored by the detrending models for that very reason too (see also Farmer
(2012) who is raising the issue of detrending using HP or any similar filters because
they take long-term movements out of the resulting data and out of the economist's
picture though on a different issue). The issue of detrended data sets as well as that of
the estimated models which are then “myopic” for longer trend cycles such as political
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cycles (as raised in that section of this research), or rise of private or sovereign debt,
house prices, or slow but steady reduction of real wages, each spread over longer period
or any other longer business cycles. However, according to Brayton, Davis and  Tulip
(2000),  in  the  US  FED  macro  model,  based  on  a  different  methodology,  that  of
Polynomial Adjustment Costs, the trends are also estimated and forecasted and hence,
the trends of those slow moving variables, if included, would have been also deemed
significant.
 Analysis of the Great Recession crisis outlined in this research however concludes that
some key factors for its potential modelling are missing in their, still closed country
model: private household  debt, model of banks in their effectively new role in creation
and destruction of credit and money rather than acting just as pure intermediaries ( see
e.g. Jakab and Kumhof.(2015)) , or in channelling money in and out of the country for
foreign  investment.  Some other  factors  and  indicators  potentially  contributing  to  a
model  of  real  economy  in  a  such  crisis  but  missing  in  their  model  would  be
bankruptcies of both, large and those numerous small companies or households as a
major sources of economic frictions (and “sinks” of monetary value). 
“Yet  [NK] micro-founded models, the only models deemed acceptable in top
journals  for  both  theoretical  and  empirical  analysis,  are  normally  rather
selective about the data they focus on. Both micro and macro evidence is either
ignored because it is inconvenient, or put on a to do list for further research.
This  is  an  inevitable  result  of  making  internal  consistency  an  admissibility
criteria for publishable work.” (Simon Wren-Lewis (2016) in his comments on
Paul Romer (2016) criticism of macroeconomics , pub. on e-axes)
In a summary, the most of academic models failed to see crisis coming or to model its
long term effects mainly for two reasons: they tend to be smaller in size and number of
variables and observables being taken into account and thus, suffering from a form of
boundedly rational inattention, that is, rationally ignoring available information due to
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extensive  costs  (in  time,  money  and  intellectual  resources)  needed  to  include  and
process them too or, due to under-estimating of their value and importance. Another
part-reason of this under-estimation of their importance and their consequent ignorance
may be  that  such  information  is  not  perceived  or  even  measured  as  beneficial,  or
assessed as significant, in normal times of economy close to some ideal equilibrium,
therefore, researchers optimising their work around more parsimonious models. 
Such  parsimony  is  particularly  prevalent  in  DSGE models  which,  among  the  rest,
require as many exogenous shocks as observables, thus, complicating dimensionality
and estimation of DSGE models as well as explanatory value of, and for, the large
number of different, uncorrelated shocks needed. It may be then in turn raising their
not-completely-undeserved criticism for  being  “out  of  touch with reality”  including
those by some prominent economists (e.g. see Romer (2016)).
One may argue that such models cannot be considered rational expectation models as
they  do  not  utilise  all  relevant  information  available  at  time  t-1  and  thus  have
incomplete information not only about the shocks but also about the relevant variables.
Usual explanation that that models already assume that the agents modelled do have all
information but the modelling econometricians do not. Such systemic explanation may 
Another  issue  with  the  most  of  New-Keynesian  (NK)  micro-founded  models,
frequently used in DSGE models is that the role of government and its spending is most
of the time sporadic, modelled as an external, almost accidental shock, hence, another
useful  source  of  unexpected  and  uncorrelated  shocks  needed  to  balance-off  the
observables in DSGE models,  and thus, not at  all endogenised. Thus, role of such
spending  is  not  sufficient  to  model  a  government  intervening  in  a  counter-cyclical
manner and possibly accelerating regressed economy, and thus, acting in a Keynesian
manner. In the course of this research, an augmented endogenised government spending
DSGE model with the spending rule driven by increase in  unemployment and news-
shocks in addition to the “standard” NK features is also analysed and its advantages
presented. 
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Benchimol  and  Fourcans  (2016)  compare  nine  variations  of  monetary  policy  rules
applied as variations to Smets and Wouters (2007) model and conclude that instead
inflation and real growth gap based rules, ones based on Nominal GDP (NGDP) growth
perform better but that economic stability pursued by the central bank (US Fed) policy
loss function does not necessarily translate in higher well-being for households. 
3.5.2 Discussion: Was the crisis of 2007 caused by failure of DSGE 
models?
Whilst numerous authors see the recent crisis as a complete failure of modern, Neo-
Keynesian economics and the DSGE methodology (e.g. Gordon (2009)), this research
argues that the causes lie elsewhere. 
Firstly, most of the central banks do not rely only on the NK DSGE models but use a
weighted sum of results of a set of small and large systems of equations, VAR and only
some  of  them,  in  conjunction  with  these  other  models,  also  use  DSGE  models.
Therefore, it may have been the effect of the more standard or traditional methods on
the weighted sum and decision that led to the failure and it is after the 2008 crash that
some of the main central banks decided to increase their reliance on DSGE models
instead (e.g. the Bank of England's (BoE) decision to develop a large DSGE model
COMPASS - Burgess et al.(2013))52).
Secondly, more general and complete DSGE models may have been more adequate to
prevent the recent crisis. For example, there have been numerous discussions for a long
time whether oil, energy and house/ Real Estate prices should be included in the index
used for inflation targeting.  If housing and possibly some other asset or commodity
prices were included as a part of the inflation target package, it is possible that the
target  rates  would  have  been  increased  earlier,  thus,  preventing  (or  reducing)  the
52 The Bank of England’s forecasting platform: COMPASS, MAPS, EASE and the suite of models
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housing  market  bubble  so  that  its  bursting  would  have  had  milder  consequences.
However,  the  overall  growth  experienced  in  2003-2007  may  have  been  then
disadvantaged  by  the  resulting  lower  levels  of  borrowing  and  lending  by  many
economic agents (including the governments themselves).
Also, there may have been a model misspecification by the central banks who have
been assuming rational expectations (RE) were the main driving factor for behaviour of
the  agents  rather  than  some  of  the  other,  less  rational  motivations,  for  example,
households may be more driven by, what is this research refers to as lifestyle rigidity
(though more  often  referred  to  as  habit).  A research  should  then  test  if  a  balance
between the lifestyle rigidity (habit) and some sort of adaptive adjustment behaviour is
better in describing household behaviour than the rational expectations. Along those
lines, one should assume also that the consumer sales oriented firms themselves form
their (partially) adaptive behaviour and inflation expectation on basis of so expected
consumer behaviour as has been, for example, shown by Levine, Pearlman, Perendia
and Yang (2009-2012, explained in more detail later in this work).
There is  however  an additional  factor  to be considered.  DSGE and other economic
models which are estimated and calibrated on long term data series assume a near linear
inverse relation between interest rates and consumption, which is affected by a habit,
lifestyle rigidity factor. . However, the sudden rise in interest rates did not only reduce
commercial borrowing , employability and consumption by detracting from borrowing.
It further reduced both the spending power of households with existing loans due to
increased  interest  payable  and  hence  the  demand  for  goods,  thus  accelerating
unemployment. 
Whilst  many authors  (e.g.  Brender  and  Pisani  (2010),  p.164)  blame  the  indecisive
policy of the US FRB after its restructuring and change of Chairman in 2005 and the
slow reduction  of  base  rate  in  the  wake  of  2007  crisis,  this  work  argues  that  the
relatively sharp and high rise in the base rate in the 2004-2006 period towards long
term rate was the main trigger for the bubble bursting and the 2007 dual economic and
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financial crisis through two main channels: 
1. the resulting sudden reduction in the purchasing power of an average household
with mortgage obligations leading towards economic recession, and,
2. a simultaneous, significant burst of sub-prime (and, to a smaller extent, prime)
mortgage  defaults  resulting  from  rise  in  unemployment  and  housing  assets
deflation,  both  in  turn  resulting  from the  recessionary  trend  in  (a).  (this  is
elaborated in more detail later in this work and in Perendia (2015)).
It therefore appears that: 
1. a  too-loose  Fed rate  policy under  Greenspan  (and that  of  Bank of  England
(BoE) in 2001-2004 led to the creation of the combined market asset price and
mortgage bubbles53, 
2. an overly prudish rise of the Fed policy rate under the new leadership in the
2004-2006 period, relative to its long-term levels, may have then contributed to
the bubble bursting.
3. the  maintenance  of  the  high  rate  for  too  long  time,  despite  the  output  and
inflation  reductions  in  2006-2007,  would  have  had then  further  reduced the
Fed's ability to contain the market bubble that eventually burst.
This work then also argues that if the impact of such a rate rise on the consumption of
the households with high mortgages was taken due care within the Fed's future interest
rate setting assessment, then the rise and the resulting reduction in spending power may
not have been so large and sharp, and may not have led to the crisis of such proportions.
53 E.g.  Though Bank of  England considers  Inflation of  mortgage interest  payments  (BoEQM eq.
B.47), it is considered only as a proxy and as a weighted component of RPI index and housing rent as a
weighted component of CPI, mortgage levels and their interest rates are not considered, i.e. only only
rpix RPI excluding mortgage interest payments,   rpxc =Retail price index. excluding mortgage interest
payments and council tax, and , for Inflation the Retail Prices Index (RPI) excluding various housing
factors  (council  tax,  housing depreciation  and  mortgage  interest  payments),  Source:  BoE Quarterly
Model, February 2005.
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3.6 Conclusion
The  primary  focus  of  this  chapter  have  been  issues  in  macroeconomic  modelling,
particularly  in  Dynamic  Stochastic  General  Equilibrium  (DSGE)  models  used  by
macroeconomic planning bodies such as central banks. Whilst many of the critics have
been responded to as being out-dated since DSGE models evolved in their capabilities,
surpassing many of the older limitations that have been raised in many of the critics.
One of the criticisms that is still very valid is that they are complex to implement and
difficult to use and require much more preparation and skills than e.g. VAR or panel
data models. Another is that they tend to require more time and computational power to
run even small,  parsimonious models used by academics but these remarks are not
disqualifying DSGE models for their power of predicting and optimising economy.
Most of other valid remarks are generic for economic modelling in general and not
specific to DSGE so that they cannot be directly blamed for the 2007/8 crisis. One of
most controversial such issues being the existence of multiple possible equilibria rather
than single one. 
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Part 2: Rationality and Partial Information
4 Theories of Rationality in Economics and 
Neuroeconomics
4.1 Introduction
As this research is concerned with modelling aspects of decision making in incomplete
information condition and measuring balance between traditional rational expectation
and  the  adaptive  behaviour  in  economics,  in  this  part  of  the  text  I  would  like  to
introduce the issue of rationality and rational expectation agent in economy,  outline
some of important and more recent developments in area of rationality of economic
agents  since  introduction  of  Von  Neumann–Morgenstern  (VNM)  expected  utility
rational choice decision theory and also, introduce some aspects not so far discussed in
economic literature but deemed important for a better future economic modelling of
heterogeneous economic agents.
To address issues of rational agent, it was deemed important to address in depth nature
of rationality and rational thinking with limited information, either by its in-availability
(bounded rationality), or by rational optimisation of its use (rational inattention), dwell
into the realms of animal spirits and neuropsychology driving our decisions through
developments of neuroeconomics. One of additional aims and results  of this apparent
diversion was to identify if there are reasons for the duality of two models of rationality
in economics, that of the so-called rational choice theory and the other, the rational
expectations (RE) decision. 
Some  of  the  work  developed  here  was,  in  meantime,  in  part,  superseded  by  the
publication  of  Daniel  Kahneman's  work  Kahneman  (2011)54 but,  this  research
complements  and  takes  issue  further  to  point-out  the  likely  reasons  why our  own
empirical  analysis  results  can  be  correct  when  showing  that  only  a  minority  of
54 “Thinking Fast and Slow”
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economic agents act on basis of rational expectations using full available information at
the time. 
4.1.1 What is rationality?
Rational:
“… Opposed to irrational. ….more generally, a commitment to reason as opposed to
faith, prejudice, habit, or any other source of conviction considered to be irrational.”
(DoPh (1979))
As can be seen form the above dictionary quotation, it may be difficult to define what is
that being rational in general and I here present a systematic, step-by-step definition.
For the start,  rationing usually refers to a division of a large unit or an entity into,
usually  a  natural  number  (an  integer)55,  of  smaller  ones.  A  rationalisation for  a
conclusion or a decision can be regarded as a form of “Offering rational explanations in
an  attempt  to  justify  attitudes,  beliefs,  or  behaviour  that  may  otherwise  be
unacceptable.” ((Kaplan (1998), pp.221) . and can be observed from several aspects: 
1. Traditionally it  is  seen as reasoning by dividing the thinking, the reasoning,
process, from its starting point to its conclusion into smaller units (e.g. steps or
thought-ratios) and establishing relations between those steps with an aim to
progress  through  the  path  step-by-step,  from  the  starting  premise  to  the
conclusion (or just to justify and explain such progress) in a causal sequence.
This step-wise concluding process is usually expected to follow its reasoning
steps according to the rules of logic in which case it is referred to as logical
rationalisation. 
2. An  alternative  approach,  introduced  by  Von  Neumann–Morgenstern  (VNM)
expected utility rational choice decision theory, it  is a process of  dividing a
55 Rational numbers are, for example, by definition and their ontology, defined as ones obtained by 
division of one quantity defined by integer (nominartor) by another, non-zero integer number of pieces 
(denoiminator), e.g.: 2/3, 1475794875/2837456598393746
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choice  utility  into  its  quantitatively  proportional,  (rationalised)  goal
constituents, e.g. value/goal dimensions in a vector hyper-space (some of which
may be “rational” and some “irrational”), assigning them certain desire/demand
satisfying weight factors, and constructing the complex utility/goal hyper-plane
as a product of the two vectors, D’=[d1, d2,…dn] and the value V (V’=[v1, v2,
…vn]).
U= D’xV
4.2  Distributed  parallel  processing,  neural  networks  and  stochastic
rationing
Here I would like to provide some shorthand highlights of modern psychology which
may both, corroborate but also challenge classic economic notions of  rationality.
Developments in the 1990s in cognitive sciences led to the development of models of
parallel  distributed  processing  and  the  neural  network  (connectionist)  simulation.
Whilst  the  former  claims  that  the  stages  of  the  staged  (e.g.  decision  tree)  type  of
reasoning can be processed by the human brain in parallel rather than sequentially, the
latter allowed modelling or reasoning and choice assessment that closely resembles a
multi-staged  network  of  nodes,  each  actually  acting  similarly  to  a  Von  Neumann–
Morgenstern (VNM) expected utility rational choice decision value unit (see Stillings et
al. (1987), pg. 300 and Beltratti, Margarita and Terna (1996). The two models can be
considered as closely related and overlapping and further extended by the mathematical
model of probabilistic threshold for decision making (so called Fuzzy-Logic).  They
are both descriptive of human cognitive processing, and prescriptive (i.e. normative) as
models  for  development  of  automated  methods  of  cognitive  processing  in  areas  of
computational artificial intelligence (AI). As such, they are used for the commercial and
the  academic  R&D  applications  (e.g.  in  character  pattern  recognition,  robotics  or
medical research, e.g. see Anderson, G., Collinson, M. and Pym, D. (2013)).
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4.3. Damasio and the role of the prefrontal lobe
In his 1995 book, "Descartes' Error", (and also, in Bechara, Damasio, et al. (1994)),
neural-psychologist  Antonio  Damasio  draws  upon  the  model  of  distributed  parallel
processing and empirically analyses the effects of the pre-frontal brain lesions that may
be very difficult to diagnose otherwise. 
Such damage, the author claims, can permanently impair one's ability to make fully
rational,  good  decisions  even  if  they  possess  brilliant  knowledge,  education  or
intelligence.  His main point is that psycho-somatosensory processes and our emotional
learning  largely  influence  our  logical-rational  thinking  even  when  the  brain  is  not
damaged or impaired. This represents a departure from the classic, logical rationality
towards complex, emotionally factored, weighted and driven reasoning even when-if it
may be conducted in a “rational” - step-by-step wise fashion, (a non-logical rationality),
not unlike the effect of the subconscious in our decision-making defined initially by
theoretical psychologist Sigmund Freud.
Thus, one often reaches an answer before putting all the steps into a logical sequence
and  the  sequential  logical  form  is  frequently  just  a  rationalisation  of  parallel
(concurrent) cognitive processing (Popper (1935) refers to a cognitive rationalisation as
“rational reconstruction”).56
As Levi-Strauss (1962) pointed out, primitives do not lack rationality in development
of  their  “primitive  science  of  the  concrete”:  though,  they  may  lack  contemporary,
western,  scientific knowledge of the correct casual  premises  ,  years of observation,
trials and errors, may nevertheless still equip a tribal medicine men to identify and use
statistically most adequate cure for an illness in spite of not knowing its actual causes.
56 E.g. a medical student may have to backtrack step-by-step in the means-end problem solving heuristics
to assess symptoms of illness before diagnosis.  However,  once the student mastered his subject  and
became an expert, he would be able to recognise a pattern of the attributes and identify illness in a leap of
apparently irrational, non-deductive reasoning based on the recognition of the set of symptoms [Stillings
et al. (1987), pp.93-101].   
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Roots of early mathematical thinking can be traced to pre-historic cultures, preceding
ancient  civilisations  but,  according  to  more  recent  findings,  the  earliest  written
documents  found are related to business accounting and stock recording:  numerous
notches  engraved  in  various  bones  date  10,000s  of  years  BC  across  Africa  and
Europe57. 
The early trading civilisations and their scientists had therefore to develop commonly
acceptable notations and further develop rules of measurement and division on those
grounds  of  this  universal  logic58.  It  is  therefore  not  that  surprising  that  the  first
documents found among ruins of the early Middle-Eastern civilisations dating about
2500-2000BC are of a similar, related nature too:
“Egypt and Iraq had a broadly similar priestly bureaucratic structure, and evolved
both writing and mathematics very early to serve (among other things) bureaucratic
ends. Indeed, as far as our evidence goes, ‘mathematics’ precedes writing, in that the
earliest  documents  are  inventories  of  goods.  The  development  of  counting-symbols
seems to take place at a time when the things counted ... are described by pictures
rather  than  any  phonetic  system of  writing.  The  bureaucracy  needed  accountancy
before it needed literature”  Hodgkin (2005, pg. 16) 
57A piece of baboon fibula with 29 notches was carbon dated to 35,000BC
58 The roots of modern mathematics can be traced to early urban civilisations of Mesopotamia: Sumer
and Babylon where the earliest written texts can traced to about 2500-2000BC too. Modern geometry
was however invented a few hundreds years later, in Ancient Egypt, and Thales of Miletus brought it to
Greece and Asia-Minor after visiting Egypt and seeing it applied there in land delimitation and irrigation.
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4.4  Rationality  in  modern  economic  theory:  Background  of  RE
theory
Among the many authors, even Keynes (1936) pointed out that one of the main causes
for the Great crash was irrational panic and the herding “Animal Spirit”59 instincts that
greatly contributed to the bank runs and to the market crush and its spread throughout
the world economy. 
As a follow-up to Keynes’s emphasis on importance of psychology in functioning of
asset  markets,  Farmer(2010)  insists  that  asset  values  depend  on,  and  are  highly
correlated to levels of confidence. 
4.4.1 Decision Theory and the General Theory of Rationality
A formal, mathematical model for rationality has been developed within a discipline
called  Decision  Theory  (e.g.  see  French  (1986)).   This  model  has  been  initially
developed to provide a scientific model for general rational decision-making, primarily
for military operations research, but it found its way into modern classical economic
theory.  It  contains  all  of  the  main  axioms  and  theorems  for  a  generalised  utility
maximisation under certainty and the expected, multi-attribute utility under uncertainty
with sample applications to both economic and non-economic domains (e.g. student
marking or holiday choice). 60
59 Animal Spirit will be discussed in more detail later in this text.
60 As  Simon French  (1986)  pointed  out,  the  similarity between  weak  preference  ordering  (>~)  and
numeric ordering => “can not have passed unnoticed” and is, however, quite clear that one can associate
some numeric values to the preferences a and b ( a>~b) and add their ordering to a more meaningful
mathematical model. French provides a solution in the form of ordinal numeric Value Functions v -> R
{s.t.   v(a)  >= v(b)   <=> a  >~ b}.   Such  mapping,  French  claims,  reduces  the  size  and  conceptual
complexity of the model. However, such function is only suitable for ordering preferences in the ordinary
meaningful way. To give the cardinal quantitative meaningfulness to the numeric values he introduces the
value difference measurement method (ibid, pp. 82-89). 
We usually make choices on a number of different factors rather than just one (e.g. marking an
essay takes into account a number of criteria or factors, see also the above rationalisation, case 2).   To
develop  a  model  of  multi-attribute  (multi-criteria)  decision-making,  French  also  structures  the
alternatives as vectors of specific levels of achievement against a number of factors q where a=(a1, a2,
..aq)  and A is q-dimensional cross-product A= A1 x A2 x . x Aq where Ai is the set of possible levels of
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Such a mathematical model of rationality developed within the Decision Theory has
both a descriptive and a prescriptive role.  It  describes a scientific model of human
rational thinking as a close approximation as it is computationally and scientifically
possible. 
It is also prescribe a model of decision-making that may be expected to be followed by
individuals or teams in formal environments, such as corporate or military operations or
in scientific research, again, as much as it was computationally possible or reasonable,
or  in  the  development  of  automated  methods  reasoning  in  areas  of  computational
artificial intelligence (AI) and Decision Support Systems (DSS).
4.4.2 Rationality in Economics and Utility Maximisation
One can thus argue that the modern, economic “Rational Utility Maximisation” model
is  close,  if  not  almost  identical  to  a  general,  scientific,  model  of  rational  decision-
making.  However,  as French(1996) points out,  such a model  is  not identical  to the
observations performed by psychologists. And such model is, however, just one of the
few  models  of  rationality  developed  by  different  disciplines  including  philosophy,
linguistics,  modern  psychological  theory  which  abandons  the  over-loaded  term
“rational thinking” in favour of the more specialist term “cognitive process”, and the
relatively new scientific  domain of cognitive science (Stillings  et  al.  (1987)) which
developed out of the merger of cognitive psychology with computer sciences.
4.4.2.1 Rational Utility Maximisation in Economics
The meaning of Rational Utility Maximisation needs to be ascertained before we can
embark on further analysis of its relation to the general theory of rationality. 
Campbell (1986), references to Richard Dawkins’ theory of the Selfish Gene, arguing
achievement against factor i.
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that  rational  utility  maximisation  is  still  valid  if  we  extend  the  utility  to  include
apparently  irrational  altruistic  behaviour  and choice  rationally  aimed  to  benefit  the
close and wider family and its current and any future offspring, at the cost of one’s own
“Selfish” pleasure utility.
On  the  other  hand,  there  are  numerous  examples  of  non-optimal  irrationalities  in
economic decision-making within what he calls face-to-face groups, whose members
want to show solidarity with the rest of the group.  
A similar phenomena of apparently irrational behaviour can also been observed in so-
called “peer-groups” or “peer-pressure groups” whose, either adult or teenage members
(or would-be members), need to conform to some codes of dressing. This code can
include  obligation  to  wearing expensive,  branded clothes  that  is  irrational  from the
standpoint of budgetary rationality, or to be branded in some other way (e.g. tattooing).
But such, apparently irrational behaviour, serves another, a symbolic utility, one of the
group acceptance and belonging conformism. In general semiotics this is often referred
to as emphatic function. However, the more irrational such symbolic behaviour is, the
stronger the intra-group bonding and the reciprocal, inter-(or extra)-group separation it
may drive.61 
Thus,  the Utility may serve either  some other  rational  or irrational  goals,  but  what
classic  economics  is  concerned  with,  is  behavioural  consistency  with  one's  utility
regardless of one's inner rationality or irrationality of the factors forming that utility
function.
Sen argues  that  “...This  approach of  definitional  egoism sometimes goes  under  the
name of rational choice and involves nothing more than …consistency” i.e. “with the
revealed preference definition” (Sen (1979), pp. 92) That is, we cannot infer from their
consistent  behaviour  whether  their  choice  was  consistent  with  the  rational  utility
61Such behaviour, however, is not common only to the teenage but a few religious and also, some other, 
“rational” adult groups adhering to a particular etiquette too, and may aim to fulfil some particular socio-
emotional utility.
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maximisation or whether it is just a consistent, (e.g. a habitual) error. He then argues
that resolution of the famous Prisoners’ Dilemma leads to a sub-optimal strategy for the
two (i.e. for the group).  
On  the  other  hand,  Damasio  (1995)  argues  that  even  one's  apparently  altruistic
commitment to a social group may be ultimately serving some egoistic utility, e.g. a
commitment to one’s (or even a remote) community’s welfare may ultimately benefit
one’s “Selfish Gene”. 
Also, a random, or a consistently changing choice, may serve a set of other, higher
utilities  than  the  function/price  efficiency.  Pursuing such choice  policy,  e.g.  buying
apples from different countries, may provide for a healthier variety of vitamins and
other substances. 
Along the lines of Habermas (1983/96),  Arrow(1987) also claims that rationality is not
a  feature  of  an  individual  but  of  the  social  environment.  Arrow  than  states  that
rationality  is  not  required  for  an  economic  system  to  function  and  that  plausible
economic theories can be built upon criteria different from rationality of the individual
participants.
Following Habermas, it can be therefore argued that rationality does not need to play a
very important role in decision-making of an individual actor in economics (and utility
maximisation) but in a few situations:
1. In any process of negotiation when a purchase decision is being made, between (or
among) the parties involved in the negotiation (e.g. over the price, the quantity or
the choice of the item), a rational argumentation as a means of collective decision-
making is usually being used a priori to the decision.
2. When a decision needs to be achieved by a collective actor (e.g. a family, group,
association or a  business unit  consisting of individuals)  and individuals need to
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assert their positions and recommendations in the decision-making process. This is
in  line  with  the  Schumpeterian  argument  of  the  non-individualistic  economy
gradually prevailing over the individualistic one. 
3. Not unsimilar to the above situation, when one is asked to rationalise, i.e. explain
the  reasoning  behind  a  decision  that  was  made  (i.e.  as  a  form of  a  posteriori
rationalisation). Because decisions may be made intuitively, randomly or habitually
computationally quicker than on the basis of a rational assessment of all known
information and the consecutive deduction, for everyday shopping choice, or when
decisions  needs  to  be  made  quickly,  the  rational  decision  process  may  be
abandoned. However, to make one’s decision understandable and/or acceptable to
his own super-ego or to their social group, one may retract to the development of a
rationale for the decision that was made a priori (Popper (1935/2002)) refers to this
as “rational reconstruction”).
Here,  the  Rational  Utility  Maximisation  model  acts  as  a  normative  and  as
communication  model  for  explaining  or  rationalising  our  decisions  reached  in
alternative,  intuitive  ways.   This  then  can  lead  to  the  model  of  so-called
“communicative rationality” developed by Jirgen Habermas (1983/96) that also uses
the notion of rational reconstruction as its base.
However,  Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1987)  argue  that  decision  models  are  mainly
normative  and  not  sufficiently  accurate  to  be  also  descriptive  of  human  decision-
making and that decision errors are too systematic to cancel each other out. “The four
principles underlying expected utility theory can be ordered by their normative appeal:
Invariance  and  dominance  seem  essential,  transitivity  could  be  questioned,  and
cancellation has been rejected by many authors” (Tversky and Kahneman (1987))62.
62 It  may also be argued that the independence axiom is not an axiom in the first place and is not a
required condition for rational expected utility maximisation but mainly an application of the rule of
transitivity. 
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It is their opinion that the criterion of invariance of choice presentation does not stand
in many cases, as a decision is driven by non-linear, (intuitive) loss aversion and an
accompanying incomplete (rational) decomposition of the given presentation into its
invariant “canonical representation” (Chomsky 1967).
In my opinion, the two issues, one of non-linear systematic loss-aversion and the other
of  random incomplete  reconstruction  of  invariant  canonical  presentation,  should  be
separated. The loss-aversion affects both the invariant canonical (rational) presentation
as well as the incomplete one that circumvents the invariance, but the latter more so.
The loss aversion can be statistically measured and modelled using non-linear weights
(e.g. prospect weights or similar, wealth-related weights) and such a model can be used
to  create  a  loss-aversion  extended  invariant  rational  utility  maximisation  decision
model suitable for both the normative and descriptive purposes. 
On the other hand, invariance circumvention due to incomplete (rational) analysis of
choice presentation would invalidate the rationality of the utility maximisation decision,
regardless of whether it is normative or descriptive. This is mainly because the criterion
of  invariance  is  implied  by the  criterion  of  independence  where  a  variance  in  the
presentation  can  be  regarded  as  a  special  case  of  an  irrelevant  alternative.  Such
circumvention of invariance would invalidate the cardinality of utility function and the
expected utility assessment. 
4.4.3 Rational Utility Optimisation, Decision Cost and Risk of Error
Macroeconomics  takes  into  consideration  the  labour  offer  based  on  one’s  choice
between  consumption  capability  and  leisure  time.  Having  taken  into  consideration
Simon’s and other remarks, it transpires that in real life situations, participants are more
likely to make decisions that allow them to reach an optimum level of utility midst
social pressures, information and time available, rather than to go through the whole
process of information acquisition and its computation. 
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Information  acquisition,  and  processing  it  using  declarative  memory,  may  both  be
costly. The actor may need to do a search and find the other party and then analyse and
compare quality and then negotiate or assess the price of the items (goods or services)
being exchanged (search, observation and negotiation costs respectively as in Gravelle
and Rees (2004) pp317). The high costs of the decision process may deter otherwise
profitable exchanges or purchases to be pursued and completed. 
We  believe  that  the  amount  of  information  acquisition  (depth  of  knowledge)  and
computation used, is an individual’s function of the relative cost of the choice, and with
it, the associated cost and risk of possible error. If we were to spend the whole evening
after  work  going  around  different  supermarkets  and  comparing  prices  and  value-
characteristics  of  different  cereals  for  tomorrow’s  breakfast,  we  would  have  been
considered  mentally  or  emotionally  unusual  to  say  the  least,  unless  price-spotting
became a social or family quality-time activity.
However, such rational optimisation of a choice of one of bundles can be considered a
constituent part of the maximisation of an overall utility vector, or the overall expected
utility over a range of bundles, where the optimisation of the costs of the choice and the
associated error for each bundle are constituent parts of the overall utility maximisation.
4.4.3.1 Dual nature of utility function
If the earlier findings by Brocas and Carrillo (2011) are taken into account, and our
conclusion of non-linearity of decision naming, we need to assume that even the utility
function may not be linear in a similar sense if a sufficient information shock may shift
one's thinking from procedural to the costly declarative domain.
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4.5 Modelling Rational Agent
Giocoli (2003) claims that the importance of Nash’s Equilibrium for classicist rational
utilisation based economics was recognised very late.  He draws a line between two
visions of the economic systems, the first as a System of Forces (SoF) and the second,
as a System of Relations (SoR), both around equilibria. He also makes a distinction
between two types of rationality in those economies: the more recent one based around
consistency of  behaviour  and  transitivity  of  choice  of  perfectly  logical  agents,  the
approach aimed to take any psychologism of the agents out of the economics theory,
and,  the  more  traditional,  “marginalist”  approach,  around  the  utility  maximisation
approach of real agents. It is the consistency of an economic agent’s approach that was
paralleled by the empirical behaviourist reorientation in psychological theory,  which
prevailed and provided grounds for the vision of economics as a System of Relations
leading to economic equilibria. 
In Giocoli’s view, it was Max Weber’s abstract, strictly rational approach to human
behaviour based around a non-existent ideal of rational hommo-economicus, devoid of
any psychological empiricism, that provided some of the seeds for the newer, rationalist
view of consistent rational agents and for the economy as system of relations (SoR).
Giocoli (2003) refers to 1935 work by Morgenstern when he already attacked Hayek
and other supporters of the perfect foresight hypothesis (PFH) theory of equilibrium
and argued that the intellectual capabilities of agents are over-estimated and that it is
more applicable to modelled economic agents as boundedly rational individuals with
imperfect  knowledge.  Giocoli  (2003)  states  that  von  Newman-Morgenstern  (1953)
(vNM) theory is rooted in a socio-cooperative approach, prevailing in the culture of
Central  Europe,  whilst  Nash’s  equilibrium is  a  result  of  typical  American  non-co-
operative culture. 
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4.5.1 Bayesian Rationality
"Thoughts  without  content  are  empty,  intuitions [i.e.  observations]  without
[prior] concepts are blind." Kant (1781)
The Bayesian inference model is paralleled by Kantian epistemology that states that our
understanding of the objective world is based not only on experience, but on both the
experience and the a-priori knowledge. Hence, Bayesian estimation posterior depends
on both the likelihood of observed data and the prior distributions, both taken in the
calculation of the posterior distribution.
Whilst  the  mathematics  of  inferring  data  likelihood  has  been  well  established  and
accepted  in  the  wider  scientific  community  (though  still  open  to  alternative
interpretations),  one  of  the  main  issues  in  Bayesian  inference  is  choice  of  the
parameters’ prior beliefs' probability distributions. 
Though in depth discussion on their choice is beyond the scope of this research, I just
wanted to provide some of the highlights of the controversies relevant for his research.
Flat, non-informative (Laplacean) priors are often used when no other, either intuitive
(subjective)  or  rational  informative  beliefs  can  be  used.  Sometimes,  so-called
Minnesota priors are used as an alternative, as a first proxy for the flat priors. A few
authors,  so-called  strict  subjectivists,  argue  that  intuitive  (subjective)  prior  beliefs
should  be  used,  whilst  others  argue  that  empirical  priors  –  priors  based  on  some
empirical  evidence -  should be used instead.  Others  argue that  the  non-informative
priors should be replaced by the objective ones consistent with the whole, (i.e. prior)
background knowledge but non-committal, maximum entropy ones, thus, near to the
non-informative (Williamson (2010)).
Gilboa et al. (2004-2008a) and Gilboa et al.  (2008b) analyse this issue in detail and
argue that Bayesian theory ignores belief formation and prior beliefs may or may not be
founded on objectively rational grounds. E.g. Gilboa et al. (2004-2008a) argues that a
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delusional agent (or a delusional economic scientist) may satisfy all of Savage’s axioms
(originally in Savage (1954)) and the Bayesian axiom of updates, but remain on the
wrong track because his priors and the resulting posteriors may not prove him wrong in
his objectively irrational (though rationally internally consistent) prior belief that he is
e.g. a genius.
4.6  Critiques of Pure Rational Expectations theory
The main stream of the critiques of the traditional rational expectations theory focuses
on its shortcomings rooted in the “abstraction” of the real price-setting agents and an
implicit  assumption  of  an  external  Walrasian  auctioneer  (Lyons  (2001)).  Another
traditional assumption and shortcoming of RE is that of complete information and the
related ability of the agent to process the complete information set in a timely manner.
Therefore, a few alternative models have been put forward.
4.6.1 Animal Spirit and Herd Behaviour
Even in the aftermath of the Great Depression, few authors (e.g. Keynes), pointed out
that one of the main causes for the crash was irrational panic, herding, and “Animal
Spirit” instincts that greatly contributed to the market crash and its spread throughout
the  economy.  Some  other  authors  pointed  to  the  similar  herding  behaviour  being
observed in the wake of the 2007 crisis and blamed it for the acceleration of the crisis
(Akerlof and. Shiller (2009)).  It is difficult to assess to what extent and whether the
Animal (herd) spirit was a cause or just an accelerator for those crises. It is also likely
that  the crises  may not  have had become crises  and could have stayed only minor
recessions if there was no such herd behaviour widespread among the agents that was
accelerating the downturn.  The original passage by Keynes (1936) reads:
"Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability due to the
characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our positive activities depend
on spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical  expectations,  whether moral  or
hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the
full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be
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taken as the result of animal spirits - a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction,
and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by
quantitative probabilities." Keynes (1936) 
One should make some distinction between agents’ deliberate ignorance of a rational,
informed  decision-making  process  associated  with  following  herd  behaviour
(regressing  to  analogue,  imitative  behaviour)  on  one  hand  from  acting  within  the
constraints  of  the  bounded-rationality  and  incomplete  information  resulting  from
inability to gather and to process the complete information. Categorising what probably
accounts for the majority of economic agents to act within the constraints of incomplete
information driven bounded-rationality as “animal spirits” may be therefore perceived
as being rather limiting and inaccurate if not even arrogantly condescending.
As  mentioned  above,  Loewenstein  and  O’Donoghue  (2004) define  the  cognitive
optimum and develop a  very simple economic  agent  decision model  as a weighted
balance between the cognitive and affective dominance.
Rotheli (2007) argues that heterogeneous agents affect the economics of the equilibria
in different ways. For example, he refers to psychological research that concluded that
people are biased more often towards over-estimating their abilities and potentials and,
as  a  consequence,  they  tend  to  be  more  often  optimistic  in  general  and  in  their
productivity estimates than that of ideally rational agents would (pp21). 
Using  also  a  rather  simple  model,  Rotheli  (2007)  then  shows  how  any  type  of
homogeneity  among  the  agents,  whether  being  dominantly  rational  or  dominantly
biased  towards  either  optimism  or  pessimism,  is  more  beneficial  for  the  overall
economic output and welfare, regardless of the level of the bias and expectation error,
than is a nearly equally spread of those heterogeneous agents between the two main
bias-groups of optimists and pessimists. In more recent research, Harrison and Weder
(2010) use a limited supply of one asset (land) as the collateral constrained borrowing
limit in a relatively simple model based on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). They then show
that in credit friction marred markets, there can be an in-determinacy of  equilibria, driven
by agents’ self-fulfilling optimistic or pessimistic prophecies.
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In a remarkable break-through paper, De Grauwe (2009) and later, De Grauwe and Ji
(2016), explore along the similar lines the non-linear effects of human behaviour and
the  pertaining  balance  between  optimism/pessimism  biases  on  self-fulfilling
prophecies. The author compares several behavioural models with the biases against a
simple rational, linear DSGE model and shows that the behavioural model is better at
forecasting  and creating  business  cycles.  He argues  that,  though the more complex
rational DSGE models are better at predicting business cycles than the simple ones used
in  his  experiment,  the  behavioural  ones  can  do  that  without  the  complexity  being
involved. And also,  that the behavioural models can be extended similarly with the
additional auto-regression and financial accelerators to achieve even better fit with the
observed persistency and cyclical behaviour. 
For simplicity he assumes pragmatically in the first part of the research, that both the
optimistic and pessimistic agents forecast inflation along the lines of the central bank
target  forecast,  that  is,  0,  though  that  position  is  relaxed  in  a  later  stage  of  the
experiment and a 2nd heterogeneity between the central bank target believers (rational?)
and the sceptics (adaptive forecasters?) introduced.
He finds that the impulse responses to the shocks in the behavioural model are not
consistent  across  the  trials.  Though  the  parameters  are  consistent,  the  diversity  of
outcomes  comes  from the  variation  in  the  waves  of  optimism and  pessimism that
prevail in the individual IRFs, something not present in the consistent rational models.
This creates an interesting model of non-linearity in agent behaviour and that of the
economy as a whole.
De  Grauwe  (2009)  then  distinguishes  between  exogenous  (systemic,  transmission)
inertia present in the auto-correlation in the rational DSGE models, and what he calls
endogenous inertia, caused by the agents' mood-wave oriented behaviour evident in his
behavioural models. He also claims the inertia to be informational, as agents do not
instantly  understand  the  transmission  of  the  observed  shock  and,  consequently,  its
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effects. 
To this argument, however, it may be better to say that they do not observe the mood of
others  sufficiently  to  model  that  into  their  forecasts.  It  can  be  said  that  the  rather
technical  term  “transmission  delay”  encompasses  to  a  great  extent  the  above
informational inertia due to the lifestyle rigidity (i.e. habitual behaviour) as well as lack
of information and of understanding of the consequences when that agent has to rely on
the  emotional  aspect  of  his/her  psychological  mood.  However,  the  optimistic  or
pessimistic auto-correlation wave, as presented in the De Grauwe's (2009) model, does
represent  the  innovative  contribution  that  allows  for  the  cyclic  behaviour  to  be
modelled.  It  is  however,  also auto-correlative  and adaptive as  the  biased agents  do
measure and weight previous prediction errors and may correct their choice and the
level of their optimistic or pessimistic bias.
It is another issue how we can measure or observe such “mood waves”. Consumer (and
investor) confidence measures are a starting point, and using those B&G, as we have
shown already, can improve DSGE forecasting. 
Consequently,  using a more comprehensive model and methods, De Grauwe (2009)
explores  non-linear  feedback  of  optimism  and  pessimism  and  contradicts  Rotheli
(2007) by showing that optimistic bias is more beneficial for the output and welfare
whilst the pessimistic position could be rather detrimental.
However, one shortcoming I see with  De Grauwe’s (2009) work is that the model of
optimism and pessimism is not providing for measure and effect of either a time variant
or  culturally-variant  ratio  between  the  biased  (either  optimist  and/or  pessimist)
positions on one and the rational approach within the same model on the other side.
And,  although  the  time-variant  asymmetry  between  optimism  and  pessimism  is
achieved by time-variant but exclusive probabilities that agents are either optimistic or
pessimistic or driven endogenously in De Grauwe and Yi (2016) where endogenous
changes  take  place,  it  is  not  leaving  an  option  of  sufficient  probability  for  the
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heterogeneous agents to be somewhere rational, within the same model. 
This  latter  option  has  been  explored  in  part  by  Rotheli  (2007)  later  on  when  he
developed an integrated heterogeneous agent model using additional weighting between
the  heuristic  (adaptive-historical)  and  the  rational  decision-making  models  for  the
economic agent, though within a very simple, non-DSGE model. Such an extension
may be the way to integrate the two (or more), the behavioural and the rational (and
possibly the heuristic) heterogeneous decision models under a DSGE model of partial
information.
Herd behaviour may be in part rooted in the psychology of adopting and following
collective behaviour. However, information and rationality may still play an important
role in adoption of the so-called herd behaviour. Firstly, a rational expectation of herd
behaviour becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy and it may be rationally optimal to follow
the mass behaviour at least in the short term.  Secondly, another rationality working
behind the scene may be referred to as “communicative rationality” (or “rationality of
communicative action”) introduced by Habermas (1981/84). While Habermas argued
that communication facilitates more objective rationality, reverting irrational outliers by
means of negative feedback towards the common, higher levels of rationality, in times
of irrational fear or exuberance, the same communication may instead provide a so-
called positive feedback, an actual acceleration of the irrational (e.g. herd) arguments
and resulting behaviour by leading the behaviour of those who use others’ supporting
responses  to  strengthen their  opinion and actions  along the common,  self-fulfilling,
disequilibrium path (that is, unless they are the contrarians in either of the above cases)
and I would refer to this as an “accelerated communicative irrationality”.
Along the lines of the above discussion, Barton, Berns and Brooks (2012) find relation
between market earnings, returns news, investment decisions and functioning of the
human  inner-brain,  whilst  Levine,  Pearlman,  Perendia  and  Yang  (2008-2012)  are
estimating a model with two sets of heterogeneous agents, one set being fully rational
and the other set behaving in an adaptive manner. These estimations were performed
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within both perfect and imperfect information assumptions and show significant data fit
improvements with such diversification of rational and adaptive agents63.
4.6.2 Academic moral hazard
Colander et al. (2009) accuse mainstream economics for holding on to standard models
of  the economic  systems hovering within  the  limits  of  an inherently stable  general
equilibrium state whilst ignoring warnings of a pending major crisis from a minority of
academics,  and then switching to the common sense measures in a rush to provide
exceptional measures for exceptional times. The authors in essence seek agreement on a
model  that  can  be used  to  warn of  pending exceptional  circumstances  and help  in
developing policies that can either prevent or manage those exceptional circumstances
using scientifically approved methods. The authors also claim that it was unlikely that
all researchers were unaware of the fragility and limitations of their financial economic
models. The most likely explanation is what they refer to as “academic moral hazard”:
that the researchers did not think it was their responsibility to provide, and the authors
argue  for  assertion  of  ethical  responsibility  of  economists  to  warn  of  their  model
limitations. 
Such  apparent  academic  behaviour  in  being  overly  cautious  in  disclosing  results
indicating  a  pending  crisis,  may be  rational  in  essence  because  they  may want  to
understate the seriousness of a possible crisis in the hope that maintaining an optimistic
mood may help avoid the crisis. 
In addition, in essence, as (Perendia and Tsoukis (2012)) research shows, good news
can have a beneficial effect on positive fiscal multipliers, but, reciprocally, bad news
can  have  a  very  negative  one.  Widespread  publications  of  pending  crisis  warning
signals may lead to a crisis on the basis of a self-fulfilling prophecy, even if such crisis
would not have happened, or not to the same extent, if the bad news were not made
public, and established economists rarely want to risk the burden of such consequences.
63 This model, its solution and results will be presented in more detail later in this work
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The authors (Colander et  al.  (2009)) however,  also point to the usual limitations of
standard  macroeconomic  models  such  as  a  single  representative  agent  following  a
rational expectation behaviour model and ignoring imperfect information and adaptive
behaviour based on bounded rationality and heuristic decision-making that is observed
in reality and is in line with the wider psychological research. They then argue for the
development of imperfect information heterogeneous agent models where agents are
connected in networks through which contagion spreads and that provide an additional
dimension for macro-micro economic analysis.64 
64 In response to such and similar criticism, Levine, Pearlman, Perendia and Yang (2009-2012) research
develops  such  extension  and  shows  clear  benefits  of  models  with  imperfect  information  and
heterogeneous,  rational  and adaptive  behaviour.  This  model  is  described in  more detail  later  in  this
research.
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4.7 An Introduction to Neuroeconomics
Neuroeconomics is a relatively new multi-disciplinary area of research, in part derived
from behavioural-economics that combines economics with neuropsychology based on
distributed parallel processing theory and augmented by recent developments in live
brain MR scanning which allows identification of the relevant centres in the brain that
are  involved  in  information  perception,  synthesis  and  decision-making.
Neuroeconomics has two sides: one is  applying economics,  mainly microeconomics
paradigm on analysis of the brain and neural system working and its optimisation. For
example,  Brocas and Carrillo (2012) analyse inner-brain neurology and mechanisms
and apply economic methodology on optimal management of memory retrieval. 
On the other hand, neuropsychological findings are applied to better understanding or
modelling of both micro- and macro-economic agents. These two apparently distinct
and separate  fields  are  however  interconnected.  There is  an overlap or  a  kind of  a
mutual  correlation  of  those  two  aspects:  the  neuro-microeconomics  of  the  brain
workings influences the way the brain makes decisions and its understanding augments
the understanding of how economic agents optimise their decision-making and their
market choices.
We then need to ask what is an economic model, i.e., if not other than an aggregate
model of human economic agents' decision- making mechanism – the brains working
within the constraints of their neurological and physical environment, the budgets and
time, but on an aggregate level. This works then vice versa too: the macroeconomic and
microeconomic decisions can be measured statistically,  as statistical averages of the
whole or of a segment of the human population, and on these assumptions, analysed,
and  the  information  used  to  understand  better  the  human  behaviour  and  to  model
decision-making  from  both,  the  economic  agent  and  the  neurological  science
perspectives.  Brocas and Carrillo (2008a) emphasise that neuroeconomics offers the
advantages  of  scientific  rigour  in  modelling  bounded  rationality  and  better
understanding of the inner workings of one's time preference and future discounting. 
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4.7.1 Economic Brain
Another  research  publication  by Brocas  and Carrillo  (2008b) takes  this  further  and
extends their theory of the economics of information on optimisation of inner conflicts
within the brain structure that leads to decision-making: the asymmetric information,
the inter-temporal horizon, and the incentive salience. 
Extending the works of Damasio (1995) and Bechara (2005), they derive a model based
on two distinct areas of the brain, the prefrontal that is reflexive and good at assessing
long-term future related decisions, contrasted with the ventral striatum and amygdala
centres  associated  with  immediate  gratitude,  short-term  rewards  and  impulsive
reactions. One can say that an individual's future discounting depends on the strength of
the influences of the two areas of brain relative to each other, whilst damage in one or
another leads to extreme reactions respective to which part is functionally remaining.
This model is shown to support the theory of hyperbolic discounting.
Their  model  is  very  much  based  on  the  micro-economic  model  of  a  firm,  where
heterogeneous  agents  and  principals  act  in  asymmetric  information  and  different
incentive and time discounting fashion. Whilst it may be beneficial for understanding
the decisions an individual makes through application of the economic optimisation
within  budget  and  the  above  informational  constraints,  it  is  unlikely  to  contribute
greatly to the broader, micro or even less, macro-economic dynamics.
Their more recent work (Brocas and Carrillo (2011)) has probably the most profound
implications in that it shows how humans may be using their more precise declarative
memory only for important and high-level information shocks, but tend to use their less
precise but “cheaper”, easier and quicker to use procedural memory and its associated
thinking in other,  less critical  situations. In decision-making, a brain will  engage in
retrieval  of  the  more  costly  but  more  precise  “declarative”  memory  only  when
information impulses are high, exceeding averages by a substantial amount, otherwise it
will use the less expensive but less precise, “procedural” memory. 
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This  may be  one  of  the  possible  explanations  and  factors  contributing  to  habitual
behaviour or lifestyle rigidity, since the everyday decisions, from supermarket shopping
to  experienced  traders'  security  trading  in  usual  circumstances,  may not  call-in  the
expensive declarative but only the cheap procedural memory, resulting in near-habitual
behaviour.  Respective brain damage in different areas of the brain will then bring about
quite distinctly different behavioural patterns: from extreme habitual, sticky preferences
for the known and learned options, to an extreme divergence and inconsistencies  in the
agents' consumption choices. 
This finding parallels an earlier  work of Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004) who
present a comprehensive overview of the psychological background of human agents’
decision-making  process.  They  divide  decision-making  between  the  deliberative
(cognitive,  rational)  and  the  affective  (emotional,  instinctive)  and  introduce  the
emotional cost of rational decision-making in the form of the scaling factor h(W,σ): 
“i.e., the higher is h(W,σ), the larger is the cognitive effort required to induce a given
deviation from the affective optimum (we assume h(W,σ) > 0 for all W and  σ). This
cost of willpower will  depend on the person’s current willpower strength, which we
denote by W, and on other factors that undermine or bolster the deliberative system,
which we denote by  σ. … If the affective system alone were completely in charge of
behaviour,  and if  the current  vector of  affective states  were a,  the  affective system
would “choose” xA =argmaxx M(x,a), which we refer to as the affective optimum.” 
They then define the cognitive optimum and develop a very simple economic agent
decision model as a weighted balance between the cognitive and affective dominance.
It can be said that the former reflects declarative, and the latter, procedural memory
retrieval and decision processing.
4.7.2 Neuroeconomics and  Animal spirits
It may be a tempting and an undue simplification to conclude that the new theory of
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Neuroeconomic, neural science based model, is consistent with the Animal Spirit theory
outlined  above  in  that  the  rational  behaviour  relates  to  higher,  declarative  thinking
whilst the animal herd behaviour stems from use of the procedural thinking. It seems
however  that  the  neuroeconomics  theory  is  more  consistent  with  that  of  Damasio
(2005),  Kahneman  (2011)  and  Loewenstein  and  O’Donoghue  (2004)  work
distinguishing  between  fast  but  intuitive  and  emotional,  and  the  slower,  cognitive,
rational  thinking.  However,  further  cross-mapping  may  be  beneficial  for  drawing
parallels and establishing the cross-consistency of the theories by accepting that the
near-automatic, procedural thinking may be more affected by the subliminal, emotional
and intuitive processes than the higher cognitive and rational one.
 
Camerer (2011) conducts experimental research and points out (what many restaurant
owners, who let smells of their cuisine out onto the street, have known for centuries)
that the sense of proximity of food (or other desired goods) can invoke a Pavlovian
reaction and lead agents to accept a higher price for those goods than in its absence.
This however, may also be less of an instinct, and in fact, subliminal rationalisation of
the extra financial (but also, the emotional) cost(s) of obtaining cheaper goods further
away in space/time, combined with a sensory reminder of its existence and our desire
for it. The author points out that presentation of an already-signed cheque may lead the
other party in a financial argument to neutralise their negotiation strategy armament and
settle for a lower deal than otherwise. Also, sadness cued agents tended to sell for lower
and buy for higher prices, indicating that similar behaviour may be expected in times of
economic depression. 
Another experimental behavioural economist, Dan Ariely (2008) points to a variety of
experimentally proven irrational decisions people make that may affect and potentially
harm their well-being Standard economics based on rational agents will assume that
they will  not be tricked into free lunches,  and that agents are saving for retirement
exactly according to their preferences for life in retirement. Behavioural economics, as
Ariely points  out,  is  however  assuming irrational  agents  and can  explain  that  they
irrationally can forego the value of their time for apparently “free-lunch” deals, and,
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more importantly, often underestimate and suppress rational knowledge of difficulties
of a long retirement without sufficient income, all for the sake of short-term pleasure
from high expenditure today.
4.7.3 Discussion 
4.7.3.1 Two (or three) models of economic rationalities
In terms of Neuroeconomics, lack of information about the shocks, and consequently, a
lack of a sufficiently large information shock that can act as a trigger for declarative,
cognitive processing, the thinking then may remain within the emotions, imitations and
habits-influenced area of procedural thinking. 
This trigger-driven switching between spheres of mind where processing is performed
and memories are utilised, represents another form of non-linearity in human decision-
making but it  is  however very difficult  to model any non-linear behaviour,  and the
modern economic theory seems to be only in its very early stages of modelling non-
linearities. To our knowledge, no such models have been used in practice by central
banks. However, one can possibly argue that the modern economics theory has already
recognised and catered for the two spheres and two kinds of rational thinking. 
Whilst the revealed preference rational choice model, mainly applicable to every-day
consumption  and  short  to  mid-term  purchases  performed  mainly  by  household
consumers requires less information and cerebral engagement and may most likely be
processed and decided using the cheaper,  emotional  (procedural)  rationalisation,  the
more important, mid-to-long term professional decisions such as wage or other contract
negotiations and larger investments, or any major informational shocks to everyday life,
would require assembly and processing of “full information” available (i.e. reasonably
available  and  feasibly  operational  information,  see  below  chapters  on  rational
inattention)  which  will  require  discussion  the  more  “expensive”  (declarative)  brain
processing, could probably be associated with the other type of economic rationality,
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that of fully informed Rational Expectation (RE) and similar sets of models. 
However, despite requiring and relying on the more “expensive”, declarative centres,
the mode of declarative thinking in one's mind is still not fully free from priming  and
other emotional influences. To be more objective, the decision  process therefore needs
to get engaged into a team, collective discussion when making important decisions and
hence,  utilise  a  form of  a  communicative  rationalisation  defined  e.g.  by Habermas
(1983/96).  One can therefore argue that closest to the fully rational agents in economy
can be found only in medium-to-larger institutions, whether private or public, where
sufficient information can be afforded to be collected and processed and where  either
large  advisory  teams  or  collectives,  such  as  boards  of  directors,  are  engaged  in
collective, communicative rationalisation prior to the final decision-making on major
moves.  However,  even  such  collective  rational  decision  may be  sub-optimal  when
individuals taking part in it may find it fully rationally-opportune and optimal from
their own separate, individual standpoints. 
4.7.3.2 Subliminal information affecting fast thinking
As we now know, the fast thinking which is not based in declarative memory and does
not  invoke slow logical  derivation of  conclusions,  but  which instead  integrates  our
emotional  priors and efficiently derives  decisions,  may be affected by a  number of
factors.  Factors  such  as  emotional  state  (Damasio  (1995))  and  our  emotional  and
cognitive history and many of memories would be processed in parallel, thus without
direct  control  of  the  consciousness  and  may  therefore  bring  about  the  effect  of
subliminal information into decision making without passing the threshold of human
conscious recognition. We may then be affected in our decision-making by a number of
subliminal cues, from information arriving from the side of our visual perception, or
imprinted in one of 24/25 frames of a film or a television programme (despite such
techniques being banned), or registered by our auditory or smell senses, however, still
below the threshold needed to trigger conscious registration.
Further discussion on this subject is beyond the main scope of this research.
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4.8 Imperfect information, Neuroeconomics and “Animal Spirit” effects
One of the main issues raised by the New (Information) Paradigm movement, led by
Greenwald and Stiglitz (Stiglitz (2009)) on information in economics, is the issue of
effectiveness of the competitive market economy which, they claim, cannot reach the
real Nash optimum equilibrium due to imperfect information (Stiglitz (2009)).
 
Kirman (2011) analyses the impact of human interaction networks (other than those
formed  purely  by  economic  market  mechanisms)  and  their  stochastically  formed
topologies on economic and financial markets. He lists several possible reasons for herd
behaviour  in  economic  and  financial  markets  and  also  points  to  various  other
interpretations of herd behaviour. In some cases, such as informational cascade, when
actors  abandon  their  own (rational)  information  and  adopt  to  follow the  prevailing
behaviour accepting that as the more correct information, they may still remain rational
and still follow herd behaviour. (I.e. in a way that can be seen as a form of rational asset
market behaviour where the price reflects the true knowledge of its value.). He also
refers to the 1992 research work of Banerjee who, in turn, shows that the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium may be  chosen differently by agents  acting  fully  rationally,  each
resulting in a stable equilibrium, however, an inefficient one from the welfare point of
view, but each of which may be derived depending on the starting movements and on
the dynamics of the players in the game. 
Kirman states that a belief that a macroeconomic policy works may itself provide for a
stable economy, based on the self-fulfilling belief, valid for the time being only, until
agents change their belief.
4.8.1 Role of historical data in RE models
Paul Krugman (1991) shows that in economies that are moving relatively slowly and
where  adjustment  costs  are  high,  it  is  their  historical  paths  that  are  prevailing  in
determination  of  their  optimal  equilibrium,  dominant  over  the  alternative,  rational
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expectation-based “self-fulfilling” paths to several of possible alternative equilibria.
Those  conditions  seem to  reflect  the  situation  in  larger,  highly  invested  and  more
developed  economies  where  adjustment  costs  would  be  prohibitively  high  in
comparison  to  the  benefits  of  moving  to  an  alternative,  economically  possible
equilibrium. 
The opposite could however be true for economies with low or no adjustment costs, e.g.
under-invested  and  under-developed  economies  in  their  prime  development  stages,
where a co-ordinated political effort in converging rational expectations of the investors
may help develop an economy towards the one, politically most desirable out of several
plausible, attainable equilibria (Krugman 1991). 
However,  similar  may  apply  to  the  so-called  post-industrial  service-oriented  (e.g.
financial  services)  economies  where  adjustment  costs  and  time-scales  are  highly
reduced  in  comparison  with  the  “old-style”  heavy-invested  industrial-oriented
economies.  
Similarly, though assuming a different perspective, Woodford (2000) argues that pure
forward-looking  monetary  policy  may  result  in  indeterminacy  of  equilibrium,  and
concludes that historical data analysis is necessary in derivation of an optimal policy
because  it  allows  for  estimation  and projection  of  the  market  agents’ responses  to
inflationary  and  other  economic  factors  based  on  their  past  information  and
expectations (i.e. the “forecasting the forecasts of others”).  
In addition, Svensson  and Woodford (2005) state that it is optimal to take into account
historical paths even when future development paths are not dependent on them solely
because it is assumed by the players that the future paths are dependent on the history
and so takes part in forecasts by other players.65
65 Although acceptable as plausible, such situation may be falsified since there is no adequate measure of 
statistical importance of such false belief.
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In  an  article,  Krugman  (2009) criticises  contemporary  economists  (mainly  the  so-
called  Fresh-water  Neoclassical  purists)  for  relying  too  much  on  mathematically
attractive, “neat, plausible and wrong”, rational agents and efficient markets models.
According to him, they are omitting to account for the effects of agents’ irrationality
and market  inefficiencies,  both of which largely contributed to,  and accelerated the
downfall  through the recent  (2008-09)  economic and financial  crisis  as  they did in
many other similar crises. He also points out that despite Keynes’ emphasis on agents’
irrationality (e.g. in his notions of Animal Spirits and the ‘beauty contest’ applied in
financial economics), even most of the Neo-Keynesians, whilst accepting a certain level
of  market  frictions  and  inefficiencies,  have  nevertheless  accepted  the  Neoclassical
models of rational representative economic agents.
4.8.2 Forecasting the forecasts of others 
This area has been augmented by “forecasting the forecasts of others”, i.e. modelling of
an infinite, explosive, iterative process of deriving one’s expectations on the basis of
estimation of expectation and pricing decision-making of other rational agents such as
policymakers and micro-economic agents (Townsend 1983 and Sargent 1991). More
recent approaches use frequency-domain (Kasa 2000) or a combination of recursive
methods,  Kalman filter  and sub-space methods in the time domain (PCL 1986 and,
Pearlman  and  Sargent  2002)  to  deal  with  situations  of  asymmetric  or  incomplete
information.
4.8.3 Bounded Rationality and Rational Inattention
 
The issues of rational expectations in a partial information framework has also raised an
additional  epistemological question and resulted in further  expansion of the already
extensive  discussion  on  the  rationality  of  economic  utility  maximisation,  and  the
expectations and the psychology of the subsequent decision-making amidst constraints
of  incomplete  (partial)  information  and  bounded  rationality  (e.g.  Campbell  (1986),
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Simon  (1986)  and  (1979),  Arrow  (1987),  Tversky  and  Kahneman(1987),  and,
Gigerenzer  and  Todd(1999)).   It  also  became  questionable  whether  the  agents’
expectations are truly rational in the sense of REH or they actually are adaptive rational
expectations  in  the sense  of  integration  of  AEH and REH, or  their  convergence to
AREH. 
4.8.3.1 Simple Heuristics that makes us smart
Gigerenzer  and  Todd  (1999) (GIG99)  are  bringing  back  to  our  attention  Simon’s
(1957)66 original  idea  of  Bounded  Rationality  and  are  differentiating  it  from
optimisation under constraints. The idea of simple but effective heuristics based on one
(or a small number of) reason(s). In short, to make computationally and time-efficient
decisions, living organisms, including humans, usually search for clues, and at the first
sign of a positive clue give up further searching and go for the solution that is not fully
optimal (maximal) but is satisfying for less important decisions, or use so-called “Fast
and Frugal Heuristics” (FFH) for multi-factor decisions. However, both of them are
possible,  but  not  necessary to  differentiate  from decision-making  optimised  for  the
computational time and the incomplete information constraints. 
On the other hand, such heuristics depends on satisfying a goal or the (optimal) number
of “reasonable”, most important factors and cues that can be identified for the FFH.
When the goal is reached, or the reasonable number of cues for a decision is identified,
the search for better solutions or further cues stops. 
However, such satisfying (Satisficing) or FFH (bounded) single cause rationality may
be also just a simplified explanation used as an a posteriori rationalisation for a rather
complex, intuitive, or distributed decision-making process. In any case, its goal, though
constrained, is the (bounded) rational maximisation of utility. 
66 Originally in Simon, H.A., (1957), Models of Man, New York, Wiley & Sons 
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4.8.3.2 Rational Inattention and Informational Limitations
Rational  Inattention  (RI)  is  characterised  by  agents’ deliberate  inattention  to  some
available information since they consider attendance to that information sub-optimal
and prefer to make decisions in ignorance of that information. For example, the cost of
adjustment to information at hand may be prohibitive when if it needs to be done in
short, or in real time, i.e. as soon as the information becomes available. The production
life-cycle may not even allow for such adjustment in short time, and so, the strategic or
tactical  plans  may  need  to  be  followed-up  on  the  basis  of  the  previous  period(s)
predictions (expectations) of the current state rather than on the basis of the accurate
information that just arrived.
4.8.3.3 Entropy and Rational Inattention
The notion of Rational Inattention and use of entropy in Rational Inattention theory has
been introduced in  a  ground-breaking paper  by C.  Sims (2002).  Few other  authors
accepted this information theory approach to the Rational Inattention theory and use
entropy, signal/noise ratio and impose restrictions on information channel flow.
Although entropy of a series of events X with probability of p(X) is defined as:
H(X) = -  p(X) log 2 (p(x))                                           (4.8.3.3.1)
Entropy is  usually expressed using a  logarithm with base 2 for  the convenience of
measuring capacity in the binary base in bits. However, other logarithmic bases may be
used instead and when base e is used, the capacity is measured in nats. In addition, as
per Sims (2002), for a Gaussian process G~N(2) of dimension n it may be shown
that entropy is 
H(G) = -  ½ log2(|) - ½ n log2(2e)                   (4.8.3.3.2)
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Following Sims  (2002),  Luo and Young (2009)  and Martins  and Sinigaglia  (2009)
impose a time in-variant information channel capacity   constraint on the difference
between  the  posterior  and  the  prior  values  of  entropies,  both  conditional  on  the
information set available. 
Whilst Luo and Young (2009) impose entropy difference for only one state variable –
capital kt, Martins and Sinigaglia (2009) use the full set of state variables respectively. 
Thus, the difference between the posterior and the prior values of entropies has to be
limited to the available and used information channel capacity κ, i.e.:
H(kt+1|It)−H(kt+1|It+1)≤ κ                             (4.8.3.3.3)
Or, for Gaussian variables,
log2 |Ψt| − log2 |Σt+1| ≤ 2κ               (4.8.3.3.4)
where |Ψt| and Σt+1 are prior and posterior variances of the state vector. The change in
entropy and reduction in uncertainty need not  be positive in all  cases and a  higher
uncertainty may be introduced with a posterior information set. 
4.8.3.4 Some other approaches to use of Entropy in Economics
Gomes (2006) and Gomes (2009) deal with entropy and diminishing returns of agents’
communication,  learning  and  their  memory  depreciation,  and  argue  that  a  rapid
knowledge rise can result in entropy of knowledge and that may become a source of
endogenous  business  cycles.  Human  capital,  the  knowledge,  and  the  organisational
capital can suffer similar depreciation as the physical one. What is more, an entropy
based knowledge accumulation difference equation may lead to unstable bifurcation
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leading the economy into different directions unless it satisfies stability criteria. Gomes
(2009) introduces a model of divided cognitive resources when agents have to choose
between introspective analyses of historical data or adhere to communicative inference
methods.
Similarly,  to  Sims  (2002),  Chen (2002) and Chen (2004) analyse  subject  cognitive
capabilities or behaviour in relation to the theory of entropy and to Shannon (1948)’s
formulation of mutual information one can receive based on conditional entropy H (x|
y), 
R= H(x) - H (x|y)                                        (4.8.3.4.1)
where higher levels of information can be transferred between correlated agents than
uncorrelated ones, as the uncorrelated groups would not have been able to understand
each other and decipher information from the other group (e.g. as if they are not sharing
same languages). Chen (2002) introduces entropy reduction as a measure not only of
information along the lines  of Shannon (1948) but also of socio-economic value,  a
measure of the laborious effort required to reduce (or reverse the trend towards) entropy
(chaos) within the human socio-natural environment. Chen (2004) uses Hy (x)- H (x|y)
as a measure of information asymmetry, and states that new information is difficult to
comprehend  and  a  (usually  slow)  learning  process  is  required  to  increase  mutual
correlation and so improve understanding between two groups. For uncorrelated (i.e.
statistically “orthogonal” groups of) agents, H (x|y) = H (x) and hence,
R= H(x) - H (x|y) = 0               (4.8.3.4.2)
One  can  then  recall  and  relate  this  model  to  the  concepts  of  communicative  (i.e.
collective) rationality as in Habermas (1983/96) or Arrow (1987) concept of rationality
as a social phenomenon.
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4.8.3.5 Discussion on RI and Partial information
Despite  their  nominal  difference,  Partial  Information  as  defined  in  PCL86,  or,  as
redefined as Imperfect Information in the later works, e.g. Levine et al (2008-2012) are
conceptually similar, analogue to both, Bounded Rationality and Rational Inattention in
that, for a variety of different reasons, incomplete information is used in decisions. This
in turn, delays effects of the phenomena, e.g. shocks, as both, the real world and the
model  of  the  economy adjust  slower  to  new information  and the  respective  model
simulation IRFs show more realistic, humped, delayed responses.
For example, Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) model the economy with restricted
information channel and observe the effect of imperfect information inattention on the
firms’ sluggish  (sticky)  price-change  decision-making:  “Firms  adjust  prices  every
period  and yet  impulse  responses  of  prices  to  shocks  are  sticky  — dampened  and
delayed relative to the impulse responses under perfect information...”
The main difference between Sims (2002b) model and that of PCL86, is that Sims uses
information entropy to model RI whilst PCL86 assumes that the new, current, shocks
are not observed in real time but with delay but the overall effects are similar. There is
however, a large number of alternative, non-entropy based, models of partial/imperfect
information and rational inattention and they are discussed in more detail later, in Ch. 5
and 6 of this work.
4.9 Discussion: 
4.9.1 Habit and lifestyle rigidity as R.I. driven utility maximiser
Contrary  to  the  earlier  definition  of  rationality  (e.g.  one  from  the  dictionary  of
philosophy),  habitual  behaviour  can be seen as  a  mean of maximising one’s utility
rationally. I.e., instead of acquiring and analysing all necessary information about the
variety of  the  substitutes  of  the  products  we intend to  buy every time we go to  a
supermarket,  one  can  rely  on  repeating  the  same  behaviour  learned  from  rational
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optimisation performed over a longer period of time. Such habitual behaviour, thus,
minimises information acquisition and its processing costs (in terms of both the time
and financial costs) a trip to a supermarket would entail if one was to take the fully
analytical, rational approach. As such, habit may be considered to represent a form of
rational inattention. 
However, as already mentioned in this work, a number of cues, some even subliminal,
or an optimisation based, e.g., on local supply and avoiding of a much longer and more
expensive journey needed to obtain the first favourite, can make a consumer purchase a
less favoured (second-best, or a lower ranking) substitute, which may then be observed,
however wrongly, as a purchase of the favoured variant.
Though it is unlikely that families would be discussing inflation and all other publicly
available  economic data  whilst  optimising their  next  week’s regular  purchases over
Sunday family lunches, however, a certain element of consumer behaviour optimisation
may  be  resulting  from the  communicative  rationality  and  irregular  revising  of  the
market news over family events, evening tea or beer drinking sessions of the relevant
households' purchases decision-makers and their peers.  
I would therefore argue that, having been most likely rooted in an early-established set
of revealed preferences, habitual behaviour used in daily purchases is most likely based
on the procedural (emotional) thinking as discussed earlier, and that is what is enabling
consumers to quickly work-out their short term purchases on a semi-automatic pilot.
Such, emotional, thus not RE-rooted, combination of habit and lifestyle rigidity would
affect market stability at a more strategic level, when such agents are trying to maintain
their life-style and their perceived social position midst income loss. Aiming either to
“keep-up  with  the  Joneses”  or  just  to  maintain  their  own  family  and  social  strata
lifestyle  continuum  irrespective  of  the  rational  expectations  of  their  future,  lower,
income, they may resort to spending any of their precautionary savings or to borrowing,
when that desire is met by over-optimistic credit facilities.
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4.9.2 A Hypothetical Mid-level Model of Rationality and Knowledge
I  would  like  here  to  postulate  a  hypothetical  development  based  on  traditional
distributed cognitive processing and Neuroeconomic theories, which are, of course, the
underlying  ground  for  this  model  but  overly  too  detailed  for  explaining  macro-
economic agent knowledge based decision making in socio-economic context.
4.9.2.1 Distributed Parallel Processing Utility Maximization
What  this  intuitively may  mean  is  that  our  brain  does  not  cognitively  process
information in a “logical” sequence but divides (rationalises) the process into parallel,
concurrent processes. At the top of the hierarchy, each rationalised process is a stage of
what we traditionally perceive as a step in logical processing and may be assessed
concurrently before their results are “projected” into the sequential, pre-dominantly left
hemisphere  for  its  presentation  in  the  sequentially-logical,  form  that  is  easily
translatable into word-sequential spoken language form. Thus, cutting the lapse time
from the start to the end of processing allows more factors to be evaluated within the
same short time comparable with a heuristic process.  
Thus, one often reaches an answer before putting all steps into a logical sequence and
the sequential logical form is frequently just a rationalisation of parallel (concurrent)
cognitive processing (Popper (1935) refers to a cognitive rationalisation as “rational
reconstruction”). A person making a decision has then a choice of how to present this
rationalised cognitive process in  the logical  and the phonetic  forms of  a  sequential
natural language (possibly based on Chomsky  (1967, 1995)) , mainly:
1. Project the most important of those parallel assessments and the overall result in a
form of a single-reason heuristic conclusion, or,
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2. Project several of the concurrently processed assessments into a logical sequence or
a decision tree and “derive” the same logical  conclusion in  a  sequential  logical
process.
Let us take an example of a medical student who may have to backtrack, step-by-step,
using difference reduction and sub-goals in the means-end problem-solving heuristics
to assess all the symptoms and causes of an illness before reaching a diagnosis. 
However, once the medical student masters his subject and becomes a practitioner and
an expert, he/she will not need to go through the whole process of step-by-step rational
assessment  of  the  factors,  but  will  be  able  to  recognise  a  pattern  of  a  few of  the
attributes and identify the particular type of flu in a leap of apparently irrational, non-
deductive, non-declarative but procedural reasoning based on a recognition of a whole
set of factors (see Stillings et al. (1987), pp.93-101). 
Thus, the general model of a multi-attribute rational utility maximiser can still stand as
the ultimate goal of this alternative model of rationality. A quick intuitive or a heuristic
decision may be based on a large number of factors, probably cognitively processed by
the  distributed  neural  network  of  vNM nodes  in  the  right  hemisphere  before  their
results are “projected” into a sequential, left hemisphere for a presentation in a logical
form. Hence, a heuristic, short decision may be just the tip of a hierarchical “iceberg”
of distributed processes taking place in the human brain.
The emotional and other subliminal factors may act as Bayesian priors and this is then
why a trained, Bayesian neural network simulator can simulate a “trained” consumer,
apply multi-attribute statistical regression, recognise a pattern and act as an expert in
solving some problems  such as  identifying  a  product  with  the  highest  utility,  both
quicker and more close to real life, than a system based on the first generation of AI
systems and the single-dimensional predicative logic.
Rationality has, to a varied but a larger extent became associated with contemporary
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economic theory. An economical definition of utility maximising rational choice, on the
other  hand,  allows close  econometric  mapping of  “consumer  choice”  on  the  set  of
rational numbers. The association goes so far that the mere word economical became
almost a synonym for rationality, which has probably been part of human thinking from
the time before writing, the pre-historic times. The economic theory of rational utility
maximisation was however  developed in a dialogue between the economic and the
decision-making theories developed in WW2, based on maximisation of the effect the
military operations achieved under severe constraints of incomplete information and
limited time. 
4.9.2.2 Communicative Rationality
On the other hand, as part of the increased amount of available information and the
information needed to make rational consumer choice, we can observe that consumers
more and more opt to acquire both market and product information for facilitation of
their rational utility maximisation choice from the pool of technologically advanced and
increasingly  complex  products.  This  information  is  increasingly  sought  from
specialised magazines with long articles dedicated to price and feature comparison of
groups of products (e.g. Which Car, Mortgage, etc.). As a result, social conversations
nowadays increasingly frequently consist of either single,  or, sometimes,  two sided,
elaboration  and  comparison  of  features  and  utility  benefits  of  consumer  products,
raising the case for Habermas' (1981/84) communicative rationality.
The majority of individual consumers and other  agents  of the economic system, as
many  recent  psychological  researchers  argue,  do  not  follow  this  rather  normative
model. This paper shows that such unexpected, observed, behaviour is not just simply
due to the individual agents behaving in an irrational manner, but it might be better
described by some different rules and models of rationality. However, even with the
recent  developments  of  the  models  of  rationality,  the  rational  utility  maximisation
ultimately still applies to both the economic and the non-economic domains of our lives
as either a normative or a communication model for explaining and rationalising our
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decisions reached in various, alternative ways. 
Because  decisions  made  intuitively,  concurrently,  heuristically,  procedurally  or
habitually are quicker than those made on basis of the full rational cognitive assessment
utilising declarative centres, it seems that rationality does not play an (important) role
in individual decision-making. Along the lines of Habermas' (1981/84) communicative
rationality, Arrow (1987) claims that the rationality is not feature of an individual but of
the social environment.67 What this may also mean is that the a posteriori rationalisation
(“rational reconstruction”) is mainly used just to present and justify the choice to a
social  group  for  approval.  However,  the  vNM  (bounded)  rational  expected  utility
maximisation-like mechanisms are inherently at the core, though sometimes behind the
stage,  of  the  many alternative  human  decision-making  processes  as  well  as  of  the
applied normative models68. These models, however, need to remain compatible with
the findings of neurology and neuroeconomics. 
4.9.2.3 Applications of Entropy  
On the other hand, following-up on Sims (2002b):
1) An economic model, as such, is an approximation, a kind of “bracketing out”
and acts as a restricted information channel with its own entropy as its capacity.
Different agents have different models and observe different data with different
frequencies and with a different precision. (E.g., macroeconomists are trying to
model  economic behaviour  using only a  subset  of  quarterly data.  Such data
allow modelling and identifying cycles only as short as 0.5 year, whilst those
67 Arrow claims that rationality is not required for an economic system to function and that plausible 
economic theories can be built upon criteria different from rationality of the individual participants: 
"Among the classical economists rationality had a limited meaning of preferring more to less”
68 Thus, the general model of multi-attribute rational utility maximiser can still stand as the ultimate 
method and the goal of this alternative model of rationality. A quick intuitive or a heuristic decision may 
be actually based on a large number of evaluated factors, possibly cognitively processed by the 
distributed neural network of vNM nodes in the right hemisphere before their results are “projected” into 
a sequential, left hemisphere for a presentation in a logical form. Hence, a heuristic, short decision may 
be just the tip of a hierarchical “iceberg” of distributed processes taking place in the human brain.
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more  frequent,  shorter,  production  and  price  change  cycles  in  the  economy
cannot be identified.). If a single model is to represent a generic, representative
agent, than it is that model’s entropy that defines the channel capacity. 
2) Restricting entropy change to the information channel capacity   as in Sims
(2002b),  Luo  and  Young  (2009)  and  Martins  and  Sinigaglia  (2009)  is  a
convenient abstraction but one which, mainly for the above reasons, has little, if
any relevance in reality. Any model has its own entropy and different agents will
have different models and capacities, but none will have the ability to perceive
the economy in full and will be limited to partial (imperfect) information. 
3) If the model is that of a representative agent, simulating the agent's information
processing, than its entropy represents the representative restriction k. If it is a
meta-model trying to represent the entire economy, then its information change
cannot  be restricted by the representative agent’s capacity but  only the sub-
model of the agent’s own perception of the economy can be restricted. 
.
Increasing computational power may enable us in near future to have macro-economic
heterogeneous agent model with detailed neuroeconomics simulation models at its core
for each agent. Until then, we need some intermediate-complexity models, probably
based on entropy as a measure of limits to their informational capacity limits to work
with but building such full-scale model is beyond the scope of this research.
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4.10 Conclusion
The preceding chapter revisited issue of rationality, a fundamental presumption in at
least  two  of  its  main  models,  that  of  rational  preferences  and  the  other,  rational
expectations and it was shown that there is, one could say, a common underlying and
partially, sub-conscious mechanism connecting the two models as analysed within the
relatively new domain of neuroeconomics. It was also shown that there are additional,
major  implication  of  imperfect,  incomplete,  limited  information  and  of  its  limited
processing  capacity  available  to  individuals  or  smaller  organisations,  thus  driving
heuristics  based  decision  making  within  bounded  rationality  or  rational  inattention
conditions and so, explaining why only larger teams or organisations can be considered
to have basic conditions to needed for forming fully rational expectations. Saying so, it
does  not  necessarily  mean  that  they  follow  it  and  some  empirical  results  in  the
following chapter confirm the clear segmentation among fundamentally heterogeneous
agents  driven  markets  and  the  surprising  ration  of  agents  not  following  it,  thus,
indicating a major issue in the traditional and more recent macro-economic modelling
theory making assumption of full sufficiency of a single representative agent forming
fully rational expectations based on fully set of needed information. There is of course,
more work needed to pin-point more precisely the statistical  and causality relations
between the above theoretical conclusion and segmentation and the ground data that
that what has been done in this research work and the next chapter though, it should be
mentioned that  the  above results  in  a  way match  the  small  sample  of  the  author's
ground-work professional experiences.  
A remark: This research work is, therefore, on its own just an attempt to rationalise a
large number of collected facts, bracketed by a rational attention, itself optimised to
collect sufficient but not overly too large number of information items that can be put in
a  rationally  logical  and  communicable  sequence  so  to  convey  certain  scientific
discoveries  at  a  level  of  complexity,  quality  and  quantity  expected  for  a  PhD
dissertation.
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5 Methodology and Application of Partial Information 
DSGE Economic Models 
5.1 Partial Information Rational Expectations DSGE Models
In line  with  the  main  aim of  this  research  to  address  importance  of  more  realistic
assumptions of absence of full information (or of the ability to process it) in decision
making by economic agents, this section aims to address some of the most frequently
voiced criticisms of both classical and NK DSGE models and tools that deemed to be
fully justified: 
1) that  economic  agents  have  full  information  available  at  their  disposal  (and,
though  less  explicitly  mentioned,  are  also  assumed  to  be  able  to  process  it
correctly), and,
2) that  a  single  representative  aggregate  agent  may  then  form  fully  rational
expectations and be sufficient to represent aggregate economic behaviour.
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  provide  and  test  some  of  improvements  to  DSGE
modelling in those two areas of most frequent criticisms of rather unrealistic classical
assumptions of the DSGE models discussed and criticised earlier. 
I.e.,  most  of both classical and NK DSGE models  make a  computationally simpler
assumptions  of  asymmetric  information,  where  full  information  about  shocks  is
available  to  the  economic  agents  but  not  to  the  institutional  (e.g.  central  bank's)
econometricians (e.g. in Svensson and Woodford 2002b). According to many the critics
(e.g. Romer 2016), such models henceforth fail to take into account that only partial
information is available to all the economic agents. The full-information assumption
leads  to  more questionable estimates  than those following a more realistic  scenario
where  partial  (i.e.  imperfect,  though symmetric)  information  assumptions  are  made
when the models are estimated and evaluated. 
A partial  (imperfect)  information  approach can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  provide  a
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model  for rational  inattention or  bounded rationality information constrained agents
within a Rational Expectation DSGE framework solution, when agents make decisions
without having full knowledge of all current shocks affecting endogenous, unobserved
variables.
5.1.1 Asymmetric Partial Information
Whilst  assumption  of  asymmetric  information  being  available  is  realistic,  it  is  not
realistic to assume that any party has full information (and, to add to that, the ability to
process  it  in  reasonable time with  the  all  needed accuracy)  to  derive fully rational
expectations.  On  the  other  hand,  Svensson  and  Woodford  (2002b) argue  that  it  is
logically sound to assume that in case of asymmetric information, where central banks
and/or policy makers observe less than private sector economic agents who will have a
full common information set of all relevant factors. The elegant logic they postulate is
that only the information about target variables, symmetrically known across all private
agents is relevant for economic modelling. Whatever else is there that is not known by
the  agents,  although  possibly  known  by  others  such  as  policy  makers  is,  in  their
opinion, nevertheless irrelevant for making decisions by the agent being unknown to
them. Such additional information is thus irrelevant for forecasting agents decisions and
their  behaviour  and  hence  for  making  policy  decisions.  (Svensson  and  Woodford
2002a) also say that authorities,  e.g. central  banks only have additional information
about their own intentions).
However  convenient  and  elegant  this  pragmatic  approach  aimed  at  creating  an
aggregate and tractable model is,  their  argument is also rather difficult  to accept as
being realistic:
Firstly, it would be wrong to assume that private agents commonly shared more
information  than  is  available  publicly  to  the  authorities  and  their
econometricians  too.  This  is  mainly  because  such  situation  would  be
contradictory to both, the rules but also aims of market competition. 
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Secondly, most of the shocks come from the effects of actions based on private
information (or from the inferred conclusions based on the mixture of public
and private information and staying private for a while), i.e. private information
that drives some organisations in directions not expected or being inferred from
the public information.  
Also,  contradicting the above assumptions Romer and Romer (2000) show that  the
Federal Reserve’s forecasts of inflation (a private information at the time but released
several years later) - has much higher statistical regression significance in predicting
inflation than any of the commercial forecasts publicly available at the time. Even in
the case of forecasting GDP, the Fed’s forecasts had a higher significance than those by
the  commercial  forecasters,  but  the  difference  was  not  as  high  as  in  the  case  of
inflation. In the authors’ opinion this may be indicative that (at least some) planners
have  more  information  than  the  agents  do  about  future  state  of  the  economy.  The
authors suspect that the source of additional information results from the fact that the
Fed has more resources and more data collected by the regional offices. This allows
them to process more information than any commercial, public forecaster can afford to
have69.  As  a  result,  they  expect  that  market  agents  suspect  that  Fed  has  more
information when rising (or lowering) short-term interest rates in relation to the overall
inflation  process.  The  market  then  proportionally  adjusts  the  expected  futures  and,
consequently, the longer term rates (and bond yield curves)70 which is in line with the
findings of Cook and Han (1989). 
And, it is not just that the large pull of heterogeneous data series enables authorities to
produce  more  efficient  and  accurate  forecasts.  Examples  of  types  of  additional
information a financial authority, such as central bank, would have at its disposal as (a
temporary) private information useful in planning the future policy are fluctuations in
69 Exceptions may be Thomson/Reuters and Bloomberg. (that is, with the addition of the FED itself since
it is not strictly speaking purely a public institution).
70 From other sources such as Bernanke and Boivin (2003) the researchers know that Fed uses several
thousands of data series in their estimation process.
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the value of money in circulation and aggregate loan exposures of retail and some of
investment banks.  This raises  a case for models of both,  imperfect  and asymmetric
information being available among heterogeneous agents.
5.1.2 Symmetric Imperfect (Partial) Information
However, as was case in Minford and Peel (1983), in the course of this research, it was
deemed that a closer and more accurate approximation of such complex heterogeneous
model would be assumption of a set of symmetric (i.e. publicly shared) information,
however, assumed to be incomplete (imperfect or partial). This imperfection is either
because  there  is  a  multitude  of  different  (heterogeneous)  agents  holding  private
information (this including the central banks and authorities) or the current period data
and shocks are yet un-observed because there is a set of exogenous shocks but publicly
yet unknown (i.e. yet unobserved), or data are observed with substantial errors.
Many works in this area: (e.g. Minford and Peel (1983), Sargent and Wallace 1985 or
Lungu  et  al.  2003/2006) concentrate  on  the  so  also  called  Ragged  Edge  Partial
(Imperfect)  Information  when  only  some  of  the  contemporary  state  information  is
available (i.e. at time t) to the market participants, usually only the interest rate (and, in
some models, the exchange rate), and all other information is only available as past
data,  lagged at  least  for one period and as previous  or current estimates of current
period data. 
For example, aggregate supply curve in Sargent and Wallace (1985) eq.1:
yt = a1kt + a2 ( pt – t p*t-1 ) + ut (5.1.2.1)
where t p*t-1 is public expectation of the time t (current) value of log of price levels held
at time t-1 has been a starting point for many imperfect/partial information models.
However, more recent examples, like PCL86, instead, provide solutions and estimations
for the problem of current, imperfect, estimate of the current values, e.g. pt,t (or, t p*t in
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Sargent and Wallace (1985) notation). PCL86 solution is first RE DSGE solution for
imperfect information using the current estimate of the current values, e.g.  pt,t, to be
provided as an extension to Blanchard and Kahn (1980) RE DSGE solution. 
I.e. Blanchard and Kahn (1980) solve linearised model around steady state:
   (5.1.2.2a)
                  (5.1.2.2b)
Where wt is observation vector and eq. 5.1.2b observation equation. PCL86 extension, 
using earlier notation, solves the following model:
  (5.1.2.3a)
           (5.1.2.3b)
Other research works that provider similar solutions to PCL86 are by Collard, Dellas &
Smets (2009), Kormilitsina (2011), and, Neri and Ropele (2011) who quote both PCL86
and an earlier, 2010 version of Levine, Pearlman, Perendia and Yang (2009-2012) that
they  used  as  one  of  models  for  their  solution  also  based  on  symmetric  partial
information. In addition, Adam and Marcet (2011) provide a model of so-called Internal
Rationality, which reflects an idea that households behave fully rational but based on
only limited information they can obtain and process. 
5.1.3 Asymmetric Imperfect Information
More  recently,  building  upon PCL86  and  asymmetric  partial  information  model  of
Svenson  and  Woodford  (2003b),  Lubik,  Matthes  and  Mertens  (2016)  developed  a
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partial  information  solver  for  linear  rational  expectation  equation  system  (LRE)
inspired  by,  and  that  of  Farmer,  Khramov  and  Giovanni  (2015).  They  emphasis
differences between their and the work of PCL86, which they consider as a special,
simpler case of their model and which, this research is using as its starting point too.
They provide a set of solutions showing how varied imperfect information can lead to
different  equilibria  based  on  what  appears,  the  lowest  common  denominator  of
available information processing (filtering problem) capabilities among the agents and
the nature of information. In addition, Feve, Kass-Hanna and Pietrunti (2016) develop
another  DSGE  partial  information  model  for  treating  imperfect  real-time  data  and
Hauk, Lanteri and Marcet (2014, 2016) use another PI DSGE solution to model optimal
policy with endogenous and general signal extraction respectively. 
In another recent and discussion triggering work, Gabaix (2016) raised a controversy
analysing a NK model with “myopic”, not fully rational but boundedly-rational agents,
ignorant of unusual events and  unable to perfectly anticipate future, distorting general
equilibria.  He  does  not  provide  partial  information  solution  but  instead,  simulates
different agent's information asymmetry by means of weights of their “myopia”. He
then claims that his model with myopic agents allows even for a passive monetary
policy, thus, not just active one, to gain determinate equilibrium rather than multiple
ones.  However, one of his conclusions is that in such framework myopic agents are not
Ricardian as they do not fully anticipate future effects of tax cuts so that the fiscal
policy becomes much more important and powerful. 
Remark: It needs to be said that, those recent finding of Lubik, Matthes and Mertens
(2016) that  economy converge  to  different  equilibria  based  on what  information  is
available are similar,  if  not in line with the much earlier  (2008-10) findings of this
research based on implementation of PCL86 where different assumptions of various
information  availability  to  the  agents  would  create  different  responses  and  hence
reaction in the economy (see later in this chapter, in 5.6.1).
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5.1.4 Forecasting the forecasts of others and Optimal Policy under Partial 
Information
It  is  however  also  a  question  whether  the  economies  are  operating  in  the  Pareto
optimum manner, or as either irrational or simply adaptive reactions to disturbances in
a competitive and uncooperative environment leading to an under-performing, local,
Nash  equilibria  where  one  can  only  fit  models  to  data,  assume  Bayesian  rational
expectation and that only a local equilibrium optimisation takes place (Kirman (2011),
see earlier reference to Banerjee(1992)). 
The above issue has been underlined by the problem of “forecasting the forecasts of
others”,  i.e.  modelling  of  an  infinite,  explosive,  iterative  process  of  deriving  one’s
expectations on the basis of an estimation of expectation and pricing decision making
of other rational agents such as policymakers and micro-economic agents (Townsend
1983 and Sargent 1991). The later approaches used frequency-domain (Kasa 2000) or, a
combination of recursive methods, Kalman filter and sub-space methods in the time
domain  (PCL 1986,  and,  Pearlman  and  Sargent  2002)  to  deal  with  situations  of
asymmetric or incomplete information.
For deriving optimal policy in such complexity and imperfect information, Svensson
and Woodford (2003a) state that,  under usual linear estimation principles for purely
backward-looking  models  and  quadratic  (welfare)  loss  functions,  the  principle  of
certainty  equivalence  applies  to  the  derivation  of  optimal  policy  by  policy  maker
whether the state of economy was fully observable or not. However, in case of forward-
looking Rational Expectation models the situation is more complicated if for no other
reasons  than  for  the  problem  of  forecasting  other's  forecasts,  and  optimal  policy
becomes sub-optimal over time leading to time-inconsistent discretionary (reputational)
policy strategy.
The  authors  however  refer  to  the  PCL86  solution  saying  that  it  provides  rather  a
complex,  partial  symmetric  information  Kalman  filter  solution71 that  allows  for
71 They provide a partial information solution they claim is more intuitive than that of PCL86
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certainty  equivalence  under  non-optimising,  time-consistent,  regimes,  either
discretionary or non-discretionary, and that Pearlman (1992) provides a solution for the
optimising regimes also showing that certainty equivalence applies in both commitment
and discretion models.72 
Another  important  contribution  to  imperfect  information  literature  was  Woodford
(2003),  who  used  a  model  of  imperfect  competition  pricing  decisions  of  the  form
weighted sum of current estimates of market price levels and output.  Woodford  then
goes  to  demonstrate  how the  Townsend’s  (1983)  method  of  estimating  the  overall
average of others’ estimates can be reduced to finite-dimensional form.
5.1.5 Information, price and wage stickiness
Most of contemporary DSGE have NK micro-foundations and models of price and/or
wage  rigidities  (stickiness).  The  Calvo  price  contract  stickiness  parameters  (p)  is
usually  estimated by DSGE models to be well above 0.8 that relates to the probability
of contracts being negotiated to less than 0.2 in each observation period and that they
are renegotiated in periods exceeding an average of 5 quarters. This, however, does not
reflect reality and observations indicate renegotiation periods on an average are just
above 4 for European markets and even less for the US.
Some authors link (rational) inattentiveness with information and price stickiness. For
example, Reis (2008) introduces asymmetric in-attentiveness as a main cause of the
information,  and  consequently,  of  the  price  and  wage  stickiness  at  all  levels  of
economic market - among firms, labour and consumer groups, each having potentially
different level of attentiveness. Using both Euro and US data Reis (2008) concludes
72 Woodford and Swenson also state: “Certainty equivalence means that the estimation of the partially
observed state of the economy can be separated from the optimization, the setting of the instrument so as
to minimize the intertemporal loss function…(…).. In the case of commitment, “certainty equivalence”
means that the optimal instrument settings are the same linear function of the current estimate of the
predetermined variables describing the state of the economy and specific Lagrange multipliers (related to
the value that alternative expectations would have had in the previous period’s policy problem) as in the
case of the corresponding optimal policy problem under certainty.”
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that US and European firms show similar levels of attentiveness, whilst US labour and
Euro consumers show more attentiveness than their respective counterparts across the
ocean.
Several research projects concentrating on modelling and taking into account various
aspects of partial information however, managed to reduce the estimates of the Calvo
contract factor p  closer to the observations. Martinez-Garcia (2007), concentrating on
asymmetric information being available to different, heterogeneous agents in the area
of  foreign  exchange,  estimates  3-3.5  quarters  and  works  of  Levine,  Pearlman  and
Perendia (2008) and Levine, Pearlman, Perendia and Yang (2009-2012) focusing on
partial but symmetric information and the US data. The results of their later research
are consistent with those of the authors’ earlier  work and estimate average contract
lengths of 4 periods showing advantage of partial information assumptions (and PCL86
PI model solution method) for DSGE parameter estimation.   
5.1.6 Volatility and Imperfect Information
Here  we  explore  if  incomplete  information  leads  to  higher  swings  in  agents’
expectations.
For  example,  Pearlman (1992) states  that  Minford and Peel  (1983) and Currie  and
Levine (1985) showed in the early 1980s that  imperfect,  incomplete  information of
contemporary  price  levels  leads  to  higher  volatility  of  asset  prices,  exchange  and
interest rates73. Similarly, Martinez-Garcia (2007) indicates that imperfect, asymmetric
information may be one of the main factors contributing to the observed high volatility
on forex markets. He argues that  “…whenever  agents are  informationally-constrained,
their  responses  are  lagged  and  re-balancing  consumption  expenditures  across  countries
requires a more volatile exchange rate.”  
Such volatile behaviour is consistent with earlier  mentioned mood swings and self-
73 Indicated in Pearlman (1992), but the source materials were not available
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fulfilling  prophecies  resulting  from  combination  of  imperfect  information  and  the
consequent,  prevailing “animal spirits” herd behaviour,  and also,  from adherence to
such majority swings by rational agents and, as Gabaix (2016) recently showed, the so
called “myopia” of incomplete, partial asymmetric information being available.
5.1.7 Conclusion
The previous sections presented several models of Imperfect and Partial Information
and outlined concepts behind their implementations. It also outlined several advantages
of  use  of  imperfect  information  models  such  as  being  more  realistic  in  simulating
delayed,  hump-shaped  responses  to  shocks  as  well  as  many  them  being  better  at
modelling complexity of forecasting forecasts of others, volatilities caused by so-called
“animal  spirits”,  usually borne from uncertainty and myopia  of  incomplete,  partial,
information.
5.2 PCL Method for Solving and Testing Partial Information RE Models
5.2.1 Background of PCL86 Imperfect Partial Information in DSGE Models
As mentioned earlier, most of modern DSGE models and tools (e.g. BayesDSGE and
Dynare, prior to their enhancements for PCL86 solver), and for most of the time, use
variations of the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) or its generalisations (e.g. by Sims 2002a,
or, Collard and Juillard 2001 perturbation based solution for Dynare). They generally
provide asymmetric information solution procedures to obtain a closed form solution of
the linearised model. Along the line, these solutions assume that not all information is
observable by the authorities but is by the private agents.
To correct such unrealistic assumptions, Pearlman et al.  (1986) (PCL86) provided a
non-optimising  -  a  sub-space  and  Riccati  equation  based  solution  for  partial
information,  forward-looking Rational  Expectations  DSGE models  whilst  enhancing
the solution given initially by Blanchard and Kahn (1980). PCL86 also provides and
136
uses a partial-information extended recursive Kalman filter that enables estimation of
the  extended,  partial-information  model.  As  mentioned  earlier  in  Ch.  5.1,  PCL86
solution and its  version of  Kalman Filter  are  first  RE DSGE solution for  Bayesian
estimation of imperfect information using the current estimate of the current values, e.g.
pt,t, to be provided as an extension to Blanchard and Kahn (1980) RE DSGE solution.
I.e. Blanchard and Kahn (1980) solve linearised model around steady state:
   (5.2.1.1a)
                  (5.2.1.1b)
Where wt is observation vector and eq. 5.1.2b observation equation. PCL86 extension, 
using earlier notation, solves the following model:
  (5.2.1.2a)
           (5.2.1.2b)
NOTE: A reduced version of PCL (1986) solution model adjusted to ByesDSGE system
has been described in detail in Appendix 1 to this document. 
The  model  for  implementation  for  Dynare  DSGE  system  required  additional
modification and adjustment  of the original  PCL 86 solution.  For details  on partial
information  implementation  in  Dynare,  please  refer  to  Pearlman  (2009),  Perendia
(2010d), Levine and Pearlman (2011), and, as well, Dynare users’ manual and on-line
code. 
5.2.2 Use of PCL86 Solution for Partial Information in DSGE Models
A partial  (imperfect)  information  approach can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  provide  a
137
model  for  bounded  rationality  driven  agents  within  a  Rational  Expectation  DSGE
framework solution, when agents make decisions without having full knowledge of all
current shocks affecting endogenous, unobserved variables. If a model has as many
shocks as observables,  n (as recommended by the most of DSGE literature)  then a
partial information solution of a p-variable model will assume position that all n shocks
can be derived from an p*p covariance matrix and equation system of p-n unknown and
n known observations. As a result, both the solution and the estimation results will be
exactly same as in case of the standard (e.g. Dynare) full, but asymmetric information
knowledge model. 
However, if the researchers increase the number of shocks (or reduce the number of
observables), the partial information solver will assume the position that not all shocks
can be derived and both the model solution and the estimation results will differ from
those of standard DSGE solutions such as Dynare74 perturbation based ones. 
NOTE: For more detailed user guidelines of the PCL86 solver and facilities within
Dynare, please refer to Perendia (2010d) and, as well, Dynare users’ manual.
5.2.3 Evaluation Methodology for PCL Solution and New Enhancements
5.2.3.1 Parameter Estimation and Model Shock Simulation
One of the aims of this research was to apply and test the PCL86 partial information
DSGE solution by applying both the old and the enhanced solution method on US
macroeconomic datasets under various shocks and then present a comparison of the
results. In addition to using variety of known, standard DSGE models, a number of
modelling enhancements and extensions to those models have been made in the course
of this research so that those specific enhancements can be tested in their own merit
74 Dynare also provides for Bayesian VAR estimation on lines of Sims & Zha (1996) and the DSGE-VAR
combination for model miss-specification assessment and comparison based on del Negro Scharfheide
(2004), del Negro Scharfheide Smets Wouters (2007) and, after adjusting for partial information PCL86
soleution, used in Levine, Pearlman Perendia and Yang (2009-2012) 
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against the original models using standard DSGE solutions. However, in line with the
underlying theme of this research, those new, models enhancements introduced in this
research are estimated and simulated also using PCL86 partial information solution to
assess what effect and differences the PI approach could have made.
5.2.3.2 Data
With the exception of the first  work undertaken during this  research study,  Levine,
Pearlman and Perendia (2007),  which uses  EU data covering  the  period  1970Q1 –
2005Q4 obtained from the Area Wide Model database, all other research models were
estimated using US data from several sources. This was case mainly because US data
and  estimation  parameters  based  on  them informally  represent  a  de-facto  standard
economic research benchmark for models and results comparisons. The obtained model
parameters scoring the highest likelihood of the fit  to  data were then used for IRF
simulations in most of the cases.
5.2.3.3 Model and Solution Evaluation Methodology
Del Negro and Schorfheide (2006) advance methods for comparing models and ranking
their  possible,  relative  miss-specifications  whilst  recent  work of  e.g.  Wieland et  al.
(2016) suggests sets of complex methods for model comparisons. However, most of
results’ comparisons in this  research will  be between those obtained from Bayesian
estimations of similar or the same models being estimated with the same or similar data
sets, in few cases with added time series, however, using different solution methods.
Considering  such  relative  minor  model  differences,  the  main  criteria  for  assessing
quality of either the enhancements to the models or to the solution mechanisms will be
comparison of the posterior marginal likelihood levels along the suggestions of Geweke
(1998). 
5.2.3.3.1 Comparing DSGE Models using Posterior and Marginal Densities 
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For comparative purposes, with the DSGE toolkit,  one can estimate model data and
evaluate it against other similar models, comparing marginal densities whilst keeping
data and priors constant and common. These densities are dependent on 
.1 Model parameter set M and their priors ,
.2 dataset (YT)
.3 model variations (Ri)
More specifically, the posterior probability density: 
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Its denominator, referred to as marginal density for e.g. a model  R, p(Yt|R), can be
expressed as integral over all model  R’s parameter sets can be calculated using full
integration or estimated as a discrete sum, of all conditional likelihood nominators for
all parameter sets.
Different models are likely to have different probability of single dataset across all of
their  parameter  sets  and  are  therefore,  expected  to  have  different  marginal  density
denominator even for common dataset. Among others Smets and Wouters (2003) and
Adjemian  (2008)  test  and  assert  that  the  marginal  density  computation  can  be
simplified with use of either Laplace transformation or modified harmonic mean (as
suggested by Geweke (1998)) to evaluate marginal density integral over the sample
with similar accuracy, instead of computing full integration. 
For further details on Kalman filter  based Bayesian DSGE estimation, the posterior
density for a state space system see Geweke (1998) or, for its Dynare implementation,
Appendix 3 or Adjemian (2008). 
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5.2.3.3.2 Empirical comparison 
In addition, we will empirically compare the “proximities” (i.e. inverse of differences
or errors) either of the estimated parameter values or of the responses of the IRFs to
various  shocks in  comparison to  the  empirically  observed or  theoretically expected
values. 
This  integral  denominator  of  the posterior  density equation is  constant  for a  model
using same data set so that it can be ignored if only probability of different parameter
sets conditional n parameter set needs to be assessed for a single model, and the model
parameter estimates can be then compared based on the nominator estimates only.
The nominator is usually expressed in logarithmic form for a state-space Kalman filter
based  estimation  and  its  right  part,  probability  density  of  the  data  sample  usually
calculated  within  the  Kalman  filter,  one  for  each  time-step  vector  yt in  the  time
sequence YT as log likelihood (ln L) of model for given data sample (or probability of
data sample for given model): 
lnL = -1/2*[T*n*log(2*)  + ln det(cov(et)) + eTt(cov(et))-1et] (5.2.3.3.2.1)
where T is the length of the data sample and n -  the number of observed variables in
the sample and et – a vector of prediction errors for each time step’s. To obtain full
measure  of  the  nominator  in  logarithmic  form  used  for  parameter  set  likelihood
comparison, Dynare and other DSGE estimation tools, calculate and add logarithm of
the joint prior density lnP()= ln P(i))  (see Adjemian (2008)).
5.2.3.3.3 Expectations
The main theoretical expectation in estimation and simulation of PI models solutions
would be that either their parameter value or the simulated IRF (or both) outcomes
show more empirically and theoretically realistic, slower, delayed reactions of those
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unobserved  endogenous  variables  to  the  shocks  through  either  the  value  of  their
associated parameters or hump-shapes of their IRF curves.
5.2.3.3.5 Extended DSGE-VAR Evaluation Tests
In case of one of the enhancement projects undertaken in this research, encompassing
more complex model enhancements to the standard,  single representative agent  NK
DSGE models, the models were also evaluated using DSGE-VAR along the lines of Del
Negro and Schorfheide (2004) and their background work. Levine et al (2009-2012)
that used DSGE-VAR as an additional, model miss-specification evaluation method for
its variety of models of the heterogeneous agent enhancement to standard DSGE, for
both of the two solution mechanisms, the standard Dynare asymmetric and the PCL86
PI extension, partial imperfect information too. However, since that project is already
explained in detail in a publication, it will not be detailed in this research.
5.2.3.4 DSGE Work-bench Systems Used
Two different DSGE solution, estimation and simulation workbench systems have been
enhanced and used to  enable solving  and estimating  models  and running their  IRF
simulation  under  different,  standard  asymmetric  full  and  symmetric  imperfect
informational  assumptions  using  the  solution  for  partial  information  modelling
developed in PCL86.
1) BayesDSGE, a small-scale DSGE workbench that was originally developed by
A.  Justiniano  who  made  it  available  in  the  course  of  a  preparatory
implementation and evaluation of PCL86 Partial Information sub-system work
preceding this project (see next sub-chapter below). This research project, at its
start,  used it  in  Levine,  Pearlman and Perendia  (2007) and Perendia  (2008)
initial yield curve fitting research work.
2) Dynare,  a very comprehensive set of DSGE tools, initially developed by M.
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Juillard at CEPREMAP and enhanced regularly by a team of researchers and
specialised developers. It was enhanced for PCL86 sub-system and used for the
most of research work on this project. 
NOTE: For more detailed user guidelines of the PCL86 solver and facilities within
Dynare, please refer to Perendia (2010d) and, as well, Dynare users’ manual.
5.3 Initial Implementation Work and Tests
5.3.1 Initial Implementation 
This project continues previous work (Pearlman and Perendia 2006 and Perendia 2006)
so that, in its early stages, as in Levine, Pearlman and Perendia (2007) and Perendia
(2008)), a modified BayesDSGE system of Matlab routines was used. Comparing to
Dynare, BayesDSGE is a simpler, two-stage solution variant of the standard MCMC
DSGE  tool  based  on  the  recursive  State-space  Kalman  Filter  MLE  and  Bayesian
MCMC Random-Walk  Metropolis-Hastings  algorithm methodologies75.  BayesDSGE
was  initially  developed  by A.  Justiniano  around  C.  Sims’ ‘gensys’ and  ‘csminwel’
algorithms (See Sims 2002a) and also used in e.g. Batini et al. (2005 a and b). 
The BayesDSGE system was then extended by implementation of 
1) two modifications aimed directly for PCL86 solution and estimation: one for
modified general solution subsystem, and the other for Kalman filter estimation
sub-system  with  aim  to  support  the  partial  (but  symmetric)  information
assumption based on the solution provided in PCL86.
2) In addition to the direct support for PCL86 enhancement to standard DSGE, this
project provides another, the so-called Factor-Augmented VAR (FAVAR) data
rich estimation econometric extension.  The PCL86 in particular was deemed
75 Results from both stages are reported in Appendix 3.
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well  suited  for  a  further,  FAVAR  data-rich  enhancement  to  both  DSGE  in
general and PCL86. This PCL86 enhancement was designed upon the model of
data-rich  estimation  model  of  data  as  imperfect  indicators  driving  Factor-
Augmented VAR (FAVAR), specified and used in Bernanke and Boivin (2003),
Jacquier et al.  (2004) , Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005), and, Boivin and
Giannoni (2005)76 (see also Apendix 2.a)
NOTE: This version of PCL (1986) solution model adjusted to the ByesDSGE system
implementation as well as an outline of the modifications to the BayesDSGE system
have been described in detail in Appendix 1 of this document. (The BayesDSGE system
technical  modification  is  described  in  more  detail  in  Appendix  1.6).  Also,  due  to
alternations to implementation of PCL86 into Dynare and complexity of Dynare system
FAVAR-like extension was not ported and implemented in Dynare system.
5.3.2 The Initial Models
The two NK models estimated in the very early stages of this project were both derived
from Smets and Wouters (2002 and 2003) model. The first, used in Levine, Pearlman
and Perendia (2007), as noted earlier, was estimated using EU data. The model and its
results were in detail described and discussed in the paper available on line and will not
be  covered  here.  One  of  its  features,  however,  the  rich  data  FAVAR-like  option
extension was not covered in detail there; however, it is explained in Appendix 2a of
this work. 
The second, used for the early version of yield curve fitting in Perendia (2008), was
based on the model used in Pearlman and Perendia (2006), also a small, single and
closed country, a subset version of standard New-Keynesian (NK) models as defined in
Smets and Wouters (2002 and 2003).  It  is also closely based on the model used in
Batini et al. (2005 a and b), and Levine et al. (2006), however, extended with the wage
76 For example, Bernanke & Boivin 2003 build upon the work of Stock & Watson (1999) who conclude
that “the best-performing forecast for inflation is an augmented Phillips curve forecast that uses a new
composite index of aggregate activity comprised of the 168 individual activity measures”. 
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equation based on the one used in (Smets and Wouters (2002) and (2003)). Alike the
first model above, it also featured data-rich option for estimation FAVAR-like noisy
factor  data  along  the  lines  of  BG05,  however,  here  used  in  yield  curve  fitting
mechanism. It was estimated using US data with the treasury yields obtained from US
Fed Reserve database, augmenting the overall data fit log-likelihood. Again, the rich
data FAVAR-like option extension used is explained in Appendix 2a of this work. The
initial model and its log-linear linearization around the steady state, are described in
Appendices A2b and A2c respectively.
In the remainder of this section an explanation of those models is presented and it is
closely based on the main source material, namely work of Smets and Wouters (2002)
(SW02 henceforth).
Please  see  Appendix  2b  that  replicates  the  model  used  and  described  in  detail  in
Perendia (2006) and also, used in Pearlman and Perendia (2006) and Perendia (2008).
Appendix 2c outline the model’s log-linear linearization around steady state.
5.3.3 Initial Estimation using US data:
That work project then:
1. Reproduced  some  of  the  results  of  DSGE  asymmetric-information  US
macroeconomic  parameter  estimation  and  forecasting  work  by  Boivin  and
Giannoni (2005) (BG05) and Smets and Wouters (2003),
2. Applied  the  enhanced,  partial  information  method  on  US  macroeconomic
datasets to forecast macroeconomic factors under shocks inside sample. 
Both the earlier and this work then evaluate differences in the estimation accuracy and
the extent to which accuracy of forecasting business cycles using DSGE methods can
be improved by the estimation method developed in PCL86.It provided motivation and
basis early stage of this research and presentation Perendia (2008). 
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5.3.4 Additional Discussion on Early Estimation Results
In all  early estimations  using PCL86 in BayesDSGE one can  observe  a  significant
difference between the part and the asymmetric information model estimates and both
sets  of  results  from this  research  and  those  of  some  other  researchers.  The  partial
information estimates are particularly significantly lower for consumption and wage
indexation factors (c and w), higher for (differentiated, skilled) wage mark-up: m   and
significantly higher  for  labour  disutility  (i.e.  l)  (i.e.  lower labour  inter-temporal
elasticity) (e.g Please see the results in Appendix 4)
Even the authors’ asymmetric-information estimates for indexation are lower than the
results  reported  by  other  studies  covering  longer  data  samples  (e.g.  Boivin  and
Giannoni (2005) covering 1965-2002 and Smets and Wouters (2003) starting back in
1957). 
In  de-Walque,  Smets  and  Wouters  (2005),  the  authors  pay  their  attention  to  the
estimates of price and wage “stickiness” factors in their previous (2004) work (i.e. p
=0.89 and  w =0.71). They found those variables were over-estimated in comparison
with the observed micro-data, This means that their estimates indicated much longer
contracts  (  e.g.  approx. over  10 quarters for prices)  than the observed (approx. 4-8
quarters) and they devised a method based on the grouping of firms into “cohorts” by
price category by which they were able to show a  lowering  indexation estimates. 
However, this division effectively creates semi-isolated “economic islands”, for groups
of firms where information and labour can flow easily within the island but not much
so between those islands –not entirely dissimilar to the Lucas’s island. This has a dual
effect.  First,  the  creation  of  economic  clusters  which  are  known  to  increase  the
fluctuation of labour and the information sharing within them, but has an overall effect
that  the  overall  demand  elasticity  for  labour  and  information  share  is  lower.
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Consequently,  the  second  effect  is  that  they  also  create  a  situation  of  information
partialisation, i.e. the cohorts have full information within but only limited information
outside  their  “islands”.  In  this  manner,  they effectively create  a  partial  information
situation and the resulting model does yield lower indexation estimates similar to the
PCL model – but their estimates are valid only within the cohorts, not for industry as
whole.
The estimates in this research, using both the asymmetric and, even more so, the partial
information estimates  show values  which are substantially lower than their  original
estimates, without the need for market sub-structuring. It is then, however, possible that
both,  the estimation on the data  window from the last  twenty years and the use of
higher precision, partial information, estimation model, indicate some of the changes in
the economy in  recent  decades.  For  example,  it  may indicate  the higher  impact  of
technological developments  (e.g.  of the internet  and information technology)  and/or
reflect the recent increases in the collection and the assessment of marketing data at
micro-agent level and indicate the effect of such changes on lowering price stickiness
and increasing frequency of price optimisation77. This, however, needs to be clarified by
additional research, for example, applying the part-info estimation to the same period as
in Smets and Wouters (2003).  Similarly, it is also possible that the authors’ estimates of
m and  indicate the effects of changes in the recent decades, marked by an increased
frequency of short-term contract based employment, and the associated (re-)negotiation
of the wage contracts.
In the longer term, it is worth investigating to which extent both of the above micro-
agent factors could have contributed to decrease in both inflation and inflation related
shocks over the past decades rather than attributing this effect solely to the inflation
targeting skills of central bankers78. 
77 For example, the consumer price indexation parameter c in the part-information model reflects much
more realistic estimate of price contract lengths of about 3 months rather in comparison to the contracts
estimates of more than a year in some other model estimates (i.e. when c ~ 0.8).
78 Justiniano, Kumhoff and Ravena (2006) find that short (one to two quarter) price contract business
cycles are still compatible with the observed inflation persistency and that Calvo type price stickiness,
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It is also possible that, the higher precision of partial information estimation similarly
points  to  other  possible  effects  of  technological  developments  that  have  led  to  the
increase in demand for skilled, differentiated labour and the wage mark-up (1+ w)
and the inversely related lower elasticity of the specialised labour  demand (=(1+
w)/w).  Similarly,  the  rise  in  marketing  methodologies  and  market  analysis
technology may have led to the increase in overall role of consumer preferences (and
the new-brand release preference shocks) relative the technology shocks. This change is
expected to have led to the (relative) increase of the preference shock factor over the
technology shock factor, the pref and tech respectively.
Also the increased likelihood of the part-info estimations with a larger number of series
and the consistency of their estimation results show the ability of the PCL86 method to
cope and take substantial advantage of the additional, noisy indicator data sets in data
rich environments.
5.4 Using Partial Information Solution to Fit Yield Curve 
This section partially reproduces work Perendia (2008). 
5.4.1 Overview (Abstract)
At early stage of this research project, an experiment was done to use multiple Taylor-
type equations as extension to the above described large dataset model, one for each
different maturity treasury yield. The starting point and motivation was to parallel work
by De Graeve, Emirisy and Wouters (2007) and (2008) that extends Smets and Wouters’
DSGE  model  with  term  structure  for  bond  yield  along  the  lines  of  extensions  of
structural  NK models  in  research  programs  conducted  by  several  authors  showing
advantages of DSGE implementations over structural model implementations.
due to intermediate product price aggregation and their random optimization adjustments occurring at
different  times.  (re  Justiniano,  Kumhoff  and  Ravena  (2006):  Multi-Sectoral  Cascading  and  Price
Dynamics - A Bayesian Econometric Evaluation, unpublished paper).
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However, the Perendia (2008) research work is taking a slightly different approach to
Taylor rule and it is estimating yields using the above combined Taylor rule, extended
by  the  Hull  and  White  model  of  term structure  (see  Appendix  8),  with  both,  the
standard, full (asymmetric) information DSGE model and the PCL extensions to the
linear Kalman filter. The results provided a better fit in general than the standard model.
This experimental work was partially replicated with similar YC extension to the SW07
model  with news and unemployment  in  the  fiscal  rule,  as  in  Perendia and Tsoukis
(2012), but not in Partial Information mode (see Appendix 7).
Note:  An additional discussion related to this project is included later, in context of
chapter 6.6 and data in Appendix 7.
5.4.2 Background
An article  by De Graeve,  Emirisy &Wouters (2007) and (2008) extends Smets  and
Wouters’ DSGE model with term structure for bond yield. Their rationale was that the
current macroeconomic models are insufficient, leading to inadequate yield prediction
and  rational  expectations,  and  those  authors  proposed  a  more  rigorous  model  of
macroeconomy, which allows more rigorous formation of rational expectations of the
term structure in DSGE models.
They achieved a substantial explanatory coverage of the yield fluctuations over the past
forty years and improvements in out-of-sample predictions of the yield changes, and
also, related to that, improvements in predictions of the GDP changes from the interest
rate and term spread fluctuations. They also base their model on a variation of Smets
and Wouters (2007). However, they extended it with a more rigorous model of inflation
targeting; by adding time-varying inflation targets. As a result, they succeeded to match
the model to the more realistic observed variations in long- term future interest rates
(and, hence, their expectations) than has been achieved in the standard macro-economic
models which tend to model them as rather flat.
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5.4.3 Fitting Yield Curve in Standard and Partial Information DSGE Models
5.4.3.1 Fitting yield curve using DSGE
It is suggested in DEW07 for the term structure to be modelled with RE and in line
with the risk-neutral, “perfect foresight” valuation methodology and Pure Expectation
Hypothesis  (see  also  Curtberthson  1996,  pp224,226),  modelled   “as  a  weighted
average of expected future short term interest rates:”
Rtn = 1/N Et{ Rt + Rt+1 + Rt+2 +…  + Rt+N-1} (5.4.3.1.1)
The authors then extend the state space of the RE DSGE model with forward rates and
yields.  They  consider  several  possible  ways  of  estimating  the  yields  within  the
recursive state space model. One approach is to take the risk-neutral assumptions that
time t expectation of short rate is “tomorrow’s” (time t+1) forward rate and progress
with estimation in forward recursive manner. 79 The second approach takes into account
risk premium and uses a log-linear RE solution with a lognormal approximation of a
stochastic discount factor as used, e.g. by Wu (2005).80
However, DEW07 selected yet another, the third approach, and simply extend the space
state  system matrix  with  an  additional  set  of  state  variables  RtN where  N  is  bond
maturity in periods (N= 4, 12, 20 and 40 for 1, 3, 5 and 10 years respectively) and
extend the observation matrix with four equations in the form of :
RtN obs = cN + RtN + tN (5.4.3.1.2)
79 This would probably require running a 40 step forward simulation for each estimation step.
80 Wu does not use the traditional linearised DSGE model as he states that the DSGE model first order
linearization of Euler equation leads to risk -neutral  “certainty equivalence” solution which, in turn,
renders all assets’ returns identical and makes such linearization unsuitable for asset pricing research.
Instead, he uses a two-step solution strategy: log-linearization of Euler equations as usual  for macro
models and then, log-normal bond pricing Euler to derive risk compensation terms.
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Where 
RtN obs is observed expected yield on a zero coupon bond over N periods as of time t, 
cN is a constant aimed to capture mean yield
RtN is the current PEH based estimate of the observed (expected) yield rates RtN over N
periods (where N=4, 12, 20 and 40). 
tN is the measurement error and its fluctuations are expected to be closely related to,
and capturing, the fluctuations in the term risk premium. 
Such an  extension,  however,  does  not  relate  the  observed and estimated  yields  for
different periods (other than the one period bank rate) to the system of endogenous
variables and equations other than by means of time-variate state-space error var./covar
matrix.
The observed current interest rates for different periods, however, are not observations
of the factual, measured values of those interest rate/yield curves (those will be known
at  the  end  of  the  lending  period),  but  are  observations  of  the  current  (rational)
expectations of those future interest rate yield curves, in a similar way to the equity
prices  which  are  current  expectations  of  future  income  curves.  They  are  therefore
rational  expectations  of  future  economic  equilibrium behaviour,  and  the  longer  the
interest rates’ periods, the less they are influenced by the current fluctuations81. 
In their budget constraint equation the authors also include an exogenous risk premium
tb on return on holding default-able bonds as opposed to risk-free assets, similar to the
model of Goodfriend & McCallum, (2007). Again, however, they do not seem to make
that risk premium relate to the above- mentioned yield observation errors (tN) which
should reflect the risk premia.
5.4.3.2 Fitting yield curve using Partial Information and FAVAR enhancement
This research is taking a somehow different approach and it is estimating yields using
81 The currently observed spot prices of goods on the markets are, on the other hand, not measurement of
RE of their future demand but of their spot demand.
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the combined Taylor-type rule, extended by the Hull and White model of term structure,
(See  Appendix  8)  and via  both,  the  standard,  full  (asymmetric)  information  DSGE
model and the PCL extensions to the linear Kalman filter. The results provided a better
fit in general than the standard model. (Perendia (2008)) 
The better fit to data is achieved on a few fronts:
1) Provision  and  use  of  PCL86  model  solution  for  more  correct  partial
information  assumption. Most  economic  estimates,  including  those  using
DSGE models,  are  done using contemporary observations,  with values  from
databanks at time t and assuming knowledge of the shocks at time t too. 
However, in reality and in so-called real-time situations when decisions are made, not
all that assumed information is available, and some observed endogenous data (series)
are not available at time t for time t but only as one-period lagged values. 
The PCL86 framework allows a solution for the more correct assumptions that some
but not all observable information and shocks are only available as one period lagged
values (e.g yt-1) rather than at time t.
2) Provision  of  a  framework  to  use  of  FAVAR-like  data-rich  extension,
introduced as and enhancement to PCL86 to augment estimates using a large
number  of  additional  data  (series)  that  are  available  at  time  t  though,  as
inaccurate and noisy observations. 
In  addition,  the  PCL model  with  extension  as  defined  and  used  in  Pearlman  and
Perendia (2006) and Levine, Pearlman and Perendia (2007) allows for establishing an
even larger variety of functional and estimated relations between the noisy input data
and the model’s endogenous data. In this current research, longer term Treasury rates
are handled as noisy observations and put in relation to the endogenous variables in a
form of a Bayesian regression for which parameters may be either pre-calibrated or
estimated during the DSGE Bayesian estimation process:
152
Treating the additional yields via PCL extensions should provide a better fit in general.
More specifically, the PCL model with the FAVAR-like Bayesian regression extension
(Pearlman and Perendia 2006 and Levine,  Pearlman and Perendia 2007) allows for
estimation  of  an  even  larger  variety  of  relations  between  the  yield  rates  and  the
endogenous variables in an extended measurement equation.
5.4.3.3 Measurement equations for yield curve using FAVAR
)1 related directly to the estimate of one-period rate:
RtN = aN Rt + tN (5.4.3.3.1)
)2 A very simple but complete Taylor/Hull & White model: spread between the
long-term  (e.g.  10  year,  40  period)  and  the  one-period  rates  related  to  the
contemporary  output  gap  y  –  y*  between  the  real  and  the  flexible  price
economies:
RtN = aN Rt +  byN (yt – yt*) + tN (5.4.3.3.2)
)3 A more complete Taylor / multifactor Hull & White model: the spread between
the  long-term  (e.g.  10  year)  and  the  one-period  rates  related  to  both  the
contemporary  output  gap  y  –  y*  between  the  real  and  the  flexible  price
economies and the inflation gap between current inflation and inflation target.:
RtN = aN Rt +  byN(yt – yt*) +N(t – t*) + tN (5.4.3.3.3)
In addition, using the FAVAR-like Bayesian regression extension to the PCL
model, the researchers can derive the weighted sum (or average) of error  tN
related to exogenous risk premium tb
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5.4.3.4 The Model, Data, Priors and Results
The core  model  used  in  this  project  is  the  same one used  in  Perendia  (2006)  and
Pearlman  and  Perendia  (2006),  extended  using  above  measurement  equations  for
additional, noisy, data representing yield curve of zero-coupon treasury bonds. Again,
the rich data FAVAR-like option extension used is explained in Appendix 2a of this
work, and, the initial model and its log-linear linearization around the steady state are
described in Appendices A2b and A2c respectively.
Main data and priors (mostly taken form SW03) are in Appendix 3 and the additional
Treasury bond rates were taken from Datastream. The priors for the output and inflation
gaps in the additional YC measurement equations were same as those for the corollary
parameters in the Taylor rule equation.
The main estimation results for log-likelihoods and yield curve estimation parameters
with yield curve fitted, are presented in Appendix 7.
5.4.4 Discussion:
The estimation results for the above cases 2 and 3 are in Appendix 7. 
Whilst  relation  to  the  output  gap  shows  a  higher  level  of  variance  between  the
observations, the pi-gap seems to be less prone to such variations. On the other hand,
introduction of inflation gap to long-term yield curve equations increases fit likelihood
dramatically, from 174.9 to 268.9 and indicates high explanation power of the inflation
gap for the longer-term yield curve.
However, for both the Yt and Pi gaps, a pattern consistent with the expectations clearly
emerges:  the longer the maturity is, the higher the spread weight load is, and thus, the
higher the spread is between the contemporary spot interest rate and the longer maturity
period yield. 
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NOTE: This work also has implication to analysis of the so-called conundrum of short
and long-term interest rates moving in different direction in 2005 but it is deferred to
the chapter 7 where it has more relevance. 
5.4.5 Conclusion
This work shows that: 
There are close relations between macro-economic, Taylor rule based  models
for deriving interest rate, the financial models for equilibrium forecasting (Vasicek) and
the arbitrage-free fitting of yield curve (Hull and White). (see appendix 8).
There are few advantages of the Pearlman, Currie and Levine (1986 - PCL86)
partial information model in utilising multitude of available real-life/real-time imperfect
data as either contemporary or lagged data, endogenous or as noisy, auxiliary data in
the  Pearlman  and Perendia  (2006)  Bayesian  FAVAR-like  data-rich  extension  to  the
PCL86 model introduced there and used here.
5.5 Comparative Tests of IRFs Using Dynare
5.5.1 Motivation and Method
The next stage of this research was porting PCL86 method to Dynare package and these
tests were the initial comparative tests for differences in the outcomes of the PCL’86
solver to the Dynare DSGE modelling, solving and simulating package. The PCL86
solving  an  estimating  method  was  integrated  as  part  of  a  joint  EU  FP7  funded
MonFisPol project82, itself aiming to show the benefits of new econometric methods for
82 Seventh Framework Programme for Research (FP7) of the European Commission's Socio-economic
Sciences and Humanities (SSH) Program from October 2008 to September 2011 under grant agreement
SSH-CT-2009-225149.
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optimising monetary and fiscal policy models83. Using the PCL’86 solver, PI Kalman
Filter estimation and an IRF simulator modules augmented Dynare 4.0.2 software, the
researchers  run  initial,  comparative  impulse  response  function  (IRF)  tests  with  the
model using the common initial values for two different solution and IRF simulation
methods:  
1. The standard Dynare84, with unrealistic assumptions of full information, and,
2. The new Pearlman SVD-based, general purpose, linear model solver tailored for
integration and running of the PCL96 partial  information estimation Kalman
filter and the associated, iterative, IRF and forecasting simulation law-of-motion
model within the Dynare system.
The tests were run as comparative proof of accuracy in four groups:
1. Standard Dynare stoch_simul IRFs for five variables: t ct yt rt
2. the full information version of PCL law of motion IRF for five variables:
3. the  partial  information  version  of  PCL  IRF  but  with  full  information
assumptions for the same five variables
4. the  partial  information  version  of  PCL  IRF  with  partial  information
assumptions:
a. only one variable being observed
b. several combinations with two variables 
c. three variables
d. four variables
e. five variables
f. seven variables assumed being observed at the time.
83 One of the aims of the Monfispol consortium project (http://www.monfispol.eu/) was to provide a
PCL’86 Partial  Information solution for estimation and an IRF simulation to Dynare DSGE package
(http://www.dynare.org/) users, a project the author participated in from 2009-2010. This research is also
a background for the resulting joint research report and publication of Levine, Pearlman, Perendia and
Yang (2009-2012). 
84Original Dynare mjdgges solver and its IRF using stoch_simul manager
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5.5.2 Model and Calibration
Model  used  for  these  tests  is  the  rational  expectation  one  described  in  Levine,
Pearlman, Prendia and Yung (2010),85 The model was first log-linearised assuming that
variables are deviations from its linear steady state. It used only three observations,
output yt, inflation t and interest rate rt from a sample of US data Q1:1970- Q4:2004,
detrended  as  deviation  from the  sample  man.  Its  Bayesian  estimation  priors,  their
distributions and standard errors, and the fixed (pre-) calibrated parameters, were taken
from the previous literature including, mostly, Smets and Wouters (2007) (please see
the original paper for more details). 
The IRFs were run under a subset of shocks present in the model:
Table 5.5.2.1: shocks present in the model used in the tests:
Shock Description Std. Error
eps_g Gov. spending 1.67
eps_a Technology 0.60
eps_ms Price Markup Shock 0.50
eps_r Interest rate 0.10
eps_c Consumption 0.10
5.5.3 Results
The results from the first three groups were identical, showing that both the  PCL solver
and its partial information law of motion, IRF generator can comparatively accurately
project  model  behaviour  under  the  same,  full  information  conditions  for  the  same
model as the standard Dynare package solver and IRF generator.
The  respective  results  in  the  fourth  group  from IRFs,  under  a  partial  information
assumption however, showed some differences from the other three groups. The results
for the IRFs under partial information assumption were same as for those of the full
information assumption when the researchers had five or more variables observed and
85 This is an earlier version of the paper published in EJ in 2012, presented at the workshop at University 
of Surrey in 2010, available as "Endogenous Persistence in an Estimated DSGE Model under Imperfect 
Information," CDMA Working Paper Series 201002, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis. At : 
https://repec.som.surrey.ac.uk/2010/DP03-10.pdf
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the same or nearly the same when four were observed. The small, but (in the graphs)
visible, differences occurred when three variables were assumed to be observed. The
differences were significant when less than three variables were assumed observed, but
they also depended on what particular variables were assumed observed. A subset of the
comparative graphs obtained, a subset useful for illustrating and assessing the effects of
IRF simulation under different partial  information assumptions (i.e. only part of the
variables being observed, e.g. 2 or 3 ), is presented in Appendix 5.
Note: These early results are in line with the much later work of Lubik, Matthes and
Mertens (2016) who also developed a partial asymmetric information solver for DSGE
models, but, as they emphasis, different from the work of  PCL86 which they consider
as  a  special,  simpler  case  of  their  model,  and  showing  how  varied  imperfect
information  can  lead  to  different  equilibria  based  on  the  what  appears,  the  lowest
common  denominator  of  available  information  processing  (filtering  problem)
capabilities among the agents and the nature of information. 
5.6 Further applications of the PCL’86 PI model
5.6.1 Persistency in Imperfect Information Models
The later revision of the above research work was included in the Levine, Pearlman,
Perendia and Yang (2009-2012) started in 2009 as a part of a joint EU FP7 funded
MonFisPol project.  In a summary, this research provides a tool for estimating DSGE
models  by  Bayesian  maximum-likelihood  methods  under  very  general  information
assumptions. This framework is again applied to a NK model where the researchers
compare  the  standard  approach  that  assumes  an  informational  asymmetry  between
private agents and the econometricians, with another, mixed rational and behavioural
assumption of (all) imperfect informational symmetry. 
For the former, private agents observe all state variables including shocks, whereas the
econometricians use only data for output, inflation and interest rates. For the latter both
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agents  have  the  same  imperfect  information  set  and  this  corresponds  to  what  the
researchers term the ‘informational consistency principle’. The researchers first assume
that rational expectations drive the agents and then generalise the model to allow some
heterogeneous households and firms to form expectations adaptively. The researchers
find that in terms of the model’s posterior probabilities and on a comparison with the
benchmark,  the  assumption  of  imperfect  informational  symmetry  by  the  agents
significantly improves the model fit. 
The  researchers  also  find  qualified  empirical  support  for  the  heterogeneous
expectations /  heterogeneous agents model with consumption habits  comes out as a
more realistic one and also, showing that majority but not all of both, household and
corporate  agents  adhere  to  the  adaptive  expectations  rather  than  the  rational
expectations (see next section in this chapter for detailed discussion on this issue of
heterogeneity).  Another  significant  finding,  in  line  with  the  title,  is  that  impulse
response to a variety of shocks is humped, thus, slower to start but staying for longer
and showing a higher level of persistency in partial symmetric than in the standard,
asymmetric information,  mode. Please refer to the Levine, Pearlman, Perendia and
Yang (2009-2012) article(s) for more details on the models, data, results and the
additional discussion. 
5.6.2 Partial Information DSGE Models with Heterogeneous Agents
As mentioned earlier,  heterogeneous agents’ models (HAM) started to receive more
research focus after the recent crisis. Most of the HAMs are based around behavioural
modelling and the stochastic simulation of several economic agent segments, but the
issues of estimation methods of such models are still mainly unresolved. Another issue
is  the  determination  of  the  number,  the  types  and  the  relative  proportions  of  the
different segments of agents. 
Levine,  Pearlman,  Perendia  and  Yang  (2009-2012) make  progress  related  to  the
estimation of relative proportions of four (two pairs) distinct groups of heterogeneous
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agents. They assumed two main types, one being classical economic rational agents,
and  the  other,  adaptive-rational  learning  agents.  Both  of  these  groups  are  being
distributed  between  the  sectors  of  household  and  the  business  entrepreneurs/firms’
agents.
5.6.2.1 Relevant Results
The results appear a bit surprising if taken from the perspective of modern, RE based
economic theory: 
a. There is a higher proportion of agents following adaptive-learning behaviour
than those adopting rational expectation consistent behaviour in both sectors.
b. There is, however, a higher proportion of households than firms that behave
in apparently rational expectations consistent manner relative to their adaptive
counterparts.  I.e.  results  show  that  a  relative  larger  proportion  of  around
30−34% of  households  compared  to  only  17  −  25% of  firms  behave  in  a
rationally consistent manner. 
5.6.2.2 Discussion
The finding (a) is in some respect in-line with both, the theoretical position expressed
earlier that only very largest institutions can deemed to base their decisions using full
available information in a rational manner (e.g. see discussion section in the previous
chapter)86. It is also in line with a similar lack of empirical evidence that agents are
using or behaving in RE manner expressed in research findings, e.g. by Chow (2007)
who shows that adaptive expectation models still have usefulness and dominance in
modelling markets. 
86 It is also with the empirical/experiential observations of this author as an experienced commercial data 
analyst working at major international industrial organisations that, by majority, utilise more traditional 
regression or adaptive econometric rather than rational expectation models in their forecasting.
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On the other hand, one can than concluded that, as majority of agents use by education
or to simulate other assumed adaptive agents using adaptive methods, that the adaptive
behaviour becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy and that it is fully rational to behave in the
prevalent adaptive manner as it is assumed that others will adopt it too.87   
In addition, the apparent rational consistency prevailing among households may not be
what it appears: as adapting and learning may require regular family weekend coffee
table games or discussions to become focused on multivariate time-series analysis and
the adaptation of. These activities are rather rare if not unlikely to be habitual family
weekend  behaviour.  The  apparent  rational  consistency  may  instead  simply  be  a
consequence of their adopted life-style rigidities and the intuitive habit formation based
on their consumer experience. 
This so-called habitual (i.e. procedurally – rational) behaviour may be driving some
small and medium businesses too. Along those lines, it is interesting that such macro
estimations roughly (though very tentatively) also echo some recent survey findings in
the  area  of  business  firms’ management,  which  have  identified  that  a  rather  low
proportion of the surveyed business managers base their strategic or tactical decisions
on a thorough analysis of historical evidence and data.88 Those findings also point out
that  managers  tend to  put  much  higher  weight  on  a  combination  of  their  personal
experience  and  forward  looking  risk,  cost-benefit  and  overall  business  impact
assessments instead.89 
However,  even  among  firms,  mainly  among  intermediate  producers,  the  consistent
rational expectation formation strategy may result  from equally experiential  reasons
87 In a way, this is inspired by and a paraphrase on Akerlof and Shiller who claim that adopting a 
prevalent herd behaviour in a crisis is fully rational.
88 The finding identifies that avoidance of the evidence-based approach is justified mainly by a variety of
difficulties and costs rising in obtaining and then processing such data.
89 This finding may not be so surprising considering that the most of the management training courses
and books shy away from complex  numerical  rational  expectations techniques and focus instead on
various heuristic and common-sense, communicative rationality based business management methods
whilst, at the same time, emphasizing that “businesses need to adopt new strategies so as to adapt to the
ever- changing business environment”.
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and a need for maintaining consistent market behaviour for the sake of retaining their
long-term  business  partners,  customers  or  shareholders  in  the  larger  firms.  (see
McClelland  et al. (2010) )90
5.6.3 Some hypotheses for future work
A hypothesis  is  that,  in the modern developed economy society,  there would be an
increasing proportion of smaller or single families relative to the large ones among
those  higher  income,  affluent  families,  and  also,  that  of  the  lower  income  larger
families, a trend that adds to both, the increasing inequality and increased saving among
affluent  ones.  Another  consequence  (H2) would be that  those affluent,  traditionally
Ricardian (as so often denoted in the early heterogeneous agent models, e.g. Levine et
al., 2009), small families are increasingly becoming less and less Ricardian. This is not
only  because  they  are  boundedly  rational  about  the  future  effects  in  increasing
complexity  of  the  socio-economic  system,  but  more  likely  so  because  they  are
increasingly rationally inattentional, one could say, less concerned about it. This is in
part  due  to  the  (partially consequential)  slow breakdown of  intergenerational  social
contract, which makes even stronger argument for inadequacy of the infinitely - living
(intergenerational) household economic models. (Also, the lower income ones remain
less able to optimise consumption based on Ricardian principles mainly due to their low
income and the resulting lower ability to save.).
5.6.4 IRF Simulation of Housing Prices and Borrowing Constraints with 
Imperfect Information
Iacoviello’s (2005) model is one of the models available in the Macro-Model Database
(for reference, see http://www.macromodelbase.com/ and Wieland et al. (2010)). Here
this  research  wants  to  pay  special  attention  to  this  model  as  it  extends  the  BGG
90 A further analysis of this (?) however indicates that the older managers of larger firms tend more to
commit to status-quo but is this because they are at that stage of their career becoming more risk-averse
or are those characteristics and attitudes required for them to gain the position of a CEO in a larger and
more successful firm?
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financial  friction  DSGE  models  with  a  model  of  the  effect  of  housing  prices  on
consumption using three heterogeneous categories of consumers, two of which are two
types of households: the saving, patient (Ricardian-type) ones and the cash-constrained,
impatient  ones.  The  former  group  is  the  only  one  group  that  follows  the  rational
consumption model (in linearised form): 
C 1,t = C1,t+1 – r t                                                                            (5.6.4.1)
This  section  reproduces  some  of  the  IRF  simulations  of  that  model  using  the
US_IAC05  model  from  the  Macro-model  Database  (Wieland  et  al,  2009)  that
reconstructs the Iacoviello 2005 model for DSGE simulation and applying the new PCL
partial information solution framework.
The  main  result  that  appears  is  that  IRFs  behave  differently  if  we  apply  partial
information solution with different observation assumptions. For example, when we do
not restrict observation, there is no difference in impulse response IRF graphs from
shocks  under  full  and  partial  information  models.  However,  if  only  inflation  and
interest rates (or only the latter) are being observed, there is a significant difference
between  partial  and full  information  impulse  response  simulations  for  some of  the
variables such as real housing price ‘qhat’ and output ‘Yhat. 
For  start,  under  the  technology  shock,  assumed  un-observed  in  partial  information
simulation,  one  can  observe  significant  differences  in  IRFs  for  partial  information
solution in  the first  row and full  information in  the second row further  below. For
example, one can see in the below graphs that PI IRFs to technology shock result in a
more realistic:
a) delayed response in housing prices as observed in real data.and,
b) symmetric  response  in  output  to  technology  shock  rather  than  dominantly
negative one resulting from the full-information assumptions.
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Figure 5.6.4.1: Partial Information responses, 
and
Figure 5.6.4.2: Full information responses to a technology shock
The above IRF simulation responses are  comparable to  the earlier  presented partial
information assumption simulation in 5.6 of this chapter and, in particular the case of
Figure A5.3: Part information PCL IRFs for eps_a technology shock when only pi and
y (left) are observed. The response of the partial information Levine et al. model in
output  is  slower,  more  humped  and  less  sharp  than  that  of  Iacoviello  for  partial
information (5.6.4.1, top figure) whilst house prices react completely opposite to the
consumption inflation in Levine et al. (2010) model which may not be surprising to
observe in the same period of time. A shock in the marginal utility from housing creates
different effects on interest rate R, inflation pi, housing stock q and output Y: 
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Figure 5.6.4.3 Partial Information effect of shock in marginal utility from housing:
Figure 5.6.4.4: Full information effect of shock in marginal utility from housing
Similarly, an inflation shock creates a significantly smaller effect on the system under
the more realistic partial information assumption:
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Figure 5.6.4.5: Partial Information effect of inflation shock:
Figure 5.6.4.6: Full information effect of inflation shock:
Even the interest rate response rule provides a different outcome, most likely because
the effect on output Y is initially of different sign and later followed by a small fall. It is
also  delayed, so that  under the same inflation shock, the Taylor  rule under partial
information does not result in an increase of the interest rate to the same level as in case
of full information solution. 
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Note that  these different results  for different  information assumptions  are following
similar patterns, with notable differences though, to the effects in IRF test performed on
the  initial,  single  (representative)  agent  models  as  explained  earlier  in  5.7..  These
results are along the lines with the very recent works of Lubik, Matthes and Mertens
(2016) and Gabaix  (2016) who claim that  different  equilibria  occur  under  different
information being available to different agents.  However, those are only preliminary
results  and  more  research  work  is  needed  in  this  unexplored  field  of  asymmetric
information under imperfect information assumptions.
5.7 Conclusion
In this  chapter  presented  were  theoretical  concepts  and background as  well  as  and
estimation  results  for  several  application  of  Partial  Information  solution  for  DSGE
models based on work PCL'86.
In addition to more realistic estimates of parameters and of the persistence of simulated
shocks' effects shown in the results of this research as part of implementation of Partial
Information solution with heterogeneous agents in Levine et al.(2012), results seemed
somehow surprising to identify that majority of the heterogeneous agents appeared to
accept adaptive instead RE driven forecast.
However surprising in the first moment, these are in line with other findings of lack of
empirical evidence for using or behaving in RE manner expressed in Chow (2007).
They are also in line with the conclusion of the previous chapter on rationality that
stated that only larger enterprises and organisations, where decisions are performed in
team discussions, whether in the management or the board meetings could act in a fully
rational manner. The hypothesis was that only they  have both financial and man-power
resources to process all information and ability to then, in same time, form basis for a
kind of (trans-personal) communicative rationality akin to one described by Habermas
(1983/96). This may be, (but will needs to be researched in more depth at this stage),
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where subliminal priming, subconscious and emotional influences of individuals may
often, but not always, cancel-out within a larger group and teams of communicative
decision makers. And, it may be where, also, a larger amount of relevant information
can be accessed and processed rather than just assumed to be known by the automation
of  being  in  public  domain  as  per  assumptions  of  efficient  market  hypothesis  and
rational expectation models. One can then refer to this form expectations creation and
decision making as bounded communicative rationality.
In the last section of this chapter, one could also see how partial information solution
can  produce  very  different  model  impulse-response  functions  depending  on  which
information agents had at their disposal, results similar to those of the recent works by
Gabaix (2016) and Lubik et al. (2016).
5.8 Possible Future Research:
One can take-up a further analysis whether the above discussed “slow”, fully rational
thinking is driving higher stability of e.g., a parliamentarian democracy acting in RE
manner. Or, whether the “fast” intuitive can, on the other hand, drive faster adaptive
response and higher dynamics in a system lead by one person, a somehow authoritarian
president, or a CEO, with prerogative of high powers of authority. Or, whether the latter
system,  can  be  exposed  to  higher  danger  of  an  inadequate  personal  bias  and/or
potentially higher volatility of its policies. A working hypothesis would then be that the
fast reactive mode in imperfect (partial) information forcing bounded rationality may be
optimal  in  short  term  and  exceptional  circumstances  driven  by  high,  exogenous
uncertainty.  Another  situation  however  would  be  a  state  closer  to  a  longer-term
equilibrium when slower but RE based group decision making may be more optimal
one.
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Part 3: The 2007/8 Recession and its Causes
6 Debt accelerator and Large Scale Crises
This chapter (6.1) provides some background literature analysing causes of the two
large scale crises, 1929 and 2007/891 whilst the following one (6.2) focuses on the less
discussed accelerator mechanism that was, according to this research, the likely cause
and also the channel for their evolution to their large scales. (Perendia(2015)), 
Though apparently departing from the main theme of DSGE modelling, this section of
the research shows a bigger picture of more systemic and complex issues that were
contributing  to  the  overall  process  leading  to  the  2007/8  crisis  rather  than  just
limitations of insufficiencies of DSGE tools (and that many authors tend to blame for
the crisis, as discussed in ch. 3) or any other econometric tools or methods. It, instead,
shows likely importance of the effects of liquidity shortage shock and its causes, but
also, the effects of an under-analysed debt-accelerator and of the possibly inadequate
information (or omitted data) for the evolution of the crisis. It appears that  this initial,
household  and  SME  liquidity  shortage  shock  was  introduced  by  a  possible
misspecification of the macro-economic models, this in turn, most likely due to a kind
of rational inattention on part of the market monitoring, investment management and
policy  driving  institutions.  Such  miss-specification  or  rational  inattention  and  the
resulting  data  omission,  if  occurred,  would,  however  not  be  specific  to  any  one
particular methodological approach such as DSGE but would be then widespread across
the variety of models and tool-kits used by the policy institutions.
91 the presentation, Perendia(2015), was given in December 2015 at Large Scale Crises: 1929 vs 2008, a 
conference held at Universite de le Marche at Ancona, Italy.
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Methodological focus 
This section of the project will be mainly relying on different methodologies to DSGE
such as empirical analysis of data and graphs, VAR or Granger causality analysis when
appropriate  and  only  to  a  limited  extent  on  DSGE.  A full-scale  DSGE model  for
analysis of such complex problem as the Great Recession and the crises of 2007/2008
are, as it turned out to be from this initial analysis, has yet to be developed in future.
6.1 Seeds of the Great Recession and Globalisation 
6.1.1 Foreign Direct Investment Abroad and Globalisation
Whilst many authors (see below) focused on the collapse of mortgage based securities
and  their  derivatives  (MBS)  as  the  trigger  for  2007/8  crisis,  and  the  subsequent
international contagion of the financial crisis once it started, only a few other research
papers have been dedicated to the background relation between the Great Recession on
one, and, the international trade and globalisation on the other end. These two aspects
have  however  been  analysed  in  relative  isolation  from  the  international  financial
economics sector. Whilst the financial globalisation boom accompanied by the flow of
relatively  large-scale  private  investment,  in  great  part  directly  from the  developed
countries  into  the  emerging  and  developing  ones  has  been  widely  discussed  and
analysed,  the  resulting  domestic  under-investment  and its  effects  have  been largely
neglected. 
The boom in the  (non-tradable)  housing markets  at  home,  fuelled by both  the low
interest  rate  and  the  lower  cost  of  living  resulting  from  the  lower  cost  imported
substitutes  relatively  to  the  domestic  tradable  goods,  was  another  side  of  the
globalisation effect.  On the other hand, the same low interest rates throughout the early
2000s that fuelled the over-optimistic investment in outsourcing the manufacturing and
the  tradable  services  to  the  lower  wage  developing  countries,  also  resulted  in  a
stagnation of domestic industrial production of both, tradable goods and services. This
170
was done on a scale beyond the initial expectations of the leading economists.  The
actual FDI flow and their cumulative values are difficult to track down.
Table 6.1.1.1:  Cumulative US Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) abroad
Period                         FDI Inflow      FDI Outflow   Net Inflow
1960-69 $ 42.18 bn $ 5.13 bn + $ 37.04 bn
1970-79 $ 122.72 bn $ 40.79 bn + $ 81.93 bn
1980-89 $ 206.27 bn $ 329.23 bn - $ 122.96 bn
1990-99 $ 950.47 bn $ 907.34 bn + $ 43.13 bn
2000-07           $ 1,629.05 bn   $ 1,421.31 bn   + $ 207.74 bn
Total $ 2,950.72 bn $ 2,703.81 bn + $ 246.88 bn
Figure 6.1.1.1: Foreign Direct Investment into the United States and U.S. Direct
Investment Abroad, Annual Flows, 1990-2012 (in billions of dollars)  showing that
outflow outpaced inflows in the years preceding and the after the recent crisis.
(Reproduced from Jackson (2012))
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Those high Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) abroad have been partly driven by  the
widespread adopters of the Ricardian law of comparative advantage.  This  theory is
widely  taught  and,  as  part  of  the  new  theory  of  trade  in  the  globalised  world,
encouraged by many of the world-renowned economists (e.g. Dombrusch, Fischer and
Samuelson 1977, Krugman 1991 or Krugman and Obstfeld 1997). Economists of all
backgrounds were hoping for the better overall output and welfare outcome for both of
the worlds. Jackson (2012) for example claims that there is no conclusive evidence of
actual job shifting abroad and that majority (cca. 70%) of the US FDI abroad went into
the developed, mainly EU countries with similar wages. 
However, in addition to corporate FDI, there are other flows of investment funds. A
Post-Keynesian  economist,  Paul  Davidson (2011) pointed-out,  the  Ricardian  law of
comparative  advantage  expects  that  both  capital  and  labour  are  confined  to  their
countries.  Along  similar  lines,  the  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson  endowment  factor
theory also assumes that the endowment factors of production e.g. skilled labour and
natural resources are confined to their original state/space. Davidson, however, points
out that, whilst the labour (and some other endowment factors) was mainly confined,
the  capital  was  not,  and  so,  the  resulting  flow  of  foreign  direct  investment  into
developing countries then led to outsourcing of the industrial production and services,
and consequently, it invalidated the original Ricardian law. 
Krugman  (1997b)  was  aware  of  the  dangers  of  capital  outflow  to  the  developing
countries and that that may lead to lower wages in the West, but at the time of his
writing in mid 1990s, the interest rates in US were higher and outflows much lower
than those following in 2000s. Consequently, his view at the time was that the outflows
(contemporary at the time), were too small to be able to affect the local wages or lead to
their reduction. Leamer (1996) however, shows that consumer prices of tradable goods
even in 1970s declined by about  30%. This  was paralleled  by a  40% reduction  in
salaries  for  unskilled  worker  at  the  time  of  the  US’s  rapid  opening  up  to  and
dependency on foreign trade. It should be noted this trend reversed in 1980s by 20%.
The author also performs a component analysis and shows that the globalisation was
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the dominant factor over technological advance, which is usually perceived to be the
main factor for such wage decline. 
Lamer’s  analysis  however  does not  extend beyond the mid-90s but  the two graphs
below do show a striking coincidence of declining real hourly wages (deflated using
GDP deflator) from mid-2003 to mid-2006 and a sharp rise of imported goods over the
same period.
        Figure 6.1.1.2: US real hourly wages (USD) and Figure 6.1.1.3: US Import
                          Figure 6.1.1.2                                                    Figure 6.1.1.3
For example, most of new job creation in US tends to be in areas of financial and other
non-productive or non-tradable services, hi-tech IT or in the low-wage, private health
and care services (e.g. see table 8.1 on page 219 of Krugman (1997b) for early 1990s).
Nevertheless, US wages remained relatively high in the high tech sector and, as a result
of  lower  lending  rates  in  early  2000s,  with  financial  flow  deregulation  one  could
observe increased FDI capital outflow from the US. As a consequence of those high
flows of FDI capital, it was the law of absolute advantage, resulting from the lower
wages for the production of tradable goods and services, which started prevailing over
the  law of  comparative  advantage  in  attracting  the  capital  that  was  seeking higher
growth related returns. To paraphrase the example used in Davidson (2011), instead of
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low-tech  bicycles  being  produced mainly in  the  specialised  East  and  the  high-tech
computers in the specialised West, both bicycles and computers started to be produced
in the low wage East. This was fuelled by the liberalised capital flows in the form of
direct foreign investments. 
On the other hand, Davidson (2011) also claims that the resulting higher overall output
by all involved countries was not automatically matched and absorbed by the sufficient
rise in the demand for those tradable goods and services across the globalised world. 
Davidson however does not provide any quantitative indicators for this claim. As the
second result, the resulting more diminishing returns on the foreign direct investments
than  initially  expected,  though  used  to  finance  foreign  imports  spending  and  to
compensate for the trade imbalance, could not compensate for the loss of jobs in the
tradable goods sectors at home caused by the outsourcing, and therefore provided an
additional recessionary momentum.  
In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 credit crisis, investors pulled back large sums of
their investments in 2008 to maintain liquidity at home instead of partially financing the
imports, which fell around 30% from 836bn USD in Q2 of 2008 to 575bin Q2 of the
following year. The foreign investment pullback (i.e. a re-importation of the previously
exported capital) resulted in share slumps in foreign asset markets and probably also
accelerated  the  parallel  drop  in  the  now  under-financed  exports  around  25% from
693bn to 522bn over the same period.
Levchenko, Lewis and Tesar (2011) analyse the international trade collapse during the
2007-2009 financial crisis. They state that the collapse of about 20% far exceeded the
GDP decrease of about 3.8%. The highest drops in trade were among durables, cars and
intermediate products. They are puzzled by the relative extent of the trade collapse and
identify that the most likely causes are fall in domestic production of goods needing
intermediate goods from the imports but do not find links to the shortage of credit
provision for the trade.
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They however do not take into account the complexity of the possible effect of the
above-mentioned  pullback  of  investment  funds.  These  funds  would  otherwise  have
been used in part to finance capital goods imported from the US (i.e., the US exports)
directly. 
The fall  in  the  market  share  net  value  of  those  foreign  companies  due  to  the  FDI
investment  withdrawal  and  the  market  sell-off  reduced  their  own  import  credit-
worthiness. On the other hand, there was a likely an effect on the import of this rapid
pull back of the returns on the earlier investments that, as this research work expects,
would have been used to finance the imports to US (or other Western countries) instead,
engaged directly at their source whilst avoiding foreign-exchange levies. These possible
linkages  will  need to  be explored in  another  study however.  However,  Podkaminer
(2014), points-out that, though the growth of global trade contributed to the growth in
exporting  countries,  there  is  no  compelling  evidence  that  it  also contributed  to  the
growth in the importing ones. 
He shows that the global trade grew more than overall GDP - see figure below:
Figure 6.1.1.4: Trade/GDP ratio, quoted from Podkaminer (2014)
Using Granger causality test, the author shows that, though the rise of output Granger
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causes growth in exports, the opposite does not hold and the rise in exports and trade do
not Granger cause the output growth per se. On the contrary, basing his analysis on
estimation and simulation of VEC models, the author claims that the rise in exports and
the trade can cause decline in output. More importantly, the author shows that, though
global trade increased, the real global growth rate has declined since the trade increase
and the recent globalisation started in mid 1970s. Though the reasons may be different,
the author finds the most plausible roots for such an unexpected development from the
point of view of classical economics, in the trade imbalances and in the decline of wage
share compared to the rise of profit related income that is facilitating investment rather
than expenditure. We can say that such findings are in line with both the earlier outlined
miscalculated ex-ante predictions of the effects of the global trade increase, and the
already mentioned effects of the increased investment share over consumption goods on
the reduction of the demand for goods on domestic markets. 
6.1.2 Some Unusual Expansionary Fiscal Interventions
As it turns out, the military spending for the Iraq war may have been another boost for
the US economy between 2003 and 2007. (See Appendix 9). However, coinciding with
the looming crash,  in  2008 one can observe another  falling economic category not
usually considered to be caused directly by the economic crisis, this one in the US
government’s Iraq war funding. Although not a result of the looming economic crisis,
this decline in funding may have been one of its contributing factors. Whilst the start of
the  Iraq  war  and the  increase  in  US government  spending  to  support  it  may have
accelerated the bubble growth since 2003, so the anticipation and realisation of the cuts
in government orders related to the Iraq war from 2008 would have at least accelerated,
if  not  directly  triggered,  the  rise  of  unemployment  in  related  industries,  therefore
contributing to the stagnation if not even to a recessionary trend leading into the 2007-8
crash.
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Figure 6.1.2.1 replicated and quoted from the BBC website, sourced by US
Congressional Research Service.
Historical  evidence  of  this  kind  of  countercyclical  fiscal  intervention  gives  strong
grounds  in  its  own  right  to  endogenise  countercyclical  government  spending  in
economic (e.g. DSGE) models rather than treat it as an exogenous shock.  Some aspects
of countercyclical government spending and fiscal multipliers are dealt in Perendia and
Tsoukis (2012) detailed later in this research work.
6.1.3 Elections in 2004 and 2008 and politico-economic cycles 
On the lines of Alesina et al. (1992) and other works discussed earlier in the section on
politico-economic cycles, we can also observe some interest trends in different interest
rate  policies  used  in  the  2004 and 2008 election  years  in  US under  different  FED
governors. The US fiscal and monetary policies appear to followed similar patterns as
the pre-election political-cycles movements described above during the G.W. Bush's
second, 2003/4,  pre-election period when FED was pursuing unusually low, in  real
terms negative, policy rates (Taylor,(2008) for example), thus, boosting both debt and
the economic growth and housing bubbles in the last years of Greenspan's leadership.
However, rather different trends were observed for the 2007/8 pre-election period with
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FED rates stepping up from 2005 onwards and through a (possibly resulting) stagnation
and a recessionary trend starting in 2006.
6.1.4 A Summary of the Main Errors Made by the Financial Services 
Sector leading to Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis
“But anyone who has looked seriously at how we got into this slump knows that
private  debt,  especially  household  debt,  was  the  real  culprit:  it  was  the
explosion of household debt during the Bush years that set the stage for the
crisis.” 
Paul Krugman, NY Times, 22. Jan. 2012
There is, however, no doubt that the reckless borrowing and over-rating of the new
types  of  derivatives  such as  Collateralised  Debt  Obligations  (CDOs) and Mortgage
Backed Securities (MBS) securitization mechanisms provided the commercial financial
sector with the needed spin for the bubble to grow beyond sustainability. Because this
aspect has been analysed by many authors in great depth and detail, this research work
will only mention the early analysis by Ashcraft and Schuermann (2009) who identify
five  main  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  frictions  in  the  sub-prime  mortgage
market’s securitization mechanisms that contributed to the Sub-prime Crisis:
1. Adverse selection and predatory lending and borrowing of complex, difficult to
understand, mortgage products in relation between the mortgagor (the borrower)
and the originator (the original lender).
2. The  issue  of  the  principle  agent  between  the  asset  manager  and  the  less
informed investor who does not understand the risks attached to the investment
and the manager who does not spend enough time explaining.
3. Adverse selection friction between the arranger, who has a better understanding
of the quality of the loans, and the third parties providing the securitization,
including ultimately, the asset manager: the arranger's due diligence is reduced
178
by the reduced asset manager's due diligence.
4. Information  asymmetry  between  originator  who  has  better  understanding  of
mortgagor quality and the arranger (packager)
5. Frictions between the investor and credit rating agencies which did not assign
proper ratings to the MBS due to honest and dishonest errors.
Among others, more recently,  Lysandrou (2012) point-out to demand for derivatives
created by the hedge funds as the main driving factor in the sub-prime crisis, hence,
asking for their better supervisory control.
6.1.5 Practice and Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Crisis
6.1.5.1 Moral Hazard Issues
As a follow-up to the Ashcraft and Schuermann (2009) friction No. 5, referring to the
credit rating agencies that did not assign proper ratings to the MBS due to either honest
or dishonest errors, it is important to note several aspects: 
1. there is a small number of recognised Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in the US
but more than one, 
2. they are commercial institutions competing on the market to gain commission
fees from the asset (e.g. bonds and mortgage backed CDO) issuers. 
3. the issuers  are  seeking best  value for  the fees paid and,  even more,  for  the
expected income from the initial offering. They thus seek the best ratings and
valuations they can. 
There  is  therefore  an  issue,  raised  by several  authors,  of  a  moral  hazard  (friction)
embedded in the rating agencies stakeholders and employees, all financially motivated
to approve and give better, more optimistic ratings to more instruments than they may
have deserved in  a  more  rigorous,  objective  assessment.  On the  other  hand,  moral
179
hazard was present also among the issuers who were seeking instruments’ rating service
only  from  agencies  prepared  to  provide  such  over-optimistic  rating  in  a  systemic
manner.
Pagano and Volpin (2009) indicate that there was a case of “rating inflation” in relation
mortgage  based  securities  leading  to  mispricing  of  the  risk  as  one  of  the  main
contributors to the crisis. The authors provide a very comprehensive analysis of the
issues but the main issue seems to come from a conflict of interest and two facts - that
the  agencies  are  insufficiently  regulated  and  that  they  are  multiple  commercial
organisations92 that  compete  on  the  market  for  the  instrument-issuers.  The  authors
therefore analyse alternative options for their funding and explore the possibility of the
agencies being paid by the investors instead.93.
Another related issue is that under the Basel II Accord rules, banks can use credit rating
agencies’ (CRAs)  ratings  for  the  assets  they  hold  to  assess  their  working  capital
requirements (Haan and Amtenbrink (2011)). This too may have provided an incentive
to encourage banks to seek rating agencies prepared to provide higher ratings for those
instruments. 
6.1.5.2 Some financing problems with the rating practices
There is  also a problem with the instruments or their  underlying institutions’ credit
rating practice as the rating agencies provide their ratings based on average values over
a longer period of time which are business cycle agnostic94. In their defence, CRAs
however claim they cannot include market or liquidity risks into their calculations as
those are  beyond the scope of  credit  risks  rating.  Such a  practice has  been widely
92 Status of US Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) was awarded only
awarded to Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch until recently.
93 To address the issue of insufficient regulation and conflict of interest, the new, so called Dodd-Frank
regulation (named after senators B. Frank and C. Dodd who introduced it on request of US President B.
Obama in 2010) offers a compromise solution and forbids the rating agencies employees involved in the
rating process to have their pay linked to the financial performance of the agency. 
94 that is, invariant to the overall changes in the economy along the phase of the RBC paths
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accepted and it is within the recommendations of BASEL II and III Accords, and so, it
provides for an additional, informational friction (Bhatia,(2006)). CRAs have been also
criticized for slow adjustment of their ratings (Haan and Amtenbrink (2011)).95
That would mean that the ratings are consistent only in relative but not in their absolute
values.  An  organisation’s  or  instrument’s  (time)  distance  to  default  may  drop
dramatically with market  changes but  that will  not necessarily trigger a change the
instrument’s (or the organisation’s) relative rating as long as other organisations are
exposed  to  proportionally  similar,  market  changes.  Though  this  friction  paints  an
incorrect  picture  in  times  of  either  peaks  or  toughs,  it  is  allowing  public  asset
management institutions to maintain their portfolios within the legally required rating
boundaries without making any major changes in their structures even in recessions.
This also applies to the Federal Reserve (and other central banks) that accept collateral
from financial institutions within legally required rating limits and for those banks who
back  their  working  capital  requirements  using  potentially  much  riskier  and  hence
effectively less valuable instruments.
However, according to some economists, the use of the long-term average (time-less),
or even of the over-optimistic ratings may be favoured even by the authorities. This
kind of the RBC “image air-brush smoothing” may provide a more optimistic, stable
view of the economy and may then require a lower level of fundamental strength to
keep the economy running even in shallow toughs, or may help the economy recover
from the troughs earlier. 
Holden, Natvik and Vigier (2011) analyse if rating agencies can affect real economy
outcomes. They look into alternative ways of awarding the rating agencies for their
service. They indicate that, amid the growing criticism that current service awarding
methods for the commercial rating agencies result in a bias towards over-rating their
client's products, the problem of the socially optimal way of their service awarding is
95  “ For instance, on the day before Lehman Brothers went bankrupt the major CRAs still gave the bank
an investment grade rating”, ditto.
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not  easy  to  resolve.  The  authors  state  that  if  the  rating  agencies  are  not  funded
commercially by the issuers but by the authorities (or by the investors through some
investment tax mechanism), a posteriori, proportionally to the success of their guesses,
they may be inclined to take an overly optimistic view again and over-rate the assets.
This  is  in  part  as such optimism may fuel  self-fulfilling prophecy of the economic
success and of the success of their guesses accordingly (or vice-versa). The authors
simulate a game based model and find that those attitudes may be self-defeating and
that optimism may induce more durable crises whilst pessimist prognoses may help to
avoid them. However, the authors have accepted this researcher’s comment that these
arguments apply irrespectively of whether the agencies’ services are awarded by the
issuers or by the authorities. 
It is in the view of this research that a due attention should be given to the awarding
mechanisms for credit  ratings and that a model of a single,  independent,  non-profit
making rating agency should be set and researched. This task however, is beyond the
scope of this research. 
6.1.6 Other Possible Causes
The aim of the preceding chapter was to identify the main causes and driving forces
leading to the 2007/8 crisis (Great Recession). This piece of research concludes that a
number of political (e.g. elections) and wider, real economic issues (e.g. global over-
investment  and  domestic  under-investment)  probably  played  a  role  on  the  stage
preceding the crisis  and possibly caused a  recessionary trend that  triggered the big
financial crash that was mainly felt within the financial industry: collapses of the major
banks and other financial institutions throughout 2008. 
This work thus concludes that the recessionary trend starting in 2006 led to both the
recession and the crisis of the financial system in 2008. It is not the other way around as
it is mistakenly assumed. However, the onset of the major 2008 financial crisis and the
extremely high losses that banks suffered, in turn, certainly accelerated the recessionary
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trend even further, triggering the start of the official recession as late as Q3 of 2008,
though already in making since 2006.
 
One area this research work does not address, but is probably worth looking into, is
how much the crisis resulted from the oil price bubble, itself encouraged by low interest
rates and the low US Dollar; thus whether it was the high price of oil that fuelled the
recession which triggered the crisis. 
However, some areas that this research work will address are the endogenisation of the
government  lead  counter-cyclical  fiscal  spending  aimed  to  smooth  the  effects  of
business cycles and potentially give a boost to  the economic system to move out of
recessionary (or near –recessionary) state.
6.2  Recessionary  Debt  Accelerator  and  possible  effect  of  the  Fed's
inflation targeting on financial bubble in 2008 crisis
6.2.1 Introduction Summary:
This research is posting a hypothesis to the likely existence of a, to our knowledge,
hitherto  probably  overlooked,  “positive”  (recession  accelerating)  feedback  channel.
This additional channel may have even further suppressed consumption demand due to
cash-flow difficulties caused initially by rises of existing, floating loan interest rates in
heavily indebted economies. Consequently, this channel potentially contributed to both,
recessionary trends and the prolonged depression in both the 1929 and 2008 crises. This
paper poses a hypothesis that there was likely an additional channel that accelerated
Fed’s contractionary policy at  that time of high levels of both private (mainly real-
estate)  and  public  debt,  a  channel  that  it  may  have  inadvertently  significantly
contributed more directly and with a higher accelerating effect to the demand downturn
effects in case of 2008 as it admittedly did in 1929 crisis, and, if a further analysis
should be conducted. This research concludes that its initial analysis is affirmative one,
meriting further analysis into this hypothesis
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6.2.2. The Backstage in a new perspective: The Great Depression 1929, its
Causes in Existing Literature
In the aftermath of the Great Depression few authors dedicated their  research to its
causes and remedies. Among the rest, even then Keynes pointed out that one of the
main causes for the crash was irrational panic and the herding. “Animal Spirit” that
greatly contributed to the bank runs, the market crush and its spread throughout the
world economy.
Among the more recent analyses, Galbraith (1954, pp 194-200) summarises and lists
several  key  causes  for  the  Great  Depression  following  the  stock  market  crash  in
October 192996. This research work would like to pay attention to two of the issues:
1. The bad banking structure: the failure of a small number of weak banks lead to
the epidemic of failures of other banks which suffered runs.
2. In the footnotes he also mentions under-consumption as a possible accelerator
but states under-investment as the main reason.
Another under-reported aspect that preceded and significantly contributed to the Great
Depression are the so-called “silent-runs”. Rockoff (2004) points to a large number of
under-reported and less visible monetary transfers taking place mainly from small to
larger banks and to larger financial centres. These starved the smaller local banks and,
consequently, their regular business borrowers from the needed cash-flow funds and
credits. For example, whilst during the 1929-30 period New York banks experienced a
15% rise in deposits paralleled by similar rises in other large industrial centres, small
regional banks in rural areas suffered great losses. As Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003)
(S&G  03  henceforth)  show  in  their  analysis  of  credit  rationing,  the  borrowers  of
bankrupt banks could not have just gone to another bank, either small or big local ones,
or even less so to any large bank in a distant centre to borrow money on the same
96 Galbraith also lists:
1. Bad (unequal)  distribution of income,
2. Bad corporate structure: short term-ist dividend demands over expansion investment,
3. Dubious state of the foreign balance: 
4. Poor state of economic intelligence.
184
preferential terms as those banks did not know their credit history. Such “silent run”
transfers hence created credit shortages (“rationing”) and undermined the stability of
the economy at that time.
For  the  above  reasons,  S&G03  claim  credit-worthiness  is  heterogeneous  (and
asymmetric) and an aggregate assessment can be misleading since the surplus of funds
in one bank is not a substitute for the lack of funds in another, the client’s usual lender.
This is in part because the bank which has sufficient funds may not be accessible to a
borrower for various reasons such as logistic access Another reason is such a bank may
not have sufficient credit information on the client and may either refuse the loan all
together or charge too high interest rate resulting from both the increased risk premium
and the increased agency costs.97 Due to information and the resulting credit asymmetry,
S&G03 claim that credit allocation is not Pareto efficient and that its effects are highly
non-linear – e.g. a bankruptcy resulting from increased interest rates cannot be undone
by decreasing interest rates after the bankruptcy.
Mishkin (1978) takes a different  slant  in his  analysis  and states that most  previous
authors surprisingly omitted to pay attention to the effect household balance sheets and
the sharp (approx. 12% and 20% on average) increase of household credit liabilities
throughout 1928 and 1929 (respectively) for the economic contraction leading to 1929
Great Depression. Mishkin there dis-aggregates the net aggregate effect of the asset
income and the liabilities on household cash-flow (liquidity) and monitor effects of the
so composed household balance sheet portfolio.  Mishkin points to the stock market
crash as the main culprit for the decline in houses’ asset prices and, consequently, the
demand downturn, but he does not go further into analysis of the causes of the crash.
The  first  issue  of  banking  bankruptcies  leading  to  the  Great  Depression  has  been
analysed in great detail by many academics. Bernanke (see Bernanke 1983 and 1995)
gives an overview of financial economic factors leading to the Great Depression such
97 The agency cost is what Bernanke et al. (1999) perceive as one of the main mechanisms behind the
financing positive feedback mechanism exacerbating business cycles they termed “financial accelerator”
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as  wage  rigidity  amidst  deflation,  lending  risks,  and  demand  shocks.  His  work  is
however  focusing mainly on the importance of the gold standard,  agency costs,  on
Fisher’s accelerating debt-deflation crisis (“debt-crisis”) but also, bank runs, panic and
monetary shocks and international contagion in accelerating further the spread of the
Great Depression post 1929 Crash. Bernanke asserted that the monetary contraction
pursued  in  years  preceding  the  Depression  was  the  most  likely  cause  of  the
depression.98 He also points out that the countries that abandoned the gold standard and
pursued monetary reflation found a way out and recovered from the depression earlier
than those sticking to the standards did. This finding is affirmed by recent research by
Albers and Uebele (2012) who point out that there was a higher co-movement among
countries accepting the gold standard than with the ones outside the standard, including
the Sterling countries, and which recovered earlier99.  Albers and Uebele (2012) also
find  that  the  agricultural  countries  experienced  approximately  a  one  year  delay  in
entering (and also in getting out of) the Depression. This is understandable when one
takes into account the delayed and prolonged production cycles of agricultural products
in  comparison  to  those  of  most  of  industrial  ones  and  also,  the  human  existential
dependency on relatively smooth consumption of food-stuff compared to the usually
more volatile and pro-cyclical consumption of durable industrial goods100.
98 Bernanke states that the US Fed, (as several of most developed countries) pursued a contractionary
policy reducing money base 6% in period from Summer 1928 to Summer 1930, initially trying to reduce
speculative use of the money despite increase in gold reserves.
99 We  can  then  consider  that  the  gold  standard  countries  correlate  (and  co-move)  more  than  those
controlling  (protecting)  the  exchane  rates  because  the  gold  standard  fixed  exchange  rate,  results
effectively in creating an in-flexible, mutually fixed exchange rate monetary union. Such (gold standard)
union makes the "member-states" more vulnerable to cross-contagion, although it may be intended to
alleviate risks.
100 - food demand is stickier – it is existentially dependent good which humans can not stop consuming
and buying just because it  is a crisis - thus, affecting industrial economies quicker and deeper (non-
linearly) than the agriculture.
- food production cycle extends to a year - thus agricultural production goes on through its
annual cycle before it reacts...and so the whole countries based on it..
-  food  is  often  sold  at  commodities  future  markets  in  advance  (would  be  interesting  to
investigate that too) so, there is no need to stop harvest either as the hedging farmer can still get the
expected, long in advance contracted price .
-  there is  therefore about 6-12 month time lag for  reaction of  agricultural  producers  whilst
production life-cycle of the industrial goods (and worker dismissal notice then) is usually considerably
shorter, few days to weeks, and, being affected more, the latter may react quicker to recession trend...but
also,.the recovery trend too.
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Bernanke (1983, 1995) explain the causes of the (Post-Crash) Great depression as a loss
of  confidence  in  the  banking  system and  debtor  insolvency mainly  resulting  from
deflationary “debt-crisis” – effectively a variant of the famous Fisher’s (1933) debt-
deflation accelerator. Bernanke (1983) points to the resulting insolvencies of debt and
mortgage holders, the doubling of debt service cost/GDP ratio from 1929 to 1933 and
the prolonged effect on the increased (agency) costs of financial intermediation in the
post-crash economy as cause of prolonged depression.
Bernanke (1995) looks at the drop in aggregate demand in 1930s and finds that it was
correlated to the monetary contraction resulting from the poorly managed monetary
policy aimed at re-introduction of the international gold standard. He sees demand drop
being  triggered  by  that  contractionary  policy  which  also  triggered  negative  credit
supply shock resulting in high interest rates.  This is, as he claims, in the line with the
monetarist Freedman and Schwartz (1963) view that the banking difficulties created a
money shortage leading to a downturn in the aggregate demand and output and causing
the financial crash101. Henceforth, one of more vocal, famous solutions for such crisis
caused  by  shortage  of  money  and  resulting  high  interest  rates  is  the  so-called
“Helicopter drop” of money.
However, what about the other way around, will not the rate rise in an over-indebted
household and over-leveraged businesses  driven economy trigger  liquidity shortage,
recession  and crisis?  It  appears  to  this  author  as  if  that  Mishkin  (1978),  Bernanke
(1995) and many other modern analysts may not have paid a proper attention to all
details of the mechanism of the contractionary policy propagation channel.  
This research is posting a hypothesis of existence of another, not explicitly investigated,
“positive”  (accelerating)  feedback  factor  that  could  have  suppressed  consumption
demand due to cash-flow difficulties caused initially by rises of existing, floating loan
101 Bernanke states that this monetarist view was opposed in 1976 by Temin  who claimed that the real
cause of the Great depression is in the real economy and that output contraction was preceded and caused
by a consumption contraction and both of these were before (and caused) the monetary one but this view
has been broadly criticised.
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interest rates in heavily indebted economies, triggering  both, recessionary trends and
the  prolonged depression  in  a  way that  has  not  been  explored  so  far.  Namely,  we
question if it is likely that the Fed’s contractionary policy at that time of high level of
both, private (mainly real-estate) and public debt, may have contributed more directly
and with a higher accelerating effect to the severe demand downturns in both durable
and non-durable sectors that Mishkin shows in his analysis.
6.2.3 Introduction to interest rate triggered recessionary debt accelerator
To be able to understand better my comments in analysis of the existing literature on
the causes of two major recessions the earlier described 1930s and the 2007, I would
like  at  this  stage  to  introduce  a  theory  of  potentially  novel  or,  at  least  a  possibly
neglected  channel  for  interest  rate  affecting  economy  –  a  recessionary  debt
accelerator (initially discussed as part of Perendia 2010). The aim of this research is to
show  that  this  neglected  but  potentially  crucial  factor  may  have  significantly
contributed to both, the recent 2007-08 financial  and economic crisis known as the
Great Recession, and very likely, the earlier Great Depression too.
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Figures 6.2.3.1: Real estate investment loans as % of GDP and 6.2.3.2: the US Fed
policy target “real” rate (blue) showing its substantial rise from 2004 to 2007
compared to inflation (red):
           Figure 6.2.3.1                                                     Figure 6.2.3.2
The point this  research paper is making is  that there were other accelerating forces
suppressing  consumption  demand  and  accelerating  initially  mild  recessionary
downturns into full-blown recessions. Also, one of the main causes for the 2007 crash is
likely to be the same accelerated recessionary trend caused by a slowdown in aggregate
demand, itself caused and triggered by what this research introduces and refers to as the
recessionary debt accelerator.
A monetary  tightening  (e.g.  an  interest  rate  rise)  at  a  time  of  high  levels  of  both
household and corporate debt triggered a remaining cash-flow crisis  and then debt-
accelerated demand-cutting positive feedback (i.e. spiralling decelerator) effect. This
accelerator’s positive feedback affected the cash-flows, demand for both the (every-
day)  non-durable,  and even more for the (usually) debt-financed durable goods and
services and triggered bankruptcies as early as 2005 at the rise of Fed rate, their 2nd
wave  and  unemployment  later  and,  in  whole  2006-8  period,  the  multitude  of
foreclosures.
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6.2.4 The total real cost of credit and borrowings
Rather than using just a real rate of return as the cost of borrowing, we can observe the
total  amount  of  the  real  return  on  the  borrowing  based  on  real  rate  of  return  (rr)
multiplied by the inflation-adjusted (deflated) total credit borrowing: 
ccr_df= total_credit_deflated * rr  (6.2.4.1) 
Figures 6.2.4.1 and 6.2.4.2: total real return on credit and its level in relation to
GDP using monthly US data 1980-2007.
Table 6.2.4.3: Unit root on  total rear return on credit
Null Hypothesis: CCR_DF has a unit root
t-Statistic Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.966332 0.3018
We can notice that, with some variations, the total amount of borrowing return, main
income of retail baking is rather stationary, especially before 1995 deregulations, and
steadily  increasing  in  its  value  and  variance.  It  can  also  help  put  into  perspective
lowering of the interest rates midst even higher income form the proportionally even
higher borrowings...that is, when higher interest rates allow for that.
190
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06
CCR_DF
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06
CCR_GDPDF
Thus, another claim is that if we monitor and start targeting the total amount of credit
and/or its  return (or its  normalised value per GDP, graph above right)  then we can
expect that some more realistic estimates and forecasts could be achieved.
6.2.4.1 VAR Estimation Data – Preparation and Inspection
In  this  section  for  later  econometric  analysis  we  use  a  set  of  US  monthly  data
downloaded from US Fed from Nov. 1989 to Feb. 2007, mostly HP detrended and then
normalised (except for the Fed policy rate and inflation) and, also, had added a derived
total return on credit/loans as  per above section. This work was done in Eviews.
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Figure 6.2.4.1.1: Combined, overlapping graphs of major measures or their HP
cycles, normalised to fit the illustration and allow easier comparison 
(See Appendix A.1 Figure A1.1.1 for the individual data graphs)
Where: CCR- Consumer credit real rate return (blue) per GDP: CCR = CC *rr /GDP
where rr = real interest rate:  rr = prime_rate - inflation
PI12 – Annualised inflation
R_FED_TGT – US Federal Reserve policy target rate.
PCEDF HPCYCL07 – HP filter cycle component of deflated personal consumption
BNKRPC_HPCYC – HP filter cycle component of bankruptcies
WHD_HPCYC – HP filter cycle component of hourly wage
UNEMP_HPCYC -HP filter cycle component of unemployment rate (however, in the
VAR analysis we will be using more reliable and informative employment data:
EMP_HPCYC - HP filter cycle component of employment hours
The above figure shows overlapping graphs of  major  measures  or  their  HP cycles,
normalised to allow easier inspection of their correlation and timings (See Appendix
A.1 Figure A1.1.1 for individual data graphs). We can see that credit return payment
increased 6 fold from 2003 to 2006, boosting banking profits and depleting households’
and  SMEs’ liquidity  and  consumption  ability.  The  consumption  level  remained  to
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increase but its growth declined sharply from the growing trend from 2005 (this being
the case until late 2007 when the Fed and the real return interest rates started falling). 
6.2.4.2 Further Data Analysis and Tests Discussion 
In this section, econometric methods are applied to the set of US data downloaded from
US Fed and HP detrended102. 
Figures 6.2.4.2.1 and 6.2.4.2.2: Second wave of bankruptcies and unemployment
respectively, both start rising in 2007:
           
.
Also,  in  the  below  tables  we  show  Granger  causality  test  among  pairs  of
(un)employment cycle and that for Fed policy rate and for bankruptcies respectively.
 
102 This initial and the later, VAR data analysis was done using Eviews.
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Table 6.2.4.2.3: HP filtered cyclic components of bankruptcies, unemployment and
employment respectively: 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
EMP_HPCYC/2000 does not Granger
Cause R_FED_TGT/12 342 2.34772 0.00674
R_FED_TGT/12 does not Granger Cause
EMP_HPCYC/2000 1.38142 0.17313
BNKRP_HPCYC/10000 does not
Granger Cause R_FED_TGT/12 341 3.02199 0.00049
R_FED_TGT/12 does not Granger Cause
BNKRP_HPCYC/10000 1.94819 0.02852
This above, initial, Granger causality analysis of US data indicates that all but one can
be rejected with different levels of confidence and that it is more likely that changes in
the Fed policy rates (R_FED_TGT) are Granger caused by the changes in employment
and, the cyclic bankruptcies rates (BNKRP_HPCYC). However, with less certainly one
can reject that the Fed rate changes do not (Granger) cause employment changes.
Table 6.2.4.2.4: Granger causality tests between HP filtered cyclic components of
bankruptcies, unemployment and employment respectively.
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic
Probabilit
y
BNKRP_HPCYC/10000 does not
Granger Cause UNMP_CYCLE 341 1.59758 0.09087
UNMP_CYCLE does not Granger
Cause BNKRP_HPCYC/10000 1.19713 0.28385
EMP_HPCYC/2000 does not Granger
Cause BNKRP_HPCYC/10000 341 1.01825 0.43156
BNKRP_HPCYC/10000 does not
Granger Cause EMP_HPCYC/2000 1.83998 0.04130
The  above  table  6.2.4.2.4  with  Granger  causality  tests  between  bankruptcies  and
unemployment and employment respectively is showing a stronger Granger causality of
employment changes than unemployment changes caused by bankruptcies rather than
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bankruptcies being Granger caused by either of the two labour measures.
However, the above more clear Granger causality of employment over unemployment
relation  to  bankruptcies  is  based  on  statistical  occurrences  of  unemployment  or
employment-change cycle ahead or after of bankruptcies and, it may be explained by
unemployment data being less reliable than employment changes.  Consequently,  the
latter  are  giving  more  clear  sequence  based  precedence  (i.e.  Granger  causality)
especially since laying-off employers does not cause unemployment to rise during their
usual redundancy payment period. 
In Appendix A 1, Table A.1.1: VAR estimation measures of R2 we can observe that the
variable least explainable by others is private consumption  with its R2  0.69 comparing
with most of other being above 0.95. This is because, as noted earlier (and identified
also in Levine et al.2009-2012), the lifestyle rigidity (incl. habit) drives the rigidity (or
the  “stickiness”)  of  private  consumption  so  that  even  increased  income  from  e.g.
interest rate revenue, does not immediately find its way in increased consumption by
the savers as expected by the classic macro models, but, as explained earlier, to great
part probably goes into re-investment.103 In fact, the consumption level continued to
increase but declined sharply from such its trend from 2005 coinciding with the rise in
the interest rates and the credit revenues.
The two other less explained variables with their low R2 (e.g. below 0.9 for VAR(4)) are
wage and (un)employment, the first of the two being the well-known “sticky” variable
from the Keynesian and NK theories and models, (discussed also in Levine et al. 2009-
2012),  and  the  latter,  the  (involuntary  un-)employment,  probably  needs  to  be
“disaggregated ” from the sticky wage contracts (i.e. as in most of the NK models), and,
instead, modelled as a separate sticky variable (this has been, but only in part addressed
later, in Ch. 7 of  this research and, also, in Perendia and Tsoukis 2012).
103 And, for those with possibly decreased income, it will motivate loan borrowing and debt accumulation
up to the level allowd by the banks. 
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6.2.4.3 VAR Estimations and Comparison with Standard DSGE IRFs
Using same data downloaded from US Fed, an unrestricted VAR(12) was estimated
using more reliable and informative employment data (EMP_HPCYC - HP filter cycle
component of employment hours) instead unemployment statistics. (For details please
see Appendix C6.1). Here are presented fur sets of one standard deviation innovation
impulse response functions (IRFs) with two standard deviation confidence ranges. The
shocks analysed were to bankruptcies, consumption, employment, and finally, to the
un-observed,  derived variable  private  credit  (loan debt)  real  interest  revenue levels.
(See Appendix C6.1, Fig. A.C6.1.2 to A.C6.1.5 respectively).
The  first  three  figures  are  illustrative  of  system  reactions  to  shocks  to  observed
variables and how the VAR responds usually pretty well along the lines of expected
theory and stylised facts. 
In  figure  A.C6.1.2,  unstructured  VAR(12)  for  60-month-(5  year)  period  response
functions  (with  two  standard  deviations  certainty  range)  to  one  standard  deviation
shock rise in bankruptcies indicates, as expected, that it is resulting in significantly long
initial  drops  in  consumption,  wage  and  employment.  It  was  as  well  generating
increased volatility to credit interest return and its underlying real rate of interest.
In Fig A.C6.1.3 and A.C6.1.4 we can see very similar (though opposite) effects from
the  one  SD  shocks  to  consumption  and  employment  respectively  on  to  the  other
respective endogenous variables including drops in bankruptcies. Note however that the
visible “positive” effects to reducing bankruptcies and unemployment and rising wage
to  positive  impulse to  consumption  should  be  imagined working in  opposite  if  the
shock was negative to consumption or employment driving economy downward. 
Finally, in figure A.C6.1.5 we can see unstructured VAR(12), 60-month-(5 year) period
response functions with two standard deviations certainty range to one SD shock rise in
the newly derived variable, the private credit (loan debt) real interest revenue returns
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(D(CCR…) – i.e. we will use its first difference (D(*)) due to unit root presence in the
level data). It is resulting initially in some 15 month of substantial rise in bankruptcies
and drop in wages (bottom left). It also triggers a rather volatile, and small rises, over
some 15 initial month-periods in consumption and some 25 in employment, and, as
well, volatile increases to the interest rates ( however, the real rate of interest rr is one
of its components anyway). 
Effects  of  shocks  and  rises  of  the  policy rate  on  other  economic  variables  can  be
observed in  the IRF functions  diagrams to that  shock from simulation presented in
Appendix C6.2  below. They came from running IRF response functions to the DSGE
model provided by Smets and Wouters (2007) using US data to 2nd quarter of 2004 as
they supplied, estimated and simulated using Dynare DSGE estimation and simulation
package and clearly indicate that the existing DSGE models already expects drops in
output,  employment,  investment,  wages  and  consumption  as  a  result  of  such  rate
increase even with already known channels. That SW07 model, however, did not have
credit/loan revenue or the credit as its variables or measurements.
6.2.4.4 Discussion on Results
Whilst the above, first three IRF responses results are not overly surprising or new, the
new and so far unexplored factor (un-observed but derived variable) there is the derived
credit revenue per GDP and this is just a preliminary analysis. The responses to the
credit return rise appear to have “positive” effects by  increasing  employment (which is
unexpected) but, expectedly “negative” on increasing bankruptcies and lowering wage,
which  are  likely triggers  for  a  spiralling  down-ward trend through their  impact  on
consumption demand.
We also need to bear in mind that effects presented by IRFs are to one-off, one period
increases whilst US economy was exposed to prolonged “shock” if not trend of policy
and commercial interest rates increase over two years, 2005-2007.  
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6.2.5 Discussion
This research therefore, proposes that the interest rate rise induced “debt-accelerator”
channel contributed to both triggering and prolonging the downturn of the 1930s Great
Depression more than the known channels would normally do. The same mechanism I
believe even more prominently contributed to triggering the recent “Great Recession”
of  2007.  Both  crises  were  shortly  preceded  by  two  different  modes  of  monetary
tightening taking place in two periods of highly indebted private sector of US economy.
Prior to both of these contractions, trading had increased rapidly in the increasingly
over priced stocks by the rapidly widening community of the mid and lower income
public who were taking advantage of low loan borrowing interest rates over several
years  preceding the  stock  market  crashes.  This  resulted  in  an  increased  amount  of
consumers’ usual  base  income  becoming  increasingly  invested  in  the  stock  market
midst hopes of high returns whilst substituting today’s consumption for tomorrow’s, in
spite of low interest  rates.  This shifting of the aggregate inter-temporal  substitution
factor  and  investment-to-income  ratio  thus  contributed  to  a  further  reducing  of
aggregate demand.104
In addition to the US FED tightening the monetary base, to reduce the outflow of its
gold reserves and cool-down the over-heated stock market, it increased its discount rate
in 1928 from 3.5% to 5%, further increasing it in August 1929 to 6%.  In the opinion of
many authors, this is likely to have led to a slowdown in the real economy (see e.g.
Field (1984) and (2015)) in a similar fashion as that of the earlier recession of 1921
which, according to some authors, was also triggered by an inadequately steep rise in
the Fed’s policy rate.  (This  inadequate move in 1921 is  perceived to be caused by
inexperience of the newly founded Federal Reserve Bank’s Board.)
The  interest  rate  increases  in  1928  and  in  August  1929,  however,  I  believe,  also
triggered the recessionary debt accelerator and so contributed to the then downturn of
104 That is, the current consumption was forgone as they invested with the hope of higher future returns.
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the aggregate demand. Both effects ultimately then triggered a recessionary trend. This
recessionary trend may have then contributed to a further demand decelerating shock
midst a high-investment-led overproduction. All of these were contributing factors to
the industrial  product stock build-up in the summer 1929. They acted as additional
triggers for the overall economic concerns that then triggered the reduction in the value
of stocks on the NY market, the panic and the stock market crash.
6.2.6 Comparing Recessionary Debt Accelerator and other similar 
Accelerators and Decelerators in related literature
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke et al.  (1999) (BGG later-on)) revive the
importance of Fisher’s (1933) notion of on "debt-deflation," They introduce the well-
known “financial accelerator” (explained in more detail later in the text). However, the
BGG accelerator is based on agency costs for tackling asymmetric information between
the lenders (the banks) and the borrowers. Therefore, by both the nominal definition
and in substance it is rather different from the debt accelerator introduced above. The
BGG accelerator reduces loans in time of downturns (regardless of the level of debt)
and  only  indirectly  affects,  and  reduces  employment,  supply  and  the  debt-driven
demand.  The  latter,  the  Fisher's  debt  deflator,  however,  directly  affects  overall
aggregate demand by the already indebted agents and then, indirectly the other factors
too. The debt accelerator effect also usually precedes the financial decelerator effect
introduced by BGG.
Iacoviello  (2005)  also  introduces  and  augments  his  model  with  another  type  of
accelerator – a demand shock driven effect of asset and interest rate rises, allowing for
higher  collateralised loans  and even more  demand (and the  opposite,  supply shock
“decelerator”).  Though it  is  applicable to both corporate  and household agents,  this
demand  shock  accelerator  is  however  a  different  from,  and,  eventually  may  be
dampened by the recession “debt accelerator” (or decelerator) which is introduced in
this research - an accelerator that is resulting from the loan interest  rates rise in an
already highly indebted economy (see earlier explanation).
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Burgstaller (2006) uses VAR to analyse effect of the interest rate spreads between the
loan  and  deposit  rates  and finds  empirical  evidence  of  higher  spreads  slowing  the
economy, in line with the decelerating financial accelerator hypothesis of Bernanke,
Gertler  and Gilchrist  (1999) acting in  downturn and refer  to the effect  as financial
decelerator but it is effectively a variation on Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)
one when acting in downturns.
Another similar  decelerator  was  analysed  and  introduced  by  Kiyotaki  and  Moore
(1997) who show that asset value loss affects credit and ability of firms to borrow and
then further  affecting  asset-prices  in  a  manner  of  a  positive-feedback,  either  as  an
upwards accelerator or as a downwards decelerator. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) build
their model of the asset collateral value credit constrained agent upon the earlier work
of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Greenwald and Stiglitz:
“Borrowers' credit limits are affected by the prices of the collateralized assets. And at
the same time, these prices are affected by the size of the credit limits. The dynamic
interaction  between  credit  limits  and  asset  prices  turns  out  to  be  a  powerful
transmission mechanism by which the effects of shocks persist,  amplify,  and spread
out”
Applying a form of game of life model: the predator (credit-unconstrained) vs. the prey
(i.e., a credit-constrained firm) relation analogy, they find, among the rest, that credit
constraints in down-turns spirals down credit worth of a firm and their collateral asset
prices  which,  in turn further  reduces  their  creditworthiness.  They also find that  the
marginal productivity of a constrained firm is higher than that of unconstrained ones.
This, on other hand, has an accelerating effect on output in business cycles when output
of (and employment by) a constrained firm is more affected by asset value fluctuations
in business cycles.
In a later research, Harrison and Weder (2010) use a limited supply of one asset (land)
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as the collateral  constrained borrowing limit  in  a  relatively simple model  based on
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). They then show that in credit friction marred markets there
can be an in-determinacy of equilibria, driven by agents’ self-fulfilling (i.e. optimistic
vs. pessimistic) prophecies.
Another  of  the  closest  accelerators  to  the  above  recessionary  debt-accelerator  is
Fisher’s 1933 debt-deflator accelerator. Fisher’s debt-deflator has been perceived as one
of the main triggers for recessions and starts to affect an economy when intensive debt
liquidation starts following a “Mild Gloom and Shock to Confidence” (Fisher (1933),
pg. 343), and that is likely to be when a recessionary trend becomes visible. Though the
debt accelerator starts  and acts  in similar conditions,  it,  on the other hand, directly
affects different agents and slows down the demand of the highly indebted agents who
cannot  dispose of  or  liquidate  their  high  debts.  This  is  mostly due to  those agents
having borrowed to invest in less liquid assets such as domestic or commercial real-
estate,  or  due  to  them  using  those  assets  as  their  collateral.  In  addition,  the  debt
accelerator introduced here is directly triggered by an increase in interest rates, either as
a  part  of  a  credit  rationing  (when  the  interest  rates  on  risky loans  rise),  or,  when
monetary  tightening  and/or  the  central  bank  policy  rate  increase  forces  a  rise  in
commercial banks’ loan rates. That means that, ahead of Fisher’s deflation, it  is the
price rise and the consecutive inflation targeting action by a central  bank that  may
trigger  this  form of  debt  accelerated  recession,  it  triggering  the  other  decelerators
(including the Fisher’s debt-deflator) then too. However, a monetary tightening may
also lead to debt liquidation and start the Fisher’s deflation cycle independently of the
effect of the debt accelerator described above.
A similar  situation is  explained by Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) who provide a
small scale New-Keynesian (NK) model with private debt105 aiming to model Fisher’s
debt deflation effect and the deflationary trigger event as an exogenous deleveraging
105 The authors also depart from the single representative agent and the agents’ preference shocks driven
models. They model two categories of agents: the impatient borrowers driving by debt funded demand
build-up, and the patient savers..
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switch from the high debt limit to the low debt limit reducing demand.106 Their model
however assumes that agents can easily move from high to low debt levels and clearing
(consuming)  the  saver’s  extra  income  from increased  interest  rate  on  saving  from
debtors in a closed economy and does not have investment and financial sectors or the
foreign investment leakages. On the contrary, many families reduced spending as they
could or did not deleverage to low debt midst increasing rates, drop in housing prices
and negative equity. Also, whilst consumption clearing assumed in their model would
simply  shift  consumption  demand  from  borrowers  to  savers,  data  show  overall
reduction  in  consumption,  this,  possibly  along  the  lines  that  the  saver  prefers  to
continue to save and gain higher income  (see also Kumhof et al. (2013)).  At this stage
they  may  want  (as  financial  institutions  do)  to  purchase  more  of  lower  risk,  now
cheaper (i.e. higher yield income) government debt instead. Eggertsson and Krugman
(2012) also seem missing that the high debt deleveraging “switch” is likely to be an
endogenous event, e.g. either driven by an increase in central bank’s policy rate  as
elaborated in this paper, or, possibly, by a series of endogenous defaults described by
Kumhof et al. (2013). They nevertheless indeed rightly conclude that fiscal spending
intervention is needed to accelerate spending in such situation, something however that
seems to have been rather delayed in 2007/08 crisis.
Another example of a similar financial accelerator (referred to as financial decelerator)
was introduced and analysed in a small, two period model by Elul (2005) who presents
effects  of  strategic  bankruptcy  when  house  owning  agents  decide  that  it  is  more
opportune to fill  for bankruptcy in case of asset value reduction than to commit to
service their existing loan obligations. The author is mostly concerned with strategic
bankruptcies when agents can obtain other loans (“...repayment is always an option in
that agents do indeed have sufficient funds to cover their debts even when house prices
fall.” ibid.) rather than forced bankruptcies when agents are not any more in situation to
repay existing or obtain alternative loans, thus, events which may occur even in the
state of economic equilibrium. (Similar model of endogenous rational default induced
by gradually increasing income-debt leverage was explained in Kumhof et al. (2013)). 
106 The authors refer to the debt limit switch moment as the “Minsky moment”
202
Though the recessionary debt-accelerator  introduced here overlaps  and may include
such strategic bankruptcy and/or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) cases at a later stage, it is
primarily concerned with the earlier phases, before the assets fall in values, more as one
of main causes of their fall – the triggering of early recessionary and unemployment
trends  caused  by the  lower  consumption  or  forced  bankruptcies,  either  due  to  the
successive cash-flow difficulties among already highly-indebted households and small
businesses  that  are  in  turn  caused  by  shocks  in  either  the  policy  base  and/or  the
(resulting) floating retail loan interest rates rises.
Paul (2015) present an overview of the recent literature on crises modelling and a novel
parsimonious DGE model of monetary policy simulating effects of a long expansionary
one usually followed by a short contractionary one just ahead of endogenous rise of
financial crises. In his model focusing on the role of financial sector intermediaries,
these endogenous crises are rooted in the high leverage of these financial intermediaries
initially taking opportunities of the low interest rates during the expansionary phases,
when their leverage increases due to a subsequent drop in their asset values during the
monetary  contraction.107 The  model  successfully  show  the  potential  effects  such
leveraging among the financial intermediaries could have had on development of the
2008 financial crisis but excludes leveraging of the households.
Muellbauer  (2016)  and  Duca  and  Muellbauer  (2013)  also  introduce  a  feed-back
amplifier i.e. an accelerator, which shows how indebted households became vulnerable
due to high debt triggering crash. His model of accelerator, however, is not explicitly
identifying  rise  in  interest  rates  as  trigger  which  turned  that  vulnerability  into  the
liquidity shortage crisis leading to the initial reduction of house prices triggering crash
but presents that crucial price reduction as an event which  “subsequently” follows their
rise, but the model of debt lead feed-back accelerator and its effects seems similar if not
same as the accelerator introduced as part of this research (Perendia (2010) and (2015)).
107In the pen-ultimate chapter, the author also states that “.... In the short run, contractionary monetary 
policy may increase financial instability instead of decreasing it.” and concludes that 
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Despite that Muellbauer (2016) misses to point to interest rate as a  likely cause of
liquidity constraints, nevertheless, both Muellbauer (2016) and this research conclude
that  one  of  the  main  causes  is  probably  a  misspecification  in  that  US  FED  (and
probably  few  other  central  bank  models)  did  not  have  proper  specification  of
households' debt that can show its effect on the consumption and the economy.  
A  part  of  such  non-linear  accelerator  are  asset-value-liquidity  positive  feedback
mechanisms modelled by Iacoviello (2005),  Iacoviello and Neri (2010) as well as the
Guren and McQuade (2014)  foreclosure triggered  households  home asset  downturn
reducing even further the liquidity of households or SMEs. Whilst the former one can
work  in  both  direction,  the  latter  is  downturn  accelerating  only  and  each  can  be
triggered by interest rate shocks in opposite directions.
There is also an ongoing discussion on how to mitigate such risk in future and while
this research and  Muellbauer (2016) point out that central banks should have stronger
role in accounting if not even adjusting rates for household debt build-up, Duca et al.
(2016) seek better macro-prudential policies and mechanisms to be put in place in the
regulations for the lending banks and similar institutions so to prevent such debt build-
up. Experience however indicate that regulations left alone without being monitored
and reinforced by adequately equipped and empowered impartial institutions will can
do little good if not being even more damaging by giving impression of false security..
6.2.7 Effects of the accelerators working together
In order to understand effects of different accelerators, this section discusses effects of
the accelerators working together in a rather crude mode of a business cycle.  One of
the points is that those accelerators may act in different moments of the business cycle.
Iacoviello’s (2005) demand shock accelerator would follow the BGG financial one in
boom times.
The boom then may be followed by increases of the policy or retail banks’ interest rates
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which,  in  highly  indebted  economies,  triggers  both  the  Fisher’s  debt  deflation
decelerator effect and the (introduced here) recession debt accelerator (i.e. decelerator).
Both of these are then dampening the initial positive effects of the Iacoviello’s demand
shock  accelerator  that  acted  in  the  up-cycle.  These  decelerating  effects  may  be
paralleled  by  Iacoviello’s  supply  shock  decelerator  and,  then,  further,  by  BGG’s
decelerating effect of agency costs in recession.
It is however difficult to assess the impact of any specific accelerator as they often
work together and models usually measure only one. It is therefore quite possible that
data based estimations of e.g., BGG accelerator effects exaggerated its importance and
presence as the authors assumed their financial accelerator is a single one whilst it is
just  a  measure  for  aggregate  effect  of  those  partially  the  overlapping  decelerators
including the  here introduced debt  accelerator  without  recognising  its  presence  and
measuring its specific effect.
Such a fine analysis of the effects of different accelerators is beyond the scope of this
research study and it will be left to another study. One thing, however, this research
wants to stress is that the debt driven deceleration forces need to be taken into account
within macroeconomic models. To begin with, one can use an aggregate of the two
components: Fisher’s debt deflator and the here introduced recession debt accelerator
(i.e. decelerator).
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6.3 Backstage repeated: The Great Recession of 2007
“But anyone who has looked seriously at how we got into this slump knows that private
debt, especially household debt, was the real culprit: it was the explosion of household
debt during the Bush years that set the stage for the crisis.”
Paul Krugman, NY Times, 22. Jan. 2012
6.3.1 Fiscal Policy of Sovereign Debt driven Growth
The  so-called  “years  of  great  moderation”,  the  years  of  relatively  stable  and  low
inflation since early 1980, when FED and other governments let their central banks
exercise inflation targeting with rather low target goals of around 2%, were all but that.
Though this was a period of steady and of stable, low inflation and interest rates, it was
also accompanied by increasing government spending per capita (see below Figures
6.3.1.1 and 6.3.1.2). These low inflation and interest rates in the long term, were green
lights for many others, homebuyers, impatient consumers and speculative investors, to
start borrowing excessively with expectation of low loan repayment rates. In addition to
the consumers  and investors,  the followers of this  trend included also many of the
world governments including the US (see below Figures).                
Figures 6.3.1.1 HP filtering of government spending per capita (left), and, 6.3.1.2:
the Fed’s target policy,  prime and interbank interest and inflation rates form
1950-2010 (right)
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Figures 6.3.1.3 and 6.3.1.4: US public debt in levels (left) and the public debt /
GDP ratio (right) from 1950-2010
                                  
The above graphs illustrate rapid rise in US public debt from 30% of GDP to around
60% during Reagan administration in those very same early 1980’s. It rose further until
the Clinton administration increased taxes and started reducing the debt in absolute
value (left  diagram 6.3.1.3) and as a  percentage of GDP (right  diagram 6.3.1.4).  It
reached  its  recent  minimum in  the  2nd Q  of  2001  –  that  is,  just  before  the  2001
September 11 events and has experienced rapid growth ever since to nearly 100% in
recent years.
However,  following  a  common  practices  of  “political  monetary  cycles,”  (e.g.  see
Alesina,.  Cohen and Roubini (1992) and the earlier  chapter  “Elections  in 2004 and
2008 and politico-economic cycles”) many of democratic governments spent more in
pre-election periods to please their voters and, reduced interest rates and taxed less to
please their investors to get re-elected. Consequently, for implementation of their own,
publicised policies, the governments had to borrow more, though, also at lower rates.
Presumably,  they  all  (rationally)  expected  perpetual  high  growth  and  the  low debt
repayment interest rates to bring sustainability to their excessive borrowings.
Starting from late 1970s or early 1980s, most of the countries in the developed world
started building their public debt and increasing their debt-to-GDP ratios. As research
from the  IMF (2010) shows for  the  G7 countries,  the  increase  of  public  debt  was
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mainly caused by loss of revenue (i.e. tax income). Whilst an increase in expenditure
for  health  (particularly  for  US)  constituted  the  largest  part  of  the  rise  in  total
expenditure (and relative “size of the government”) in the pre-crisis period from 1965
to 2007, it is small in comparison to the loss of tax revenue. The tax revenue reduction
was  mainly due  to  substantial  reduction  of  corporate  taxation “as  competition  for
increasingly mobile capital and profits intensified” the report states.
Consequently, the more the households borrowed, the more they would spend creating
higher demand and, the resulting, higher GDP output was enabling their governments to
borrow and spend even more.  The low inflation was supported by import  of cheap
goods from developing countries and the trade deficit  was balanced by government
debt being sold to the same, mainly exporting countries of East Asia whose foreign
reserves rocketed from 2002.
Therefore, governments potentially have an interest to keep the interest rates low to
reduce  the  costs  of  both  their  borrowing,  and  indirectly,  to  encourage  household
consumption  and  so  accelerate  the  growth  bubble.  Industry and  the  other  business
agents such as the financial intermediaries and central banks also shared some of these
interests.
6.3.2 Debt and Growth
Many authors,  in particular those from IMF background,  traditionally argue that an
increase  in  public  debt  reduces  the prospects  of  growth.  This  is  mainly due to  the
resulting pattern of under-investment that is caused by potential investors’ expectations
of  higher long-term interest rates, future taxation, inflation and economic volatility108
e.g. see Marcet and Scott 2003 and Kumar and Woo (2010). However, the authors state
this pattern may not be so prominent in the developed countries. If this is the case the
rapid growth of US public debt did not result in a crowding out of capital investment,
an increase in  interest  rates  (strictly controlled  by central  banks)  or  a  fall  in  GDP.
108 though in some cases, a low growth may cause, or accelerate public debt,
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However, Kumar and Woo consider a country’s openness by the sum of its imports and
exports in relation to its GDP and its government size by proportion of government
consumption  of  the  GDP  but  their  analysis  is  does  not  consider  government
contribution to GDP through investment.
On the  other  hand,  a  few authors  show that  in  some cases  increased  debt  may be
beneficial for growth. According to Crotty (2008), recent US GDP growth was driven
by a rise in consumption despite a continuous decrease in real wages thanks to the rise
of household debt from 48% of GDP in 1985 to over 100% in late 2008.
Traum  and  Yang  (2009)  and  Traum  and  Yang  (2011-13)  go  beyond  the  common
position  of  non-productive  government  spending.  In  their  NK  Smets  and  Wouters
derived  DSGE  model  they  introduce  two  types  of  government  expenditure,  the
productive investment [which may attract complementary private investment], and the
more traditional, non-productive spending. Similar to Levine et  al.  (2009) they also
have both the myopic non-saving and the rational, forward looking saving (Ricardian)
agents.  They then show that  if  an increase in  government debt was used to  reduce
capital  gains taxes on business investment,  then further  investment can be attracted
(crowded-in) instead of being discouraged (and crowded-out), leading to an increase of
GDP output.
In their study Greiner and Finke (2009) define criteria for a sustainable government
deficit as a scenario where, at least in the long term, the government ensures that the
increase in the government budget surplus to GDP ratio is higher than the increase in
the debt to GDP ratio They then similarly show that a short term increase in sovereign
debt  aimed  to  finance  productive  public  spending  and  encourage  investment  can
increase balanced growth and the government budget surplus. But, as authors state, this
is feasible only as long as the government switches to the aforementioned sustainable
budget  scenario  in  the  long  term  and  wages  are  sufficiently  flexible  to  maintain
employment to its near full natural levels. If wages are, however, very rigid and the
debt increase leads to higher unemployment, than the effect of productive spending is
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non-existent unless the government is also the creditor with surplus funds.
Though the US appears to have followed a policy grounded on principles similar to
those outlined above, growth of GDP in the prolonged conditions of reduced taxes was
not sufficient to offset for the budget deficit and the US debt continued increasing to
reach again levels close to 65% GDP just before the start of the 2008 financial crisis.  
6.3.3 Bubble growth
Among many, Arrow (2010) points out that midst bubble growth most investors and
bank managers took a biased rational decision to engage in highly risky investment, in
sub-prime MBSs, since the potential incentives of high bonuses and high returns over-
weighted the perceived risks of losses. The perspectives of “the worst-case scenarios”
such as bankruptcy,  loss of bonuses or even job losses were over-shadowed by the
expectations of high gains. 
It may be argued however that the group of those rational agents could be extended to
include many sub-prime households and small-to-medium-businesses.  For example, a
few authors point out (e.g. Dokko et al. (2009)), the lowering of the federal funds target
rate from 6.5% in 2000 to a mere 1% by mid-2003 may have accelerated both private
industrial  and the private housing investment borrowing as well  as the sale of both
prime and sub-prime mortgages109.
109 As well as the sale of public debt treasuries and bonds.
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Figures 6.3.3.1 - left:  Total consumer credit (mill. USD, deflated, data from
Federal Reserve of St. Louis), and, 6.3.3.2 (right), real estate investment loans per
GDP
Beaudry and Lahiri (2009) show how the total private debt rose to 3 times GDP: 
Figure 6.3.3.3 Growth of the total private (top), domestic and household debt to
GDP ratio from Q1 1968 to Q3 2008. (rep. from Beaudry and Lahiri 2009)
As one can see in the diagrams below, in spite of rising inflation, the Federal Funds
target rate was lowered even further from 2002 to 2004 (left) and the resulting, “real”
Fed funds target rate (right) i.e. the rfft –   (inflation) was actually around negative
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2.5% in Q1 of 2004 and then it rose, starting from Q2 of 2004 to nearly +3.5% by Q4
of 2006 and stayed rather high throughout 2007.
Figures: 6.3.3.4, left: Fed’s policy target rate (blue/middle), inflation (red/bottom)
and banks’ prime rate (green/top), and,
6.3.3.5: (right): The real Fed’s policy “real” rate, as a difference between the
nominal target rate and the inflation rate (blue) and the inflation rate (red), both
1980-2010.
In response to the criticism that the Fed’s policies facilitated the housing bubble, the
Fed and Mr B. Bernanke110 reject such responsibility and, prefer to focus on the crisis
contagion mechanisms. On the other hand, Taylor (2007) is one of the earliest authors
who indicated that a “too loose” monetary policy during 2003-2004 period (after  a
combined Sep. 11 2001 crisis and DOT-COM bubble  recession), probably lead to the
extensive housing activity. Gordon (2009) also analyses the causes and points to many
similarities  between  the  1927-29  and  2003-06  bubbles.  He  refers  to  the  highly
leveraged  (90%)  and  low  interest  rate  loans  for  stock  and  housing  purposes
respectively, to the regulatory failures caused by repeal of Glass-Steagall Act. Gordon
then states (ibid, pg. 6):
110 E.g. in the hearing at  Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission held on 2
nd
 Sep. 2010, Mr. Bernanke
maintained that the Fed did not aid the housing bubble by keeping interest rates too low for too long in
2002-4.
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“It is widely acknowledged that the Fed maintained short‐term interest rates too
low for too long in 2003‐04, in the sense that any set of parameters on a Taylor
Rule‐type  function  responding  to  inflation  and  the  output  gap  predicts
substantially higher short‐term interest rates during this period than actually
occurred… thus  indirectly  the  Fed’s  interest  rate  policies  contributed  to  the
housing bubble”
One explanation for the adherence to a prolonged low target rate during the 2003-2004
period is the fear of a Japan styled deflation after 2001/2002 recession (Taylor (2007))
that was implied by the Fed at-the-time using real-time PCE inflation indicator data but
this trend was only later revised not to be deflationary (Dokko et al. (2009)).
As Ahrend (2008) shows, monetary easing can lead to an excessive increase in asset
and  real  estate  prices.  Whilst  the  initial  stages  of  globalisation  kept  the  prices  of
tradable  goods  low  and  consequently  the  officially  accounted  CPI  based  level  of
inflation and interest rates in the last two decades, the market values of non-tradable
goods such as real estate and other assets have rocketed rather excessively. As Ahrend
shows, the most excessive increases in real estate values, and to a much lesser extent of
the equity assets,  are associated with periods when short-term rates were kept  well
below the level that the Taylor rule would prescribe. This was often in or after periods
of lower GDP and amidst the fear of following Japan into deflation. Ahrend argues that
such monetary easing over extended periods leads to housing booms followed by a
financial  or banking crisis.  UK, Japan and Finland are cited as examples of having
earlier episodes of such developments around the developed world in the late 1980s,
only  to  be  usually  followed  by  financial  or  banking  crises  in  the  early  1990s.  In
addition, similarly, the recent easing in period 2002 – 2005 would have provided the
grounds for both the recent housing boom and then the financial crisis of 2007-2008.
Whilst Dokko et al. (2009)111 admit that the Federal Reserve target rate was up to 2%
111 Article published by Federal Reserve Board, Washington DC, 2009
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below what the traditional Taylor rule prescribed, they still deny that monetary policy
facilitated or triggered the housing bubble.   Please see the diagram (Figure 6.3.3.6,
below-left)  reproduced from their report.  It shows the fed target in full red and the
Taylor rule rate in dotted-blue line),  They also admit what the below right diagram
shows, that there was a sharp rise in the growth of the housing loans for residential
investment (in relation to GDP) from 2003:
Figure 6.3.3.6 (left): Taylor expected (dotted) and Fed (red) rate, and
Figure 6.3.3.7 (right): Real-estate investment loans as percent of GDP, repeated for
comparison.
The authors note “…that the measure of inflation reported in these documents shifted
from overall PCE inflation to core PCE inflation from the years 2003–04 to the years
2005–06”
It is however known that reducing the inflation measure to so-called core (or “net”)
may create an inadequate response and higher variance in both the inflation and the
target rate. Mishkin (2007, pp 376) and Jonas and Mishkin (2005) state that the net
inflation construct is frequently more volatile and that it leads to targets being missed
more than would have been case with the headline inflation. 
Focusing the inflation target on the core inflation without the “bubbling” property and
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energy prices may have encouraged Fed to keep interest rates lower than they may have
been set otherwise. Lansing (2008) ,  a Senior Economist at FRBSF, states that it  is
controversial whether the increase of the Fed’s rate to the level expected by the Taylor
rule in 2003-2005 would have prevented or reduced the growth of the housing bubble
and whether central banks should engage in asset bubble control and targeting. 
6.3.4 Distribution and Underinvestment
The  additional  explanation  for  the  crashes  comes  from  analysis  of  the  common
underlying causes for both crises. Livingston (2010) and Belabed (2015) point-out that
both crises were preceded by a significant shift from wage income to profit income and
increases in inequality . Livingston claims that unusually high household consumption
beyond their income means and the parallel high retention of the profit with a small
proportion of profit re-investment, in part due to insufficient investment opportunities,
resulted in the recession.
Kumhof et al. (2013) develop model which shows that savings of the higher income
group enables the low and the medium income group to borrow and compensate for the
loss of real income so to maintain consumption to levels close observed in the US data
between 1983 and 2008, increasing danger of crisis. They then conclude that rising
income inequality may lead to increased saving and wealth-accumulation in the high
income group and the decreasing relative and real incomes among the lower and the
middle income groups, thus, both facilitating and inducing build-up of, eventually, high
debt  and  debt-to-income  leverage  among  the  latter  two  groups  that  will  be
endogenously  contributing  to  increased  risks  of  crises  through  mechanism  of
endogenous, rational defaults of households. 
6.4 Bubbles Burst
6.4.1 Corporate Financing Structure and Burst of Economic Bubble
“...  From  2003  to  2008  the  [debt] liabilities  of  small  companies  ballooned  from
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roughly equal to sales to three times sales, according to Sageworks, a financial data
company that tracks 1 million small private businesses. "In the crazy times, people
were  like  drunken  sailors—they'd  project  that  in  two  years  they'd  double  their
earnings, [so they would] overvalue their companies, and as owners in love with their
businesses, take on debt, right or wrong," .... "They got away from the historical debt-
to-equity parameters of their industries." Banks and credit-card companies did their
part,  too,  heedlessly  throwing  offers  of  credit  at  entrepreneurs.  Some  636  million
business credit-card offers went out in 2007, according to ...., a research group. That
works out to about 27 offers mailed to each company in the U.S.” ; 
Jill Hamburg Coplan, Bloomberg Businessweek, Dec. 4, 2009
During the time of the bubble bursting, corporate finance structures changed in favour
of bank loan debt over equity. This made many businesses much more vulnerable to
bankruptcy or liquidity problems when interest rates started rising between 2004 and
2006, thus accelerating the recessionary trend beyond that which historical data based
model estimations would have predicted. For example, the foreclosures on sub-prime
but  adjustable  rate  mortgages  (ARMs)  exceeded  foreclosures  on  any  other  type
mortgage type. The cumulative rise since Q2 2006 also exceeds the fixed rate, either
sub-prime or prime mortgage foreclosures, the number of which did not show much of
a rise with the interest rate rise (Murphy (2009) and USGAO (2009)).
Such  an  increased  debt-to-equity  ratio  however,  also  accelerated  the  valuation
downturn of both the corporate debt (bonds, if issued) and of the company shares as the
risk premia shot up in the wake of increased bankruptcy risk. Again these moves were
disproportionate to the historical data estimates,  this  in turn spiralling the corporate
liquidity problems and bankruptcies of the small firms rising from late 2006 and, as
well unemployment rising as early as Q1 2007 (see below figures).
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Figure 6.4.1.3: Foreclosures 1970-2008 as percentage of loans, (source: US Census)
We can see that number of foreclosures112 decreased in the period 2002-05 and started
increasing again in 2006 slowly but not substantially until Q2 of 2007. That 2007 rise
coincides if not follows the rise of unemployment and bankruptcies which started in Q1
2007. The point we need to make here is that the rise in foreclosures seems to be more
112Foreclosures 1999-2011 as % of loan customers per the US state have been the highest in Nevada 
(NV), Arizona (AZ), Florida (FL) and California (CA) (Source - N.Y. Fed)
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of a result of, or an accompanying (non-trivially) parallel channel with the two other
major  movements  contributing  to  an  overall  recessionary trend  –  bankruptcies  and
unemployment -  rather than their  main cause.  In addition,  whilst  there is  no strong
direct causal link from the rise of foreclosures to a major recession at this stage, there is
definitely  a  direct  causal  link  other  way  around,  from  the  stagnation  and  minor
recessionary trend to the increasing number of foreclosures. On the other hand, increase
in foreclosures is likely to reduce credit-worthiness of the market and banks inclination
to provide further credit, thus in turn facilitating further bankruptcies, unemployment
and foreclosures.
For example, Schelkle (2011) analyses mortgage default theories and their fit to the US
2007 crisis defaults and identifies that a double problem, such as the occurrence of both
the negative equity and unemployment fits the US 2007 crisis data the best. On the
other hand, from the graphs below one can see that, though house prices peaked in Q2
2007 and started to decline in Q3 2007, their inflation started slowing as early as Q1
2005. On the other hand, the “real” house price rise actually went “negative” (i.e. below
the  average  consumer  price  inflation)  in  Q2  2006,  thus,  creating  a  pretext  for
occurrence of negative equity as early as mid-2006. This was the same quarter that
private investment per-capita peaked and started its downward trend (see graph later
below) and the overall GDP per capita slowing its growth below its mid-term trend,
thus, both signalling slowdown though not yet a clear turn to a recessionary trend.
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Figures 6.4.1.4: private investment per-capita (left) and 6.4.1.5: the overall GDP
per capita and their HP filtered trends and deviations (right) respectively.
The  increase  in  unemployment  in  early  2007  (fig.  6.4.1.2)  then  added  the  second
necessary ingredient needed to accelerate the already started foreclosures, trigger the
second wave of bankruptcies and finally, the financial crisis that further spiralled the
economy along the now well-known path.
Fig. 6.4.1.6 Average US Home prices (left), and Fig. 6.4.1.7 (right): Annualised
average US home, (blue) and consumer price (red) inflations.
                                                                         
But,  as US Fed planners may appear not to have considered trends and changes in
housing inflation or possibly even the level of overall debt, the impact of the increasing
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unemployment and foreclosures to be a threat to the economy to a sufficient extent, it
continued raising the target base rate in Q3 2006 to 5.25%. Fed subsequently kept the
rate  at  that  high  level  until  Q3  2007,  two  quarters  after  the  unemployment  and
bankruptcies had started rising rapidly, thus, apparently, fuelling the recession and the
foreclosure trends (and the resulting financial crisis) even further.
Figure 6.4.1.8: Combined, overlapping graphs of major measures or their HP
cycles normalised to fit the illustration and allow easier comparison:
CCR- Consumer credit real rate return (blue) per GDP: CCR= CC *rr /GDP
PI12 – Annualised inflation
R_FED_TGT – US Federal Reserve policy target rate.
PCEDF HPCYCL07 – HP filter cycle component of deflated personal consumption
BNKRPC_HPCYC – HP filtered bankruptcies
WHD_HPCYC – HP filtered hourly wage
UNEMP_HPCYC HP cycle of unemployment rate
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In the above figure we can see that credit return payment increased 6 fold from 2003 to
2005,  boosting  banking  profits  and  depleting  households’ and  SMEs’ liquidity  and
consumption ability. The consumption level measures remained to increase but declined
sharply form their trend (this being until late 2007 when the fed and the real return
interest rates started falling). 
Real  hourly  wages  declined  in  levels  and  potentially  accelerated  slowdown  in
consumption which seem to have been sticky due to lifestyle rigidity and whose fall
was counteracted mainly by further increasing credit, however, up to a time limit when
further  credit  was  not  feasible  due  to  fall  in  housing  assets  prices.  Sticky,
unemployment started eventually rising too which appears to have finally prompted
lowering of the US Federal Reserve policy and the real interest rates later in 2007.
These events are all however, preceding the financial crisis: the collapses of the major
banks  and  other  financial  institutions  throughout  2008  and  this  research  therefore
concludes that it was the economic stagnation and a minor recessionary trend starting in
late 2006 and early 2007 that contributed to, if not triggered, development of both the
recession and the crisis of the financial system in 2008, not the other way around as it
is, often, I believe incorrectly, assumed.
6.4.2 The Burst of the Financial System Bubble
Many articles discuss the causes of the sub-prime mortgage based securities ( SMBS)
bubble and show how, after their  collapse,  the contagion of the resulting sub-prime
bubble collapse spread beyond the borders of US and caused recession (e.g. Kamin and
DeMarco (2010), Mishkin (2010), Kolb (2011) and Brender and Pisani (2010). Among
few others, Farmer (2012) also points to the drop in demand caused by the financial
crash as the cause for the economic crisis that, according to their analysis, followed the
financial crash. Not many, however, show why the collapse started. 
One of\the recent, earlier bursts of the financial sector occurred in late 1987. Konings
(2010) indicates that Volker’s policies of high interest rates introduced in early 1980s to
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curb inflation did not do the job as intended. While the price inflation of goods in the
real economy came down, monetarism worked its way around it and liquidity was on
increase  in  the  financial  sector.  However,  instead  of  causing  inflation  in  the  real
economy,  the  liquidity  remained  within  the  financial  institutions  contributing  to
inflation of financial assets instead. Inflows of foreign assets increased exchange rates,
both contributing to an under-investment in the real economy paralleled by the over-
investment in the financial sector. This trend then contributed to a two-way economy:
the real economy heading for a recession and the financial sector bubble growth, the
instability, the Savings and Loans crisis and then the 1987 financial market crash.
In 2005-6 period we can similarly see a rise of interest rates together with inflation of
securities, but also, increase of investment into emerging markets and foreign capital
outflows  which  created  additional  shortage  of  consumption  demand  liquidity,  thus,
following  pattern  of  debt  accelerator  explained  in  previous  section,  leading  into
stagnation  and  eventually  decline  in  real  consumption  demand  and  rapid  rise  of
bankruptcies.  This  trend  was  to  retreat  in  early  2006  but  to  resume  with  further
bankruptcies  after  a  prolonged  exposure  to  high  interest  rates  depleted  liquidity  in
another batch of businesses and households. By then, they probably spent most of their
cashflow reserves, thus, now, mutually accelerating even further the slowing-down of
consumption demand growth. Starved from further credit midst the stagnation in values
of their main collateral assets (e.g. their houses) asset prices started to decline and so,
gradually trigger the other financial accelerators (e.g. BGG and Iacoviello 2005) and,
eventually, the collapse of MBSs. As mentioned earlier, US foreclosures on sub-prime
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) exceeded foreclosures on any other type mortgage
type and all fixed rate ones, either sub-prime or prime mortgage foreclosures, whilst the
number of the latter two did not show much of a rise with the interest rate rise (Murphy
(2009) and USGAO (2009)).
Mishkin (2010) appears to be one of few authors who explain the development and
spread of the mortgage based securities collapse-led crisis, however, without trying to
explain its underlying roots of the MBSs value collapse. He was trying to make an
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implicit  parallel  to  the  Great  Crash  of  1929.  and asserted  that,  in  the  wake of  the
modern Great Recession there was a series of events such as the bank runs, (that led to
a few, including the 1929 crisis) but that this time they occurred on the shadow banking
system (i.e. non-depository, investment banks or hedge funds). 
Whilst  in  classic  (e.g.  1930s)  bank runs  depositors  withdraw the  short-term bank’s
liabilities consisting of their deposits or transfer funds to bigger banks along the lines of
the “silent runs” explained by Rockoff (2004), in the shadow banking it is the long term
asset-backed short term loans (e.g. asset repurchase agreements or repos) that are the
key  for  understanding  the  problem.  Usually,  a  borrower  institution  is  expected  to
provide some less-liquid, long-term assets (e.g., mortgage-based securities – MBS) as
collateral  with  their  total  nominal  value  higher  than  the  amount  of  the  loan.  The
difference is  the so-called haircut,  a form of risk insurance and interest  rate on the
short-term loan.
However,  as  the  value  of  MBSs fell  amid  the  increased  uncertainty  and  mortgage
defaults, the haircuts rose from what was mere 5-10% to up to 50%, thus, accelerating
the bubble bursting. Whilst Mishkin (2010) refers to this effect as a form of modern,
shadow-banking bank run, it can be argued, however, that it was a shadow market crash
caused by the  MBS credit  crash  that  was  then  accelerating  further  the  MBS price
decline, the shadow banking market crash and then, the crash of the shadow financial
institutions too. The short-term lending intermediary institutions then withdrew their
credit to their short-term borrowers who were using MBS as collateral deposits, thus,
accelerating further fire sale of MBS.
The overall effect of MBSs collapse was equivalent to lowering the credit-worthiness
of  the  borrowing  parties  and  their  resulting  cash-flow  shortages  accelerated  the
recession in a similar fashion as the “silent runs” did in 1930s as explained by Rockoff
(2004).
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6.5 Sovereign Debt Accelerator
6.5.1 Sovereign Debt Driven Debt Accelerator
Whilst earlier explained mechanisms for debt accelerator were driven by private debt
and liquidity shortage, there may be a more endogenous mechanism driving it and one
such mechanism will be discussed in this chapter. 
Increase in sovereign debt, at some point on the scale of its rise, will usually lead to its
debt instruments not to be accepted on the open market unless they yield higher interest
rates (and the risk premiums) whilst increasing the cost of debt pay-off and the total
liabilities.  That  raise  would  then  probably  trigger  another,  a  sovereign  debt-risk-
premium-accelerator effect where higher default risk premiums and resulting interest
rates seek even higher premiums and thus, even higher interest rates.
However,  in  addition,  each  rise  of  sovereign  debt  interest/yield  rate  would  then
probably trigger rise of the commercial banks deposit and loan rates which, it can be
then argued, in case of already exiting high private debt obtained on flexible rate as it
has been recorded in 2006/7 may then trigger another, a sovereign debt-recessionary
debt-accelerator  effect  where  higher  default  risk  premiums  on  commercial  loans
interest rates are leading then to recession as described earlier.
Increased  debt  liabilities,  may result  in  high  taxation  leading to  both  financial  and
human capital flights distorting even further the Ricardian equivalence. Currently this
would turn most developed and indebted economies with an already ageing population
into old-people homes and dormitories for their low wage basic service workers and
unsustainable pension liabilities, raising problems in both, some EU countries and US
states.
Any of the above stages may create a contraction pressure that may affect its growth
path  and  prevent  the  government  from creating  the  revenue needed to  pay for  the
existing coupons, and even less, for higher risk-premiums and interest rates on the debt.
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Thus, a self-fulfilling sovereign default may then occur too.
6.5.2 Endogenous Debt Accelerator in Smaller Countries
Smaller countries are exposed to additional external capital inflows that are following
the principles of credit default risk for large corporations and small countries, where the
market  agents assess default  risk and the required premium. There,  highly indebted
institutions are thus forced to increase interest rates on their debt obligations and this
then  creates  pressure  on  an  indebted  smaller  country  to  increase  its  interest  rates
(Márcio and Rigobon (2004) and Jens Hilscher Yves Nosbusch 2008 ). 
On the other hand, higher relative indebtedness over GDP may occur in the time of
crisis  if  a  government  followed  an  inconsistent,  short-termist  pro-cyclical  spending
policy and then  lacking resources  to  switch to  a  counter-cyclical  management  of  a
downturn  crisis  with  increased  spending.  This  could  have  been  avoided  if  it  was,
instead, following a consistent counter-cyclical budgeting and spending. However, the
reduced form models used (e.g. by Márcio and Rigobon (2004)) cannot show that and
their results are therefore often inconclusive.
6.5.3 Some Fundamental Issues of Small Government Debt
A large  proportion  of  debt  instruments  traded  or  used  as  high-class  collateral  are
sovereign bonds and treasuries whilst, since the 2007 crisis, MBSs are regarded as low
quality ones unsuitable as collateral. However, in a recent move, Danish FSA has issued
a directive that domestic MBSs should be treated as AAA products, stepping outside of
the recent international trends to critically assess MBSs and avoid their  use as they
were at the centre of the recent, 2007 Great recession. Large amounts of sovereign debt
among the majority of the developed, leading countries, provides at the same time, high
quantities of high-grade assets for collateralisation or pension investment.  However,
like the other Scandinavian countries, Denmark has small government debt and its debt
is insufficient to satisfy requirements for the high-grade domestic debt needed by the
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pension funds and other players in the Scandinavian domestic financial markets. 
Whilst a government’s regular financial obligations should be met from ongoing taxes
and reserves, any additional debt issued in extraordinary situations only, such as war or
another calamity, which needs to be financed in an emergency or in a short term, is
expected to be recovered through increased taxes in the longer term.
 
On the other hand, two of the main purposes of agent's/households'  saving now for
spending later would be:
 precautionary, consumption smoothing, for the rationally expected future times
of lower income, such as retirement. 
 saving  for  an  investment:  a  big  purchase  or  investment  in  either  business,
physical assets (house, car), financial or human assets (education or children).
(Where the latter (b) may be related to the former retirement investment (a)).
In each case, traditionally, an agent would save cash but even better, if available, invest
in an interest or a return yielding instrument rather than keep cash under pillow. 
If the saving is aimed for precautionary purposes, e.g. retirement (a), the agent may
want the investment to be secure and of a high grade; a (e.g. government) bond may be
the only acceptable alternative to cash in a retail bank deposit account (or to cash under
the pillow). On the other hand, if there is not enough government debt (and certificates)
floating on the markets, the only alternatives are low risk bank deposits, keeping cash
(“under  pillow”)  or  opting  for  a  balanced  risk  portfolio  of  cash  and  more  risky,
commercial assets. 
But a legal framework (e.g. Solvency 2) has been put in place which obliges financial
and pension institutions to keep in pension funds, or use as a collateral, only high grade
assets akin to treasuries or gov. bonds, whilst the risky commercial ones are not an
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acceptable option, that is, unless they are up-graded as is the case of Danish MBSs113.
On the other hand, the owners of existing debt seek income and to protect their asset
and their monopoly on the rental income from the government debt. They are likely to
fear the dilution of their debt value with more bonds being issued on the market. This
would happen when creditors seek a higher yield and hence lower prices, thus, force the
initial creditors towards a loss.  
6.5.4 Voluntary Default
This  is  a  brief  discussion  on  whether  a  country  may decide  to  resist  interest  rate
pressure and protect the sustainability of its growth by opting to default on its debt. 
Wray (2014b) analyses  the theory of  money and sovereign debt  and takes  a  rather
unorthodox approach. He derives the conclusion that, like Japan, no government should
face involuntary default and that the issue of money (IOU) is limited only by the danger
of inflation whilst the issue of debt securities, like bonds, with the aim to cover the
budget deficit, is unnecessary and has limited demand - it only has the goal to control
interest rates and draw out surplus of money (and reducing inflation). Following along
the  lines  of  other  unorthodox  authors,  he  goes  that  far  to  claim  that  taxation  is
unnecessary too, and that the main reason for taxation is just to give value to the IOU
money issued by the state. 
For  this  very  interesting,  unorthodox  view  Wray  does  not,  however,   provide  an
estimate of the point  at  which demand for  a  currency will  start  diminish its  value,
leading  to  inflation,  nor  any  support  by  any  analytical  model  other  than  the  lose
reference to the Japanese economy that successfully maintains low interest rates and
high sovereign debt. In a case similar to that of the US, as the US Dollar is a world
reserve currency and foreign investors and sovereign funds are happy to stock both US
113  Aboulian, B (2012): Pension funds assess investments in government debt, Financial Times, October 
8, 2012:   http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/df07bcd6-0c95-11e2-a776-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3AyNQrztK
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Dollars and US Treasuries, inflationary pressures are reduced on the US Dollar.  In the
case of Japan, cheap Yen loans are converted by global investors to US Dollars keeping
the Yen low relative to the Dollar and making Japanese goods even more affordable on
the world market. On the other hand, smaller and emerging economies do not have such
a luxury and need to keep foreign reserves as guarantees for trade agreements whilst
emissions of their own currencies would quickly result in inflation if they were not
issuing debt obligations to drain the surplus currency from the market. However, Wray's
considerations certainly merit a more analytical approach that is beyond the scope of
this research.
However,  though  the  potentially  resulting  inflation  (with  or  without  additional
monetarisation stimulus) may be detrimental for growth, the higher domestic inflation
may be preferable midst a stagnating economy (stagflation) since the higher inflation
will  also  ease  some  of  the  debt  costs,  thus,  compensating  for  higher  government
liabilities and also, reduce risks of deflation, that is, as long as the debt is in the local
currency. Such inflation may also depreciate the local currency and that in turn may be
eventually beneficial for both the international debt reduction (again, as long as the debt
is in the local currency) and the increase of exports, helping a return to growth. These
solutions however, come at a cost, mainly to the lenders (the local banks and savers,
and, the foreign investors and governments) whose debt portfolios and cash savings
would  plunge  in  market  value,  whilst  other  countries’  competitiveness  on  the
international market will be reduced. This may then potentially create either or both, a
domestic and an international financial, and possibly a political crisis too. On the other
hand, to satisfy the balance of payments114, an indebted and overly importing country
may resort to import protectionism and the promotion of domestic products with similar
implications on the international markets. 
114 Balance of all monetary transactions between a country and the rest of the world over a period of
time, usually a year,  needs to be satisfied. e.g., if the trade balance is in deficit, the shortfall has to be
balanced e.g. by returns from any foreign investments, paying for the difference from country’s foreign
reserves or by selling debt to and receiving loans from other countries. The main components are the
current account and the capital (or the financial) account: BOP=CA-FA.
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6.6 The conundrum: why does the yield curve forecast growth, or its lack
Note: This text uses the terms ‘yield curve’ and ‘term structure’ interchangeably
The determination of yield curves and (a variety of) risk premia by the estimation and
forecasting  of  macroeconomic  models  has  been  a  subject  of  great  many  research
projects.  Gagliardini,  Porchia  and  Trojani  (2009) explore  the  effect  of  ambiguity
aversion on the term structure and show that ambiguity premia can be larger than the
usually modelled risk premia.
De  Graeve,  Emirisy   and  Wouters  (2008)  (DEW08  henceforth)  present  as  an
unexplained problem that yields on long term bonds did not rise-up in 2004 as fast as
the increase of the short term Treasury rate, resulting in an unexpectedly large reduction
of the spread perceived in 2003/4. 
This issue was also raised and analysed in Rudebusch, Swanson and Wu (2006). It
refers to A. Greenspan’s statement that in 2004, long-term yield curves did not follow
the short-term rate increase but some, the 10-year bond yields, took opposite direction,
declining from 4.7% to 4.5%.
Similarly, our analysis shows a higher gap between the US FED base rate and retail
banks’ loan rates just after the FED started cutting rates at the start of the 2007 “Credit
Crunch” than the gap has been in the preceding years seen in figure below. Such an
“interest  rate  spread puzzle”  has  been observed earlier  and Stiglitz  and Greenwald
(2003) (S&G03 henceforth) seem to have found an explanation for that situation. They
focus on the importance of credit rating and its supply, and conclude those factors are
affecting the modern economy equally or even more than changes in the central bank’s
monetary supply and interest rates, which is in line with Goodhart and Hoffman (2004)
too (see above). 
The author of this paper however does not see these events as a conundrum. Whilst the
long-term yield is aligned with rational expectations of inflation based on its long-term
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target, short yields show higher variations closely in line with short-term rates. This
pattern  of  behaviour  is  visible  in  the  figure  below and was  present  throughout  the
depicted period, particularly since the mid-1980s, therefore, coinciding more with the
later period of systematic inflation targeting.
In the Figure 6.6.1 below, one can see that the shorter the US Treasury term bond is, the
closer is its yield to the short-term rate (i.e. one period or 3 month M_TBILL_RATE in
the graph below) and those close spreads are more prominent in periods of very low or
very high short-term rates.  
Figure 6.6.1: Yield structure of US government bonds  
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Similar phenomena in different markets have also been discussed in Curtberthson 1996)
and he shows that such spreads between long and short rates show a regular pattern but
their extent differs between developed countries.
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What is more, the two visible departures of that pattern can be considered as exceptions
or conundrums, appearing the early 1980s and in the year 2000.  However, the year
2000 was election year in the US and, as explained earlier, political uncertainty and
cycles- related factors may be contributing to that pre-election shift. 
Similarly, the Greenspan 2005 conundrum of the small opposite move of the long term
structure yields in 2005, may be attributed to the general criticism and observations that
the short-term fed rates in the preceding period were far too low (negative in real terms,
see earlier in the text). However, year 2004 was also another election year and the 2005
upward move of the fed rate affecting short term T-bills, was simply recognised as a
necessary,  or possibly even an over-extensive, post-election (over-)correction for the
preceding, pre-election period of far too low rate.  This was probably even more so
considering  that  the  inflation  was  still  within  limits  (see  earlier  chapters  and  in
Rudebusch, Swanson and Wu (2006)). Another factor, asserted as being influential by
Rudebusch, Swanson and Wu (2006) and initially indicated by Bernanke, is the so-
called international “Saving Glut”, where mainly exporting countries went on shopping
sprees for high-grade long- term bonds, mainly the US treasuries, driving their interest
rates low regardless of other movements.
It is interesting to note that DEWO7, using variance decomposition, show that inflation
target shocks are the strongest determinant of the yield curve. Such a “conundrum” may
then be explained by a (gradually) increasing confidence in central banks’ policies, their
commitment to inflation targeting in the long run, and in the consequential reduction of
the interest and inflation rates risk premia of the longer-term bonds.
Consequently, short-term bonds are more affected by short-term reduction (increase) in
interest rates in down (up-) turns and the subsequent expectations of those interest rates
increasing (lowering) slowly in medium-to-long-term whilst affecting the yield of the
bond more the shorter its maturity is.
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That is the rational expectation (i.e. the prospect) of an immediate mid-term increase in
output and, consequently, of the interest rates and inflation, reduces the expected yield
of the short-to-mid term bonds more than long-term ones that are more co-integrated
with the inflation targets. 
From the above we can however also conclude, in the retrospect of the years following
it, that the conundrum most likely arose because long term yields are based on longer
term  expectations  and  that  rise  of  the  short  term  rates  was  not  considered  to  be
remaining  in  the  long  term and/or  that  they  were  rather  too  high  for  the  level  of
inflation. 
Whatsoever, considering findings of Rudebusch  and Williams (2008) that the long-
short bond yield spread predicts recessions (or is an anticipation of its coming), the
financial  industry  would  have  already  anticipated  that  the  rate  rise  would  be
unsustainable in the long term. It could have then also expected that the rate increase
would be even more detrimental for the consumer liquidity and future of the economy,
a  conclusion  that  the  economic  recession  and  financial  collapse  of  2006-2008
eventually reinforced. 
6.7 Discussion: Could the Fed Acted Differently?
Mishkin (2010) states that many economists claimed that the Treasury’ and the Fed’s
decision to let Lehman Brothers collapse escalated what would have been a relatively
small financial crisis into a much larger, wider spread and largely a panic driven world
crisis. At the time of the crisis, however, he stated that there were no legal grounds on
which the government bodies could have intervened directly.
In addition, in their 1963 seminal work on causes of the Great Depression, "A Monetary
History of the United States" (1963),  Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz accused
monetary and credit contraction for the Great Depression rather than financial crash, an
opinion adopted and shared by Ben Bernanke. During Milton Friedman's 90th birthday
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conference in 2002, Bernanke, at the time a member of the Federal Reserve's (Fed)
board, in his address to Friedman and Schwartz regarding the Great Depression, said
the following: “You're right, we did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do
it again.” (Bernanke 2002).
On the  other  hand,  as  Livingston  (2010)  points  out,   in  her  2008 interview,  Anna
Schwartz noticed that, like in 1929, it was monetary tightening after period of loosening
that had significantly contributed to the current 2008 crisis  : “As in the 1920s, the current
"disturbance  "  started  with  a  "mania."  …."The  particular  asset  varied  from one  boom to
another.  But  the  basic  underlying  propagator  was  too-easy  monetary  policy  and  too-low
interest rates that induced ordinary people to say, well, it's so cheap to acquire whatever is the
object of desire in an asset boom, and go ahead and acquire that object. And then of course if
monetary policy tightens, the boom collapses.". (Carney and Schwartz (2008))
Ms. Schwartz is then arguing that the immediate triggers, i.e. the bubble pricks, for the
two financial  crashes preceding both the Great Recession and Great Depression are
similar – the monetary tightening imposed by the Federal Reserve.
An explanation could be that standard classic single representative agent equilibrium
models assume that increase in  interest  rate  on borrowing may reduce demand and
increase investment saving among borrowers but that would be, assumingly, balanced-
off by the increase in consumption demand of the lenders receiving higher income from
savings, either for consumer goods or for investment consumption. However, in more
heterogeneous reality, lenders have smaller consumption demand elasticity, and, instead
in  (just  reduced)  domestic  consumption,  higher  rate  yields  were  then  increasingly
reinvested  with  a  large  proportion  into  foreign  investments,  effectively  even  more
reducing domestic investment consumption demand too. 
Another explanation for the Fed policy rate rise between 2004 and 2006 could be that,
then already highly indebted US government found it difficult to sell the lower-yield
treasuries and bonds and that the Fed was under pressure from the banking and the
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institutional investors to raise short-term yields regardless of the small inflation. This
may also explain the conundrum discussed earlier and why the industry, pre-cautiously,
lowered  the  long-term  yields  instead  of  raising  them.   However,  this  institutional
pressure  may  have  then  triggered  the  above  mentioned  sovereign  debt  accelerator
mechanism that then may trigger the private, household and SME debt accelerator as
outlined in earlier sections. Such hypothesis however, then puts on the spot the issue of
the Fed's and central banks' independence.
Another, very valid explanation frequently referred to is that at the time, the output
growth was booming and so there was space for higher rates and yield to slow-down
the  over-heating  economy and bring  the  rate  closer  to  the  normal  and  Taylor  rule
expectations. 
In any case, based on the findings of the previous chapter, indicate possibility that the
combined damaging effect of investment capital foreign outflow and the high private
(household and SME) may had been underestimated or overlooked (e.g., “myopically”,
as a case of a rational inattention) when decisions to pursue rate increase between 2004
and 2006 were made. However, any firm answers and conclusion regarding the above
posed questions, requires a further and a much more detailed research.
6.8 Conclusion and afterword
While many authors quite correctly explained that collapse of house prices and MBSs
market lead to the unprecedented international contagion and collapse of international
financial market in 2008, it is less said, as John Taylor (2008), (2016) did, that Fed's
policy of very low rate facilitated rise of the housing and economic bubbles in 2003-
2005. It is however even less said (except in non-academic press and interviews, e.g.
Carney and Schwartz (2008)) that it may be possible that the extreme and a relatively
fast  and  high  rise  in  Fed’s  policy  and  the  resulting  commercial  real  interest  rates
contributed to the monetary tightening (not unlike that in 1929) driven bubble burst.
This bubble burst, also, may have been accelerated by increased outflows of capital into
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foreign  investment  rather  than  domestic  investment  or  consumption.  Al  the  above,
taking  place  shortly  after  the  prolonged  period,  and  the  resulting  formation  of
expectations of long-term low rates, may have facilitated triggering of the 2007/2008
crisis. 
This would be also in line with earlier mentioned arguments of Goodhart and Hoffman
(2004) who then, in 2004, claimed that the two most famous economic disasters - the
1929 Great Depression in US and 1990 crisis in Japan - have both been caused by their
respective central banks trying to prick market bubbles. In the US, it was the assets
bubble and the real-estate one in Japan. A similar opinion but pertaining the 2007-8
crisis, was also voiced in a very recent blog by Muellbauer (2016). 
Based on all of the above analysis, I therefore postulate as a hypothesis  (but not at this
stage claim that being the fact), that the rise of the  interest rates midst increased debt in
period  2004-2007,  and  hence,  increased,  income-debt  leverage  related  risk  of
endogenous defaults (e.g. as in Kumhof et al.(2013)), is likely to have contributed to
the mutually accelerated collapses of several of major factors in the US economy ahead
of  the  2008  financial  crisis.  These  were  households’ and  SMEs’ liquidity,  housing
prices and then credit supply, all of them leading to the mutually accelerated reduction
in consumption and rises in bankruptcies, foreclosures and, eventually, unemployment.
Those then very likely contributed to the downward spiral of a recessionary trend and
triggering of other known decelerators and bursting of the bubble ahead of the financial
crisis and, eventually, triggering it. I would refer to this, more neglected and overlooked
rather than unknown additional channel that probably contributed to both, first a minor
recession  and  then,  eventually,  to  the  collapse  of  the  financial  market  too  as  a
recessionary debt accelerator. 
In  addition,  contrary  to  the  expectations  of  classic  economic  and  NK  economic
modellers who mostly consider US as a large closed economy where liquidity loss in
one  group of consumers will bring rise in another and balance-off the consumption, it
happened that  some very large sums went into FDI abroad. A fierce discussion arose
recently on the issue of capital investment, its foreign outflow and then a possible lack
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of job creation  facilitating under-employment even if not the official unemployment
rate  in  the  recent  decades  in  the  US.  The hypotheses  of  outflow of  funds and the
resulting domestic under-investment were some of the main additional factors brought-
in in the previous two chapters as probable contributors to the recent crisis115. We may
therefore want to measure more precisely the impact of this channel and to seek to
review both existence and roles of possible misspecifications in estimates of the central
banks’ policy rates. In addition, one should analyse and consider any viable steps that
the monetary authorities could have done to prevent the crisis. 
Some plausible measures that can be undertaken after further, in depth investigation on
their potential effects could be:
1. targeting loan debt/GDP,
2. housing asset price bubble targeting included in the Taylor rule, 
3. adding a  control  mechanism in a  more complex but  more realistic,  multiple
(heterogeneous) agent models so that bubbles can be contained  better, or,
4. improved  monitoring  of  international  capital  flow  and/or  balancing  of  the
sovereign current account.
115 And one that came into prominence during the recent changes in US politics.
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Appendix C6.1: VAR Impulse Response Functions' Outcomes
Presented  here  are  data  used  and a  subset  of  the  resulting  IRFs  (Impulse response
functions) based on an estimation of an unstructured, twelve month lagged and pre-
processed and normalised data VAR(12), using Eviews as a statistical toolbox.
A.C6.1 Data:
The original data are monthly,  taken from US Federal Reserve FRED database and
spanning  from  11/1980  to  02/2007,  covering  the  pre-2007/2008  crisis  “Great
Moderation” period. 
Due to unit-root being identified in level of the hybrid (derived) variable credit revenue
return  CCR_GDP_PC using  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test  (as  available  in  Eviews),  VAR
estimation  and  IRF  simulation  will  use  the  1st difference  of  that  derived  series
D(CCR_GDP_PC-). In addition, the roots of the lags are within the unit circle. 
Data are pre-processed or derived as follows:
CCR_GDP_PC- Consumer credit CC * real rate return and GDP: 
CCR_GDP_PC = CC *rr /GDP*1000 
however, due to a unit root, VAR uses its firs difference: D(CCR_GDP_PC) 
R_FED_TGT – US Federal Reserve policy target rate.
PCEDF HPCYCL07 – HP filter cycle component of deflated personal consumption
BNKRPC_HPCYC – HP filtered bankruptcies
WHD_HPCYC – HP filtered hourly wage
UNEMP_HPCYC HP cycle of unemployment rate was used in initial trials but
EMP_HPCYC HP cycle of employment hours is used as a more reliable measure 
RR – real interest rate:  rr = prime_rate – inflation
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Figures A.C6.1.1: Seven Normalised data series used in VAR(12) estimation. 
A.C6.2 Estimation and tests of its residuals:
Unrestricted VAR estimation and IRFs were performed using Eviews. The estimation
residuals have been plotted and tested for unit root and normality. The residuals’ plots
did  not  show  visible  regularities  and  no  unit  roots  were  found  using  Augmented
Dickey-Fuller  tests.  However,  further  descriptive  statistics  tests  in  the  below  table
A.C6.1.1  showed  some  skewness  in  all  of  the  residuals,  whilst  Jarque-Bera  tests
indicated  we can reject the null hypothesis of normality and, consequently, a departure
from normality for all but for two variables, the US Federal reserve policy inters rates
and  the  HP  filtered  consumption.  On  the  other  hand,  considering  that  we  have
sufficiently large sample of 303 monthly observations, departure from normality is not
deemed to affect greatly the reliability of the result. 
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Table A.C6.1.1: Descriptive Statistics of the VAR residuals.
VAR Residual Normality Tests
Orthogonalization: Residual Covariance (Urzua)
H0: residuals are multivariate normal
Date: 09/02/18   Time: 00:35
Sample: 1980M11 2007M02
Included observations: 303
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob.
1 -0.397403  8.134676 1  0.0043
2  0.101893  0.534769 1  0.4646
3 -0.156607  1.263274 1  0.2610
4  0.249082  3.195660 1  0.0738
5  0.093638  0.451632 1  0.5016
6  0.131371  0.888947 1  0.3458
7  0.684265  24.11718 1  0.0000
Joint  38.58614 7  0.0000
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob.
1  3.221764  0.773598 1  0.3791
2  1.799431  18.49499 1  0.0000
3  3.333441  1.654488 1  0.1983
4  3.044235  0.054282 1  0.8158
5  4.651813  37.06092 1  0.0000
6  1.774825  19.27379 1  0.0000
7  4.926033  50.21816 1  0.0000
Joint  127.5302 7  0.0000
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.
1  8.908274 2  0.0116
2  19.02976 2  0.0001
3  2.917761 2  0.2325
4  3.249942 2  0.1969
5  37.51255 2  0.0000
6  20.16274 2  0.0000
7  74.33534 2  0.0000
Joint  766.5520 294  0.0000
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A.C6.3 Autocorrelation
Two alternative residuals’ autocorrelation tests, Portmanteu and the Lagrange Multiplier
(LM) tests, both showed presence of autocorrelation up to 48 lags. The autocorrelations
were  complex  and  not  just  AR(1)  so  that  an  attempt  to  use  first  differences  (as
recommended  in  literature)  did  not  bring  about  much  different  outcome  for
autocorrelation nor the other measures. 
Following recommendations  in  literature,  alternative  data  and models  were tried  to
reduce autocorrelation. As we can show on request, in additional tests of an alternative
system estimated using first-differences of both the original (unfiltered) data, and the
filtered data, the effects of. e.g. Cholesky 1 SD innovation IRFs for shocks to credit
revenue, did not in principle bring substantially different results either. Adding GDP as
an additional (possibly missing) variable had similarly no substantially different effect
on the movements to consumption, bankruptcies and wages under innovation of credit
revenue we discuss here either.
With autocorrelations in residuals, the estimators may remain unbiased but inefficient.
On the toher hand, statistics will be biased and thus, unreliable. Hence, we will need to
be careful interpreting the results of estimations with such autocorrelation.
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A.C6.4 Heteroscedasticity 
However, the estimation residual heteroscedasticity tests did identify two variables for
which one can reject the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity (i.e. homoscedasticity
or no misspecification) with an error probability being less than 0.05 when using Chi-
sq. statistics. These variables are the US Federal reserve policy rate (also identified
above  as  departing  form  normality  conditions)  and  bankruptcies.  As  noted  above,
estimation  of  the  US Fed’s  policy rate  was  not  subject  of  this  exercise  and so  its
heteroscedasticity,  with  its  residuals’ volatility  declining  over  the  years  of  “Great
Moderation”, will again be set aside for now. As far as bankruptcies are concerned, it is
more  complex  as  its  residuals’ volatility  is  visibly higher  at  both  ends  of  the  data
sample period, stabilising in its middle, throughout 1990s and early 2000s, something
visible even from its filtered, input data series in the above figure A6.1.1. 
Considering that heteroscedasticity, generally does not crate bias but only reduces the
efficiency of the estimation,  for now, both variables will  stay in the model  as it  is
estimated.  We shall  just  not  rely on the  precision  of  the effects  of  the IRF shocks
on/from those two estimated variables, one of which, the policy rate, is not directly of
interest for this study. In a future exercise, we could consider splitting the period in 3
with two regime changes. For now, however, following that logic, we can expect that
effects 1-SD shock of bankruptcy in the final period would actually be higher, and the
below results for IRFs for bankruptcy shocks are under-estimated since the level of its
1-SD in that period is higher than its overall (average) is. Equally, it may be expected
that effects of other, below depicted shocks to it, would be similarly under-estimated.
E.g. a subsequent estimation, using log of the policy rate to reduce an impact of that
variable’s heteroscedasticity, however, produced IRFs only marginally different form
those with the rate in the level. On the other hand, the variation in the volatility of
bankruptcies should probably be a subject of a more comprehensive future study in its
own merit, possibly utilising volatility estimation tool such as variants of GARCH.
NOTES:  A more comprehensive set of estimation results and IRFs are available
on request.
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Figures A.C6.1.2: Unstructured VAR(12) 60-month-(5 year) period  response functions
with two standard deviations certainty range to one SD shock rise in bankruptcies. It is
resulting in drops in Consumption (PCEDF…mid-right), wage (bottom- left),
employment (bottom right), as well as volatility to credit interest return (top-left) and
real rate of interest (top-right):
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Figures A.C6.1.3:  Unstructured VAR(12), 60-month-(5 year) period  response
functions with two standard deviations certainty range to one SD shock rise in
consumption resulting in initial 20 month drop in bankruptcies (mid-right), and rise in
employment, both  interest rates, and, as well as increased volatility to other variables:
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Figures A.C6.1.4:  Unstructured VAR(12), 60-month-(5 year) period  response 
functions with two standard deviations certainty range to one SD shock rise in 
employment resulting in initial 20 month drop in bankruptcies (bottom left), and rise in 
consumption (PCEDF…mid-right), as well as increased volatility to other variables:
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Figures A.C6.1.5:  Unstructured VAR(12), 60-month-(5 year) period  response
functions with two standard deviations certainty range to one SD shock rise in the first
log difference credit returns (D(CCR…))  resulting in initial 20 month rises in
bankruptcies (mid-right), drop in wage (bottom left)  and volatile rises in consumption
(PCEDF…mid-left) and employment , as well an (volatile)  increase to interest rates:
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Appendix C6.2: IRF response functions to monetary policy rate rise
from simulation of Smets and Wouters 2007 DSGE model
dy – GDP growth (log(yt/yt-1)
y – GDB
pinfobs- observed Inflation
robs – observed interest rate
c – consumption
w – real wage
lab – employment
inve – investment
rk – return on capital investment
246
Part 4: Standard Non-standard ways out of the crisis: 
7. Fiscal Intervention Oriented Crisis Solutions
7.1 Introduction 
7.1.1 Post 2008 Crisis Government Led Intervention
In previous chapters presented are already sections on debt driven growth and possible
dangers  from  an  excessive  sovereign  debt  for  triggering  private  debt  recessionary
accelerator (ch. 6.5). The following chapter provides some insight into how the more
recent,  post-2007-crisis  economy revives  Keynesian  ideas  and offers  suggestions  to
overcome  the  crises  such  as  2007/8  crisis  known  as  the  Great  Recession  and  a
pragmatic return to growth. This chapter follows upon the more in-depth analysis of the
causes that led to the crisis presented earlier (ch. 6). Since it is not in focus of this
research,  this  section  is  not  intended  as  an  exhaustive  coverage  of  the  subject  but
presented just to provide an overview of few ways of thinking in those directions and as
a background to a related and more in depth research presentation in the next chapter. 
As Mr. Bernanke admitted, in the wake of looming recession 2008 (or even the 1930s-
like depression), the central banks and governments may need to act as lenders of last
resort not only to the commercial banks but to main street businesses and, possibly,
even the mortgage borrowers.  They may need to "helicopter  money"  to  those non-
banking  organisations  and  individual  mortgage  burdened  families  more  directly,
bypassing the traditional risk-averse banking sector, to prevent a further spread of a
recession  and encourage  economic  growth instead.  However,  instead  "helicoptering
money", in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 credit crunch crisis, financial institutions of
US and UK governments, in co-ordinated effort to provide necessary liquidity to the
non-banking  market  agents,  adopted  policy  of  “Credit-Easing”  to  non-banking
economic  agents  as  opposed  to  more  familiar  policy  of  increasing  monetary  base
through  market  operations  of  quantitative  easing  (QE).  Though  similar  in  their
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technical mechanisms, the goals are a bit different.116. 
 
In  an analysis,  which  re-examines  Modigliani-Miller  theorem of  the cost  of  capital
being  independent  of  the  firm’s  debt-equity  ratio,  Stiglitz  (1967)  shows  several
limitations of that theorem. They concluded that, being based on a partial equilibrium
analysis, the theorem may not hold for the firms under risk of bankruptcy or under
similar credit rationing conditions and such firms may otherwise find it difficult to gain
the  needed  finances  through  the  usual,  financial  intermediaries.  However,  Wallace
(1982) extends  the  Modigliani-Miller  theorem to  the  macro-economic,  government
sector  and  argues  that  under  certain  limitation,  the  non-standard  open-market  asset
exchange operations and content of government’s asset portfolio have no impact on the
equilibrium prices and consumption in an economy. On the other hand, De Negri et al.
(2009) claim that the main issue with the Wallace’s proof is that it relies on a limited,
theoretical two-generation model that does not lend itself well to the effects of market
and credit  frictions.  In  their  further  analysis,  they dismiss the Wallace’s  irrelevance
116 On those lines, in the aftermath of 2007/2009 credit crunch, US Fed and UK BoE in Feb. 09 assumed
coordinated policies of “Credit Easing” (CE) – buying corporate commercial papers. They distinguish
CE  from  the  more  familiar  policies  of  quantitative  easing  (QE,  usually  assumed  to  be  supplying
additional money into the companies) because their primary aim is not to increase the monetary base but
to  increase  “credit  worthiness”  of  those  corporations.  To  assert  the  difference,  the  UK  Treasury,
(according to the BoE website publications news item 2009/009.htm) covers the costs of the new Credit
Guarantee Scheme managed under the  newly established Asset Purchase Facility and parallels any BoE
purchase of corporate commercial papers with equal amount of issue and sale of treasury bills so to keep
monetary base intact. (see:
 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/009.htm) 
In  his  Januaary  2009  speech  Bernanke  also  states:  “The  Federal  Reserve's  approach  to
supporting credit markets is conceptually distinct from quantitative easing (QE), the policy approach
used by the Bank of Japan from 2001 to 2006.  Our approach--which could be described as "credit
easing"--resembles quantitative easing in one respect:  It involves an expansion of the central bank's
balance sheet.  However, in a pure QE regime, the focus of policy is the quantity of bank reserves, which
are liabilities of the central bank; the composition of loans and securities on the asset side of the central
bank's balance sheet is incidental.  Indeed, although the Bank of Japan's policy approach during the QE
period was quite multifaceted, the overall stance of its policy was gauged primarily in terms of its target
for bank reserves.  In contrast, the Federal Reserve's credit easing approach focuses on the mix of loans
and securities that it holds and on how this composition of assets affects credit conditions for households
and businesses.  This difference does not reflect any doctrinal disagreement with the Japanese approach,
but rather the differences in financial and economic conditions between the two episodes.  In particular,
credit spreads are much wider and credit markets more dysfunctional in the United States today than
was the case during the Japanese experiment with quantitative easing.  To stimulate aggregate demand
in the current environment, the Federal Reserve must focus its policies on reducing those spreads and
improving the functioning of private credit markets more generally.” (highlight by GP, 
See: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm)
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result. They instead incorporate in their model a number of credit frictions and show
that the quantitative effect of various FED Credit Easing117 operations applied by the
US FED, such as Termed Auction Facility118 (TAF) or Primary Dealer Credit Facility119
(PDCF), can be very large: especially near zero interest rates. Limitations that firms
face is a standard banking borrowing constraint (BC) rule that they may borrow only up
to a fraction of their net returns and an investment-related re-saleability constraint (RC)
that  only  a  fraction  of  their  illiquid  capital  may  be  sold  for  investment  purposes.
Therefore, any assets issued by the firm will face a re-saleability (liquidity) constraint
that limits the firms’ own liquidity. This illiquidity is contrasted by the much higher
liquidity of government debt assets such as treasury bonds. The authors consider that
the source of the 2008 crisis is a shock to the liquidity (tradability) of private assets that
lead to the freezing of private credit market. They construct a new observable from
flow of funds and use a relatively standard DSGE model similar to Smets and Wouters
(2007)  with  other  standard  frictions  such  as  wage  and  price  rigidities  and  capital
adjustment costs. They then obtained four main sets of findings:
1. In absence of price and wage rigidities, the non-standard operations have no
effect on the economy
2. In their presence, both the shock and the intervention have a significant effect
3. In  the  presence  of  zero  boundary  on  interest  rates  and  the  absence  of
intervention, the US economy then follows the route of the Great Depression
117 “Quantitative easing can be thought of as an expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet with no
intentional change in its composition,” (Gov. Duke stated).
“That is, the central bank undertakes more open market operations with the objective of expanding bank
reserve balances,  which the banking system should then use to  make new loans and buy additional
securities,”.
Credit easing is different [from QE] because it “focuses on the mix of loans and securities that
the central bank holds as assets on its balance sheet as a means to reduce credit spreads and improve the
functioning of private credit markets,”
118  “Under the Term Auction Facility (TAF), the Federal Reserve will auction term funds to depository
institutions. All depository institutions that are eligible to borrow under the primary credit program will
be eligible to participate in TAF auctions. All advances must be fully collateralized. Each TAF auction
will be for a fixed amount, with the rate determined by the auction process (subject to a minimum bid
rate).” - quoted from US FED website.
119 “The Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) is an overnight loan facility that will provide funding to
primary dealers in exchange for any tri-party-eligible collateral and is intended to foster the functioning
of financial markets more generally.” (quoted from US FED website) 
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4. With  intervention,  it  follows  a  route  similar  to  what  is  happening  in  US
economy.  This  is  in  line  with  some  other  researches,  which  show  that  the
“multiplier” of government spending is very high when interest rate is near zero.
The work of Curdia and Woodford (2009) poses the question whether the FED should
be  dealing  with  other  instruments  and  goals  than  interest  rate  policy  and  inflation
targeting respectively.  They assume agents’ household heterogeneity where an agent
household can belong to one of the two main groups of agents: the inpatient borrowers
(b) and the patient savers (s) with the respective probabilities  b and  s where their
consumption utility functions differ. The authors also introduce a credit spread between
the two groups.120 Along the lines of “positive economics”, they also presume that the
Government’s issues of riskless nominal debt are one of three exogenous fiscal shocks,
in addition to government spending G and the sales tax rate. The authors then conclude
with an argument for additional Reserve Supply Targeting but only as a technical task
on the side of the central banks’ technical staff, e.g. as a part of the work on adjustments
of policy rate121.
On the issue of whether there is a role for the “Quantitative Easing”, they conclude that
it could be useful if that is what is necessary to provide the optimal lending to the
private investor sector.
120 Remarks: Alternatively,  the discount rate  could differ for different agents instead of for a more
direct effect on the model as whole. Also the variations in the credit spread, which they specify, may not
affect  aggregate  demand  or  reflect  the  reality  of  human  behaviour  -  a  high  spread  would  simply
discourage borrowers from borrowing and consuming and that can be offset by discouraging the savers
from saving at the same time, or other way around, oscilating around the equilibrium. The spread is,
however, to a greater extent reflecting the risk the intermediary is facing in relation to the two types of
customer agents and its risk related return ratio, but a weighted spread may be more accurate. However,
because in their model the ratio between borrowers and savers on average does not change, so the effect
of the spread on the aggregate demand may be rather small.
121 “When  the  central  bank  acts  to  implement  its  target  for  the  policy  rate  through  open-market
operations, it will automatically have to adjust the supply of reserves …. But this does not require a
central bank’s monetary policy committee …Once the target for the policy rate is chosen (…through
condition (2.2)), the quantity of reserves that must be supplied to implement the target can be determined
by the bank staff in charge of carrying out the necessary interventions”
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They however state an “irrelevance proposition” for quantitative easing in their model
with the help of an (extended) Taylor type rule for the central bank mechanisms that is
valid under two conditions: 
1. “that the increase in reserves finances an increase in central bank holdings of
Treasury  securities,  rather  than  an  increase  in  central-bank  lending  to  the
private sector122; and 
2. that the policy implies no change in the way that people should expect future
interest-rate policy to be conducted.”
They however admit that the irrelevance is  not applicable midst condition of credit
frictions. In addition,  from the Figure 4 from their article, one can observe that the
largest  increase  in  Fed  reserves  was  that  of  MBSs  rather  than  the  reserves  of  the
treasuries, which were initially reduced.
Charpe et  al.  (2009) provide  an analysis  of  credit  rationing affecting over-indebted
workers and the role of the US Fed’s bailout monetary policy for economic stabilisation
in the aftermath of the recent credit crisis from a NK perspective. The authors however
adopt  a  model  whose  system  stability  is  not  based  on  reversal  to  some  rational
expectations  directed  clearing  equilibrium  and  which  differ  from  standard  DSGE
models  because  its  stability  depends  on  the  interaction  of  the  macroeconomic  and
financial  feedback  channels.  The  main  purpose  of  their  research  is  to  analyse  and
prescribe  adequate  monetary  policy  for  situation  of  excessive  mortgage  over-
indebtedness.  The prescription they suggest  is  that  central  banks step-in and buy a
percentage of bad mortgage loans to drive nominal interest rate down and facilitate
122 i.e. is this just lending to the government which spends exogenously, thus, inherently inefficiently in
case  of  a  crisis   –  setting  up  a  form  of  Ricardian  equivalence  situation,  or  also  the  purchase  of
government  bond holdings from the private sector? e.g. in their previous (base) paper, they state that
Ricardian equivalence holds in the version of their model without financial frictions. Also, whilst their
form of QE may be similar to that of BoJ QE policy, note that, on the other hand, both BoJ and BoE QE
has nominally a wider scope as it  also includes purchase of corporate bonds and possibly other debt
certificates too.
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economic growth, which is in line with the Fed's actions in the aftermath of the 2007
crisis.
Furceri and Mourougane (2009) are among first authors to construct a DSGE model
with endogenously driven government bond rates to analyse impacts of “expansionary
fiscal policy shocks on output and sustainability of sovereign debt in the Euro area”.
Their simulations show results in line with the other research papers (Traum and Yang
(2009)) indicating that the most efficient fiscal expansion for the economy is to support
economic activity in short  term through increased public  investment,  wage tax cuts
(accelerating consumption) but also through an increase in public consumption.
In addition, Lindé, Smets and Wouters  (2016) extend the  Smets and Wouters (2007)
type  DSGE model  with  zero  lower  bound  (ZLB)  rule,  heteroscedasticity  (variable
variance) of some of the exogenous shocks and with a financial accelerator aiming to
account for the effects of the 2008 Great Recession. Their comprehensive work does
make a progress to that goal but they admit that it is insufficient to model in full the
effect of the crisis or the non-standard monetary policies that followed the crisis. They
also find that, in their model with financial accelerator with Baa-Aaa bonds spread as a
measure of default  risk and its  premium, the overall  impact  of net-worth shock on
macro-dynamic remains modest.
7.1.2 Discussion
Both  Curdia  and  Woodford  (2009,  C&W henceforth)   and  De  Negri  et  al.  (2009)
introduce heterogeneous agents in their models, investors and consumers, and conclude
that  the  government  (or  CB)  credit  easing  intervention  in  near-zero  interest  rate
environment  significantly  contributes  to  reducing  the  effect  of  a  liquidity  crisis
recession turning into full-featured 1929 style depression.
De Negri et al.  (2009) consider the government as endogenous (acting together and
integrally  with  the  central  bank),  whilst,  in  the  C&W paper,  government  is  acting
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exogenously and the central  bank is  one taking the active role  of an endogenously
intervening,  active agent  that  manages  the government  debt  too.  Also,  although De
Negri’s  paper  takes  a  more  micro-economic entrepreneurs’ credit  rationing point  of
view whilst the C&W report takes more of a financial intermediary’s credit crisis point
of view they arrive to similar results and conclusions. This common result is likely to
be due to the credit crisis inflicting the increased borrowing and resale-ability constraint
spread that is fundamental in the De Negri model, and closely translates into the credit
spread between the borrowing and the deposit interest rates fundamental for the C&W
model.
It is also the opinion of the author of this research however, that  fiscal actions as in
Curdia and Woodford (2009) should not be treated as entirely exogenous. They are
endogenous reactions to the economic situation, not a calamity, unless, of course, they
are reaction on exogenous calamity (see Perendia and Tsoukis (2012) and the section
7.3 below).
Since in a crisis a central  bank tends to enforce a low monetary policy interest rate
whilst the increased risk of government debt may push the spreads of government bond
rates high over the monetary policy rate, the authors distinguish the short-term central
bank rate from the fiscal position dependent endogenous government bond rate in their
model.  The  unemployment  levels  and  related  increase  in  paid-out  benefit  driven
government consumption then also crowds-out private investment. Along the lines of
Levine et al. (2009) and Traum and Yang (2009) models, the Furceri and Mourougane
(2009)'s NK model was also derived from S&W02 model and extended with two types
of heterogeneous households, the Ricardian (approx. 75% in Euro-area steady state)
and the liquidity-constrained ones (approx. 25%). Though it also contains firms whose
output  gap  is  related  to  the  capital  utilization  gap  and  an  endogenous  government
sector, in contrast to the previous two models we discussed, (Curdia and Woodford
(2009) and De Negri et al. (2009)), it does not contain a capital investment mechanism. 
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7.1.3 US Sovereign Debt Risks
As a research paper by IMF (2010) projects for G7 countries, the rise of public debt
will be mainly caused by loss of revenue (i.e. tax income), interest re-payment and,
despite common belief, to a lesser extent, by the fiscal stimuli and support for financial
sector. At the same time, the countries face the risk of increased expenses for health and
pension payments for ageing population.  The IMF (2010) research states that under
current trend, debt to GDP ratio for G-7 countries may reach an average 200% by 2030
and 400% by 2050 and this estimate is without taking into account the risks of further
public debt incurred by longer-term reduction of GDP growth.
Similarly to the IMF report outlined above, in her report to US Senate, Reinhart (2010)
states that the biggest cause of  the US government deficit in the aftermath of crisis
would not be the actual cost of the bank bailout or the other fiscal stimuli but the loss in
tax revenues resulting from a prolonged decline in  economic output.  She,  however,
emphasised a danger of a high debt exceeding 90% of GDP since countries exposed to
such  level  of  debt  experience  much  slower  growth,  this  being  mainly  due  to  the
expected  later  introduction  of  fiscal  tightening and increased  taxation:  “Seldom do
countries simply “grow” their way out of deep debt burdens” Reinhart then stated.  
Her statement and her joint work with Rogoff (e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)), have,
however, been widely criticised by quite few authors arguing for the prevailing benefits
of government intervention and quantitative easing policies in curing the recent Great
Recession.  Such  criticism  has  mainly  come  from  the  New-Keynesians,  for  their
economic models (e.g. Nersisyan and Wray (2010)), and more recently, even for several
technical, numerical and coding errors which have systematically lead the authors to the
incorrect  over-estimations  of  the  dangers  of  high  debt/GDP ratio  on  the  future  of
growth  (Herndon, Ash and Pollin (2013)).  
In addition, Mishkin (2010) warns that holdings of long term MBSs present a double,
the credit and the interest rate, risk to any financial institution holding them, including
the Federal Reserve.  In addition,  purchasing of treasuries and the monetarisation of
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government debt raises the additional risk of higher inflation and higher interest rates in
the longer term.
7.2. Estimating the Effect of News, Fiscal Policy Rules and Accelerators in
Full and Partial Information DSGE models 
Many authors (e.g. Benassy-Quere, Coeure et al. 2010) distinguish between so-called
positive and political economics, the two analytical positions where the former takes
government decisions as exogenous and the latter as endogenous. It can be said that the
following and many other recent papers analyse the non-standard, post-crisis policies
which  evolved  from  the  more  traditional  academic  position  of  positive  analytical
economics towards the position of political economic analysis. Thus, it departs from the
position of semi-political economics of the Lucas’ critique which takes only monetary
policy (i.e. that of the central bank) as endogenous but leaves government (and its fiscal
spending)  as  exogenous  (a  kind  of  “deus-ex-machina”)  and  then  includes  it  as  an
additional endogenous agent acting within the economic universe. 
The approach of this research is to show the practices and benefits of having both the
fiscal and monetary economy as endogenous, thus returning economic models closer to
what may be referred to as a political economy. The research introduces two extension
to standard DSGE models which show importance of effects of expectation changing
information shocks (news) and of the  active, endogenised role of government fiscal
spending,  e.g.  in  pursuing  post-crisis  recovery,  and  in  particular,  when  reacting  to
deviations in employment and to those shocks to the expectations. 
The innovations tested and their results are in line with the recent return to Keynesian
theory of fiscal spending as important contributor in the post-crisis recovery after years
of its theoretical neglect. We show that government has a role in protecting viability of
its economy and the welfare of its citizens and that its actions and intention to play such
protective,  countercyclical  role  need also to  be  publicly visible  so to  achieve  even
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greater effect even if not fulfilled to its full planned or publicised financial commitment
level. 
This may appear to be in contrast with the more traditional monetarist approach which
is at least neglecting if not side-lining the role of public spending in recovery, whilst
favouring the role monetary policy lead by an independent central  bank as the sole
mechanism of  macro-economic  control.  However,  we show that  the  fiscal  and  the
monetary policies can be decided and effected independently by the government and
the independent central bank respectively. However, it is still left to be affirmed if it is
more optimal to pursue a closer cooperation between the two bodies and coordination
of  their   policies  in  general,  and  especially  when  monetary  policies  are  almost
ineffective in a near-zero interest rate regimes like the one following the 2007-08 crisis.
This chapter reproduces some of the key aspects and results of a joint work with
Dr.  C.  Tsoukis,  which  introduce  endogenous  fiscal  policy,  and  a  rule  for  its
dynamics, here however,  extended with additional discussion on its endogenous
rules for the effect of news and unemployment as well as results of unpublished
partial information DSGE solution based estimation. 123
Perendia  and  Tsoukis  (2012)  built  and  estimated  a  medium-sized  DSGE model  to
analyse  the  effects  of  a  news  channel  on  growth  and  unemployment.  The  model
augments the standard NK model of fiscal policy studies to incorporate such Keynesian
aspects  as  the  multiplier  and  involuntary  unemployment.  More  features  that  are
Neoclassical include inter-temporal optimisation, an elastic labour supply, productive
public services, endogenous growth, and ‘keeping up with the Jones’. The authors show
that  the  addition  of  the  news  channel  and  an  extended,  endogenous  government
spending fiscal policy rule all significantly improve model fit to data. The researchers
then simulate the effects of monetary and fiscal policy and particularly the role of the
Keynesian vs. Neoclassical aspects of the model in driving the results.
123  initially presented and available on-line as Perendia and Tsoukis (2012) Dynare conference paper but
it  has  been updated since  that  early version and some additional  information not  presented there is
included here.
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The  paper  synthesise  the  three  theoretical  strands  of  analysis  of  fiscal  policy:  the
Keynesian multiplier,  increases  the return to  private  capital  and the rate  of  growth,
proactive and countercyclical endogenous public sector and endogenous labour supply. 
7.2.1 The model
The model is as in Smets and Wouters (2007) (henceforth SW07) and Drautzburg-Uhlig
(2010, henceforth DU10) extended with an involuntary unemployment/labour shift, the
news based multiplier and the novel fiscal policy rule. 
7.2.1.1 Involuntary unemployment
In  those  starting  models,  unemployment  is  entirely  voluntary.  In  equilibrium,  the
variables,  including labour  hours,  completely clear  markets  and are fully consistent
with individual (and firm) optimisation. That is, unemployment is like (forced) leisure,
but  with  full  utility  remuneration.  This  has  implications  for  the  marginal  rate  of
substitution between consumption and labour/leisure, and therefore for the real wage
and hence of the rest of the system. 
On one hand, the NK Phillips curve used in standard NK DSGE models like SW07
replaces unemployment u from the original Phillips curve with output y. On the other
hand, the Taylor rule, which in past was sometimes used with the unemployment (or
employment) gap from “natural rate” as its target, has been nowadays consistently used
with the output gap as the target so that the (involuntary) (un-)employment gap does
not figure in most monetary policy oriented DSGE models.
7.2.1.2 The multiplier and the news:
The Keynesian multiplier is absent within the logic of the Smets and Wouters (2007)
model because consumption in the standard Euler equation is driven just by the real
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interest rate (see their eq. 2 which is a linearised Euler equation). The key problem is
that the standard Euler equation is insensitive to how consumption responds to changes
in lifetime resources. On the other hand, in wider context, government is expected to
play budget constraint balancing (the so called “passive” as in Leeper 1991) role (or a
role  of  or  close  to  an  exogenous  shock)  and  only  monetary  authority  is  given  an
endogenous, unconstrained, (I.e. “active”) role.
To  re-instate  the  multiplier,  the  researchers  introduce  the  effect  of  news  driven
expectation  change  on  consumption.  To  do  so,  the  authors  adopt  a  variant  of  the
‘permanent income theory of consumption’, following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Ch.
2) among others124. Accordingly, the authors write the consumption at time t as follows:
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It is the inverse of the discount factor. At is financial wealth at the beginning of time t.
Xt is labour earnings plus monopoly profits, (i.e. those profits that do not include the
competitive rate of return to capital, net of taxes). The variable rr )1(~   is the net-
of-tax steady state real interest rate r, approximately 3%, and γ the trend real growth
rate.  is a flat tax rate applicable to all incomes, labour or capital-related. 
As taxation is not the authors’ focus, this tax rate will be assumed constant throughout,
hence it will drop out of the linearisations that follow and, as in SW07, this tax rate
plays no role in the subsequent analysis. 
Fiscal  policy  will  be  assumed  to  take  the  form of  variations  in  expenditure  only.
However, those variations in spending are not of a balanced-budget; they are assumed
124 See in particular their equation (2.16). 
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to be financed by government bonds, which are not part  of the private sector’s net
wealth (in line with Ricardian equivalence).
 
As the linearised system reflects cyclical variations along the trend, the budget deficit
will  also be cyclical.  Thus,  the government  debt is  assumed not  to be accumulated
because of the cyclical deficits and sufficits around the (balanced-budget), particularly
when considered in a discounted sense and its trend will average to zero asymptotically.
Therefore,  the  fiscal  multiplier  that  will  be  considered  below  is  assumed  a  bond-
financed one, but in such a way, that does not jeopardise government solvency.  
(Please refer to the Perendia and Tsoukis (2012) paper for details of model derivation
and its linearisation).
After some transformations and subtraction (i.e. if one multiply (2’) by (1+r-γ) and (by
subtracting from 4, see in the original paper), one can then get:
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where  sttsttsttt xExExEE   11)( ,  and  similarly with  all  the  other  variables.  In
other  words,  the  evolution  of  consumption  is  attributed  to  ‘news’,  i.e.  revisions  of
expectations  due  to  the  shocks  hitting  the  system.  This  equation  involves  taking
expectations at different times, so it cannot be deduced from the aggregate resource
constraint minus the government budget’s constraint.
 
The relation to the multiplier is that when output changes, so will (monopoly) profits
and labour earnings and this will create ‘news’ of higher future earnings, which will
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affect current consumption, thus raising output further, and so on. To close the model,
the researchers need a budget constraint which, in the linearised form is: 
p
ttttt lwlshareyx  )(                                        (7.2.1.2.4)
where lshare (labour share) is parameter – commonly thought to be around 0.65. Thus,
increases in total output, wages and employment coupled with the monopolistic power
(fuelling supernormal profits) will have an impact on today’s profits. The latter idea is
the essence of the neo-Keynesian multiplier of the late 1980s Government spending and
a fiscal policy rule
SW07 allow  government  spending  to  be  endogenised  so  that  its  AR(1)  process  is
affected by technology shocks in addition to exogenous government spending shocks. It
can be however observed from comparing data series that the US government fiscal
policy shows consistent, unemployment related pro-cyclical (i.e. employment counter-
cyclical) spending policies.
Following Dixit  and Lambertini   (2001),  (2003a)  and (2003b)),  the  authors  of  this
research  let  the  government  pursue  an  activist  stabilisation  policy via  its  spending,
which  is  informed by the  state  of  the  economic  cycle  and the  future  outlook.  The
authors therefore extend the S&W model of the government spending AR(1) process
with two additional elements: the news channel wcpt and the expected unemployment
change.  This  forms  a new rule  for  government  spending similarly to  the  monetary
policy interest rate rule of Taylor (1993).  
7.2.1.3 Government Spending Rule
In case of government spending gt having a Taylor type policy rule augmenting simple
(exogenous)  AR(1) process with the news and  forward-looking unemployment jump
the generic form of this fiscal rule is:
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gtytytttwtutgt gEEgxggg    )( 11       (7.2.1.3.1)
where xt is a labour market-related indicator of the state of the business cycle, to be
defined below, whilst  yt and  gt are respectively government part of the consumption
(e.g. technology) and the exogenous government spending shocks.
In empirical implementation, the authors investigated a number of variants, depending
on the exact definition of xt; specifically, whether the level of unemployment (ut), or a
forward- or backward-looking change in unemployment or in the hours supplied (l t)
enters: 
xt  ut (7.2.1.3.1a)
xt  Etut+1 -ut (7.2.1.3.1b)
xt  ut -ut-1 (7.2.1.3.1c)
xt   Etlt+1 -lt (7.2.1.3.1d)
xt  lt -lt-1 (7.2.1.3.1e)
where  gt=log(Gt/G) and unemployment  (u)  is  defined as  a  ratio  (log  difference)  of
employment (i.e. hours worked) in the flexible and sticky-price economy:
ut= (lft - lt) +u       (7.2.1.3.2)
The authors find that the estimated parameters indicate that government spending is
characterised by a Taylor type counter-cyclical policy rule that is augmenting initially a
simple  (exogenous)  AR(1)  process.  Government  spending  rises  with  a  positive
technology shock, expectations of an unemployment rise (or the employment drop) and,
with a decrease in the news-driven expectations of higher future output or employment.
It thus behaves in an endogenous fashion, at least partially, rather than as a random,
exogenous shock as it has been usually modelled so far.
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A few brief comments are in order on this rule, which is a novelty of this paper. It is,
sometimes, claimed that there is no equilibrium for a situation when both fiscal and
monetary policy are active (e.g. Leeper 1991, Bhattarai S. et al. 2012). In this research
model, however, there is a separation of domains of responsibility and reaction: whilst
monetary policy continues to react to inflation and possibly the output gap, the counter-
cyclical  fiscal  policy focuses  mainly on  reactions  to  expected  changes  in  spending
behaviour and employment of the consuming households. Thus, there appears to be a
scope for  a  complementarity in  stabilisation,  especially when if  monetary policy is
restricted by the zero lower bound on the interest rate policy instrument125. However,
accounting for zero-bound interest rate is beyond the scope of this research. 
7.2.2 Estimation Data and Results
7.2.2.1 Preliminary data analysis
A preliminary analysis of US data, quarterly for period 1950 to 2010 and monthly, for
the  period  of  so-called  great  moderation,  1980-2007  related  to  employment,
unemployment and government spending is presented.
125 A similar approach to balanced fiscal and monetary activity has been, more recently also 
taken-up by Bhattarai K. and Trzeciakiewicz (2017).
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Figure 7.2.2.1.1: HP filter de-trended US Government per-capita spending GCPC
(renormalized by 10) and unemployment UNMP cyclical components.
 
In  the  above  figure  7.2.2.1.1,  one  can  see  large  surges  of  government  spending,
coinciding with the periods of high unemployment and its reductions: 1964-70, 1985-
90,  early  1990s,  the  crisis  in  2001,  and  a  further  spending  increase  jump  (and
unemployment drop) starting in early 2003.
Table 7.2.2.1.1: Correlation coefficients of the US government per-capita
spending, unemployment and employment-hours quarterly data for
period 1959-2010
EMP
UNEMPLM
NT GC_PC
EMP  1.000000  0.042186  0.946181
UNEMPLM
NT  0.042186  1.000000 -0.032602
GC_PC  0.946181 -0.032602  1.000000
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Table 7.2.2.1.2: Correlation coefficients of the US government per-capita
spending, unemployment and employment-hours monthly data for period
1980-2007
GCPC
UNEMPLM
NT EMP
GCPC  1.000000 -0.693074  0.885256
UNEMPLM
NT -0.693074  1.000000 -0.806671
EMP  0.885256 -0.806671  1.000000
The above tables of correlation coefficients of government  per capita spending and
unemployment, quarterly for period Jan. 1959- Aug 2010 and monthly data for period
1980-2007, shows negative values 
Those  correlation  coefficients  during  sample  period  Jan.  1959-  Aug  2010  using
quarterly  data  is  rather  more  polarised:  it  cannot  be  regarded  significant,  though
similarly  negative,  at  -0.03260  for  government  spending  correlation  to  the
unemployment but is very high and significant at 0.946 for the employment. 
Table 7.2.2.1.2 is  showing correlation coefficients  of  the US government  per-capita
spending, unemployment and employment-hours monthly data for period 1980-2007
with the former having coefficient at 0.693, thus, below the usually assumed significant
level  of  +/-0.8  that  can  explain  64%  changes.  This  negative  correlation  to
unemployment indicates therefore that a higher gov. per capita spending correlates to a
reduced unemployment and vice-versa, a higher unemployment relates to a lower gov.
per capita spending. Opposite, and more significant at level of 0.885, is the case of the
correlation coefficient between government spending and employment hours over the
same period. However, taken together, they appear consoistent with pro-cyclical rather
than counter-cyclical government spending. 
Cross-correlation  correlograms  between  the  government  spending  (GCPC)  and
unemployment  monthly  data  for  period  1980-2007,  also  shows  consistent  negative
correlation,  becoming less significant  on leads  than lags  after  24 periods  (2 years),
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indicating  that  unemployment  more  causes  government  spending  than  other  way
around. It is in a way again opposite for employment, which is positive correlation and
stays significant over more than 60 lags (5 years) however, fading-out less slowly and
so  more  on  the  leads,  indicating,  that  government  spending  may  be  causing
employment but its effects may be taking effect over a longer time-period. 
Table 7.2.2.1.3: Granger causality tests of the hypothesis that the US government
per-capita spending is not Granger-causing unemployment using quarterly data
for two periods 1960-2011 and 1980-2011
Table: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Period: 1960-2011 (quarterly)
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
GCPC does not Granger Cause UNMP 201 0.48387 0.74757
UNMP does not Granger Cause GCPC 2.53113 0.04184
Period: 1980-2011 
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability
GCPC does not Granger Cause UNMP 0.45760 0.76683
UNMP does not Granger Cause GCPC
5.19637 0.00045
The above  table  7.2.2.1.3  depicts  Eviews  results  for  Granger  causality  tests  of  the
hypothesis  that  the  US  government  per-capita  spending  is  not  Granger-causing
unemployment over two recent periods in US history and vice versa. (Data used are HP
filter de-trended US Government per-capita spending GCPC and unemployment UNMP
cyclical components).
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Table 7.2.2.1.4: Granger causality tests of the hypothesis that the US government
per-capita spending is not Granger-causing unemployment using monthly data for
period 1980-2007 and vice-versa and 18 lags: 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Date: 19/02/18   Time: 18:44
Sample: 1980M11 2007M02
Lags: 18
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  EMP does not Granger Cause GCPC 298  1.28678  0.19593
  GCPC does not Granger Cause EMP  1.33128  0.16791
  UNEMPLMNT does not Granger 
Cause GCPC 298  2.09600  0.00646
  GCPC does not Granger Cause
UNEMPLMNT  1.15155  0.30274
  UNEMPLMNT does not Granger 
Cause EMP 298  1.39925  0.13136
  EMP does not Granger Cause UNEMPLMNT  4.40020  2.8E-08
The above table 7.2.2.1.4 similarly depicts Eviews results for Granger causality tests of
the  hypothesis  that  the  US government  per-capita  spending  is  not  Granger-causing
unemployment over the recent period of “great moderation” in US history at lag 18
(Data used are in levels US Government per-capita spending GCPC, employment EMP
and unemployment UNEMPLMNT). The Granger causality is however inconclusive at
most of other lags and present only closely around 18. For lags closely around 11.the
situation is rather different, with Granger causality going both directions as can be seen
in the table 7.2.2.1.5 below:
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Table 7.2.2.1.5: Granger causality tests of the hypothesis that the US government
per-capita spending is not Granger-causing unemployment using monthly data for
period 1980-2007 and vice-versa and 11 lags:
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Date: 19/02/18   Time: 18:39
Sample: 1980M11 2007M02
Lags: 11
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  EMP does not Granger Cause GCPC 305  0.67149  0.76524
  GCPC does not Granger Cause EMP  0.84321  0.59692
  UNEMPLMNT does not Granger 
Cause GCPC 305  1.84084  0.04724
  GCPC does not Granger Cause
UNEMPLMNT  2.36530  0.00829
  UNEMPLMNT does not Granger 
Cause EMP 305  1.99488  0.02886
  EMP does not Granger Cause UNEMPLMNT  7.95339  4.7E-12
Also, at lags 8-10, it is only the last h:0 that can be rejected, implying government
spending leading ahead of unemployment. 
Whilst  correlation  does  not  indicate  causality  or  its  direction,  the  above  Granger
causality tests indicates that one cannot reject the h:0  hypothesis in most cases, the one
that government per-capita spending (GCPC) is not causing unemployment (UNMP)
can be rejected only in very small number of leg-length cases. On the other hand, it is at
least at several loner lag lengths that one can reject that unemployment is not causing
government spending implying possibility of some, though very delayed government
activity  being  caused  by  rise  in  unemployment.  Despite  their  consistent  negative
correlation, it is therefore still not possible to infer that government per-capita spending
is consistently Granger caused by unemployment nor that the US government has been
consistently  following  countercyclical,  reactive  spending  policy  to  counter  the
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unemployment levels other than by exception and, judging by empirical assessment,
this probably more so in the later, post 1990s years. A more detailed empirical research
required in this area is, however, beyond the scope of this project.
7.2.2.2 Estimation Data
The data the authors used for the estimation is the same as that used by Smets and
Wouters  (2007),  and  was  supplied  together  with  their  Dynare  model  file  from the
internet. These are seven time series: 
1. real GDP output y, 
2. real wages w, 
3. investment i, 
4. consumption c,
5. inflation , 
6. short- term Federal reserve base interest rate i,
7. work-force hours worked 
(For more details, see the SW07 Data Appendix)
7.2.2.3 Testing the starting model without extensions
The estimated results for the Dynare SW07 model, without any extensions, are close to
the results in the Table 1 of the SW07 AER paper. (See Appendix 6: Results for full set
of  results  and estimation of  parameters).  Note  that,  though the  parameter  estimates
results  are  similar,  there  are  two  marginal  likelihood  values  reported  in  by  SW07
outlined below:
1. SW07  Table  4:  Testing  the  empirical  importance  of  the  nominal  and  real
frictions in the DSGE model reports that the Base Marginal likelihood is –923,
whilst,  
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2. Table 7.2.2.3.1.1 below: Comparison of the marginal likelihood of alternative
VAR models  and the  DSGE model  the  marginal  log  likelihood reported  by
SW07 report is –905.8.
3. The  second  result  is  much  higher  than  what  this  research  obtains  for  their
original model, -924.9 (see below), or what their base one is. They, however,
stated also that for the VAR vs DSGE comparison in Table 2 they used period
1956:1 – 1965:4 as a training sample, which this research did not. 
Though this research did not succeed to replicate in full the original SW07 results, this
research compares results without training and focuses on the relative improvements to
their original model with the two novel extensions, the news driven expectation change
and the fiscal policy rule. 
Table 7.2.2.3.1: Two different MCMC Log Likelihood posterior results reported in
SW07, one with the other without training (i.e “warming-up”) of Kalamn Filter
estimation process.
Model MCMC LL Note
SW07 Tab 2 -905.8 With training
SW07 Tab 4 -923 Without training
7.2.2.4 Estimating extended models
After  experimenting  with  the  models  and  data  in  the  “linear  space”  experimental
laboratory  of  Dynare  (2011)  DSGE  models  estimation  and  simulation  toolkit,  this
research found that the model specified by the authors of this research behaves in a
comparable manner to SW07. As it has a sizeably higher likelihood, the authors’ model
in fact provides a better fit to data than SW07. 
The benchmark model estimated by Dynare, which the authors denote M0, is the SW07
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model devoid of any news extensions. The results are close, but not identical, to the
results in Table 1 of SW07.126 In terms of the additional features that concern us here,
SW07 M0 model has an Euler (8) without news and a fiscal rule (10) without any news
term pertaining to the labour market-related variable. Its log-likelihood when estimated
by Dynare is -925.088 and this forms a natural benchmark as the M0 model estimated
by Dynare underpins all other models. The authors thus compare their results to this
benchmark and the focus in the discussion that follows is a comparison of the results of
models that incorporate news driven expectation change and the fiscal policy rule with
the benchmark M0 model. 
The empirical performance of the models is shown by the –Log-Likelihood (LL or –
Log Data Density,  LDD) shown in Table 1. (More detailed parameter estimates and
Impulse Response Functions – IRFs – are shown in Appendix 6. The models with news
generally  perform better  than  similar  models  without  news.  This  is  obvious  in  the
comparison between the pairs of M0 and M6, M1 and M7, and M5 and M8, where the
latter  member  of  the  pair  involves  news  in  the  fiscal  rule.  However,  comparison
between models  M3 and M4 (the latter  with a  news-augmented Euler  equation 8’)
shows the improvements realised by augmenting the Euler equation by a news term.
Overall, however, it is fair to say that the improvement in the fit comes mainly from the
incorporation of news in the fiscal rule rather than the consumption part of the model.
In addition, estimating with partial information assumptions provided even better fit to
data (see the top row in the table below).  
126 The benchmark ll value against which the authors measure the performance of the models
they estimate is -924.956, obtained by estimating the SW07/M0 model by Dynare. Tables B.2.1
and C.2.2 in Appendixof the original Perendia and Tsoukis (2012) paper show the results from
estimation based posterior maximisation, respectively, of M0. 
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Table 7.2.2.4.1: Summary of estimated DSGE models with full and partial (the top
row) information assumptions
RankModel Features of 
consumption
Features of 
the fiscal rule
ββ gw gu LL MCMC 
10,000
Draws
1a M12 
Part 
Info
Euler augmented by 
news (8’)
News;
(11e)
0.1398 -0.26 -0.1775 -909.916
1b M12 Euler augmented by 
news (8’)
News;
(11e)
0.1463 -0.26 -0.1732 -910.513 -910.213
2 M11 Euler augmented by 
news (8’)
News;
(11a)
0.1634 -0.298 0.0265 -911.493
3 M9 Euler augmented by 
news (8’)
News;
(11b)
0.151 -0.281 0.164 -911.918
4 M7 Euler (8) News and 
(11c)
-0.259 0.1592 -911.926
5 M8 Euler augmented by 
news (8’)
Only news;
(gu=0)
0.1569 -0.295 -912.057
6 M6 Euler (8) Only news;  
(gu=0)
-0.316 -912.079
7 M10 Euler (8) augmented 
by news
News;
(11c)
0.1544 -0.265 0.1154 -912.331
8 M4 Hybrid Euler (8) with 
news and  bk-looking 
(9a) with news 
News and 
(11a)
0.269 -0.261 0.0257 -912.352
9 M13 Euler eq. (8) No news 
(gw=0);
(11e)
-0.4711 -913.115 -917.586
(10,000 
draws)
10 M3 Hybrid Euler (8) and  
bk-looking (9a) & 
news 
News and 
(11a)
0.4602 -0.318 0.0218 -915.805
11 M1 Euler eq. (8) No news 
(gw=0); 
(11c)
0.4802 -917.623 -921.946
(10,000 
draws)
12 M0 SW07 estimated by 
Euler eq. (8) 
No news 
(gw=0);  gu=0
-924.956 -925.115
13 M5 Euler augmented by 
news (8’)
No news 
(gw=0);  gu=0
-0.024 -929.619
14 M2 Bk-looking (9a) with 
news
Only news 
(gu=0)
Fails BK 
(1980)
LL is Log data density (or the Laplace approximation of marginal log likelihood unless
stated otherwise) of the estimation stage of the Dynare estimation and MCMC (where
applicable) is a 10000 sample replication based on Metropolis-Hastings Monte Carlo
Markov Chain algorithm estimation stage.
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7.2.3 Discussion
7.2.3.1 Estimated parameters
Our preferred model is  M12, in terms of empirical fit.  It  involves news both in an
augmented Euler equation (8’) and in the fiscal rule and a backward-looking labour
difference in the latter. It behaves in a comparable manner to SW07 (as shown by the
IRFs of Appendix 6). However, with a sizeably higher likelihood, this research model
provides a much-improved fit  to data than SW07: LDD=–910.513, to be contrasted
with an SW07 LDD of =-924.956 and its (short) MCMC Log data density of -929.037.
In addition, a marginally better fit was that for model M12 when estimated with Partial
Information, PCL86 method and assumptions, giving LDD=909.91.
Whilst  the  table  comparing  all  the  parameters  estimated  by this  research  using  the
original SW07 and this research’s best-fit model 12 are in Appendix 6, the following
table highlights some of the main differences:
Table 7.2.3.1.1: The main differences between SW07 M0 and best-fit M12 models with full
and partial information assumption
Estimated parameter description SW07 M0
full info. est.
M12 Estim.
Full info.
M12 Estim.
partial info.
 b Consumption shock AR1 process 
parameter
0.1623 0.4760 0.5030
 l Labour substitution risk aversion 1.6706 1.1582 1.1493
 elasticity of the capital utilisation 0.4687 0.3994 0.3956
Yo 1+fixed costs relative to steady state 
output in intermediate goods output 
1.7054 1.5279 1.5275
H Habit 0.739 0.7889 0.7914
Constant (long-term) labour 
engagement
0.2284 0.3773 0.3925
gy Tech shock effect on gov. spend 0.6045 0.7363 0.7431
 b Std err. Of consumption shock 0.2469 0.0833 0.0894
In a bit more detail, in comparison with the standard estimates of SW07, the news and
unemployment rule extended model estimates show a much higher persistence, e.g. of
the consumption shock, 0.476 vs. 0.162 (and even higher for partial information at 0.5).
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In addition, related to that, are also lower labour risk aversion (1.16 vs. 1.17), a higher
habit (lifestyle rigidity) level (0.79 vs. 0.74), lower elasticity of the capital utilisation z,
and even more interestingly, much higher levels of long-term labour engagement. The
authors also observe a much lower standard error for the consumption shock, which
means that the news effect can explain most of the apparent consumption disturbances
that are estimated when no endogenous news is present in consumption. E.g. even the
best-fit model without news, model M13, has the standard error for the consumption
shock b closely as high as that of the estimated SW07 above: 0.2456.
Lower fixed  costs  relative to  steady state  production  output  for  intermediate  goods
/Yo ~1.5 in our models vs. 1.7 in SW07 estimation seem consistent with the presence
of a government spending rule based on either, or both, unemployment and/or the news
channel rule. (I.e. /Yo is lower whenever the model has an extended fiscal rule, either
with or without news in c). 
It seems that the estimated higher constant levels of long term labour employment (0.38
vs. 0.23) for the given (i.e. measured) consumer consumption (c) and total output (y)
but with counter-cyclical government spending driven by the new fiscal rule requires a
lower relative share of the fixed costs (i.e. mainly capital investment) in relation to the
total output. This means that stabilising effects of the fiscal rule increase both labour
and fixed  capital  utilisations  (e.g.  lower  elasticity  of  capital  utilisation  :  0.47 for
SW07 vs 0.4 for M12). These effects also help to reduce the overall relative level of
capital requirements by improving the efficiency and lowering relative cost of labour in
the given intermediate goods production and hence, lower the share of the required
fixed cost relative to the total output.
The Student t-statistics of the new parameters seems strong. In addition,  the labour
market-related parameter in the fiscal rule (gu) is negative indicating counter-cyclical
nature  of  the  rule.  It  however  shows somewhat  weaker  t-statistics  in  models  when
estimated in conjunction with the news effect  (e.g.  1.9 in  model  M12) but  appears
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rather more significant when estimated without the news effect, e.g. 4.5 in model M11
(these estimates are available on request). 
The effect of news on government spending in the context of the fiscal rule (gw) is also
negative and significant (t-stat = -3.89). Thus, both the change in employment and the
news term cushion the government spending effect of the exogenous spending shock,
so that only about 61% of the initial  spending shock manifests itself  into an actual
change of government spending. This is also evidenced in an IRF of g of about 0.33 out
of a shock of about 0.56 (equal to its standard error); IRFs will be discussed shortly.
This cushioning is to be contrasted with an IRF of the spending shock on government
spending of about 0.52 in M0/SW07, roughly equal to the shock; so the shock translates
almost  one-to-one  into  a  change  in  government  spending  in  that  model.  The
interpretation  of  this  cushioning effect  in  M12 is  that  the  spending  shock  elicits  a
change in the state of the cycle and expectations about the overall future outlook. Such
developments then reduce the impact of the exogenous shock on actual government
spending. This may be for various reasons, e.g. because of a direct endogenous effect
on the fiscal rule (i.e. adjusting spending to the state of the economy). Alternatively,
this may appear for a range of political-economic reasons: a calculating government
may realise that it will probably not need to spend the full amount of the exogenous
stimulus in order to achieve a certain effect, but may retain the remaining funds for
other use. 
In  terms  of  other  parameters,  estimates  show  a  much  higher  persistence  of  the
consumption shock (0.476 vs. 0.162) and, the related, lower labour risk aversion (1.16
vs. 1.17), a higher habit level (0.79 vs. 0.74), relatively lower fixed costs per output /Y,
and interestingly a much higher level of long term labour utilisation. The higher habit
level is also significant as it implies a greater weight on lagged consumption in relation
to that of the future (see parameter  in M12 and other models in Appendix 6). 
In addition, as can be seen from the right column in the above table, this research also
shows similar  but higher persistence of a few of the parameters when estimated in
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partial  information  framework  than  those  for  the  standard  full  information  (even
comparing  with  the  extensions  outlined  above).  These parameters  are  consumption,
habit and employment related and this is fully in line with the earlier discussed results
of  e.g.  Pearlman  and  Perendia  (2006),  and,  Levine,  Pearlman,  Perendia  and  Yang
(2008-2012).
7.2.3.2 IRF Simulations
This section reviews the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) for M12 (see Figures C.1
in  Appendix  6).  As  previously mentioned,  the  overall  outlook of  the  IRFs is  quite
similar to that of M0/SW07. Notable differences concern the effects of the exogenous
spending shock (gt)  on  consumption,  which  is  positive  here  and remains  so for  a
number of quarters. This is in sharp contrast to the original M0/SW07 IRFs. Moreover,
the same shock has a smaller contemporaneous effect on total government spending
here, (about 0.45 vs. about 0.5 in M0/SW07) as it is cushioned by other variables (news
and the employment change). The effect of the news is shown in Table C.1.b. Positive
news affects consumption, investment and wages in a positive way, but reduces overall
government spending. As a result, the total effect on output is negative and remains so
rather  persistently.  This  somewhat  counter-intuitive  result  is  due  to  the  strong  and
overriding effect of news on government spending.
The  overall  results  could  then  be  indicating  that  providing  for  the  countercyclical
government spending increases both, the utilisation of now relatively longer-employed
labour,  allows  for  higher  level  of  consumption  continuity  (habit),  increases  labour
employability and lowers relative cost of capital by improving its utilisation. 
7.3 The rationale for the government spending rule(s)
Rogoff (e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)), have been widely criticised by quite a few
authors for arguing their case against the prevailing benefits of government intervention
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and  emphasising  dangers  of  quantitative  easing  policies  in  curing  the  recent  Great
recession.  This  criticism  came  mainly  from  the  NK  standpoint  mainly  for  their
economic models (e.g.  Nersisyan and Wray (2010)).  However,  more recently it  has
been shown that their data preparation had several numerical and coding errors that
have systematically lead the authors to incorrect estimations and their conclusion about
the dangers of high debt/GDP ratio on the future of growth (Herndon, Ash and Pollin
(2013)).
As mentioned earlier,  despite  their  monetarist  position,  a few authors show that,  in
some cases increased debt may be beneficial for growth. Traum and Yang (2009)  and
Traum  and  Yang  (2011-13)  go  beyond  the  common  position  of  non-productive
government spending and in their  NK, SW07 derived DSGE model,  and show that
government  spending  may be  beneficial  for  growth  if  used  for  investment  or  tax-
cutting. 
However, Leeper’s notional division between so called active and passive government
policy, somehow crude and rooted in his early paper, Leeper (1991), provided a legacy
of restricted and a bit ambiguous predicament and enforced the tradition of a relatively
narrow vision of the government role for future research. For him the “active” policy
refers to active engagement on controlling control variable or spending “as it sees fit”
and independently of the budget constraints. On the other hand, the “passive” policy is
spending without  the  “freedom” of  the  active  control,  thus  adjusting  of  the  budget
management in “response to” exogenous shocks and/or active management by other
bodies and within budget constraints. It however, looks like that one  could say that the
passive policy is then better referred to as “constrained reactive (adjustment) policy”
instead just “passive” whilst the “active” should be “unconstrained active” policy. This
is in part so to reduce possibly ambiguity because in some other literature active and
passive distinction is also used to differentiate between authority taking or not taking
reactive adjustment action to, mainly, exogenous but also, endogenous shocks, as, for
example, Ricardian equivalence, if fully applicable, would render any active (fiscal)
policy almost inefficient.  
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Influenced by the strong warnings of the negative effect of government debt on growth
(e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)), and after years of focusing on monetary policy as the
main economic driver, there is now a growing literature on government spending rules
that are mainly concerned with government policies aimed at restricting its deficit and
build-up of the sovereign debt.
Those more recent articles tackling the issue of government spending rules (e.g. Leeper
and  Bi  (2010),  Bi  (2010),  Leeper,  Plante,  and  Traum  (2010))  focus  on  budget
constraints  not  a  business  cycle  tackling  policy.  In  addition,  Fernandez-Villaverde,
Guerron-Quintana,  Kuester  and  Rubio-Ramirez  (2011) also  tackle  the  idea  of  a
government spending rule and measure the variance contribution of unemployment on
government spending, however, this is not inside the model.
Zubairy  (2013)  creates  a  small  DSGE  model  with  a  government  budget  and
consumption,  and points  out  that  if  monetary policy is  less  stringent  in  reacting to
output, the fiscal multiplier may be higher and more effective. Zubairy (2013) extends
the government spending AR (1) rule (the law of motion) with a lagged output gap as a
form of automatic stabiliser and allows its parameter to be normally distributed to allow
for either a counter or procyclical effect on government spending and estimates it to be
negative.  In Zubairy’s model,  those automatic stabilisers capture the countercyclical
spending on unemployment benefit transfers but do not indicate a significant counter-
cyclical effect of government policy.  
In the preparatory (“laboratory”) experiments we, also used the same output gap based
government rule extension with a normally distributed parameter before introducing
unemployment as the sole main driver. We then obtained a much better fit to data when
using  only  unemployment.  Comparing  impulse  response  functions  for  increases  in
government spending, we (the researchers) noticed similarities in relatively short-lived
increases in output, labour hours and consumption and a small reduction in investment. 
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In both Zubairy’s and this research model, the output multiplier effect of government
consumption is higher than 1, though lower in the long term. Zubairy also measures the
effects of tax reductions and finds their multipliers’ effects to be lower than 1 although
they have a positive effect on output. However, whilst in Zubairy’s model output yields
1.07  dollar  for  a  dollar  of  government  spending,  the  short-term  multiplier  in  the
authors’ model is much higher resulting in 1.4 dollars output increase. Also, whilst the
effects on the increase of inflation and interest rates in this research model are a quick
steep rises and have a tendency to converge towards a lower level long term increase, in
Zubairy’s model they are, unexpectedly, slower to rise but then result in rather higher
long term increase.
In view of this research, it is probably wrong to apply a relatively restrictive active
fiscal policy following the terms of Leeper (1991) and to expect cycle smoothing to be
achieved  by  assuming  deep,  strong  habits  in  government  consumption  demand  in
conjunction to its continuous aim to maximise its consumption midst budget constraint.
This,  deeply  habitual  government  consumption  behaviour  model  is,  as  the  author
explicitly states, very much alike that of households. This reflects an inert behaviour
that  does  not  seek  to  counter  the  effects  of  economic  downturns  by  changing
government consumption and is hence opposed to an engaging, endogenously driven
fiscal  spending policy,  adjusted  to  countering  business  cycle  which  the  researchers
model. Zubairy has a model of a labour taxation effect on government spending but not
a model of an unemployment effect such as this research develop.
None of those afore-mentioned reports, however, allow for a more consensual approach
or understanding of how a pro-active government policy, aiming to tackle the economic
dynamics  other  than  to  just  reactively  mend  the  wounds  of  the  business  cycle’s
downturns through unemployment benefit transfers. For example, they do not consider
that an activist fiscal policy can be endogenously driven by a rule that aims to counter
the business cycle downturns and any resulting unemployment. Consequently, none is
including  unemployment  as  a  part  of  the  government  policy  in  its  spending
consideration, but only in the household's utility equation. 
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The rule this researchers introduces is not imposed but, like the (Vasicek-)Taylor one, it
is  a  statistical  expectation  implied  from  estimations  as  an  optimising  control
mechanism.  It  is  a  departure  from the  pure  rational  expectations  and discretionary,
opaque, fiscal policy of governments spending. It is also a departure from the world of
economic models where government spending is deemed adequately described by no
more than a random, exogenous shock, a perturbation that could easily lead to a non-
optimal state.
The author of this research would therefore like to name this counter-cyclically active
policy a  pro-active policy and the limited unemployment  benefit  remedy transfer  a
remedial re-active policy, as opposed to the active and the passive policies in Leeper
(1991) sense. 
7.3.1 Is fiscal policy dead -Evidence of fiscal spending and its varied 
success
Debate continues to surround the desirability and effectiveness of fiscal policy and the
controversy surrounding the ‘Obama stimulus plan’, the ARRA 2009 (i.e. American
Recovery and Reinvestment  Act,  2009),  particularly the  government  spending,  In  a
discussion following a presentation at  a 2012 macroeconomic conference,  a leading
monetary and central banking economist proclaimed active fiscal policy dead.
However, the authors’ estimates above and the relative fluctuations of g in relation to y
indicate much larger relative fluctuations than those that would have resulted just from
direct transfers. On the other hand, the government spending may take less orthodox
means other than, and, in addition to more traditional means of government spending
for public purchases and work commissions,. Recent decades showed high increases of
foreign aid packages conditioned by the services and/or goods being bought from, or
supplied by, the donor country based business. 
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A large portion of the foreign aid money may actually not part the donor country at all
due to a frequently stipulated clause that the donated aid can be used only for services
and  goods  purchased  from the  donor  country.  This  is  effectively  functioning  as  a
domestic  government  financed  expansionary  spending  aimed  at  improving  exports.
This may be for services work done by the donor country companies, e.g. consulting or
transport, and, the goods exported and supplied to the aid-receiving foreign country. In
addition, this government co-funded work is then producing additional tax revenues as
a partial return to the donor governments. (An OECD  2009 study127 points-out that
even when aid is not formally and contractually tied to supply by the donor country, it
is still often supplied by it).
There  is  emerging  evidence  in  the  literature  of  some even more  unorthodox fiscal
intervention shocks that resulted with more or less successful growth increase effects.
As  an  example,  R.  Barro  (Barro  2010),  among  others,  recently  referred  to  fiscal
interventions in the form of defence spending (and for a military intervention related
non-military logistics spending), pointing to the overall GDP output rise at the start of
wars and to its decline amid raised taxation in their aftermath128.
Whilst C. Romer (1992) points out that those deciding factors for the US’ recovery
from the Great Depression were fiscal spending and foreign financial inflow transfers
in the wake and during WWII, a few other more recent publications claim a substantial
and sustained rise of GDP in various military interventions. A rise of nearly 7% during
the Korean war sustained and contributed to a continuous, though smaller, GDP growth
in  the  years  following  the  war,  or  just  in  intensive  preparations  for  them  (e.g.
preparation for Iranian invasion in 1980s contributed to GDP boost in time of 1980s
recession), and contributing to recoveries from preceding recessions. Although active
fiscal spending intervention may not be dead, accounting for its sources and targets and
127  Jepma, C.,: “Tying Aid”,  OECD, 1991 and“Aid untying: is it working? Thematic Study On 
The Developmental Effectiveness Of Untied Aid: Evaluation Of The Implementation Of The 
Paris Declaration And Of The 2001 DAC, Recommendation On Untying ODA To The LDCS”, 
OECD 2009
128 see: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704751304575079260144504040.html
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then taking all the fiscal spending intervention data measures into the authors’ model
would  have  required  near  forensic  research  into  foreign  aid  and those  un-orthodox
fiscal interventions. (e.g. see Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Laidler (2009), Romer (1992)
and, Labonte and Levitt (2010) and discussion in Appendix 9).
 
7.3.2 Monetary-fiscal cooperation
A number of authors claim that there is no equilibrium for a situation when both fiscal
and monetary policies  are  active.  For  example  Leeper  (1991) or  a  recent  work by
Bhattarai S. et al. (2012) has similar findings but they use similar target functions for
both  the  simultaneous  monetary  and  fiscal  policies.  This  creates  a  conflict  of
responsibility domain and disrupts equilibrium. In addition, Kirsanova, Leith and Wren-
Lewis  (2009) conclude that  the  prevailing  consensus  in  the  recent  literature  is  that
monetary policy should work together with fiscal, but with limited effect. They hence
also believe the former should be focusing on, and dominating, business cycle control
and the latter, the government deficit and debt control.
On  the  contrary,  in  our  model  there  is  a  separation  but  also  co-operation  and
complementarity of  domains  of  responsibility and reaction.  Whilst  monetary policy
continues to react to inflation (and possibly the output gap), the countercyclical fiscal
policy focuses mainly on reactions to expected changes in spending behaviour and the
employment  of  the  consuming  households.  Though  they  both  attack  an  extended
Phillips curve model from their respective domains, there is scope for complementarity
and co-operation in a joint effort in resolving the problems especially when monetary
policy is restricted by a zero lower bound on the interest rate policy instrument. 
This  is  probably  just  one  example  of  possible  co-operative  monetary-fiscal
interventions where two agencies, the central bank and the state, act towards fulfilling
their respective utility functions. They thus act in line with their obligations to improve
the  utility  of  their  respective  stakeholders:  the  business  sector  and  the  household
electorate.
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Worell  (2000) shows  that,  although  the  independence  of  a  central  bank  from  the
government works well in its drive of monetary policy in large economies, in smaller,
open economies it is better that they cooperate and coordinate their respective monetary
and fiscal policies. Lowest inflation is observed in small open economies where central
bank’s  monetary  policy  is  devised  in  a  very  tight  coordination  with  government
treasury.
In addition, several authors show active but discretionary simultaneous monetary and
fiscal policies may lead to in-determination or suboptimal Nash equilibria if they are
not fully coordinated and agreed by both sides (Dixit and Lambertini 2003a, Dixit and
Lambertini  2003b  and  Lambertini  2004).  Though  most  of  those  authors  analyse
monetary-fiscal cooperation (or the lack of it) within EMU, it is not therefore surprising
that the fiscal rule extended SW07 model and the estimated US data indicate a presence
of such dual policy activity in the US too. 
What  may  appear  surprising  is  that  economists,  in  their  publications,  nevertheless
model  government  spending  as  an  exogenous  shock.  This  opens  up  the  question
whether it is simply aimed to simulate fully discretionary and opaque fiscal policy, or
possibly also, as a part of a prudential policy to minimise the risk of potential investors’
fear from rising taxes when the fiscal policy is shown to be active. Along those lines,
Davig and Leeper (2009) use a Markov switching DSGE model to show that regime
switching between active and passive fiscal and monetary policy regimes may explain
well the recent decades in the US economy movements whilst showing positive fiscal
spending multipliers when if an active fiscal policy is in place. 
Such policy mixtures, based either on simultaneous actions driven by commonly agreed
optimal goals (Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) and (2003b), and Lambertini (2004)) or on
alternating between periods of active and passive regimes (Davig and Leeper (2009)),
indicate a need for a better cooperation if not even coordination between the fiscal and
the monetary authorities. One can therefore question the need for their separation and
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argue for their simultaneous or, even cooperative activity129.
7.3.3 Government debt and cost of fiscal intervention.
It has been frequently pointed out that government spending crowds out investment due
to the fear of future taxation of either the businesses directly, or by reducing demand for
their product through taxation of the consumers or households. In contrast there seem to
be  much  less  of  a  concern  in  the  literature  for  a  crowding  out  of  capital  midst
households maintaining their spending through rising debt which they will have even
more certain obligation to repay. 
Similarly,  whilst  the government budget is sought to be constrained, there does not
seem to be a limiting constraint on to how much the central bank can spend towards
inflation targeting costs, nor how that is going to be funded. Whilst foreign exchange
targeting may be self-financing, that is, sell high to dampen or buy low to appreciate,
the timing may be adverse.
On the other hand, this research model of endogenising government spending shows
that the feedback effect from the news effect actually reduces the government spending.
This including that of unemployment lowering incited by the shock and that not the full
amount  of  the  initial  spending  shock  is  passed  through  into  the  actual  rise  of
government spending (i.e. varying around 55% only. See the outputs of IRFs for g on g
shock and the standard error of the shock of around 0.55).
This  bears  different  interpretations.  It  may  be  perceived  that  the  government  is
spending the shock-money inefficiently by retaining 45% for itself, e.g. administrative
expenses.  Another  plausible  interpretation  (but  similar)  is  based  on  the  observed
phenomena  that  although  a  government  may  announce  a  high  expansionary
intervention policy move of e.g. 100 Mill, but knowing (or possibly hoping) that it will
129 A similar approach to balanced fiscal and monetary activity has been, more recently 
also taken-up by Bhattarai K. and Trzeciakiewicz (2017)
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not need to spend it all. I.e., the resulting good news will have its accelerating effect so
that the government will probably not need to spend the full amount announced but
only a part, e.g. 50 Mil. to achieve the desired demand and output rise stimulus effect. It
may then act intentionally slowly in the spending the budget, and, if the target was at
least partially achieved with less, it may retain the remaining budget for other use. It is
thus acting as a rational agent, optimising its spending in the short and maximising its
utility function – improving welfare of the electorate in return for re-election - in the
long term.
 
NOTE: For more details from this paper in relation to its analysis of the fiscal
multipliers, please refer to the original paper.
It  is  however  worth  re-iterating  that  the  models  with  news  in  the  Euler  equation
consistently show higher responses of both consumption and output to the fiscal shock.
In  the  models  without  news  in  consumption,  though  the  output  rises  with  fiscal
expansion, the consumption decreases (see compare models M12 and M13 that  are
identical except that the former incorporates news in the Euler equation and the fiscal
rule whereas the latter  does not).  In addition,  the researchers get  output  multipliers
higher than 1 that last at least for a year, whereas without the news, the consumption
response is less than 1 or negative. This reputes the key neoclassical criticism of the
fiscal  multiplier  that  it  crowds  out  private  consumption  and that  fiscal  spending is
therefore ‘expensive’ from the welfare point of view.
7.3.4 Conclusions 
Understanding the effects of fiscal policy on aggregate output is increasingly important
in  an era  of  business  cycle  instability,  when the stabilisation potential  of  monetary
policy appears rather limited for a variety of reasons. This paper has sought to enhance
the understanding of the aggregate effects of government spending and the nature of the
associated  multiplier.  It  does  so by building and estimating a  medium-sized DSGE
284
model  which  incorporates  ‘news’  (the  news  based  expectation  change)  and  the
formulation of fiscal policy, particularly spending, as following a rule akin to the Taylor
(1993) rule for monetary policy.  The former,  the news based expectation change, is
motivated  as  a  way  of  better  understanding  the  fiscal  multiplier,  which  the  Euler
equation  of  dynamic  models  is  not  in  a  good  position  to  capture  for  the  reasons
explained in Section 2. The fiscal rule concerns spending on goods and services (the
‘G’ of  elementary  macroeconomics)  and  is  motivated  as  a  way of  formalising  the
stabilisation role of fiscal policy and linking it to the nature of the business cycle; in
view of its potential, such government spending is unlikely to follow a pattern entirely
unrelated to the state of the economy. Furthermore, the authors (Perendia and Tsoukis
(2012)) combine these two feature enhancements and extend the fiscal rule with the
“news” as an additional term in it. These features are innovations of this paper; the rest
is  a  standard  NK DSGE model  such as  the  SW07 model  that  is  rapidly achieving
‘canonical’ status in this literature (and to which reference should be made for further
details). 
The  authors  show  that  adding  the  news  channel  and  an  extended,  endogenous
government  spending  fiscal  policy  rule  framework  both  significantly  improve  the
model fit to data and its forecasting quality.  Both of the novel features, the “news”
channel and the unemployment driven fiscal rule, seem well supported by the data. It is
however, deemed fair to say that much of the improvement in the model fitness comes
from the “news” and unemployment channel in the context of the fiscal rule, more so
than the news channel in consumption. A better fit to data after  adding such a rule
strongly suggests therefore that endogenising government spending and assuming its
countercyclical nature would be a rather more realistic assumption rather than assuming
it is a random, exogenous shock.
Finally, this framework has abstracted various important aspects of the real world such
as interactions between fiscal and monetary policy (as alluded to in the Introduction),
consumer  heterogeneity  (e.g.  adding  the  parallel  co-existence  of  non-Ricardian
consumers  a  la  Drautzburg  and Uhlig,  2010) and the  effects  of  budget  constraints,
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government deficits and debt. Incorporation of these features is on the agenda for future
research  work,  as  are  the  inclusions  of  optimistic  and pessimistic  (‘animal  spirits’-
driven)  agents  along  the  lines  of  DeGrauwe  (2009)  and  the  imperfect  (partial)
information solution framework with the adaptive behaving agents along the lines of
Levine, Pearlman, Perendia and Yang (2009-2012).
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8 Conclusion, Achievements and Future Work
8.1 Conclusion
The primary focus of this research has been on informational issues in macroeconomic
modelling,  particularly in  Dynamic  Stochastic  General  Equilibrium (DSGE) models
used by macroeconomic planning bodies such as central banks. For start, it provided an
overview of contemporary dynamic macroeconomic analysis and forecasting models
used by such institutions and of the main issues and critiques, which were discussed,
and many refuted earlier in this text. Many of the critiques have been responded to as
being out-dated since DSGE models evolved in their capabilities (and, in part thanks to
this project), surpassing, thus, many of the older limitations that have been raised in
most of those critiques.
Some of the criticisms that are still very valid are that they are complex to implement,
difficult to use and require much more preparation and skills than e.g. VAR or panel
data models. Another is that they require more time and computational power to run
even  small,  parsimonious  models  used  by  academics,  but  these  remarks  are  not,
however,  disqualifying  DSGE models  for  their  power  of  predicting  and optimising
economy.  And, this power can be improved, as we have shown, by going beyond single
representative  rational  agent  and  adding  heterogeneous,  imperfectly  informed,  non-
fully rationally behaved agents  
Most of other valid remarks are generic for economic modelling in general and not
specific to DSGE so that they cannot be directly blamed for the 2007/8 crisis. One of
most controversial such issues being the existence of multiple possible global equilibria
rather than the single one (e.g. Benhabib and Farmer 1999 and Farmer et al. 2015), the
other being what should central banks do and target, especially in time of zero (or even
negative) interest rate as we have been seeing since 2008 crisis. 
This is followed by a discussion of some of the insufficiencies in modern economic
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modelling theory and practice that may have contributed to the development of the
latest, 2007-08 economic crisis. Economic models based on a single representative or
on rational agents with full information are considered as insufficient, and some of their
respective  alternatives  such  as  using  heterogeneous  and  irrational  agents  acting  in
models  of  imperfect  information  conditions  have  been  presented  and  analysed  as
potential improvement.
A chapter was dedicated to revisit issue of rationality, a fundamental presumption in at
least  two  of  its  main  models,  that  of  rational  preferences  and  the  other,  rational
expectations and it was shown that there is, one could say, a common underlying and
partially, sub-conscious mechanism connecting the two models as analysed within the
relatively new domain of neuroeconomics. 
It was also shown that there are additional, major implications of imperfect, incomplete
or  limited  information  and  of  the  limited,  information  processing  capacity  being
available to individuals or smaller organisations to process that information. Instead,
these limitations  on resources  are  driving towards heuristics  based decision making
within bounded rationality or rational inattention conditions. This is, then explaining
why it  is  that  only larger  teams  or  organisations  can  be  considered  to  have  basic
conditions  needed  for  forming  fully  rational  expectations.  Saying  so,  it  does  not
necessarily  mean  that  they  follow  it  ,  thus,  indicating  that  a  major  issue  in  the
traditional  and  more  recent  macro-economic  modelling  theory  has  been  making
assumption of full sufficiency of a single representative agent forming fully rational
expectations based on fully set of needed information.
8.2 Summary of the Achievements
This study provided some improvements to macroeconomic theory, the modelling and
introduced  several  enhancements  to  the  DSGE  method  by  implementing  several
innovations within the now standard Smets and Wouters 2007 DSGE model: 
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1. On a more theoretical side, in ch. 3, some major criticisms of DSGE models
have  been  addressed  and  responded  to.  In  addition,  in  ch.  4,  this  research
provides  two  contributions,  one  in  terms  of  providing  an  explanation  of  a
dichotomy of two major types of rationalities, the “instinctive” utility maximiser
and  full  information  rational  expectation  formation.  It  is  deemed  that  this
dichotomy is having its possible roots in the brain structure and its function-
specialised segments as shown by neuroeconomics research. The other was to
propose  a  preliminary,  hypothetical  model  of  economic  agents  based  on
distributed parallel processing and entropy, a theoretical model needing future
development. 
   
2. The first two major innovations concern a joint research work with professors J.
Pearlman  and  P.  Levine  and  the  implementation  of  the  solution  for  partial
information modelling developed by Pearlman, Currie and Levine (1986) that
corrects  the  traditional  DSGE models’ inappropriate  asymmetric  information
assumptions  (ch.  5)130.  This  inconsistency  is  bound  to  lead  to  less  realistic
parameter estimates than a more realistic scenario in which there is symmetry
with  regard  to  partial  (imperfect)  information,  which  is  being  modelled  and
analysed throughout a good part of this research. It has been shown to produce
superior estimations and IRF simulations to some of the contemporary standard
(e.g.  Smets  and Wouters  (2007))  DSGE models  and that  decision  of  agents
differ with different information being available at the time. That research work
also showed the benefits of introducing heterogeneous agents by the inclusion
of a second group of adaptive economic agents alongside the rational ones. 
3. The second major contribution was made to analysis of causes of both the 1930s
Great Depression and the recent 2007 crisis (so called “Great Recession”) and
identification  of  influence  of  a,  so  far  overlooked  factor  that  this  research
130 I.e. They assume that all economic agents have full access to all relevant, needed 
measurements of economic shocks, whereas the econometricians have no access to all 
that information.
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introduces and denotes “recessionary debt accelerator” (see Ch. 6). This (novel)
factor, explained in this research, may affect the economy either in conjunction
or independently of other  recessionary accelerators   (“decelerators”)  such as
Fisher’s debt-deflator and its effect is analysed in context of liquidity shortage
shock, this possibly caused by monetary tightening through a sustained, long
term interest rate rise shock (trend). 
4. The third group of innovations of this research involved the extension of the
standard Smets and Wouters 2007 DSGE model to assess the effects of two new
factors  as  explained  in  ch.  7.  Firstly  news  and  the  resulting  changes  in
consumers'  rational  expectations,  and secondly,  an a  new endogenised  fiscal
policy  Taylor-like  rule  based  on  unemployment  and  the  news-  related
expectation changes on consumption and growth. The resulting work improves
the models’ fit to data and their forecasting capacity and precision, and outlines
potential directions for facilitating an economy out of a recession or a crisis by
means of combined fiscal and monetary policies with some but not conclusive
indicators that mutual coordination can also be beneficial.
8.3 Recommendations
As this  research  has  shown,  even  small  conceptual  differences  may lead  to  major
differences in the output estimates. Hence, to reduce the effect of errors and improve
estimation  precision,  the  major  institutions  need to  improve  further  their  economic
models and use a combination of several macro-models, of which some need to be large
DSGE models augmented with the VAR techniques.  They then need to  create their
estimates usually on a basis of a combination of informal and formal heuristics and the
weighted average of the results obtained from different models. However, the informal
bias  may  have  major  implications  as  this  work  shows  in  the  example  of  the
development of Great Recession of 2007/2008.
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8.4 Future Work
Though this research proved the benefits of a partial (imperfect) symmetric information
solution,  adding heterogeneous agents  to the economic models  showed even higher
improvements in the models' fit  to data. It is therefore logical to expect that partial
information  models  with  asymmetric  information  distributed  across  heterogeneous
agents  should  provide  additional  substantial  improvements,  but  that  should  be  the
subject for a further study. 
On  the  modelling  side,  it  is  expected  that  non-linear  models,  which  incorporate
household debt  and additional  financial  market  variables with heterogeneous agents
models based in neuroeconomics characteristics, would be much better at predicting the
2007 crisis. It is hence a conclusion of this research that model enhancements in these
directions should probably be given a much higher priority over other features.
Some other major next steps could be: 
1. modelling  and  inclusion  of  the  recessionary  debt  accelerator  as  introduced  and
described in this research , 
2. the inclusion of better IFRS like accounting models for the financial derivatives that
draw-in vast sums of corporate profits and household income used for investment
with no direct effect on the real economy,
3. investigating and possibly confirming, whether the technological developments and
related practices of recent years, such as internet shopping, market monitoring and
monitor electronic pricing, could have led to substantially lower price rigidities.
4. As per ch. 5.8, one can than take into further analysis whether it is the differences
between  fast  (“procedural”)  and  “slow”  (declarative)  thinking  that  may  be
facilitating  the  perceived  higher  stability  of,  e.g.,  a  large  corporation  or  a
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parliamentarian democracy acting in fully, communicatively rational manner. Or, on
the other hand,  can the procedural, individual decision making drive faster adaptive
response and higher dynamics in systems led by a somehow authoritarian CEO or
presidential with prerogative of high powers of authority, where such system can be
exposed to higher danger of an inadequate personal bias and/or potentially higher
volatility of its policies.
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Appendix 1: PCL Method for Solving Partial Information
Rational Expectations
Note:  This  section  closely  replicates  Appendix  1  and,  in  part,  Appendix  2  in
Perendia (2006)131 and cover implementation of the PCL86 partial information DSGE
models’  solution  and  estimation  method132 within  the  BayesDSGE  software  package
(details in  Appendix 1.6 below).  For details on PCL86 implementation in Dynare,
please refer to Pearlman 2009, Perendia 2010d, and, Levine and Pearlman 2011 as
well as Dynare users’ manual and material related to partial information.
PCL (1986) provided both a DSGE model solution a sub-space, time-domain recursive
Kalman filter  and Riccati  equation based estimation method for  partial  information
Rational Expectations models based on, and enhancing the solution given initially by
Blanchard and Kahn (1980). 
In Pearlman et al. (1986) extension of Blanchard and Kahn model, it is assumed that
measurements of currently observable variables are denoted as  wt and the state-space
equations written as
            (A1.1)
where K1 and K2 define relationship between the p currently observed variables in the
wt and the model state-space variables. The assumed information set available at time t
is: 
It={wt, Aij, K1, K2, U, V}, i,j=1,2                                  (A1.2)
where U=cov(ut)  and V=cov(vt).  The partial  information situation still  allows that a
131 The text below is close reproduction of the notes by Prof. J Pearlman.
132 The PCL86 provides genereci method for solving and estimating linear DSGE models that 
can be also used for models with partial information assumptions about the current values and 
shocks.
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subset  of  the  structural  state-space,  the  non-predetermined  (forward-looking  and
control)  variables133 xt and  the  pre-determined  (backward-looking  and  exogenous)
variables zt may still be observable at time t and mapped to wt. This solution however,
also allows the other, additional, non-structural, variables to be deemed observable and
to constitute wt. and thus, augment the estimation results like (See Appendix 2a).
133  The (rational) control variables can be one or more of the non-predetermined state variables,
usually  one  or  more  of  (rational)  choice  variable  that  can  be  chosen  by one  or  more  of
participating  and  decision  making  economic  agents.  The  agent(s)  need  to  make  choice(s)
optimally and effectively, in a manner so that can have a sufficient impact on the economic
system behaviour and its direction to (an/)the optimal (steady) state. In the NK models, it is
usually taken to be consumption and/or the some other choice variable(s) in the model that can
be used to optimise  model  around its  optimal  goals.  However,  in  most  of  modern the NK
monetary policy models aimed at inflation targeting, it is the monetary policy interest rate that
is most frequently used as the main or the only control variable, but money levels or target
exchange rate may be used when alternative monetary policies are used. On the other hand, the
system of equations describing the economic system, needs to be sufficiently “sensitive” (i.e.
elastic,  reactive  or  dependent)  on  that  set  of  control  variables  so  that  the  state-space
representation can be controllable and directed by that set of the chosen control variables. In the
follow-up to the 2008 crisis, it hence became evident that a single variable like policy interest
rate is not sufficient to provide sufficient level of controllability of the economic (state-space)
system and its return to its optimal growth. Mathematical models and issues of the rank of
controllability gramian matrix of a state-space system are however beyond the scope of this
research but more can be found in the state space literature, (e.g. see Aoki 1987/1990).
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A1.1 Likelihood estimation with Partial Information – Non-RE Case
For a standard time series partial information model134, one can express the system as:
zt+1 = Azt + qt (A1.3)
with observations:
 
yt = Czt + rt                                     (A1.4)
and 
cov(qt) = Q ;  cov(rt) = R                                                          (A1.5)
The system updating equations (assuming qt and rt are independent) are given by
zt+1;t = Azt;t-1 + APtCT (CPtC T + R)-1et  with   et = yt - Czt;t-1  (A1.6)
Pt+1 = APtAT - APtCT (CPtCT + R)-1CPtAT + Q                          (A1.7)
where
z1;0 = 0 ; P1;0 = AP0AT + Q                                                           (A1.8)
 and the log-likelihod is given by
2 lnL = -T*nn*log(2*) - ln det(CPtCT + R)  -eTt  (CPtCT + R) -1et    (A1.9)
where the researchers note that CPtCT + R = cov(et), T – length size of the data sample
and nn- number of observed variables in the sample 
134 I.e. one that assumes that all variables are expressed in an adaptive expectation (V)AR(n)
form  that  does  not  distinguish  between  the  non-predetermined,  forward-looking  rational
expectations variables and, the predetermined and backward-looking variables, and where eigen
vectors of the state-space gain matrix are stable (that is, all its eigen values t<1). For “proper”
PCL86 solution reduced state-space (“VAR”) form, see A1.4 below, eq. A1.13a&b, and, for its
Dynare system timing-adjusted reduced form, the equation (A1.26) in the following dection
Timing Issues. For more general discussion on “VAR” (or VARMA) representation of DSGE
please refer to e.g. Aoki (1987, 1996), Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2007) or Giacomini (2013).
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A1.2 RE with Asymmetric information 
Define  zt=backward looking and exogenous variables, and,  xt=forward-looking (non-
predetermined) and control variables. There is not an enormous amount of difference in
the likelihood calculation, except that for the observations the researchers have all of
the  predetermined  variables  assumed  observed,  plus  some  extra  non-predetermined
variables, so that the observations are given by
                         (A1.10)
where the r2t may well depend on the qt. This is technically an irritation for the filtering
problem, but is easily dealt with. The likelihood is dealt with in a related way. Note that
the  researchers  still  have  a  non-zero  innovations  process  {et}  even  for  the  fully
observed predetermined variables, because the updating equations are x t+1;t = Axt, so that
in general  xt+1 and  xt+1,t will not match. Since this situation is rarely encountered, the
authors provide no further details.
A1.3 Incorrect Partial Information Likelihood estimation
The following is the setup used in Dynare, and all other implementations of DSGE of
which the authors are aware. Assume the model is given by
                                 (A1.11)
With a subset of the structural state-space, the non-predetermined (forward-looking and
control variable) being xt and the pre-determined and backward-looking variables being
zt,and then reduced to:
(A1.12)
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A1.4 Correct Partial Information setup
This time the researchers take into account the effect that partial information has on the
reduced  form solution,  as  in  Pearlman  et  al.  (1986).  The  researchers  assume  that
measurements are denoted as wt and write the equations as135:
(A1.13a)
(A1.13b)
Then from Pearlman et al. (1986) the researchers have the following results:
Firstly define the saddlepath relationship between expectations of z and x by 
            (A1.14a)
where        
        (A1.14b)
and   is a square matrix essentially containing the unstable eigenvalues. Define the
following matrices:
C = A11 - A12N  A = A11 - A12 A22-1A21 B = A12 A22-1
(A1.15)
D = K1 – K2 A22-1A21 F = K2 A22-1 E = K1 – K2N
NB: There is no need to calculate  because it can be written (from above) as 
 = N A11 + A22
The Kalman filtering equation is then given by:
135 I.e. this is PCL86 solution for reduced form state-space representation, sometimes referred
to as VAR-representation of DSGE. With its non-predetermined (forward-looking and control)
variables xt and the pre-determined (an backward-looking) variables z t and with the Blanchard
and Kahn (1980) condition satisfied with the number of forward-looking x i variables being
equal to the number of the unstable eigen vectors of the state-space gain matrix (that is, equals
the number of unstable eigen valuesi>1). 
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zt+1;t = Czt;t-1 +(CPtDT +A12-1U22FT )(EPtDT +V +K2-1U22FT ) -1 et     (A1.16)
et = (w t - Ezt;t-1)              (A1.17)
Pt+1 = AP t AT+BU22BT+U11   
- (APt DT+BU22FT )(DPt DT+FU22FT+V )-1(DPt AT+FU22BT )       (A1.18)
the latter being a Ricatti equation.
The likelihood function can be evaluated in much the same way as in Section 1 above:
2lnL =-T*nn*log(2*)  - ln det(cov(et)) -eTt(cov(et))-1et  (A1.19)
where the researchers note that T is length size of the data sample and nn- number of
observed variables in the sample 
cov(et) = (EPtDT+V +K2-1U22FT) (DPtDT+FU22FT+V ) -1 (DPtET+FU22 -TK2T  +V )
(A1.20)
Following Pearlman et al, this is initialised at
Z1;0 = 0 P1 = P +M                                        (A1.21)
where  P  is  the  steady state  of  the  Riccati  equation,  and  M  is  the  solution  of  the
Lyapunov equation
M = CMCT +(CPDT+A12-1U22FT )(DPDT+FU22FT+V )-1(DPCT +FU22-TA12T)   (A1.22)
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Timing issues
However, modern models and tools (including Dynare) apply generalised solution that
locates zt and Etxt+1 on the left hand side of the equation: 
                      (A1.23)
Our implementation uses a special case of reorganisation of this generalised model so
that all AR1 processes are grouped in the top rows: 
    
           (A1.24)
or, in a form more suitable for application of the Pearlman et al. 1986 solution:
                        (A1.25)
After multiplying both sides by the inverted matrix on the LHS, the researchers obtain
the following equation in reduced PCL86 form: 
               (A1.26)
and the observation set may then also be expressed in PCL ’86 format as: 
              (A1.27)
Where L1 and L2 are selection matrices, or , more precisely, in this implementation
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Where  L1  and  L2 are  appropriately sized selection matrices of 1s and 0s in system
matrix St matching zt and xt respectively such that L = [L1 L2 ]T and G represents matrix
multiplying the state vector in (A1.28a) above and:
L1 = [L11 L12 L13]  = [0  L12  0] and L1G = [-L12V2   L12A2   L12B2] 
(A1.29)
L2 = [L21 L22 L23] = [0  0  L23] and [L1G   L2]T = [K1 K2] = K
 Then, in time adjusted setup:
   Nzt;t +  xt+1,t =0            (A1.30)
A1.5 Solving Riccati Equation136
Iterative Solution 
Having a linear relation 
p(t)= P(t) x(t)                                                              (A 2.31)
Ricatti  matrix differential  equation has only final conditions  and can besolved with
backward iterative recursion and numerical integration based on Euler’s approximation:
P(t-T) = P(t) = TP’(t)                                                       (A1.32)
Asuming starting value P(T) = P(0) = 0 (or T=0), 
A1.5.1 Fast-Iterative Solution
When Riccati has to be solved outside Kalman or similar recursive loop, a fast iterative
solution based on period doubling algorithm is used.
136 Based on Aoki (1987/1990) pp 78-82
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A1.5.2 Non-Iterative Solution137
Most frequently used non-iterative solution is based on construction of the real Shur
triangular  decomposition  form.  Assume n*n matrix  Riccati  equation  X=AXA’+f(X)
where 
f(X)=(M-AXC’)(-CXC’)-1(M-AXC’)’                                         (A1.33)
The researchers can define three auxiliary n*n matrices as:
=A’-C’-1 M’;  Q=C’-1C   and  D= M -1M’                    (A1.34)
then a 2n * 2n matrix can be defined as:
=  









""
""
 
D
QDQ
                                       (A1.35)
where “ denotes inverse transpose of a matrix. If one construct the real Shur triangular
decomposition form W’W of the matrix 
W’W =  





22
1211
0 

                                               (A1.36)
where each  12  is also a triangular, n*n, matrix, then matrix  X=W21W11-1 solves the
above Riccati equation where W21 and W11 are n*n submatrices of W.
137 Based on Aoki (1987/1990) pp 78-82
301
A1.6 Method and Tools: BayesDSGE system design and its modifications
A.1.6.1 PCL Implementation in BayesDSGE
This  PCL86  solution  and  estimation  method  for  DSGE  models  was  initially
implemented  as  a  modification  and  an  extension  to  BayesDSGE,  a  generic,  small
DSGE estimation and IRF simulation software package, a system of Matlab routines
that was developed by A. Justiniano. BayesDSGE was built around C. Sims’ functions
gensys  and  csminwel  (See  Sims  2002a).  It  had  to  be  modified  in  the  course  of
implementing the PCL1986 method as described in detail in Perendia (2006), and then
used in Pearlman and Perendia (2006) and Perendia (2008) research work. 
The BayesDSGE system is a two stage solution variant of the standard MCMC DSGE
tool  and  is  based  on  the  recursive  state-space  Kalman-Filter  MLE  (stage  1),  and
Bayesian  MCMC  Random-Walk  Metropolis-Hastings  algorithm  (stage  2)
methodologies. 
The system has been modified and extended with:
.1 the modified, part information general solution method outlined in the Timing
Issues  section  of   and  implemented  in  the  new  module  PI_gensys,  which
replaces  C.  Sims  (2002a)’ gensys,  but  continues  to  utilise  his  QZdiv  and
QZswitch routines for real Shur triangular decomposition and ordering matrix
elements by eigenvalues respectively (see above schema). 
.2 The existing Gensyslikel  and Gensyspost  modules needed to be modified to
handle the changes to the system.
.3 the new, computationally more complex set of functions for the new partial (but
symmetric) information assumption of the Kalman filter (PT_ KF in the above
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schema) based on the solution provided in Pearlman, Currie and Levine 1986
and its data rich generalisation and (as outlined earlier in the text and presented
in  detail  earlier  in  Appendix  1)  which  replaces  the  asymmetric  information
Kalman filter (KF in the schema):
 the modified Kalman filter shell routine which completes the PCL86 system
equation  solution  method  before  calling  the  new,  part-info  Kalman  filter
functions (pt_info_kf_shell.m),
 Fast discrete Riccati equation solver called by the new “shell”.
 A new Part info Kalman filter (pt_info_kf.m) 
A.1.6.2 General PCL Usage Notes
Both, BayesDSGE developed by A. Justiniano and Dynare are generic tools for solving
and estimating numerically DSGE models built in Matlab programming language (with
Dynare  having  some  technical  extension  in  other  languages  too).  In  both  cases,
economic DSGE models are specified in generic manner, without needing particular
characteristics for PCL86 partial  information solution and estimation.  They are then
passed through the system for either their standard, “full-info” solution and estimation,
or, using a simple system specific command, directed through a variant of the PCL86
based, however, to specific system adjusted solver and Kalman filter. 
In either of the two package implementations, a generic DSGE model can be, without
modifications,  passed  through  either  the  package's,  system specific  standard,  “full-
info”, or, the PCL86 based part-info solver and estimation pipelines with its appropriate
specific Kalman filter. However, users would see a difference in the results only when
their  DSGE economic  model  has  more  shocks than observable  variables,  otherwise
results should be equal. 
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A.1.6.3 Notes on Accessing PCL86 Matlab Implementations
Because both, BayesDSGE developed by A. Justiniano and Dynare are generic tools for
solving  and  estimating  numerically  DSGE  models  built  in  Matlab  programming
language, PCL implementation was also generic. 
However, reproducing PCL86 code for BayesDSGE within a PhD publication would
not be appropriate for two main reasons. This is primarily due to its large size, but also,
because it is part of a proprietary package system initially developed by A. Justiniano
and that it would not be much helpful to users without having seen and having access to
the whole proprietary package the new code it is part of. 
Readers interested in analysing the relevant Matlab code developed specifically for
PCL86  based  DSGE  model  solution,  its  Kalman  filter  estimation  and  IRF
simulation are, therefore, advised to access and downoload the relevant code from
the Dynare web-site, (www.dynare.org), where it is available as a part of a free,
public domain DSGE toolkit.
For  technical  details  on  PCL86  implementation  in  Dynare,  please  refer  to
Pearlman 2009, Perendia 2010d, and, Levine and Pearlman 2011 as well as Dynare
users’ manual and material related to partial information.
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Appendix 2a: Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR)
Note: This section replicates section from Perendia (2006) describing an extension
to PCL86 used in Pearlman and Perendia (2006), Levine Pearlman and Perendia
(2007) and in Perendia (2008).
Here  we briefly  explain  Factor  Augmented  VAR,  a  variant  of  which  was  used  for
estimation  of  our  initial  model  in  Levine,  Pearlman  and  Perendia  (2007)  and  in
Perendia (2008) in conjunction with PCL86 solver described earlier.
To overcome some of the remaining limitations of VAR, B-VAR and Structural VAR
(SVAR) models, such as relatively small number of variables and time-series they can
handle138 leading to “price puzzle”139, and, building on the work by Stock and Watson
(1999)140, several papers by Bernanke, (Bernanke and Boivin (2003) and, Bernanke et
al. (2004/2005)) describe and use new, Factor-Augmented VAR (FAVAR) method. 
In general, FAVAR works by nesting two VARs into the one VAR estimation process:
one for a small number of observations directly related to (or representing) the variables
of the model of interest  Yt, another made of a number of inherently non-observable
variables that augment the SVAR estimation – factors Ft, and additional vector of noisy
indicator observations Xt that are, driven by both Ft and Yt via the matrix =[F Y] of
estimated relational parameters so that:
Xt = FFt + YYt + t = [F Y] 





t
t
Y
F
+t = (Ln) 







1
1
t
t
Y
F
+t                  (A2a.1)
138 Inclusion of additional variables in standard VARs is severely limited by degrees-of-freedom
problems.
139 The conventional finding in the VAR literature that a contractionary monetary policy shock
is followed by an increase in the price level, rather than a decrease as standard economic theory
would predict.
140 For example, Bernanke & Boivin 2003 build upon the work of Stock and Watson (1999) who
conclude that “the best-performing forecast for inflation is an augmented Phillips curve forecast
that uses a new composite index of aggregate activity comprised of the 168 individual activity
measures”. 
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Where  (L)  







1
1
t
t
Y
F
 +t  defines  dual  VAR  state  equation  with  order  n  and  lag
polynomial operator L. 
FAVAR has a dual form, one of which combines the SVAR analysis with the recent
developments  in  non-parametric,  principal  component  analysis  based  dimension
reduction, and the other, which combines SVAR with Bayesian likelihood and Gibbs
sampling based estimation of the parameters [F Y] and factors  Ft from the set of
noisy  indicators.  The  latter  form was  used  to  extend  PCL86  solution  method,  the
reduced state space (i.e. VAR) form of the transformed model with, noisy observations
linear equations as factors augmenting estimation of the current estimates of the current
variables zt,t using L1 and L2 appropriately sized selection matrices in equations A.1.28
and  A.1.29  above).  The  non-pre-calibrated  additional  parameters  were  then  also
included into the estimation. 
NOTE: due to alternations to implementation of PCL86 into Dynare and complexity of
Dynare  system FAVAR-like  extension  was  not  ported  and  implemented  in  Dynare
system.
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Appendix 2b: Model and its Linearisation
Note: This section replicates model as described in detail in  Perendia (2006) and
used  in  Pearlman  and  Perendia  (2006),  Levine  Pearlman  and  Perendia  (2007)  and
Perendia (2008).
A2b.1 Households
For  most  contemporary  economic  models,  the  starting  point  is  a  constrained
maximisation  of  the  individual  multi-generational  household  ’s  expected,  inter-
temporal utility function U over infinite time and for all future generations and based
on contemporary expectations at time t=0. In its Euler type first degree discrete time
interval approximation it is usually expressed as:
E0[

0t
tUt]                         (A2b.1.1)
Where  is a future discount coefficient, usually assumed to be constrained 0<<1 and,
for simplicity, assumed to be time and household invariant141.
The instantaneous utility function (Felicity function) is expressed as a “balancing act”
optimisation function of consumption C and leisure.(1-N) where N is time (number of
hours) spent in work (assumed not to be source of pleasure). Definition of the felicity
function  varies  slightly,  however,  between authors142.  SW02 and Batini  et  al.  (05a)
define the household’s  objective felicity function as:
   Ut= C,t[

 

 
1
))(( 1,tCt HC  + M,t 
 


1
)/)(( 1tt PM -N,t 
 

 
1
))(( 1,tNt HN  + u(G t)]
(A2b.1.2)
141 Usually approximated as 1/(1+r*) where r* is real interest rate, though, in reality, this is not
the case in relation to an individual person and the phase of his/her life.
142 and even between two papers by the same authors (e.g. SW02 and SW03)
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Where HC,t and HN,t are consumption and labour supply143 habits based on past time
behaviour, life-style rigidity and a wish not to differ from the rest of the community.
The  consumption  risk  factor  is   (i.e.  inverse  of  the  inter-temporal  elasticity  of
consumption) and   is the inverse Frisch (disutility) of labour supply, i.e. inverse of
labour supply substitution elasticity144. M t ()/P t  is the real cash balance at the end of
period and   is in SW02 denoted as   m and defined as the “inverse of elasticity of
money  holding  in  respect  to  interest  rate”145.  C,t,  M,t  and  N,t are  the  general
consumption, the money demand and labour supply preference shocks respectively.146
They  are  assumed  to  follow  an  AR1  random  walk  stochastic  process  with  their
respective IID normal eerms X,t (where X is one of M,C or N). HN,t and HC,t are labour
and consumption life-style rigidities (or habits) defined as shock-less AR1 process in
proportion  to  past  labour  supply and consumption:   HC,t =  hCCt-1 and  HN,t =  hNNt-1
respectively147. The u(G t) is the utility of exogenous government spending at time t.
Households are expected to respect an inter-temporal budget constraint which may be
expressed in a variety of ways. Essentially148, in a differential equation form, a simple
budget constraint equation can be defined as:
A’t = WtNt + rtAt –Ct –Tt                                                                         (A2b.1.3)
where Wt is wage, At is the risk–free equivalent value of an income bearing portfolio of
assets  and state  contingent  claims (i.e.  normalised to its  risk-free value),  r t the real
interest rate and T taxes. It is assumed that any income residuals from period t are re-
143 SW02 and SW03 do not take into account labour supply habits.
144 In B&G and S&W - also appearing as L–inverse elasticity of labour supply in relation to
wage  i.e.  coef..  of  relative  inter-temporal  labour  supply  substitution  (labour  supply  "risk
aversion")
145 However, it may be considered as an instance of investment risk-aversion coefficient.
146 In SW02 word “preference” attributes only C,t and does not play part in definition of the
other two, and, hence, it is unclear whether the other two are “endogenous” to household or not.
147 Although  a  certain  level  of  smoothing-up  the  past  through  aggregation,  averaging  or
indexation is often assumed rather than relying on the imminent, first lag only.
148 Based on Heijdra & Van Der Plong 2002
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invested in additional assets149. Multiplying sides with e-R(t,) where R(t,)=  

t
ds s)r(  ,
integrating both sides and solving by partial differentiation, the resulting equation leads
to:
A(t) = 


t
)]T( ))N(W(-)[C(  e-R(t,)d +[lim->ooA()e-R(t,)] (A2b.1.4)
Each household  has,  however,  also had to  adhere  to  a  so called “No Ponzi  game”
lifestyle constraint which restrains households from holding any debts or any savings at
the ultimate “end of time”150, thus,
 
lim->ooA()e-R(t,)=0                                                                              (A2b.1.5)
and 
A(t) =  


t
)]T( ))N(W(-)[C(  e-(t,)d A2b.1.6)
Or, in a discrete time Euler approximation:
At+1 = WtNt + (1+rt)At –Ct –Tt                                                                                          (A2b.1.7)
-with a “No Ponzi game” lifestyle constraint: 
limt->oo A(t)e-R(t)=0   where e-R(t)~ i=1…t (1+ rt-i)-1                                (A2b.1.8)
the inter-temporal budget is then:
A(t) = t(WtNt + (1+rt)At –Ct –Tt)e-R(t)                                        (A2b..1.9)
For  example,  the  budget  constrain  in  SW02  (with  small  notational  differences)  is
149 It may have been allowed that A is negative representing a borrowing that needs to be repaid.
150 In some earlier instances, this was considered to be the end of an individual’s lifecycle but
inter-temporal, multi-generational households are now considered to last to “the end of time”.
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defined as:
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B 1  + Yt –Ct –It                  (A2b.1.10)
where Bt/Pt is bond income and bt its price151.  Their definition of household income can
be simplified to Yt=(WtNt +At) but they extended it with the difference between the
return on the real capital stock (rtztKt-1) and the cost of its utilisation zt, variation ((zt)
Kt-1) and dividend income Div, hence: 
Yt = (WtNt +At)+ (rtztKt-1 -(zt)Kt-1) +Div                     (A2b.1.11)
In the authors’ initial model, household ‘s budget constraint is expressed as:
PtCt()+At() +M t()= W t()(1-T t)N t()+(1+R t-1 )At-1() + Mt-1()+t()     (A2b.1.12)
Where P is price index, A t() is household ‘s aggregate end-of-period deposits and/or
riskless investments assets (e.g. government bonds), W t() – wage and t() dividend
income net of taxes and T – labour wage income taxes.
  
A2b.2 Consumption
Maximising the household’s instantaneous utility, a felicity objective function in respect
to consumption and asset holdings (i.e. bonds in case of SW02) and having a budget
constraint defined as above, Smets and Wouters derive first order conditions in form:
E[
1
1


tt
ttt
P
PR


] =1                                                      (A2b.2.1)
Where Rt is the gross nominal rate of return on bonds (Rt=1+rt = 1/bt) and  t is the
marginal utility of consumption:
151  The real cash balances M t (r)/P t  may be ignored if cash is not assumed to be held over
between the periods but tax Tt may be added to the balance sheet too as Batini et al. (05a) do.
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t =  t(Ct – Ht)c                                                                                                (A2b.2.2)
Similarly, demand for cash is given by
M,t(
t
t
P
M
)m = (Ct – Ht)c -1/(1+rt)                                  (A2b.2.3)
A2b.3 Labour supply and wages
According to the SW02 model, households fully re-optimise their wages at time t with
probability 1-w for a long time ahead (where w is wage stickiness or a wage rigidity
factor).  Household   aims  to  optimise  their  wages  so  as  to  maximise  their  utility
objective function subject to constraints such as the demand for labour defined as:
N,t = (
t
t
W
W ,
)w,t/w,t Nt                                                         (A2b.3.1)
Where w,t is mark-up shock152 at time t and w is mean from IID driven wage mark-up
shock  w,t =w +  w,t, and, Nt and Wt are the aggregate labour demand and (average)
nominal wage respectively aggregated across all households153 defined in Dixit-Stiglitz
form154 as:
 Nt = (  
1
0
)w1/(1
,

 tN d)w,t   and Wt = (  
1
0
w/1
,

 tW d)w,t                   (A2b.3.2)
The  households  that  do  not  receive  re-optimisation  approval  signal  and  cannot  re-
optimise. They may be able to adjust by past inflation rate as:
152 Batini et al. (2005a) instead   w,t/w,t use    - a (time invariant) demand elasticity for
specialised labour.
153 SW02 make  an  unrealistic  abstraction  that  all  households  can  supply the  full  range  of
differentiated labour. Such an assumption can lead to unrealistically low estimates for w.
154 Batini et al. (2005a) use discrete sum instead of  averaging 
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)w W,t-1                                                                       (A2b.3.3)
depending on whether their wage indexation factor  w is different from zero155.  For
those who do, the household utility maximisation leads to a wage re-optimisation mark-
up first order condition in the form:
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where tW
~  is  the  new  nominal  wage  and  UC  and  UL  are  the  marginal  utility  of
consumption  and  disutility  of  labour  respectively.  Given  the  above  relations,  the
aggregate wage dynamics is then driven by:
Wtw,t = Wt-1(
2
1


t
t
P
P
)w]w,t + (1-) tW
~ w,t                                               (A2b.3.5)
A2b.4 Firms and producers
In line with Batini et al. 05a, an output driven by a CES model results in an individual
firm f’s output 156:
Yf,t= At ((
1
)w,tw,t 






1
)w1/(1
,tfN )w,t = AtNf,t                (A2b.4.1)
where At , Nf,t and Nf,t are the exogenous productivity shock, the firm’s demand for
labour of type and the firm’s aggregate demand for labour respectively.  is the labour
type and  – the total number of hours. The firm’s marginal cost (without considering
capital or investment and as estimated in this research) is then defined as wage cost per
155 For simplification it can be expected that w, w =[0,1] and that they are time invariant but it
is worth investigating whether they can fall outside that range and be time variant. 
156 In their formulation Batini et al. use  instead of w as noted earlier 
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unit of output relative to the producer’s price157 and given by:
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SW02 define output in a Cobb-Douglas form and, with capital investment, the firm’s
marginal cost is, in a similar way, given by:
MCt = (1/at) Wt rt ((1-)))                                    (A2b.4.3)
Where at is a productivity shock at time t and , the Cobb-Douglas proportion factor.
They then declare the final output as an aggregate of different intermediate products of
type j as: 
Yt= (  
1
0
)p1/(1
,

tjy dj)p,t                                                                                 (A2b.4.4)
Where p,t is defined (in a similar way tow,t) as a stochastic time-variant price mark-up
shock driven by IID disturbances and its shocks are passed on as inflation shocks.
Similarly, output of product j may be defined as constant return CES function
Yt= (  
1
0
/)1(
,

tjy dj) /(-1)                                                         (A2b.4.5)
where  is the elasticity of substitution. Consequently, in a perfect competitive market,
the price of final good P is an aggregate of prices of the intermediate products pj:
Pt= (  
1
0
p/1
,

tjp dj)p,t                                                           (A2b.4.6)
157 “The marginal cost of an additional unit of output is the cost of the additional inputs needed
to produce that output.  More formally, the marginal cost is the derivative of total production
costs with respect to the level of output. Marginal cost and average cost can differ greatly.  For
example, suppose it costs $1000 to produce 100 units and $1020 to produce 101 units.  The
average cost  per unit  is  $10,  but  the marginal  cost  of  the 101st  unit  is  $20” (quoted from
http://www.econmodel.com/classic/terms/mc.htm)
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Similarly to wage setting, micro level firms can also re-optimise their prices only on
random signal event and those that do not receive the signal, follow a general price
inflation indexation adjustment. The first order condition for profit optimisation is: 
Et
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iipp,t+iyj,t+i [
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And their price dynamics as:
Ptp,t = pPt-1(
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)p]w,t + (1-p) tP
~ p,t                             (A2b.4.8)
A2b.5 Investment and capital rental158
As mentioned earlier, in the SW02 model, the households rent their real capital stock Kt
(e.g. savings) to the production sector159 at rate rt . They can increase the capital supply
by investing  (It)  in  future  periods  or  by increasing  the  utilisation  zt of  the  already
existing capital at the cost of its utilisation variation  (zt)Kt-1. Both options, however
lead to a consumption reduction in the current period t. In a rather simplified160 form,
capital investment is driven by:
Kt+1= Kt(1-) + (1+i,t)It                                                        (A2b.5.1)
Where   and  i,t are capital depreciation rate and investment efficiency shocks and first
order conditions from the optimisation of the household’s budget leads to the equations
giving a real value to capital and of its utilisation:
158 To be able to discuss their equilibrium equation, a necessary subset of investment related
equations is represented here too.
159 A rather useful extension for modelling the increasing number of households involved in a
small real-estate rental business, either domestic or business.
160 BW02 introduces another factor which is not being considered for this study.
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Q= E[
t
t

 11  (Q t+1(1-) + rt+1zt+1 -(zt+1))]                             (A2b.5.2)
where rt= '(zt)
A2b.6 Equilibrium
In a closed economy defined by SW02, the goods market (steady state) equilibrium is
defined  by  an  equation  stating  that  output  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  consumption,
government spending, investment and unlike most other equilibrium models, the capital
utilisation costs (zt)Kt-1, has a complementary par to investment demand: 
Yt=Ct+Gt+It+(zt)Kt-1                                                              (A2b.6.1)
The capital rental market equilibrium is an equilibrium where demand for capital by the
intermediate goods producers is equal to the supply by households and the labour when
offered matches demand, for given wage level. 
Appendix A2c: Initial Model Linearisation
In its structural, log-linearised form, the full model consists of twelve equations in total.
It has five equations for some of the main economic, potentially measurable variables:
inflation, consumption, wage, output and the interest rate. It also has three equations for
non-observable variables, namely, marginal cost, natural (i.e. steady state) production
and, similarly, natural consumption. The, additional four auxiliary equations are for the
shocks: monetary, preference, technology and government expenditure, the latter three
being AR1 random walk processes. .
The model is log-linearised around its steady state. The core part of its log-linearised
form (based on the model used in Batini et al. 2005 b), has eleven equations:
                                           (1)
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                                                                                          (2)
             (3)
 
                        (4)
                                                                                             (5)
                                        (6)
                                                                                         (7)
                                                                                     (8)
                                                                         (9)
                                                    (10)
                                                                                    (11)
(A2c.1)
Where:
C, G and Y represent steady state values for consumption, government spending and the
total (GDP) output respectively. 
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Equation 1 is a RE forward-looking Philips curve relation for inflation t.  It is defined
as  a  function  of  past  and  future  expectations  of  inflation,  price  indexation  to  past
inflation  , a future discount coefficient  161 a Calvo price stickiness (price rigidity)
factor   and the marginal cost itself defined in Eq 2. With  =0, this becomes simple
forward-looking inflation equation. With  =0, the prices in the system become fully
flexible and the system fully reacts to any marginal cost change. The inflation t in this
equation and the authors’ estimation model, is a deviation from the steady state target
inflation  which  is,  in  turn,  estimated  in  the  model  as  a  parameter  t*,  hence  the
difference between this and the equivalent equation in SW03. 
Eq.2 defines marginal cost as a difference of wage wt (defined in 4) and technological
shock at. Another inter-temporal, both backward and forward looking RE determined
variable  is  aggregate  consumption ct in  Eq.  3  expressed as  a  function of  its  future
expectation and past values, a habit  (or lifestyle rigidity) factor h, preference shock
preft, expected inflation deviation t  and the consumption risk factor  (i.e. inverse of
inter-temporal elasticity of consumption). 
Inter-temporaly optimised RE also determine the combined, forward- an
d  backward-  looking  real  wage  equation  (4)  where   is  the  demand  elasticity  for
specialised labour as in Batini et al. (2005b) (expressed in Boivin and Giannoni (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2002) and (2003) as (1+w)/w) where w is the mean from the
IID wage mark-up shock w,t =w + wt in Smets and Wouters (2002) and (2003)).
161 Smetes & Wouters (2003) and Boivin & Giannoni (2005) estimate (annual) =1/(1-
+ rk)  where   is  depreciation,  rk –  capital  cost,  whilst  Batini  et  al.  (2005b)  use
rr*)  where rr* – real interest rate. This formula is closely related to  used as
a subjective future discount (i.e. the “current time preference”) rate appearing in the
literature so that the above   is an order of magnitude of 1/(1+). There is however
another, closely related factor t used in literature as a future discount, this arising from
the risk (or, subjective estimate of the risk, i.e. the fear) of death at time t (or in its very
near future) leading to lifetime uncertainty so that the future discount becomes  t+
rather than just  (both factors order of 0.01) as in the Blanchard-Yaari model (Heijdra
& Van Der Plong 2002). 
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Eq.  5  is  a  simplified  aggregate  demand  IS  curve  which  drives  production  yt as  a
function of private and government consumption (shocks). It also represents the goods
equilibrium equation.
Eq. 6 is a Taylor rule for the optimisation of the interest rate it as a function of past
interest and current inflation rates, the production gap and monetary policy shocks. 
 
The three AR1 shock processes: Government, technology and preference shocks are
AR1 random walk processes driven by their   ( 0< <1) and IID disturbances t and
defined in Eq.7, 8 and 9 respectively.
Eq. 10 and 11 define natural rates of consumption and output respectively and define
the  natural  equilibrium as  a  reference  for  estimating  consumption  and output  gaps
respectively.  In  the  initial  test  the  researchers  assume  that  there  is  no  government
spending and, C/Y=1 and G/Y=0 (i.e. y=c and ynat=cnat) Later the researchers assume
22%  of  consumption  and  spending  is  from  government  budget,  so  C/Y=0.78  and
G/Y=0.22.
  
Eq. 12 missing above is a simplified monetary policy shock equation:
mpt =  mpt                                                                                    (A2c.2)
where all xx are IID with a zero mean (e.g mpt ~N(0,mpt)):
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Appendix 3: Data and Priors for the Initial PCL Estimation
Note: This section replicates model as described in detail in Perendia (2006) and
also used in Pearlman and Perendia (2006) and Perendia (2008).
A 3.1 Priors
Estimated
Parameter
Description Density
Distrib. 
 Prior
Mean
Prior SD


Taylor  rule  inflation  smoothing
parameter.
B **) 0.85 0.15
 *) IFB  Taylor  Rule  Inflation  Feed-
Back weight
G 2 0.5
y  *) IFB Taylor Rule Production OutputFeed-Back weight
 
N
0.5 0.25
c Price  indexation  to  lagged
inflation and target *
B 0.5 0.15
w Wage  indexation  to  lagged
inflation and target *
B 0.5 0.15
c Calvo  price  stickiness  -  a
proportion of firms that do not
re-otimise  prices  every  interval
(a form of price rigidity)
B 0.75 0.15
w Calvo  wage  stickiness  -  a
proportion of firms that do not
re-optimise  wages  every  interval
(a form of wage rigidity)
B 0.75 0.15
4.
(or L)
 
Inverse  Frisch  (disutility)  of
labor supply: In B&G and S&W also
appearing  as  L -  coef.  of
relative  intertemporal  Labour
supply  substitution  "risk
aversion" – i.e. inv. of labour
supply substitution elasticity L
N 2 1.5
c Coef.  Of  relative  intertemporalconsumption  substitution  “risk
aversion”  (or  curvature  of
consumption  utility  function)  -
inverse  of  consumption
substitution elasticity c
N 1 0.375
Habit Habit  formation  (lifestyle
rigidity) weight 
B 0.7 0.15
tech AR1  coefficient  for  technologyshock
B 0.85 0.15
pref AR1  coefficient  for  consumerpreference shock
B 0.85 0.15
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*
(%)
*  -  Mean  Inflation  (Inflation
Target) in (%)
N 2.5 0.7
Rr*
(%)
Real interest Rate in (%) N 2.5 0.7
w =(1+  w)/w is demand elasticity
for  specialized  (i.e.
differentiated)  labour  supply
where (1+ w) is the mean (steady
state) part of IID wage mark-up
shock.
N 0.2 0.15
g AR1  coefficient  for  Government
spending
B 0.85 0.15
pref SD of preference shock I 0.25 1.5
tech SD of technology shock I 0.25 1.5
gg SD of monetary shock I 0.25 1.5
mp SD of government spending shock I 0.25 1.5
Derived
Parameter
s:
 Future discount factor derived as
=1/(1+rr*),or,  for  quarterly
data in (%) as:  
=1/(1+rr*(%)/100)0.25
 demand elasticity for specialized
(differentiated)  labour  supply:
=(1+ w)/w
*)  Taken from Batini et al. 05b.
**)B= Beta; G=Gamma; I=Inv. Gamma; N=Normal
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A 3.2 Data
Although Boivin and Giannoni (2005) are covering the period 1965-2002 and Smets
and Wouters (2003) are starting back in 1957, all tests in this research were done on
quarterly US data covering period 1981Q1 – 2004Q4 to analyse the later period in US
economy during which the stricter interest rate controls were introduced by the US Fed.
The initial tests were performed primarily to establish the existence of and identify the
differences between estimations with asymmetric (but full information for the agents)
and the symmetric but all partial information assumptions. The initial estimation on the
three series: yt, it  and  t, was done with data from Datastream. The interest rate was
based  on  the  Treasury  Bill  interest  rate,  and  inflation  rates  calculated  as  the  first
difference of the logs of the GDP deflator. 
Initially, the logarithm of GDP had a Hodrick-Prescott filter in Eviews is applied to
smooth  this  data.  The  smoothed  ln(GDP)  is  then  subtracted  from  the  original
ln(GDP).162 Instead of demeaning inflation and interest rate data, following Batini et al.
(2005b)  the  early  research  used  un-transformed  inflation  and  interest  rate  data
expressed  in  percentages  to  estimate  the  mean,  real  inflation  and  unobserved  real
interest rates. These are used later in the calculation of the quarterly, future discount
coefficient  as =1/(1+r*/100 )1/4  where r* is the unobserved, estimated real rate of
interest expressed as a pecentage giving a figure roughly around 0.995 (See note 163). 
In the second group of estimates, the researchers adopt the approach of Boivin and
Giannoni (2005). They de-trend all the series and express them as (%) deviation from
162 Though there are some considerations whether an HP filter is well suited as it may
lead to  spurious  cross-correlations  between de-trended series  (see  Harvey & Jaeger
1993) and Smets & Wouters (2003) use an alternative solution, HP filter is being widely
used for RBC analysis and data smoothing, e.g. in Juillard et al. (2004) and Batini et al.
(2005b).
163 Smetes & Wouters (2003) and Boivin & Giannoni (2005) imply that the (annual)
=1/(1- + rk) where is  depreciation,  rk – capital  cost and impose its value in the
estimation process rather than estimate it.
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the trend. Again, the first estimates are on the three series: log(yt), it and t based on, or
derived from GDP, the Treasury Bill rate and the first difference of the GDP deflator
data taken from Datastream as earlier. The researchers used a Hodrick-Prescott filter in
Eviews  (with  =1600)  to  de-trend  all  the  series  as  a  difference  between  the  non-
smoothed and the  HP filter  smoothed data  series  (i.e.  the  cycle  series  output  from
Eviews HP Filter function). 
Additional  data  series  for  data-rich estimation on the lines  of  Boivin and Giannoni
(2005) were found in Datastream and IFS databases (see Appendix 3). For most of the
series, where appropriate, the logs, logs of the deflated - or of the 1st differences of the
series were used instead of their level data before de-trending them using an HP filter.
Unlike BG05, the series were not expressed in % of their deviation from their trends.
Data series are quarterly covering 96 quarters: Q1 1982 – Q4 2004
Data Series: 
Initial Case A:
Source Detre
nded
Log Deflated 1st
Diff.
Extra-/intra
- polated
r = TREASURY BILL RATE TDS
=Dlog(GDP Deflator) TDS yes Deflator
series
yes
y = GDP in volume TDS HP yes
Additional Five Series For Cases
C And D
yes
CPI Based Inflation TDS HP yes yes
Private  Domestic  Fixed
Investment
TDS HP yes Yes
Unemployment Rate IFS HP
Wages:  Hourly  Earnings  in
Manufacturing  
TDS HP yes Yes
Personal  Consumption
Expenditures (Quarterly Series)
TDS HP yes Yes
Additional  Twelve  Series  For
case E
yes
Sales Of New One family Houses
vol.
TDS HP yes
322
New  Passenger  Cars  -  Total
Registrations Vol.
TDS HP yes
Us  Personal  Saving  As  %  Of
Disposable Personal Income S.Adj
TDS HP yes
Consumer  Confidence  Index
S.Adj
TDS HP yes
Gov Consumption and Investment TDS HP yes Yes
Industrial  Production  -
Manufacturing
TDS HP yes Yes
Gold Price TDS HP yes Yes
Crude Brent Oil Price BP+
TDS
HP yes See
note164
partial165
Crude Petroleum Production (vol) IFS HP yes
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index
– Price Index
TDS HP yes
Consumption  Of  Fixed  Capital,
Lag 1
IFS HP yes Yes
The  Conference  Board  Leading
Economic Indicators Index
TDS HP yes Yes
164 It was deemed unnecessary since HP filter performs well the deflation using GDP
deflator and the two outputs were identical. 
165 For period 1981Q1- 1982Q2 not covered by TDS data are converted annual price
sourced from BP
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Appendix 4: Results of initial PCL estimation: Additional Relations
Estima-tedPara-
meters:
Asym.Info
15KMCMC
draws
Asym.info
Max.Likel
ihoodest.
Priord
ensity
PriorMe
an
PriorSD
rhoPiCG 0.756 0.760 I 0.850 0.150
rhoCcp 0.331 0.333 I 0.650 0.150
rhoWwh 0.023 0.020 I 0.050 0.150
rhoUy 0.827 0.744 I 0.800 0.150
rhoInvi 0.006 0.006 I 0.050 0.150
rhoCpiC 0.875 0.583 I 0.650 0.150
rhoWcp 0.328 0.308 I 0.650 0.150
rhoYwh 0.284 0.279 I 0.650 0.150
rhoWuu 0.616 0.580 I 0.650 0.150
rhoPiuu 0.381 0.361 I 0.650 0.150
rhoIuu 0.283 0.272 I 0.650 0.150
rhoYInv 3.374 3.362 I 0.650 0.150
rhoSAVEy 0.705 0.581 I 0.650 0.150
rhoSAVEii 0.196 0.208 I 0.650 0.150
rhoCHOUSEy 0.616 0.540 I 0.650 0.150
rhoCHOUSEcc 69.133 66.288 I 0.650 0.150
rhoCHOUSEii 0.404 0.446 I 0.650 0.150
rhoCHOUSEipi 0.268 0.251 I 0.650 0.150
rhoCCARy 0.626 0.670 I 0.650 0.150
rhoCCARcc 0.594 0.592 I 0.650 0.150
rhoCGOVgg 0.581 0.582 I 0.650 0.150
rhoCCONFXy 0.746 0.656 I 0.650 0.150
rhoCCONFXcc 90.221 83.701 I 0.650 0.150
rhoCCONFXii 0.564 0.597 I 0.650 0.150
rhoCCONFXipi 0.316 0.288 I 0.650 0.150
rhoKPTLy 0.570 0.518 I 0.650 0.150
rhoKPTLcc 25.760 23.139 I 0.650 0.150
rhoKPTLii 0.202 0.193 I 0.650 0.150
rhoYECOXy 0.395 0.339 I 0.650 0.150
rhoYMNFCTy 0.434 0.406 I 0.650 0.150
rhoYOILy 0.529 0.430 I 0.650 0.150
rhoPOILcc 0.520 0.556 I 0.650 0.150
rhoPCMDTXy 0.587 0.583 I 0.650 0.150
rhoPCMDTXcc 0.603 0.531 I 0.650 0.150
rhoPGOLDcc 0.913 0.608 I 0.650 0.150
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Appendix 5: Comparing Full and Partial Information Impulse response 
functions (IRF): Effect of incomplete (partial) information assumptions
Table A5. 1: shocks present in the model used in the tests and number of observed
variables assumed in simulation and relevant graph(s):
Shock Description Full  3 ob. 2 ob. 1 ob.
eps_g Gov. spending 5.4 5.5 5.6
eps_a Technology 5.1 5.2 5.3
eps_ms Price Markup Shock 5.13 5.14 5.15
eps_r Interest rate 5.7 5.8 5.9
eps_c Consumption 5.10 5.11 5.12
Figure A5.1: : Dynare and full information PCL IRFs for eps_a technology shock
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Figure A5.2: Part information PCL IRFs for eps_a technology shock and only pi, y and
r observed
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Figure A5.3: Part information PCL IRFs for eps_a technology shock and only pi and y
(left) and pi and r (right) are observed
Figure A5.4: Dynare and full information PCL IRFs for eps_g shock
.
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Figure A5.5: Part information PCL IRFs for eps_g gov. spending shock and only pi, y
and r observed: 
Figure A5.6: Part information PCL IRFs for eps_g shock and only pi and y (left) and pi
and r (right) are observed
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Figure A5.7: Dynare and full information PCL IRFs for eps_r interest rate shock.
Figure A5.8: Part information PCL IRFs for eps_r interest rate shock and pi, y and r
observed:
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Figure A5.9: Part information PCL IRFs for eps_r shock and only pi and y (left) and pi
and r (right) are observed
Fig A5.10: Dynare and full information PCL IRFs for eps_c consumption rate shock.
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Fig. A5.11: Part information PCL IRFs for eps_c consumption shock and pi, y and r
observed:
 
Fig A5.12: Part information PCL IRFs for eps_c shock and only pi and y (left) and pi
and r (right) are observed:
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Fig A5.13: Dynare and full information PCL IRFs for eps_ms shock:
Fig. A5.14: Part information PCL IRFs for eps_ms shock and only pi, y and r observed:
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Fig A5.15: Part information PCL IRFs for eps_ms shock and only pi and y (left) and pi
and r (right) are observed:
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Appendix 6: Results for Fiscal Policy Rules
Table A6.1 Summary estimates of the parameters for model M12
Parameter Point estimates M12 estimates
SW07 
Label
Description M0/
SW07
M12 Distribution Mean Std. error
a Technology shock AR1 coefficient 0.9585 0.9426 BETA 0.5 0.20;
 b Consumption preference shock 
AR1 coefficient
0.1623 0.476 BETA 0.5 0.20;
 g Government spending   shock AR1
coefficient
0.9688 0.9741 BETA 0.5 0.20;
 l Investment cost shock AR1 
coefficient
0.7038 0.7122 BETA 0.5 0.20;
 r Interest rate shock AR1 coefficient 0.1311 0.1285 BETA 0.5 0.20;
 p Mark-up disturbance AR1 
coefficient
0.9405 0.9351 BETA 0.5 0.20;
w Wage shock AR1 coefficient 0.9771 0.9785 BETA 0.5 0.20;
 p Price markup 0.7861 0.798 BETA 0.5 0.2;
 w Wage markup 0.8683 0.878 BETA 0.5 0.2;
  Steady-state elasticity of the
capital adjustment cost
5.3508 5.4984 NORMAL 4 1.5;
 c Consumption risk aversion 1.3027 1.333 NORMAL 1.50 0.375;
H Habit 0.739 0.7889 BETA 0.7 0.1;
w Probability of wage adjustment in 
period
0.7002 0.7056 BETA 0.5 0.1;
 l Labour risk aversion 1.6706 1.1582 NORMAL 2 0.75;
 p Probability of price adjustment in 
period
0.6225 0.6782 BETA 0.5 0.10;
iw Wage indexation 0.5894 0.5661 BETA 0.5 0.15;
ip Price indexation 0.2447 0.2497 BETA 0.5 0.15;
Z Elasticity of the capital utilisation 0.4687 0.3994 BETA 0.5 0.15;
/Y0 Fixed cost in production relative to
output 
0.7054 1.5279 NORMAL 0.25 0.125;
r Inflation coefficient in Taylor rule 2.0619 2.0298 NORMAL 1.5 0.25;
rr Interest rate coefficient in Taylor 
rule  
0.8148 0.806 BETA 0.75 0.10;
r y Output coefficient in Taylor rule 0.0846 0.0842 NORMAL 0.125 0.05;
r y Lagged output difference 
coefficient in Taylor rule
0.2125 0.219 NORMAL 0.125 0.05;
Long term inflation (constant) 0.6107 0.6155 GAMMA 0.625 0.1;
 Discount factor 0.21 0.21 GAMMA 0.25 0.1;
Long term labour 0.2284 0.3773 NORMAL 0.0 2.0;
 Growth Trend 0.4258 0.4217 NORMAL 0.4 0.10;
gy Technology shock effect on 0.6045 0.7363 NORMAL 0.5 0.25;
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government spending
 Capital weight production function 0.2957 0.3202 NORMAL 0.3 0.05;
gu Employment difference (11e) in 
the government spending rule
N/A -0.1732 NORMAL 0.01 0.2;
 News in consumption N/A 0.1463 NORMAL 0.1 2.0;
gw News in the government spending 
rule 
N/A -0.26 NORMAL 0.01 0.2;
Std. error of AR1 shocks:
 a Technology shock 0.4239 0.4433 INV_GAMMA0.1 2;
 b Consumption shock 0.2469 0.0833 INV_GAMMA0.1 2;
 g Government spending shock 0.5349 0.5566 INV_GAMMA0.1 2;
q Investment shock 0.4597 0.4575 INV_GAMMA0.1 2;
 r Monetary (interest rate) shock 0.2410 0.2442 INV_GAMMA0.1 2;
 Inflation shock 0.1372 0.1376 INV_GAMMA0.1 2;
 w Wage shock 0.2469 0.24 INV_GAMMA0.1 2;
AR1 shock to consumption 
propensity - normal economy
N/A 1.463 INV_GAMMA0.1 2;
AR1 shock to consumption 
propensity - frictionless economy
N/A 0.046 INV_GAMMA0.1 2;
Notes: The results are based on using Sims (2002a) ‘scminwel’ algorithm; see the Table
in the following section for more details. 
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Table A6.2:  Posterior Maximization of the Original SW07 Model
Parameter prior mean  mode   s.d. t-stat   prior pstdev
crhoa       0.500   0.9585  0.0106 90.2220 beta  0.2000
crhob       0.500   0.1623  0.0779  2.0839 beta  0.2000
crhog       0.500   0.9688  0.0092 105.6310 beta  0.2000
crhoqs      0.500   0.7038  0.0603 11.6642 beta  0.2000
crhoms      0.500   0.1311  0.0665  1.9737 beta  0.2000
crhopinf    0.500   0.9405  0.0380 24.7624 beta  0.2000
crhow       0.500   0.9771  0.0098 100.1353 beta  0.2000
cmap        0.500   0.7861  0.0869  9.0460 beta  0.2000
cmaw        0.500   0.8683  0.0674 12.8896 beta  0.2000
csadjcost   4.000   5.3508  1.0149  5.2724 norm  1.5000
csigma      1.500   1.3027  0.1331  9.7838 norm  0.3750
chabb       0.700   0.7390  0.0442 16.7268 beta  0.1000
cprobw      0.500   0.7002  0.0795  8.8038 beta  0.1000
csigl       2.000   1.6706  0.6229  2.6819 norm  0.7500
cprobp      0.500   0.6225  0.0576 10.8135 beta  0.1000
cindw       0.500   0.5894  0.1359  4.3373 beta  0.1500
cindp       0.500   0.2447  0.0959  2.5521 beta  0.1500
czcap       0.500   0.4687  0.1049  4.4676 beta  0.1500
cfc         1.250   1.7054  0.0762 22.3797 norm  0.1250
crpi        1.500   2.0619  0.1755 11.7454 norm  0.2500
crr         0.750   0.8148  0.0245 33.2613 beta  0.1000
cry         0.125   0.0846  0.0225  3.7636 norm  0.0500
crdy        0.125   0.2125  0.0270  7.8551 norm  0.0500
constepinf   0.625   0.6107  0.0667  9.1598 gamm  0.1000
constebeta   0.250   0.2100  0.0917  2.2913 gamm  0.1000
constelab   0.000   0.2284  1.0173  0.2245 norm  2.0000
ctrend      0.400   0.4258  0.0214 19.9343 norm  0.1000
cgy         0.500   0.6045  0.0970  6.2298 norm  0.2500
calfa       0.300   0.2957  0.0442  6.6882 norm  0.0500
Log data density [Laplace approximation] is -924.955511.
(for comparison, see table 1A in SW07)
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Table A6.3: MCMC Estimation Results For The Original SW07 
Parameter    prior mean   post. mean   conf. interval  prior     pstdev
crhoa          0.500     0.9560     0.9411   0.9741  beta      0.2000
crhob          0.500     0.1923     0.0605   0.3196  beta      0.2000
crhog          0.500     0.9683     0.9526   0.9859  beta      0.2000
crhoqs         0.500     0.7148     0.6219   0.8144  beta      0.2000
crhoms         0.500     0.1470     0.0470   0.2428  beta      0.2000
crhopinf       0.500     0.9201     0.8514   0.9924  beta      0.2000
crhow          0.500     0.9711     0.9487   0.9910  beta      0.2000
cmap           0.500     0.6806     0.4486   0.8997  beta      0.2000
cmaw           0.500     0.8243     0.7084   0.9284  beta      0.2000
csadjcost      4.000     5.4920     3.7946   7.0321  norm      1.5000
csigma         1.500     1.3106     1.1020   1.5251  norm      0.3750
chabb          0.700     0.7328     0.6621   0.8133  beta      0.1000
cprobw         0.500     0.6842     0.5735   0.7888  beta      0.1000
csigl          2.000     1.6460     0.6705   2.4433  norm      0.7500
cprobp         0.500     0.6199     0.5318   0.7017  beta      0.1000
cindw          0.500     0.5985     0.3974   0.8031  beta      0.1500
cindp          0.500     0.2344     0.0879   0.3710  beta      0.1500
czcap          0.500     0.4950     0.3381   0.6583  beta      0.1500
cfc            1.250     1.7028     1.5673   1.8233  norm      0.1250
crpi           1.500     2.0598     1.8167   2.3084  norm      0.2500
crr            0.750     0.8116     0.7743   0.8488  beta      0.1000
cry            0.125     0.0819     0.0476   0.1148  norm      0.0500
crdy           0.125     0.2149     0.1697   0.2624  norm      0.0500
constepinf      0.625     0.6366     0.5241   0.7693  gamm      0.1000
constebeta      0.250     0.2279     0.0819   0.3668  gamm      0.1000
constelab      0.000    -0.0970    -2.0788   1.6590  norm      2.0000
ctrend         0.400     0.4223     0.3874   0.4609  norm      0.1000
cgy            0.500     0.6038     0.4493   0.7605  norm      0.2500
calfa          0.300     0.2952     0.2226   0.3609  norm      0.0500
Log data density is -929.036863.
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Table A6.4: Posterior maximization: extended model with news and rules 
Parameter    prior mean mode    s.d. t-stat prior pstdev
crhoa        0.500   0.9500  0.0149 63.5825 beta  0.2000
crhob        0.500   0.4563  0.1751  2.6053 beta  0.2000
crhog        0.500   0.9727  0.0099 98.7354 beta  0.2000
crhoqs       0.500   0.7436  0.0616 12.0720 beta  0.2000
crhoms       0.500   0.1069  0.0597  1.7895 beta  0.2000
crhopinf     0.500   0.9516  0.0590 16.1327 beta  0.2000
crhow        0.500   0.9737  0.0129 75.7312 beta  0.2000
cmap         0.500   0.8602  0.1062  8.1023 beta  0.2000
cmaw         0.500   0.8974  0.0423 21.2079 beta  0.2000
csadjcost    4.000   4.8032  1.4321  3.3540 norm  1.5000
csigma       1.500   1.3701  0.1399  9.7913 norm  0.3750
chabb        0.700   0.7886  0.0432 18.2604 beta  0.1000
cprobw       0.500   0.6572  0.0719  9.1458 beta  0.1000
csigl        2.000   1.9094  0.6817  2.8010 norm  0.7500
cprobp       0.500   0.7156  0.0627 11.4089 beta  0.1000
cindw        0.500   0.5369  0.1429  3.7560 beta  0.1500
cindp        0.500   0.2340  0.0908  2.5771 beta  0.1500
czcap        0.500   0.3955  0.0917  4.3123 beta  0.1500
cfc          1.250   1.5541  0.0839 18.5201 norm  0.1250
crpi         1.500   1.9839  0.1824 10.8768 norm  0.2500
crr          0.750   0.8170  0.0251 32.5844 beta  0.1000
cry          0.125   0.0707  0.0266  2.6553 norm  0.0500
crdy         0.125   0.2221  0.0274  8.0962 norm  0.0500
constepinf   0.625   0.6275  0.0693  9.0514 gamm  0.1000
constebeta   0.250   0.2100  0.0917  2.2913 gamm  0.1000
constelab    0.000   0.2713  1.1661  0.2326 norm  2.0000
ctrend       0.400   0.4236  0.0239 17.7490 norm  0.1000
cgy          0.500   0.8238  0.1213  6.7884 norm  0.2500
calfa        0.300   0.3231  0.0404  7.9938 norm  0.0500
cgu          0.010   0.1728  0.1366  1.2647 norm  0.2000
wrhou        0.100   0.0201  0.0123  1.6323 norm  0.2000
crhowcpf     1.000  -0.1868  0.0960  1.9455 norm  2.0000
crhowcp      1.000   0.1309  0.0274  4.7854 norm  2.0000
cgw          0.010  -0.2337  0.0585  3.9971 norm  0.2000
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Log data density [Laplace approximation] is -916.513551.
A.6.IRF Diagrams
Figure A.6.1 IRFs to a shock to unemployment:
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Figure A.6.2 IRFs to a shock to propensity to consume (the news)
Figure A.6.3 IRFs to a shock to government spending
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Figure A.6.4 IRFs to a shock to monetary policy rate r
Figure A.6.5 IRFs to a shock to wage w
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Figure A.6.6 IRFs to a shock to inflation
Figure A.6.7 IRFs to a shock to technology
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Appendix 7: Yield Curve Estimation Results
A7.1 Estimation of the YC in the Initial Model with PC:86 and FAVAR
A.7.1.3 Results
NOTE: 
Throughout this estimation all of the aN parameters to Rt have been set to 1.
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Basic Simplified    2nd relation:
Case: Basic 7 and no
extra observations
YC with 
Y-gap only
YC with 
Y-gap and Pi gap
Likelihood: -210.261 174.9249 259.9105
     
Extra Parameter Estimates:
Simplified 2nd relation:
Y-gap only Y-gap and Pi gap
Y-gap: b1y 0.018302 0.040045
b3y 0.1234 0.1064
b5y 0.18327 0.14951
b10y 0.24397 0.19151
Pi gap r1y n/a -0.06075
r3y n/a 0.15287
r5y n/a 0.25605
r10y n/a 0.36936
A7.2 Estimation of the YC in the S&W07 Model with Fiscal Rule
This Appendix contains results of estimation of the S&W07 Model with news, fiscal
rule (as used in Perendia and Tsoukis 2012). In this experiment, however, its observable
dataset was augmented by one and five year Treasury bond in an additional Taylor rule
like equation, based on the early work Parendia (2008) as briefly outlined earlier in Ch
5.4, but with the risk premium time-invariant constant RP added to the rule instead of
using inflation, i.e.:
RtN = RPN + aN Rt +  byN (yt – yt*) + tN (A7.2.1)
RESULTS FROM POSTERIOR MAXIMIZATION
parameters
        prior mean     mode    s.d. t-stat prior pstdev
crhoa       0.500   0.9557  0.0104 91.7015 beta  0.2000
crhob       0.500   0.4026  0.0889  4.5298 beta  0.2000
crhog       0.500   0.9610  0.0105 91.6865 beta  0.2000
crhoqs      0.500   0.8134  0.0540 15.0682 beta  0.2000
crhoms      0.500   0.0876  0.0517  1.6942 beta  0.2000
crhopinf    0.500   0.9774  0.0179 54.5071 beta  0.2000
crhow       0.500   0.9535  0.0142 66.9143 beta  0.2000
cmap        0.500   0.9111  0.0436 20.8815 beta  0.2000
cmaw        0.500   0.8070  0.0808  9.9857 beta  0.2000
csadjcost   4.000   4.3732  1.1263  3.8826 norm  1.5000
csigma      1.500   1.9497  0.2393  8.1473 norm  0.3750
chabb       0.700   0.4959  0.0647  7.6652 beta  0.1000
cprobw      0.500   0.6325  0.1070  5.9093 beta  0.1000
csigl       2.000   0.3931  0.3306  1.1891 norm  0.7500
cprobp      0.500   0.7414  0.0523 14.1773 beta  0.1000
cindw       0.500   0.4934  0.1410  3.5003 beta  0.1500
cindp       0.500   0.2019  0.0738  2.7377 beta  0.1500
czcap       0.500   0.4214  0.0974  4.3248 beta  0.1500
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cfc         1.250   1.4704  0.0718 20.4670 norm  0.1250
crpi        1.500   1.9188  0.1699 11.2957 norm  0.2500
crr         0.750   0.8440  0.0235 35.9870 beta  0.1000
cry         0.125   0.0592  0.0161  3.6829 norm  0.0500
crdy        0.125   0.2555  0.0268  9.5409 norm  0.0500
constepinf   0.625   0.6322  0.0796  7.9407 gamm  0.1000
constebeta   0.250   0.2100  0.0916  2.2913 gamm  0.1000
constelab   0.000  -0.2671  1.2528  0.2132 norm  2.0000
ctrend      0.400   0.4661  0.0178 26.2114 norm  0.1000
cgy         0.500   0.3889  0.1137  3.4203 norm  0.2500
calfa       0.300   0.2763  0.0439  6.2869 norm  0.0500
cgu         0.010  -0.4933  0.0931  5.2983 norm  0.2000
RP1Y        0.000   0.0440  0.0283  1.5545 norm  0.5000
rhoR1Yr     1.000   0.9776  0.0502 19.4703 norm  0.0500
rhoSR1Y     1.000   1.0300  0.0227 45.3687 norm  0.0500
standard deviation of shocks
        prior mean     mode    s.d. t-stat prior pstdev
ea          0.100   0.4613  0.0296 15.5855 invg  2.0000
eb          0.100   0.1996  0.0244  8.1735 invg  2.0000
eg          0.100   0.6450  0.0489 13.1862 invg  2.0000
eqs         0.100   0.4088  0.0376 10.8621 invg  2.0000
em          0.100   0.2446  0.0153 15.9925 invg  2.0000
epinf       0.100   0.1536  0.0165  9.3003 invg  2.0000
ew          0.100   0.2334  0.0240  9.7315 invg  2.0000
ewcp        0.100   0.0461  0.0188  2.4502 invg  2.0000
ewcpf       0.100   0.0461  0.0188  2.4502 invg  2.0000
EM_R1Y      0.100   0.1732  0.0112 15.4063 invg  2.0000
 
Log data density [Laplace approximation] is -892.566505
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Appendix 8 Taylor Rule and Stochastic Interest Rate 
Forecasting
A 8.1 Taylor Rule
Along the lines of SW07, the macroeconomic model used in this research implements a
set of Taylor type inflation targeting rules (Taylor 1993) in monetary policy reaction
equations aimed at estimating the optimal real interest and inflation rates: 
r = p + .5y + .5(p - 2) + 2 (1)  (A8.1.1)
where
r is the nominal base interest rate ( e.g federal funds rate in the US),
P is the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters
Y is the percent deviation of real GDP from a target.
This simple, two-factor Taylor rule has gone a long way since its publication in 1993. A
more comprehensive rule equation for optimisation of interest rate r t as a function of
past interest rate and, the current (j=0) or the expected future inflation rate (j>0)166, the
production gap167 (yt – ynat,t), and the monetary policy shock mptt, can be given by:
rt = rt-1 + (1-)[E t,t+j + y (yt – ynat,t)] + mptt          (A8.1.2)
where ,  and  y are inflation forecasting based (IFB) monetary policy reaction (i.e.
166 Note: Following Batini et al. (2005b) it and t in this research equation are neither real nor
nominal  observations  but  deviations  from the  mean,  difference  between the  observed  data
(when available, e.g.obs,t  in this case) and the unobserved means, r* and t* respectively. In
addition, the authors estimate the mean, real inflation t* and unobserved real interest rates r*,
and use the latter  in the calculation of the (quarterly) future discount  coefficient   as  =1/
(1+r*/100)1/4. 
167 The DSGE model identifies the production gap as a difference between production in the
steady state economy and in the economy without frictions and rigidities (e.g. price and wage
stickiness).
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feedback control) rules’ parameters that will be estimated, and mptt is a simplified IID
monetary policy shock . 
After an inflation shock, the policy maker balances his options between a quick return
and a smooth inflation path back to the target rate, and sets a nominal interest  rate
accordingly  where  parameter  defines  the  degree  of  interest  rate  smoothing  –  the
higher  it  is,  the  lower  the  effect  of  inflation  or  production  gaps  is.  The  feedback
parameters y and  define the speed of the correction: the higher they are, the higher
the interest rate will be, and the quicker the economy will react to eliminate the gap
between the expected (forecasted)  and the target  inflation rate  or  to  reduce a  high,
positive output gap in an over-heated economy. Index j is policy horizon, a number of
periods ahead that the policymaker is looking for the feedback from168.  
The model estimated in this research used a Taylor rule equation for the estimation of
current  interest  rate  rt which  feeds  back on current  inflation  deviations  from target
inflation t and on the output gap. The latter is the difference between deviations from
trend output and deviations from the flexible-price natural rate y^t. (Eq 30 in LPP2007)
rt = r rt-1  + (t -t) + (t -t) + y(yt –y^t) 
+ y (yt -y^t) +R,t (A8.1.3)
where R,t ~ N (0,  R) and inflation target t follows an AR(1) process.
t+1 =  t+P,t+1                                  (A8.1.4)
In the research report presented at CFE 2008 (Perendia 2008), the author has shown
that this Taylor rule can be rewritten as 
rt = rt-1  + (1-r)[[( (t -t) + ((t -t)+ y (yt –y^t) 
+ y (yt -y^t) ]/(1-r)- rt-1 ]+R,t (A8.1.5)
168 In this model j=0 and Et,t+j = ,t
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A8.2 Stochastic Interest Rate Forecasting
One  of  the  main  differences  between  financial  and  economic  modelling  becomes
apparent  in  a  dichotomy between  their  respective  approaches  to  model  inputs  and
outputs. Along those lines, a few authors (e.g. Hull 2000, Choudhry 2004) distinguish
between the arbitrage free and the equilibrium models of term structure. The former has
future yield curves  as  input  from observations aiming at  fitting arbitrage free yield
curve regardless of the wider economic context, and the latter, is an equilibrium-mean-
reverting  statistical  projection  which  has  its  output  yields  calculated  on  economic
principles.
For example, Vasicek’s (1977) a mean-reverting stochastic process for deriving short-
term interest rates which is based on the so-called Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, which,
for  spot  rate  r(t)  is  a  normally  distributed  stationary  Markov  chain  process  with
variance :
dr(t) = (b – r(t))dt +  r(t) dz(t)       (A8.2.1)
where and b are positive constants (, b>0,), and z(t) a Brownian motion
(see Glasserman (2004)). In a specific, commonly used approximation,  =0 and the
equation is tractable analytically. 
Aiming  to  improve  the  fit  of  the  future  rate  yield  curve  and  bring  interest  rate
determination and forecasting models closer to the needs of the efficient, arbitrage free
financial  markets,  Hull  and  White(1990)  introduce  a  time-variant  extension  of  the
above Vasicek’s (1977) equilibrium model, but with a drift (t) and =0: 
dr(t) = [(t) + (b(t) – r(t))]dt + (t) dz(t)      (A8.2.2)
I.e., the above Hull and White (1990) model reduces to Vasicek’s (1977) model for =0
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(i.e. r(t) =1), b(t)=b and t = i.e. for b and  being constant (equilibrium) values and
drift (t)=0.
The  above,  time-invariant/constant  mean  reversion  factor  Vasicek  (1977)  model  is
thought  to  belong to  the  equilibrium group of  models,  with  b  being the  long-term
equilibrium value. On the other hand, the time-variant, mean reversion factor b(t) Hull
and White’s (1990) extension enables more exact fitting to the other market reference
prices such as forward rates, and represents a step in the direction towards the well-
fitted arbitrage-free models. 
In the Hull and White’s (1990) model, the drift term b(t) is calculated so that r(t)’s drift
can stochastically and asymptotically fit the drift of the forward rate and the arbitrage
free expectations:
b(t) = Ft(0,t) + a* F(0,t) + 2/2a *(1-exp(-2at))             (A8.2.3)
  
where F(0,t) is the forward rate for time t at time 0, and F t (0,t) its 1st derivative over
time t.
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A8.3 Taylor Rule and Financial Stochastic Models Compared
The earlier form of the Taylor rule for estimation of the current spot short interest rate r t
can be seen as a macro-economic approximation of what is in financial business often
used and known as a Hull and White’s (1990) arbitrage-free model of interest rates:
In a discrete Euler approximation for one step ahead forecasting of r t+1 Hull and White’s
(1990) model of interest rate r can be expressed as
r(ti+1) = r(ti) + (b(ti) – r(ti)) (ti+1- ti) + t ti+1- ti z(i+1)                    (A8.3.1)
and then its relation to the Taylor (1993) model can be made more explicit. I.e. when:
constant = (1-r)
b(t) becomes a one step ahead expectation E t+1. t[f(t+1, t+1, yt+1, yt+1)], i.e.:
b(t) = E t+1. t [( (t+1 -t+1)+((t+1 -t+1)
+  (yt+1 -yt+1)+ (yt+1 -yt+1)]/(1-r)
ti+1- ti z(i+1) = dW(t+1) where  z ~ N (0, ), and hence,
rti+1- ti z(i+1) ~ N (0, r) ~ R,t+1  when ti+1- ti 1 unit (period) of time.
The major difference appears to be that in Hull and White’s (1990) model, the drift term
b(t) is calculated differently so that r(t)’s drift can stochastically and asymptotically fit
the drift of the forward rate and r(t) the arbitrage free expectations (see above).
However, one of the problems with simple arbitrage-free models is that bond pricing
based purely on the fitting of the forward rates yield curve may lead to economically
ungrounded,  self-fulfilling  prophecies  and  rational  bubbles  in  financial  markets.
Addressing that issue, Hull and White(1990) show that their model also retains its drive
towards a long-term equilibrium reversion along the lines of the Vasicek (1977) model. 
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Consequently,  many of the more complex Taylor (1993) rule based models may be
viewed as multi-factor extensions but also a stationary close approximation of either,
the  earlier  defined,  time-variant  (and non-stationary)  Hull  and White  (1990)  or  the
Vasicek’s (1977) time-invariant (and stationary), single factor equilibrium model.
What  here transpires  is  that  a factor  that  appears missing in  most  of the economic
models  are  expected/forward  rates,  along  the  lines  of  GEW07,  whilst  the  financial
models seem to be missing more general economic factors and data.
This research extends the SW07 model by fitting it to a yield curve along similar lines
to  those  of  GEW07.  However,  this  work  intends  to  bridge  both  the  financial  and
economic sectors and be closer to the models derived by Taylor (1993), Hull and White
(1990) and Vasicek’s (1977).
The observed current interest rates for different periods, however, are not observations
of the factual, measured values of those interest rate/yield curves (those will be known
at  the  end  of  the  lending  period),  but  are  observations  of  the  current  (rational)
expectations of those future interest rate yield curves, in a similar way to the equity
prices  which  are  current  expectations  of  future  income  curves.  They  are  therefore
rational  expectations  of  future  economic  equilibrium behaviour,  and  the  longer  the
interest rates’ periods, the less they are influenced by the current fluctuations169. 
169 The currently observed spot  prices of goods on the markets are, on the other hand, not
measurement of RE of their future demand but of their spot demand.
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Appendix 9: Way(s) out of the 1930’s and other crises:
NOTE: This chapter is a small digression from the main subject of the thesis but, as it 
provides a supplementary information to its main cause, it is included as appendix.
In line with findings of many authors, Romer, 1992 argues that the recovery from the
Great Depression came about as a result of the then contemporary monetary expansion
and the monetary easing through lowered short term interest rates. 
A partisan view by Higgs (2009) states that, contrary to the popular view, the policies of
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s government did not contribute greatly to ending of the Great
Depression but, instead, prolonged it by introducing an uncertainty in the security of
property rights. Higgs thinks this discouraged the long-term private investment needed
to revive the economy. One piece of evidence the author finds is the increased spread
between the yield on longer-term and the one-year corporate bonds perceived in mid
1930’s remained high until WW2. He claims that this is a reflection of numerous court
decisions that were perceived as a threat to property rights and an investment deterrent
by many potential high power investors seeking higher risk premium midst uncertainty
in the forthcoming years. An alternative explanation for the premium, however, may be
that the Fed rate was perceived to be unrealistically low, temporary aimed at boosting
the economic recovery.
A.9.1 Effects of WW2 and military spending as a fiscal intervention
In any case, the wake of WW2 brought a remarkable rise in GNP for the US and its
final exit from the years of slow recovery. This rapid growth was initiated not by the
Fed’s actions but with the high gold and capital inflows in late 1930s due to political
instability in Europe. It then accelerated with the rise in fiscal expansionary spending at
the start of the war needed for financing its needs (see Romer (1992)). Ramey and
Shapiro (1998) create model simulations and use estimations on real data to show how
military spending associated with the Korean and Vietnam wars and with the military
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build-up in late 1970s and early 1980s during the first Afghan and Iran crisis boosted
US economy.
“Consider first the four major military build-ups of the last 60 years: World War II, the
Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Carter-Reagan build-up. In all of these periods,
government  spending on durable goods increased far more than other  categories  of
spending. During World War II, when total government spending more than quintupled,
spending on durable  goods  rose  from 3  percent  to  35  percent  of  total  government
spending. During the Korean War it  rose from 9 percent,  to 19 percent;  during the
Vietnam build-up it rose slightly from 10 percent to 12 percent; and during the 1980s
build-up, it rose from 9 percent to 14 percent. Thus, particularly during World War II
and  the  Korean  War,  the  share  of  spending  that  went  to  durable  goods  increased
substantially.” (ibid, pp 149)
Figures A.9.1.1 and A.9.1.2: US Government per-capita spending (left) and
unemployment (right).
                         Figure A.9.1.1                                                          Figure A.9.1.2    
One can see large surges during periods of rapidly declining unemployment that are
contemporary  with  build-up  of  the  wars:  Vietnam  1964-70,  building  up  arms
production and sales during the Iran crisis 1985-90, the 1st Iraq war (The Gulf War) in
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1990, the Afghanistan intervention in 2001 and a further spending increase jump (and
unemployment drop) during the 2nd Iraq war starting in early 2003 
Laidler (2009) however states that one of major contributors to the rise of inflation in
the US in early 1970s was its engagement in the Vietnam War. He claims as a result of
the politicians’ desire to keep its cost hidden from the electorate, the resulting fiscal
deficits accommodated by monetary growth triggered world-wide inflation, This rose
slowly  from the  late  1960s  and  led  towards  the  breakdown  of  the  Bretton-Woods
agreement and, eventually, the oil price hike and high inflation in the mid -1970s.
On the other  hand, as a  further  development  along the lines of the aforementioned
Romer (1992) analysis, despite of all the public cost, deficit and borrowing excesses,
Labonte and Levit (2010) state that an increase in military spending for larger military
interventions (or preparations for such interventions) typically brings economic booms
because  the  associated  borrowing  and  money  creation  boosts  aggregate  demand.
Consequently, their statistics show that in 2004, after start of the 2nd Iraq intervention,
there was doubling of real GDP growth in comparison to the pre-Iraq war year 2002
and, similarly, midst the Reagan Era military build-up, real GDP growth in 1984 was an
astonishing 7.6% comparing with mere 0% in 1980.
Both periods were associated with about a 20% increase in military spending. It  is,
however, clear from their findings that economically the most beneficial intervention
was the Korean conflict in the 1950s with military outlays rising nearly 300%, from
4.8% to 14.1% of GDP and real GDP growth 500% from 2.4% to 11.4%.  In their
concluding  remarks  they  state  that  money  creation  is  the  least  preferred  way  of
financing wars since, as Laidler (2009) also showed, it results in uncontrolled inflation.
Although the growth of 2003-2005 was probably augmented by low interest rates, even
in peacetime, military spending may work out as both, fiscal spending that boots GDP
and the contingency (insurance) policy against future likely destructive events170. 
170 For example, the US Armed Forces’ budget of 547 billion of USD in 2007 is nearly half of
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the world’s total military spending at 1,214bn USD. It is around 2/3 of total NATO spending at
804bn USD and nearly 10 times higher than that of the 2nd and 3rd ranking countries, Great
Britain and China at 60 and 58 bill. USD respectively (see table 1.1 in Hartley and Keith 2011).
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